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Thesis Abstract 
Member governance can be characterised as the voice and influence that members have in their 
cooperative. The voice is related to the tangible control mechanisms available to cooperative 
members, and the influence ingredient is more often the intangible relational aspect of a member’s 
connection. There are layers of governance that build on each other to form the foundation of 
cooperative members rights or voice and influence; these include Cooperative Principles, Cooperative 
Law, and the Cooperative Constitutional Document. The collective aim is to mitigate many of the 
known cooperative governance challenges. Notwithstanding all the theoretical layers of governance, 
the actual members’ perceptions and the reality of their participation in their cooperative can affect 
the quality of member governance in a cooperative.  
The cooperative principles are the foundational ingredient for member-organisation governance. In 
many regions, the principles are applied in the creation of cooperative law. In some regions countries 
base their legislation fully or partially on the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) set of seven 
principles; other regions engage with a different set of principles such as the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) set of three principles, while in other countries the link between 
cooperative law and cooperative principles is less visible.  
An examination of which principles are employed in constructing the legislation that governs 
cooperatives in a particular region is crucial as it provides us with a base for analysis. Cooperative law 
differs from country to country, with some cooperative law being comprehensive while other 
countries cooperative laws are not well defined. The answer as to which approach is more effective is 
examined in this thesis. 
Similarly, cooperative law usually forms the foundation that mandates provisions in the originating 
document, the cooperative constitution. The purpose of the constitution is to protect the rights of 
cooperative members at a higher level. It is usually tailored for each cooperative; however, the base 
provisions that are mandated within the cooperative law are often common. A sample of Australasian 
cooperatives is used to analyse and discover how the law influences member rights.  
Notwithstanding the layers of protection afforded to members, it is widely acknowledged that 
cooperatives face governance challenges. Besides common governance challenges that affect most 
organisational forms, cooperatives confront other unique problems. The combination of cooperative 
principles, law, and the constitutional document is, in essence, the cooperative policy framework for 
an individual cooperative within a specific country. In theory, the application of the framework should 
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significantly mitigate most cooperative governance challenges. An analysis of the level of mitigation is 
necessary to understand the effectiveness of the Australasian cooperative policy frameworks.  
Apart from the rights of cooperative members, the actual engagement that a member has with their 
cooperative can mitigate shortcomings in both voice and influence. The relationship that a member 
has with their cooperative is an essential aspect of governance in that good engagement can 
overcome poor governance processes while the converse is not always true. An in-depth 
understanding of member views, perceptions, and requirements is essential for those seeking to 
develop an effective engagement structure that can overcome governance shortcomings within dairy 
cooperatives in Australasia. This thesis explores the experience of the governance environment 
through the member-lens, specifically to understand the strengths and weaknesses of each 
cooperative's governance and engagement model when compared to the other dairy cooperatives in 
this study. 
This thesis analyses each of the supporting governance layers that contribute to maximising member 
voice and influence to answer the overarching research questions: What are the governance 
challenges and opportunities facing Australasian dairy cooperatives, and what governance elements 
contribute to an effective cooperative governance framework? Furthermore, the thesis seeks to 
answer fundamental cooperative member governance questions; Do the principles support the law 
when used in crafting policy for cooperatives? Does the law protect the members’ rights to the extent 
that was the original intention of the policymakers? Does the constitutional document have the 
correct provisions, and are these mandated, to protect the members' voice? Do these layers of 
governance collectively mitigate the challenges that might contribute to a decline in the cooperative? 
Finally, what are the governance and engagement perceptions of members on their voice and 
influence, and how well is this functioning in Australasia? 
There is little research that seeks to understand the role of cooperative principles and policy in the 
governance of a cooperative and what the reality of cooperative member participation is in 
Australasian dairy cooperative governance. This thesis contributes to the theoretical understanding 
of how cooperative principles influence the law and the associated governance documents to 
minimise the governance challenges of cooperatives. Additionally, this thesis contributes to a practical 
understanding of the effectiveness of the implementation of cooperative governance in the 
Australasian dairy context through the member-lens.   
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1. Chapter-1: Thesis Introduction 
The Cooperative Organisational Form 
 
1.1 Background 
Cooperatives are a common business form, especially in specific sectors such as agriculture. 
In these sectors, they are a significant proportion of the business population and sometimes 
dominate the traditional IOF, which have a greater presence in other sectors of the economy. 
Cooperatives play a vital role in the global economy, with the top 300 cooperative's turnover 
exceeding USD $2 trillion (International Cooperative Alliance, 2019). Of the total revenue 
previously stated, agricultural cooperatives contributed circa 31% of the total revenue, or just 
over USD $620 billion (International Cooperative Alliance, 2019). The top-100 Australian 
cooperative and mutual enterprises contribution generated more than AUD $31 billion, with 
over 31 million members participating. Australian cooperative dairy revenue exceeded AUD 
$880 million in the 2019 season (ADFC, 2019; DFMC, 2019, NORCO, 2019) and New Zealand 
dairy industry export revenue for 2018-2019 exceeded NZD $18 billion ("QuickStats about 
dairying – New Zealand", 2019).  
As dairy cooperatives are usually founded by the farmer-suppliers, these farmers initiate the 
setup of the initial operation with directors, and through the boards, the necessary staff to 
manage the operation. Therefore, the cooperative business structure must be established 
with sound governance principles to protect the farmer-owner interests. 
In 2018, Murray Goulburn, which was the largest dairy cooperative in Australia at the time, 
was sold to a Canadian IOF. Some scholars believe that one of the central reasons for the 
failure was due to ineffective governance practices. Professor Mazzarol from the University 
of Western Australia published an article outlining the issues prior to the eventual collapse of 
the cooperative (Mazzarol, 2016). Furthermore, a few months after the interviews (see 
Chapter-5) of Westland cooperative members, which was an established dairy cooperative 
located on the West Coast of New Zealand's South Island, the cooperative was sold to a 
Chinese foreign dairy processing firm, Yili. Yet, there are many successful cooperatives such 
as those in Europe and Fonterra, New Zealand’s largest commercial entity. This thesis explores 
some of the underlying factors that could contribute to the success or failure of a cooperative.  
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As many of the chapters in this thesis examine the dairy cooperative environment in 
Australasia, an inspection of the dairy cooperatives attributes is seen as pertinent information. 
The four New Zealand dairy cooperatives are Fonterra which is a large geographically 
dispersed cooperative enacted by legislation in 2001 (DIRA, 2001) with more than 10,000 
members and annual revenue of NZD $19 billion (Fonterra, 2017). As Fonterra was formed 
from the amalgamation of two large dairy cooperatives in 2001, as of 2020, the cooperative 
had operated for 19 years, however, each of the two cooperatives that had merged to form 
Fonterra operated for more than 100 years. Fonterra has a complex product mix, including 
consumer and ingredient products and has an international presence in more than 100 
countries. Westland Milk Products is a cooperative located on the western coastal region of 
the South Island of New Zealand. In 2017 Westland had 430 members with annual revenue 
of NZD $630 million (Westland, 2017). The cooperative has a product mix of consumer and 
ingredients. It has been in existence for more than 80 years. Following the data collection for 
this thesis in early 2019, Westland was bought out by Yili, a Chinese dairy corporation later 
that year. Tatua is a small centralised New Generation Cooperative (NGC) located in the 
Waikato which is mid-North Island of New Zealand with more than 100 members and revenue 
of NZD $328 Million. Tatua has a product mix of consumer products and ingredients. Tatua 
has operated for more than 100 years. The Dairy Goat Cooperative (DGC) was included in this 
study as it falls under the policy provisions of New Zealand dairy cooperatives and some raw 
milk is provided for its manufacturing process from Fonterra under the provisions of DIRA 
(2001). DGC has more than 70 members and annual revenue of NZD $180 million. It has 
operated in the mid-North Island region for more than 45 years (DGC, 2017). DGC has a 
product mix supplying both ingredients and consumer products. 
The Australian Dairy cooperatives in this study include NORCO, a geographically dispersed 
cooperative with members located along the eastern states of Australia. NORCO has more 
than 210 members and has an annual revenue of AUD $550 million (NORCO, 2017). NORCO 
has a product mix supplying both ingredients as well as consumer products and has operated 
for more than 120 years. DFMC is a geographically dispersed cooperative with more than 350 
members and annual revenue of AUD $132 million (DFMC, 2017). DFMC has operated for 
more than 110 years, taking into account the merged cooperatives that have over the years 
formed DFMC. DFMC has a simple product mix and supplied all the milk collected to a single 
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corporation, Lion Drinks and Dairy in 2017. In late 2019, the Lion Dairy products business was 
sold to Mengniu; a Chinese owned dairy corporation (Dairy Reporter, 2020) with the multi-
year remaining contacts in place for DFMC. ADFC is the final Australian dairy cooperative in 
this study. It is a smaller, more centralised cooperative that operates in Victoria, it has more 
than 80 members and is actively adding to its membership following the demise of Murray 
Goulburn. It has a simple product mix and is contracted to supply milk to three retail 
organisations with which it has multi-year contracts.  
Please refer to Table 3.2 and Table 3.3 in Chapter-3 for more detailed information on the 
seven Australasian cooperatives.  One Australian small dairy cooperative was excluded from 
this study as they had just incorporated and were in the process of starting-up. It had less 
than 15 members in 2019. 
 
1.2 Problem Statement 
In an ideal cooperative, members are fully engaged and can rely on the effective 
implementation of cooperative principles in their cooperative law. Furthermore, the ideal 
cooperative operates without governance problems. The reality is that cooperative 
governance is perceived to be problematic by commentators in many regions (Österberg and 
Nilsson, 2007; Barraud-Didier et al., 2019), including Australasia (Mazzarol et al., 2019). This 
perception exists despite the International Cooperative Alliance principles supporting farmer 
governance through provisions for Democratic member control and Member economic 
participation (ICA, 2020). This suggests the translation of these principles into governance 
instruments is not always effective. Additionally, legislation and cooperative constitutions do 
not always offer robust governance mechanisms to protect the farmers as we are aware of 
residual governance issues after the application of the law and the cooperative constitutional 
document. The consequence of a weakness in cooperative governance is a distancing of 
farmer-members from the decisions that affect their farm-profitability, which can result in a 
diminishing cooperative performance through a loss of supply. Many decisions can be 
legitimately taken by the cooperative board and management without due regard to the long-
term implications on farmer pay-out, income, and way of life. A possible cause of this problem 
is cooperative operational management believing they are working within their authority and 
not needing farmers to review pertinent decisions.  
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Exploration of governance is facilitated by precise definitions of terms. To that end 
governance is classified in terms of its role in, and impact on, the cooperative. Member 
governance is defined as the set of governance rights that members have available to apply 
in their cooperative membership; whereas cooperative governance is defined as the 
governance that the collective cooperative organisation can apply in the course of the 
operation in the wider environment. Member governance is linked to cooperative governance 
and vice versa as when a collection of member governance rights is applied, these can affect 
the internal operation of the cooperative and its governance. Similarly, when the cooperative 
organisation makes decisions that impact a member or a collection of members, this too can 
affect the member rights and governance. This thesis focuses on the member governance 
aspects; however, it does discuss the cooperative governance linkages where appropriate. 
This thesis employs grounded theory to study cooperative governance through the lens of its 
members by examining the application of cooperative principles, the content of cooperative 
legislation, the member governance provisions of their respective cooperative constitutions 
(or rules), and the associated residual governance problems that these artefacts can cause. 
The synthesis resulting from the content analysis phase shaped the design of qualitative in-
depth interviews with cooperative members to explore views on engagement and 
governance. Finally, the findings of the qualitative and content analysis phases will be used 
to develop a recommended course of action to enhance member governance. Member 
Governance is defined as the ability of a member to have his voice heard and includes voting, 
attendance, rejection, grievance procedure and others. 
 
1.3 Thesis significance and contribution 
Cooperatives are common business forms that are an alternative to the more common IOF. 
However, as these organisations have evolved, several issues have arisen. Research has found 
that the delegated structure of the cooperative governing bodies can move the decision 
making, or even information required for decision making, out of the farmers' reach (Reynolds, 
1997; Adrian and Green, 2001; Bijman et al., 2012). Member decision-making hierarchy and 
the necessary governance structure of a cooperative is critical for members to retain control 
of their cooperative.  Cooperative governance, as it pertains to member-owned businesses, 
has been studied by many researchers over the past decade (Cornforth, 2004; Franken and 
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Cook, 2013; Old, 2009). Much of the research has resulted in theoretical output such as: 
finding that agency theory issue exists in farmer cooperatives (Neto et al., 2009); financial 
issues exist in cooperative ownership (Chaddad and Cook, 2004); and information was found 
to be missing on the allocation of control rights (Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2012). Other 
research (Birchall, 2014) into farmer governance shows that farmers are not always satisfied 
with how much input they have into the running of the cooperative. One research paper 
found that farmers believed they had more say when the cooperative was smaller 
(Alsemgeest and Smit, 2012). Again, in a study that looked into farmer involvement, it was 
found that farmers attached great importance to their participation in the cooperative 
governance (Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009). Shaw (2007) found that governance issues were 
more prevalent in sizeable cooperatives. In the same research, the author found that as 
cooperatives got more extensive and more complex, the members involvement in the 
governance of the cooperative diminished. A comparative advantages research paper found 
that member-owned businesses have an advantage over investor-owned except when 
farmers did not retain sufficient control over the running of the cooperative (Birchall, 2012). 
Dairy cooperatives operate to supply and process raw milk into consumer and other products. 
A key aim of a dairy cooperative when it is formed is to maximise the long-term milk supply 
price received by its members. Dairy cooperatives, in addition to financial returns, usually 
supply other vertical services such as the manufacturing, distribution, and sales of the 
manufactured product (Reid, 2011). Through a democratic process, members of a 
cooperative are tasked with appointing the board of directors who, in turn, appoint the 
management which is then tasked with the day-to-day operation of the entity. However, 
members have a vested interest in any decisions that could alter the initial intent of the 
cooperative. For instance, any decision that could negatively impact the supply price 
(sometimes referred to as the "farm gate price") would be carefully examined, and any 
decisions that affect the financial viability of the cooperative such as asset debt leverage 
would be cautiously considered by the members. The farmers have multiple relationships 
with the cooperative being suppliers, owners, and members simultaneously (Ling, 2011). 
Unless the law and the constitutional documents of a cooperative explicitly states a variation 
to the above, most dairy cooperatives in Australasia are founded on a similar operating model 
which has been in existence for many years.  
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Figure 1. 1: Member Voice and Influence elements 
 
When examining the components of member governance for a typical cooperative, it is 
proposed that there are a number of discrete elements, as presented in Figure 1.1. The 
argument is that member governance can be seen as having different elements which, when 
combined, support and protect members. Cooperative principles are seen as the foundational 
element for member governance followed by cooperative law and then the constitutional 
document. These elements aim to minimise the governance problems that members and 
their cooperatives might face in the course of their operation. The final element is that of 
member engagement, as we know from many scholars (Gray and Kraenzle, 1998; Fulton, 1999; 
Mazzarol, 2012) that high quality engagement can protect and enhance the cooperative 
organisation. The aim of this thesis is to understand how the different elements make up 
member governance rights, and the objective is to prove that each of these elements is 
necessary to maximise member governance. 
Modern cooperatives trace their origin back to the Rochdale group of weavers from the mid-
19th century when 28 weavers formed a cooperative business to counter negative behaviour 
by suppliers unrelated to the weavers' main line of business. In the process of the 
establishment of the entity, the weavers created a constitution and a set of governing 
principles (ICA, 2020). These principles have subsequently been modified and generally 
adopted by the International Cooperative Alliance and are used to form the base set of 
principles that are applied by cooperatives around the world. However, there are other sets 
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set of three principles, for example. How effectively the principles have been implemented 
into Australian and New Zealand law is examined in Chapter-2. 
 
When examining the implementation of the law, it is found that there are two legal forms of 
Australian cooperatives based on the Australian Cooperatives law (Coopdevelopment.org.au, 
2019), namely trading and non-trading entities (Australian Uniform Co-operative Laws 
Agreement, 2012). The law governing cooperatives in Australia was very complex until 
recently when the Australian Uniform Co-operative Laws Agreement was introduced (AUCLA, 
2012). The rationale behind the introduction of the agreement was to attempt to standardise 
the approach to cooperatives. This law included the goal of ensuring there were no 
competitive advantages or disadvantages given or taken away, from a cooperative when 
compared to an IOF. The new law has been implemented on a state-by-state basis in Australia 
with New South Wales being the first state adopting the law in 2013 and the other states 
following. However, some states have yet to enact their legislation based on the AUCLA. The 
Australian definition of a cooperative is “an autonomous association of persons united 
voluntarily to meet their common economic, social, and cultural needs and aspirations 
through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise" (University Co-operative 
Bookshop, 2019). Western Australia and Queensland have both recently accepted the AUCLA 
and in 2019 and 2020 respectively have enacted the uniform law.  
New Zealand dairy cooperatives are governed by the Co-operative Companies Act (1996), in 
conjunction with the New Zealand's Companies Act (1993). The New Zealand definition of a 
cooperative is "A user-owned and controlled business where benefits are derived and 
distributed equitably on the basis of use" (Cooperative Business New Zealand, 2019). The 
Australian and New Zealand cooperative definitions both agree on ownership and control, 
stating that the enterprise is democratically controlled by the members. The linkages 
between the law and cooperative principles are examined in Chapter-2 for both Australia and 
New Zealand. Evidence of the separate cooperative principles as found in each of the 
countries law is examined and contrasted. 
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As contained within many of the cooperative laws, a mandated set of requirements is laid out 
for cooperatives to follow in their constitutional document. The constitutional document has 
other names in various regions (such as Replaceable Rules in Australia) however, for the 
purpose of this thesis we use the term Constitutional Document to mean the constitutional 
document that governs the cooperative as mentioned in the specific cooperative law of the 
applicable country. The constitutional document allows the tailoring or even over-writing of 
specific cooperative law provisions; this can assist the cooperative in its governance 
endeavours. How effective the implementation of the constitutional document is examined 
in Chapter-3.   
Cooperatives have governance issues as a result of their unique business structure. Agency 
theory describes the potential conflict between the interests of the management versus the 
interest of the firm owner. Modern studies posit that agency theory should be taken into 
account whenever a conflict of interest is possible (Eisenhardt, 1989). Agency theory has been 
investigated in many corporate and investor-owned business models. Research has found 
that agency conflicts can be present and do occur in member-owned businesses or 
cooperatives (Dewes and Padula, 2012). Other research found that agency theory could be 
applied to cooperatives, but its manifestation was different in that the explicit goals for an 
IOF differ from that of a cooperative. Corporates aim to maximise profits, but cooperatives 
have this as only one of the aims (Cornforth, 2004).  
Stakeholder theory is another lens through which to view cooperative governance. It 
concerns itself with the many stakeholders that any enterprise has, whether these 
stakeholders are internal or external to the organisation. The central idea of stakeholder 
theory is that business entities that manage their stakeholder relationships well will survive 
longer and have better overall performance than organisations that do not (Freeman, 2007). 
Furthermore, Foss (1999) found that the greater the size and complexity of a business entity, 
the more prevalent the agency and stakeholder governance issues can be. There are, of 
course, other challenges that cooperatives face. For instance, Agency theory gives rise to the 
Control Problem (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) where the cooperative operational 
management adopts a strategy that is not endorsed by the membership. Free Rider Problems 
exist in cooperatives (Cook, 1995; Royer, 1999) where, in the case of dairy cooperatives, 
farmers do not need to join a cooperative to benefit from the advantages that a large 
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cooperative has made in the operating environment. The Horizon Problem (Cook, 1995) refers 
to a time problem where members do not vote for improvements they do not believe they 
will see the commercial benefits from, within their membership lifespan. Members having 
different risk appetites can give rise to the Portfolio Problem (Royer, 1995 1999) as they 
cannot buy or sell the equity they have in their cooperative to match their risk appetites and 
have a greater say. The Influence Cost Problem arises when the cost of influencing members 
is high (Royer, 1999), especially where the cooperative membership is heterogeneous. There 
are other problems that exist, such as Cherry Picking where members take advantage of an 
average return base to lower their costs and provide an inferior product. Quality of Product 
problems exists where members take advantage of the higher return where a higher quality 
product was offered but did not bear the costs of the grading, collection and separation of 
the high-quality product. The problems discussed above are just a sub-set of governance 
problems; however, there are other problems that exist within cooperatives and their 
membership. 
Once the principles, the law, and the constitutional document have been applied to the 
known governance problems encountered by cooperatives and their membership, there will 
always be “left-over” governance problems that would vary in individual impact and risk. 
These remaining traces of the governance problems are defined as the Residual Problems in 
this thesis. Chapter-4 examines the residual governance challenges that a cooperative and its 
membership might face after the principles, the law, and the constitutional document is 
applied to reduce the impact and risk of the above governance problems.  
 
The core elements of cooperative governance comprise the cooperative principles, the 
cooperative law, the cooperative constitutional document, and together make up what is 
defined in this thesis as the Cooperative Policy Framework (CPF). After the application of the 
CPF there remains left-over or residual cooperative governance challenges. Chapter-5 of this 
thesis examines the perceptions of the members themselves to understand their view, 
requirements, and their suggestions as far as cooperative governance is concerned. Good 
engagement implies that members are "connected" and in this way, governance 
requirements might be eased in some ways. On the converse where engagement 
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"connection" is loose, the reliance on formal governance rules or provisions might be more 
necessary. Chapter-5 analyses data from interviews of members that belong to various 




This thesis contributes an original analysis of cooperative governance in Australasia. It applies 
a methodology rarely used in cooperative studies, comparative legal analysis, to identify 
reasons for underlying cooperative governance challenges. It contributes new empirical data 
of Australasian member perceptions on their participation in governance. This research is 
unique in that there is little research that has been carried out on the "ground-up" approach 
using the elements of cooperative governance, as explained above. The contribution each 
chapter makes is as follows: 
Chapter-2: An evaluation of cooperative principles as applied in the cooperative law of 
Australasia 
Chapter-3: An evaluation of the significance of the cooperative constitutional document, with 
a focus on Australasian dairy cooperatives. 
Chapter-4: An evaluation of the effectiveness of the application of the Cooperative Policy 
Framework (CPF) in mitigating the major known governance challenges for Australasian dairy 
cooperatives. 
Chapter-5: An in-depth study into Australasian cooperative member perceptions of 
engagement and governance, including empirical data of Australasian member perceptions. 
Overall, the thesis contributes an innovative framework for assessing dairy cooperative 
governance, and policy improvement recommendations with Insights for members, 
cooperatives, and other stakeholders  
The thesis examines the implementation of New Zealand and Australian policy effectiveness 
and highlight the gaps between the law and the international cooperative principles and how 
these have contributed to governance problems. It contrasts the two laws (that of New 
Zealand and Australia) as they each have perceived advantages and disadvantages. 
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Additionally, it contributes data and analysis as to the effectiveness of constitutions and how 
these relate to good farmer governance. Using the results from the first two chapters, this 
chapter analyses the part that the law and constitutions play in the known governance 
problems for cooperatives and then the residual challenges that cooperatives might still be 
forced to face.  The in-depth interviews provide data which is used in the qualitative analysis 
phase to generate an understanding of the evolution of cooperative governance and options 
for its enhancement and reform from the members perspective. The findings provide 
information for interested stakeholders as to farmer perceptions of cooperative governance 
effectiveness are and makes recommendations to improve, where necessary, the cooperative 
policy framework. Finally, the thesis uses the conclusions in all chapters to propose a model 
of cooperative governance that would improve member governance.  
 
1.5 Foundational Literature Review 
Cooperatives trace their origins back more than two thousand years to trade structures such 
as the Indian Sreni in 800BC (Khanna, 2005). According to the author, the Sreni was a 
collection of individuals formed into a guild that banded together for an economic purpose 
and shared profits according to some labour and input calculations. Later, in the early 18th 
century, a fire insurance cooperative company was formed in England. In 1750, a group of 
French cheesemakers formed a cooperative, which is the first documented producer 
cooperative (Williams, 2007). The author names the cheesemaker cooperative as a consumer 
cooperative (Williams, 2007, p10). However, under the definition of types of cooperatives, a 
consumer cooperative is owned by consumers, not producers whereas producer cooperatives 
are primary producer cooperatives such as the cheesemakers and other dairy cooperatives 
(Hansmann, 1999). The modern-day cooperatives trace their origins back to the Rochdale 
weavers' cooperative, which codified a set of principles. These base principles are still used 
globally in cooperatives today (Rochdale Pioneers Museum, 2017). The base set of principles 
was formed in the creation of the modern cooperative model which was formed in response 
to predatory behaviour by merchants who supplied the weavers and their workers with 
consumer goods such as flour, sugar, and other commodities. Since the formation of the 
Rochdale cooperative, cooperatives have increased in number and revenue to become an 
essential part of the global economy. However, when cooperatives concentrate on the 
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Member Value Proposition (MVP) by adding value for their members, success stories of 
cooperatives thriving under challenging market conditions are evident such as Livestock 
Improvement Corporation (Mazzarol, T., Reboud, S., Limnios, E. M., & Clark, D., 2014). 
Examples of these cooperatives will provide valuable insight into what governance 
mechanisms work and which ones end up limiting member involvement.   
In 2014, cooperatives were estimated to have around 1 billion members, and cooperatives 
employed more than 250 million staff. The world's top 300 cooperatives by themselves have 
an estimated global turnover of 2.2 trillion USD, as revealed by the 2014 World Co-operative 
Monitor (ICA, 2014) which is slightly less than the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Brazil, the 
7th largest economy (World Bank, 2014). This data signals that cooperatives are a significant 
sector and should not be discounted as insignificant in the global economy. 
According to the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA), "A cooperative is an autonomous 
association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, social and cultural 
needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-controlled enterprise" (ICA, 
2015). Most cooperatives have, as part of the association, a reference to the seven 
internationally agreed principles of cooperatives. These include: 
Voluntary and open membership without discrimination of any kind, which includes no 
discrimination regardless of race, creed, gender, sexual orientation. Most of the developed 
world has adopted some form of anti-discriminatory legislation which supports this principle. 
However, legislation is often attempted to curtail the rights of cooperatives, citing unfair 
advantage, but these have been largely unsuccessful (Birchall, 2005).  
Democratic member control according to an agreed voting system and process, which ensures 
that no member has more voice or say that any other member. According to Williams (2007), 
this principle is often modified in the case of a cooperative of cooperatives, where several 
smaller cooperatives are networked, as the member of the smaller cooperative could end up 
with more vote and control than the member of a larger cooperative within the network. 
Member economic participation of the members for both contribution and compensation. 
However, some cooperatives allow the issue of instruments to gain additional capital such as 
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promissory notes, which still do not give the holder of the note any vote, control or voting 
rights within the cooperative ("Fonterra Shareholders' Fund", 2020). 
Autonomy and independence ensuring any dealing with external organisations and 
governments do not detract from the member rights. However, this principle is difficult to 
apply as many countries corporation law can affect this to some degree and thereby place 
burdens on the cooperative in some way to comply with the law (Government of New Zealand, 
2017; Government of Australia, 2017). Many cooperative laws have taken the view that a 
cooperative provides commercial services to its members without gain for itself. 
Provision of education and training for all stakeholders of a cooperative, including the 
members, managers, and employees. This principle has had varied success as the challenge 
of setting up the education framework would require resources that could be better 
employed in other areas of need, such as manufacturing.  
Cooperation among cooperatives, as the cooperative members are often members of more 
than one cooperative, the need to link these into a type of network has benefits for all 
cooperatives within the network. The advantages of the linking of these cooperatives within 
a community are self-evident as is the linking across the state and country borders to open 
new markets, for example. 
Concern for the community to ensure that environmentally sound practices are used that are 
linked to sustained development. The connection of this principle to the community is self-
evident and places the cooperative closer to the social aspects of a community-run 
corporation.  
1.5.1 Types of cooperatives 
While the principles are important to lay the groundwork of a cooperative, there are many 
different types of cooperatives in existence in the world. The ICA and Zeuli and Cropp (2007) 
have listed the types of cooperatives; the main ones are discussed below: 
Producer Cooperatives, which include agricultural production cooperatives, usually produce 
food. The members are a business entity, each in their own right, that has formed a 
cooperative to distribute, market or manufacture the members produce. For example, 
Fonterra in New Zealand is a Producer Cooperative with services from milk collection, 
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manufacturing of ingredients, and the marketing of manufactured products. Similarly, in 
Australia, Norco is also considered a producer cooperative which collects milk, manufactures 
products and markets end products on behalf of its members.  
Marketing Cooperatives, as their name suggests, market the product on behalf of the 
members. There are cases where two or more cooperatives form an alliance – a cooperative 
of cooperatives - to market the combined product, thereby ensuring they do not force pricing 
down by competing against each other. As mentioned above, producer cooperatives 
sometimes fulfil the marketing function as well so are vertically integrated to meet the end-
product point. 
Worker Cooperatives are owned by their workers who are the cooperative members. If capital 
is required for a start-up, then the workers all contribute capital as member-shareholders. 
These cooperatives are popular with low-income earners, and more recently become more 
popular with attorneys, engineers, and other professionals. The cooperatives themselves are 
small and thus require no governance board of directors, and it is, therefore, possible for all 
members to meet to create policy, governance and make decisions. Some research has 
posited that employees of a traditional company that participates in an employee share 
scheme, whereby they are offered shares of the firm with conditions, are a category of worker 
cooperative (Pencavel, 2012). 
Consumer cooperatives are characterised by consumers buying goods or services from the 
cooperative but retain ownership of these cooperatives. These cooperatives were formed to 
purchase commodities on behalf of the members who are primarily retail customers as well. 
The Rochdale Pioneers' cooperative is an example of a retail consumer cooperative to supply 
commodities to their members. According to the European community of consumer 
cooperatives (Eurocoop, 2015), consumer cooperatives "…are enterprises owned by 
consumers, managed democratically, aiming at fulfilling the needs and aspirations of the 
members". This statement is in line with the cooperative definitions above. The primary 
activity describes the difference. Consumer cooperatives hire managers and usually have 
boards of directors, according to Eurocoop (2015), which manage the entity on behalf of their 
members. Consumer member-owners may serve on committees and be elected as directors 
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of the board. However, the usual practice is that they are consumers of the goods or services 
and hire in required skills to operate the entity.  
Credit unions and cooperative banks have been described as consumer-owned financial 
services cooperatives as they consume the services provided by the credit union or bank. 
Members of the credit union or bank can elect directors who then hire professional managers 
to run the day-to-day operations. After the global financial crisis in 2008/2009, research has 
been abundant into the advantages or disadvantages of cooperatives in the financial services 
sector, but many agree that in a broad range of circumstances the cooperative model offers 
distinct advantages when compared to that of the traditional investor-owned banking model 
(Birchall and Ketilson, 2009; United Nations, 2009). A paper presented to the United Nations 
in 2009 stated unequivocally "Cooperative banks in the form of credit unions, building 
societies and cooperative banks, by focusing primarily on the needs of their members, have 
displayed prudence and avoided the excessive risk-taking that plagued many large global 
financial institutions" which supports the findings made by various other scholars. 
1.5.2 Cooperative Market and Structure 
Cooperatives can be local in that they operate in a local community serving members who are 
geographically close to the cooperative headquarters. These local cooperatives start off 
serving the local community and would be expected to serve a small geographical region. 
When the local cooperatives expand, they can span the state, district or county boundaries. 
The growth usually comes about by mergers and acquisitions of other cooperatives. 
Interregional and national cooperatives are cooperatives that provide for more than the 
region serving significant portions of a country.  In the absence of any limiting legislation and 
regulation, cooperatives can cooperate with the result that mergers then take place to extend 
the market boundaries of the central regional or national cooperative. International or global 
cooperatives operate in more than one country and serve many national regions. Different 
structures can support the cooperative when becoming global, which can take many forms. 
Broadly, evidence of the breadth of the market that a cooperative exists in can indicate the 
lifecycle stage (Cook, 2018). The lifecycle is explained below. However, a cooperative usually 
starts as local, moving to regional by mergers and acquisitions and finally becoming global 
with further mergers and acquisitions in order to extend its influence in the marketplace. 
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There are several ownership structures, each having advantages and disadvantages. Zeuli and 
Cropp (2007) consider a range of different structures, which are described below. 
Centralised cooperatives are owned directly by the members and are typically local 
cooperatives. Large cooperatives usually do not follow this structure (Zeuli and Cropp, 2007). 
The members elect the board of directors, and the board employs professional managers, so 
in this way, the cooperative is similar to a corporate entity or an IOF. These cooperatives are 
usually split into different regions, usually with each of the regions electing a delegate. If there 
are a large number of delegates, these usually form part of a supervisory council from which 
the member directors are appointed. Independent directors with backgrounds that are 
relevant to the nature of the cooperative's business are also present in large cooperatives but 
usually, do not outnumber the regionally elected member directors as the cooperative 
constitution generally has specific rules around the independent and member-elected 
director mix. 
Federated Cooperatives is a term used for a cooperative of networked cooperatives. Each 
local cooperative would elect members to serve on their boards similar to that of a centralised 
cooperative with these members electing directors to sit on the federated cooperative board 
(Zeuli and Cropp, 2007). Once again, independent directors are typically elected from the 
management team of the local cooperatives, or once again, external independent directors 
are elected to serve on the board. 
Hybrid cooperatives are cooperatives that have a combination of centralised and federated 
structures. The board composition of these is similar to that of the federated board structure 
once again being dominated by member-elected directors with a few independent director's 
present (Zeuli and Cropp, 2007). 
Other structures exist, especially some large global cooperatives. These cooperatives could 
have a subsidiary structure, which is a corporation wholly owned by the cooperative. Joint 
Ventures (JVs) are also present in some large and multinational cooperatives. These 
structures involve a cooperative and another party, which could be a publicly listed entity, a 
private corporation or another cooperative. A new cooperative model has emerged called the 
New Generation Cooperative (NGC). The NGC operates mainly on the same principles of a 
traditional cooperative, but the membership is closed or limited. The shares are based on the 
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volume of the product received from the member and shares are issued on that basis. This 
ensures a specific quantity of produce is available for the cooperative. If the member does 
not meet his quota according to the shares purchased there may be action taken in the form 
of a fine, or withheld proceeds. The model is different as it takes the amount of capital 
required and divides this by the number of units of product that will be processed through 
the cooperative.  The capital from the member's initial investment is employed to purchase, 
for example, manufacturing capabilities. Since the members contribute a substantial amount 
of capital at the start-up, the expectation is that they will receive a high proportion of the 
profits of the cooperative retaining little of the earnings for future capital projects. Traditional 
cooperatives often retain high percentages of the profits to ensure future capital projects and 
expansion can continue (Zeuli and Cropp, 2007; Grashuis, 2018). 
Another member class created in the United States is the investor-class. Zeuli and Cropp (2007) 
mention that these members share in the profits but not in the voting of the directors or 
operational decisions. Hence, they are similar to those of shares with no voting rights, such 
as preference shares, in listed corporations.  
Hansmann (1999) stated that cooperatives are no different to IOFs as investors can be seen 
as a type of cooperative member that use their equity in the same way as cooperative farmers 
contribute product to the centralised cooperative. However, the reason for the formation of 
the cooperative in the first place may have more to do with the structure it adopts than 
Hansmann takes into his account.  
Zeuli and Cropp (2007) name a few reasons why cooperatives form which are not substantially 
different for a firm to form. The rationale for formation can include market failure where 
there is a monopoly; excess supply or an opportunity for a new market which is not present; 
economic crisis such as in times of a depression or recession; new technology, for instance, a 
technology disruptor; farm organisation and cooperative advocates adapting to new 
requirements; favourable public policy where government legislates to the advantage of 
cooperatives or disadvantage of IOFs. There are specific reasons for the choice of an 
agricultural cooperative business model over the investor-owned structure, which has been 
examined, and a few papers have been published (Bonus, 1986; Valentinov, 2017). Of 
particular interest is the agricultural cooperative, which exists to take the product from the 
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farmer in the form of perishable goods, so the timing to market or manufacture is critical. This 
is not to say that an IOF could not perform the same function in the market, but the raising of 
the capital for the building of a manufacturing facility is more likely to be successful based on 
an equity view. For instance, a number of farmers using their equity in land and livestock as 
collateral for a loan would be more likely to succeed when compared to an IOF trying to raise 
capital from financial institutions where the equity is not held by the enterprise. The 
advantage to the farmer is that he has greater influence over the price mechanism in this case, 
whereas an IOF would attempt to drive the input costs to the minimum.  
Australia and New Zealand have their own definition of cooperatives. There are two types of 
cooperatives in Australia either a distributing or non-distributing cooperative where the 
former can distribute surplus income to the members and the latter being considered a not-
for-profit organisation as the surpluses are kept within the organisation (BCCM, 2020). New 
Zealand does not have an equivalent non-distributing cooperative as Australia (Cooperative 
Business New Zealand, 2020). In this study, the focus is on producer cooperatives and in 
particular, dairy cooperatives.  
 
1.5.3 Cooperative Governance versus Corporate Governance  
Cooperatives face similar governance challenges to that of IOFs. However, due to the social 
nature of cooperation, there are a few additional concerns of cooperatives that could shape 
the governance structure. Before a comparison is made with the governance issues between 
an IOF and cooperative it is appropriate to consider the cooperative specific problems and 
why these are distinctive to cooperatives generally and then look at the theory of the firm 
and how this is applied, or can be applied, to a different business model, the cooperative. The 
specific issues that cooperatives face are now discussed. 
Free rider issues are described as problems that arise when property rights are unassigned or 
non-tradable (Cook, 1995; Royer, 1999). Cooperatives rarely have assigned property rights 
resulting in the free-rider problem of, for example, a non-cooperative dairy farmer is assigned 
the same prices (rights) that a large cooperative has negotiated without joining the 
cooperative. Internal free-rider issues exist in the case where new cooperative members have 
the same rights and advantages of those long-term members. Iliopoulos and Cook (1999) 
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state that because of the continuing dilution of the rate of return of the members, there is no 
incentive for long-term members to invest in the cooperative.  
 
The horizon dilemma refers to the disincentive to invest in long-term projects by members. 
Horizon challenges occur when the returns of the project have a shorter life than the 
members' cooperative association (Cook, 1995). Cooperatives formed with similar member 
demographics can result in a time-horizon problem for the cooperative. Without new 
members continually joining the cooperative, the pressure for the long-standing members is 
to get the directors to reduce retained earnings and pay this out to the members for their 
benefit rather than invest in long-term projects. New Generation Cooperatives (NGCs) use 
tradable stock to mitigate the horizon problems, but the success has been limited by the fact 
that the tradable stock is commonly restricted to active members of the NGC only. 
 
The portfolio difficulty lies in the lack of transferability of the residual member equity, 
meaning members of a cooperative cannot buy and sell shares in a cooperative to match their 
risk preference. Some members would prefer a higher risk profile and more returns, while 
others prefer a more conservative risk avoidance approach. Royer (1995, 1999) states that 
cooperative members are more impacted by this problem due to the closed nature of 
cooperative investment which is closed to members only and does not allow external 
investors to buy shares. The gap between the risk profiles of the two views causes the 
portfolio limitation, therefore restricting the growth of the cooperative.  
 
 
The control problem exists in all organisations where ownership and control are separated. 
The cooperative owners usually have control over who sits on the boards but cannot always 
effectively address the directors' interests. This control issue can result in the agency problem 
that is similar to that experienced by publicly listed companies. Essentially this is the 
divergence of interests between the directors and member-owners and could also be found 
in a divergence of interests between the directors and the professional cooperative 
management. Cook (1995), citing Hansmann (1999), believes that smaller cooperatives suffer 
less from this issue than similar-sized IOFs due to the nature of the members' income, which 
20 | P a g e  
 
was mainly from the cooperative. However, it can be argued that the aspect of size advantage 
could limit the agency problem when examining a small corporate entity as well. 
 
Influence cost problems exist in cooperatives more than IOFs due to the diverse nature of the 
membership and ownership. Royer (1999) defined the cost as being associated with 
influencing other members. The size of the cost is contingent on the central cooperative 
management; the process of decision-making; and the degree that members are similar in 
their thinking. Royer (1999) states that cooperatives suffer more than IOFs do with divergent 
interests, as the shareholders of a firm are more homogenous in that they want the firm to 
provide dividends and share price growth whereas the members of a cooperative might have 
varied interests. For instance, a cooperative dairy member might instead want a combination 
of a higher payment for his produce as well as supporting services such as cheaper input costs 
from fertiliser suppliers rather than dividends. 
 
 
There are, besides the above problems with cooperative governance, issues of anonymity 
with the directors serving the cooperative. These directors are often members of the local 
community sharing social interactions with the farmers they serve. This often places the 
directors under challenging positions, which are quite different from that experienced by 
directors of publicly listed companies. The shareholders of publicly listed companies are 
unlikely to regularly socially interact with their directors and even less likely to have a detailed 
interest in the operations of the entity.  Issues of quality of product can cause tensions within 
the member community. For instance, if a high-quality product were created the labour 
associated with the separate process for picking, grading and storing would be borne by all 
the members, yet the proceeds of the high-quality produce could accrue only to a few 
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Table 1. 1: Cooperative Governance Weaknesses  
 
Cherry-picking is often found within member-owned businesses where certain members can 
take advantage of the average return base to lower costs and thereby burden the cooperative 
with additional costs that should be borne by the member.  
 
There is considerable research on a firm's lifecycle (Miller and Friesen, 1983; Adizes, 1989) 
which has examined different measures ranging from strategic intent to structural 





How these manifests itself within a 
traditional cooperative 
Does this apply to a traditional IOF Firm, and 
why/ why not? 
Free rider New members afforded the same rights as 
long-standing members – same vote; same 
benefits; no appreciation of share value 
No, shareholders invest only and are allocated 
voting rights according to shareholding. Shares 
appreciate/ depreciate over time 
Horizon Disincentive to invest in long-term projects. 
Members usually have a similar timeframe 
(and lifespan) as members. Members want 
maximum pay-out rather than investing in 
projects that may not personally benefit 
them 
No, shareholders understand investment with 
long-term investors accruing the advantage over 
time. Usually, when new projects are started 
within a publicly listed firm, shares appreciate if 
the market believes the project will yield 
returns. 
Portfolio Members have differing risk appetites and, 
therefore, block riskier initiatives at the 
expense of higher returns. The member 
cannot buy more shares and thereby 
influence – one member one vote issue, 
votes not based on the quantity of shares 
but the member vote. 
No, investor shareholders can use a portfolio 
approach to minimise risk within their 
investments. They buy shares from different 
industry sectors, ensuring that if shares fall in 
value in one sector, this is mitigated by a 
strategic investment in a different industry 
sector. 
Control This is the agency problem between the 
directors and the member-owners. A 
divergence of interests between the two 
parties can also exist between the directors 
and management of the cooperative as 
well. 
Yes, this issue has been widely researched, 




Costs associated with activities that 
members engage in, in an attempt to 
influence the decisions that affect the 
distribution of funds. Cooperatives may 
experience greater costs influencing due to 
the diverse nature of the membership. 
(Royer, 1999; Cook 1995; Milgram and 
Roberts; 1990) 
Yes, perhaps not as much as cooperatives as 
investors understand the direction that a firm is 
taking strategically, and the decisions are 
sometimes made at the board level delegated 





There are a number of cooperative 
problems that are unique to the 
cooperative business structure, which 
include Cherry-Picking, Product Quality, 
Directory anonymity as examples, please 
refer to the above discussion. 
Not usually, however, there are cases where 
some franchise-type organisational forms can 
encounter similar problems. 
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three main stages and those that have ten stages. When examining the 3-stage model and 
comparing this to the 10-stage model, it can be argued that the models with more stages have 
expanded the three key stages to explain more fully the lifecycle. The schematic below shows 
the generally accepted 5-stage view of Miller and Friesen (1984) for a firm. 
 
Figure 1. 2: Miller and Friesen Model of the Phases of a Company (1984) 
 
According to Cook (2018), cooperatives follow a 5-stage life cycle, which was later expanded, 
by Cook and Buress (2009). The lifecycle starts with forming and ends in decline or a 
reinvention of the entity. When examining the five stages of a cooperative lifecycle of Cook 
(2018), a need to contrast the cooperative life cycle against other business models particularly 
that of the IOF (IOF), as presented above, is required. According to Cook (2018), the 
cooperative lifecycle can be represented by the 5-stage schematic as represented below. 
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Figure 1. 3: Basic Life Cycle Framework Cook (2018) 
 
It can be established when comparing the two schematics, that there is a similarity between 
the lifecycle of the cooperative and that of the IOF as both go through the initial stage of 
formation, continuing to growth, plateauing or a maturity level, and then declining or 
reinvention. The organisational management structure of a cooperative is similar to that of a 
firm, both having a senior management team with a CEO reporting to the board of directors. 
The management team employs staff with other required skills within the cooperative, and 
these are commonly organised by business function. The workers enter into employment 
contracts with the entity much the same as a firm and are assessed on performance criteria 
that are created to align the interests of the cooperative employees with that of the owners. 
This is not unexpected; however, in the literature, there has been debate as to whether a 
cooperative is different from a firm. Hansmann (1999) has said there is no difference. 
However, Birchall (2012) has stated that there are fundamental differences. As can be 
deduced from the above lifecycle approach, there is little that distinguishes the cooperative 
from the firm examining the organisational management perspective. Therefore, it is likely if 
there are any differences, these differences exist above the operational management layer at 
the ownership layer of the members of a cooperative. The case of the financial sector 
member-owned firms is a good example. Produce based cooperatives have found it 
problematic to change business models due mainly to the issues of property rights and 
horizon problems mentioned above.  
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When cooperatives own limited liability entities, there is an argument that the use of the 
funds, or the leverage of the assets by way of secured loans, is in contrast to the principles 
and ideals of a cooperative entity (Lund, 2013). Many arguments have been put forward by 
members that the retained funds used, or the debt entered into should be a decision made 
at the farmer level not only at the operational management level (Challita, Sentis, and Aurier, 
2014).  
 
If there is little difference between the cooperative and IOF within the operational 
management structure, then it is likely many of the corporate governance issues that exist 
within a firm are similar when looking at a cooperative. The differences, as stated above, may 
exist at the layer of ownership, which will be expanded below.  
 
Considering the governance innovations that have taken place in the European Union which 
has been very well summarised in the paper by Bijman et al. (2014), the dairy cooperatives in 
both New Zealand and Australia have followed similar paths to the different types of 
innovation. The inclusion of a supervisory board looking at the pre-and post-decisions of the 
board of directors has been implemented in Fonterra (New Zealand) by means of the 
shareholder council; however, this has been met with limited success, and none of the other 
cooperatives has this type of governance structure. The other innovation of proportional 
voting of members depending on the amount of raw material they provide is present in New 
Zealand cooperatives (Tatua,  Fonterra, and Westland before it was sold) but was not found 
in any of the Australian dairy cooperatives although one of the Australian cooperatives has 
incorporated under the Corporations Legislation (see Chapter-2) which implies that this 
option is open to them as they are no longer considered a cooperative as the cooperative law 
does limit them in this regard. The Board of Directors in Australasia have options to appoint 
professional directors which are non-members, so in this way, they do follow innovation three 
of the Bijman et al. (2014) paper. The fourth innovation is the composition of the supervisory 
board; however, this composition innovation is not found in the Australasian dairy 
cooperatives in this study. Finally, the innovation that separates the cooperative association 
and the cooperative firm as described in innovation five Bijman et al. (2014) is similarly not 
found in the cooperatives that are examined in this thesis.  
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Examining the theory of the firm, we find that the cooperative has many issues that a firm 
has. Agency theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) is an issue where the interests are not aligned 
between the owners and their agents. The principal-agent issue is likely to exist with 
cooperatives for similar reasons that it exists within a firm, already discussed above. The 
nexus of contracts view of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) is essentially a principal-agent issue 
where management contracts do not differ from the contract between an internal and 
external party. Coase (1937) and Simon (1951) believed that the management had the 
authority, and, therefore, the contracts with employees were broader and, therefore, more 
easily applied. Moral Hazard is another issue that finds it roots within the asymmetrical 
information issue where owners and the managers have different information, and, therefore, 
the managers use this information gap opportunistically. This would be no different for a 
cooperative as the contracts within a cooperative do not differ from that of a traditional firm, 
and neither is the information asymmetry likely to be any different. Incentives within a 
cooperative are unlikely to be distinct from that of the traditional firm except for certain firms 
allowing share allocations to incentivise senior staff who are able to influence the firms' 
direction on the owner's behalf. Shares in a traditional cooperative are a closed pool and not 
able to be allocated.  However, some cooperatives have allowed an investor-class member 
category, so this could be used to incentivise managers to align their interests with the owners. 
On the Incomplete Contracts view of the theory of the firm Coase (1937), states that a firm 
would arise when the costs of transacting outside the firm would be more than the cost of 
transacting internally. Williamson's work (1971, 1973, 1975, 1979, 1985, and 1996) was based 
on bounded rationality and opportunism, both of which can result in incomplete contracts. 
The safeguards that Williamson mentioned in his work are referred to as governance 
mechanisms. As the management structure below the ownership layer is organised in the 
same way as a traditional firm, cooperatives would be no different, suffering the opportunistic 
behaviour of employees. Other aspects of the theory of the firm from the Incomplete 
Contracts view would be similar to that of the traditional firm leading to the general 
supposition that a cooperative and a traditional IOF suffer from similar issues that corporate 
(or cooperative) governance needs to minimise where possible.  
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1.6 Thesis Research Question and Hypothesis 
This research uses multiple lenses to answer the substantive research question. It will 
examine the roles of law, cooperative constitutions, implementation challenges, farmer 
engagement, and alternative approaches to cooperative design and function. As this thesis 
will cover overlapping sections of work, each comes with its research questions and 
hypotheses. However, the overarching research question and hypothesis are as below:  
 
1.6.1 Overarching Research Questions:  
What are the governance challenges and opportunities facing Australasian dairy cooperatives, 
and what governance elements contribute to an effective cooperative governance framework? 
 
1.6.2 Overarching Hypothesis: 
The International Cooperative Alliance seven cooperative principles have not been effectively 
implemented in Australasia, resulting in member governance challenges within dairy 
cooperatives. Farmer-members are not always aware of decisions that cooperative 
businesses legitimately make in the course of business operation which could directly or 
indirectly affect farmer income and viability. 
 
1.6.3 Specific Chapter research questions  
The specific research questions addressed in the thesis are listed below. Chapter-1 
(Introduction) and Chapter-6 (Conclusions, implications, and Research Agenda) do not have 
research questions. 
1.6.3.1 Chapter-2 Research Questions. 
1. Globally, how have the different sets of cooperative principles been implemented?  
2. How effective is the implementation of cooperative principles in Australasian law? 
1.6.3.2 Chapter-3 Research Questions.  
1. What is the role of the cooperative constitutional document?  
2. What support can be found for the constitutional document in cooperative laws 
around the world? 
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3. What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of dairy cooperative constitutional 
documents when contrasting their implementation in Australia and New Zealand? 
1.6.3.3 Chapter-4 Research Questions. 
1. To what extent does the application of cooperative principles, the law, and the 
constitutional document mitigate the known governance problems in Australasian 
dairy cooperatives? 
2. To what degree are residual governance problems apparent in Australasia? 
1.6.3.4 Chapter-5 Research Questions. 
1. What are the views and perceptions of Australasian dairy cooperative members when 
considering participation and governance in their cooperative?  
2. What is optimum Australasian cooperative member voice and influence? 
 
1.7 Research Methodologies and Analysis 
The complete dissertation consists of six distinct chapters. Therefore, a range of different 
methodologies and analysis techniques are proposed for each of the chapters.  
 
Chapter-1 Introduction. This chapter takes a broad view that provides an overview of the 
elements of member governance, which is more thoroughly discussed and analysed in the 
subsequent chapters of the thesis.  
 
Chapter-2 provides an analysis of the different sets of cooperative principles and how these 
have been implemented in various regions. Furthermore, it then examines the 
implementation of principles in the Australasian policy environment, specifically for Australia 
and New Zealand. The primary data sources will be the various sets of principles in use around 
the world, any literature or theoretical sets of principles that have been studied will form the 
secondary data source.  
The laws of Australasia governing cooperatives enterprises in New Zealand and Australia are 
then examined. The primary data source will be the legislation as it currently stands in New 
Zealand and Australia that govern the operation of cooperatives. It is anticipated that ancillary 
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type legislation, including regulation and market rules, will likewise influence the governance 
mechanisms that cooperative dairy farmer-members can apply, so will be examined as well. 
Secondary data sources such as other cooperative laws found in Europe, China and America 
will be compared against the cooperative laws in New Zealand and Australia. The comparison 
will allow a conceptual understanding of the maturity of the current legislation when talking 
a theoretical view applying the seven cooperative principles. The primary methodology will 
be content analysis for the intent and thematic content analysis to gain an understanding of 
the level of governance the cooperative laws allow. Keywords will be tabulated using 
computer software tools, enabling a comparison to be drawn for each of the laws when 
analysing other legislation from different parts of the global dairy sector. The expected output 
will be a view of the maturity of the New Zealand and Australian cooperative legislation when 
using the seven global cooperative principles as a base. 
 
Chapter-3 provides an analysis of the constitutions, or replaceable rules as they are referred 
to in Australia, for each of the eight dairy cooperatives. These are expected to differ when 
comparing New Zealand to Australia as a result of the legislation which enacts which 
provisions may be altered to form part of the cooperative constitution. The primary data 
source is the constitutions of the cooperatives, which are all publicly available in New Zealand 
from the government regulation sites. Australian constitutions, or replaceable rules as they 
are referred to in Australian legislation, can be bought off the local state governments by any 
member of the public for a nominal fee. However, individual Australian cooperatives, in the 
interests of their farmer-members, have their constitutions publicly available at no charge. 
Employing the seven global cooperative principles as a base, a Content Analysis will be 
undertaken for intent. Thematic content analysis using computer software will tabulate the 
governance-related keywords for further analysis and understanding. The expected output 
will be a view on how different constitutions have been used to close perceived deficiencies 
in New Zealand and Australian legislation. 
 
Chapter-4 provides an analysis of the governance challenges of cooperatives, specifically 
looking at those difficulties which are found in New Zealand and Australia by analysing the 
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cooperative governance issues which all cooperatives face. It will then furthermore, study the 
governance issues that arise from the first chapter in this thesis (cooperative law and their 
constitutions). Primary data will use the resulting findings from the previous chapter in which 
looked at the principles, the governing cooperative legislation in New Zealand and Australia, 
and the constitutions of the dairy cooperatives. Other legislation and regulation which affect 
the governance of dairy cooperatives in New Zealand and Australia, such as the Dairy Industry 
Restructuring Act (DIRA) 2001 and subsequent amendments in New Zealand and the 
accounting rules for cooperatives in Australia, will be used as sources of primary data. 
Research from global cooperative governance issues that have been studied over time by 
leading academic experts will provide the sources of secondary data. The specific governance 
issues that arise from specific unique legislation and the resultant provisions in the 
constitutions of the dairy cooperatives will provide a view of unique governance issues that 
New Zealand and Australian dairy cooperative farmer-members face. This chapter will then 
provide a theoretical framework to employ for the following chapter. Content analysis and 
thematic content analysis will be employed in the analysis for this chapter. The expected 
output will be a unique view of the New Zealand and Australian governance issues for 
cooperative dairy members.  
 
Chapter-5 analyses and reports on the sample of interviews from dairy cooperatives in 
Australasia. The qualitative data from these interviews come from the same set of dairy 
cooperatives that were examined in Chapter-3, The Cooperative Constitutional Document. 
The sample size was determined to ensure that the Principle of Saturation was achieved 
without compromising the number of different views of the participants (Mason, 2010; 
Creswell, 2014; Guest, 2006). The chapter includes an analysis of the practice of governance 
as opposed to the theoretical governance mechanisms, of the seven New Zealand and 
Australian cooperatives. It examines each cooperative separately using publicly available 
artefacts such as annual reports, press releases, and general market announcements. Using 
these artefacts, a list of the decisions that could have affected the financial viability of the 
cooperative are tabulated. Using the list of decisions, a sample of dairy farmers, and where 
possible, elected board members are qualitatively interviewed in a face-to-face setting. The 
questions employed in the interviews to generate qualitative answers assist in determining 
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the extent of the farmer members' involvement or influence in major decisions.   The analysis 
identifies the underlying reasons for the dairy cooperative farmer-member involvement or 
influence.   
 
Chapter-6 is a concluding chapter and includes conclusions, implications, and a suggested 
further research agenda. 
In summary, Table 1.2 below describes the methodologies used in each of the chapters. 
 
 
Chapter Title Research Methodology and comments 
1 Introduction Introduction Chapter 
2 Principle-based Cooperative 




Qualitative Content Analysis (Krippendorff, 2013) and 
Document Analysis (Bowen, 2009) 
Comparative Legal Analysis (Van Hoecke, 2015), Document 
Analysis (Bowen, 2009), and Content Analysis (Krippendorff, 
2013) 
3 The Cooperative Constitution as 
the Foundational Member 
Governance Mechanism 
Comparative Legal Analysis (Van Hoecke, 2015), Document 
Analysis (Bowen, 2009), and Content Analysis (Krippendorff, 
2013) 
4 Cooperative Governance 
Challenges: Understanding their 
Origins and Possible Causes 
 
Document Analysis (Bowen, 2009), and Content Analysis 
(Krippendorff, 2013) 
5 Member governance rights in a 
New Zealand and Australian 
Cooperative 
Qualitative Research Method: 
31 Interviews (in-depth) using a sample, including directors or 
ex-directors where possible. 
24 Semi-structured interview questions (quantity: 24 
questions); and 
Tools: NVIVO Qualitative Data Analysis software (In-depth, 
1:1 face to face; recorded and anonymised) 
6 Conclusions, Implications and 
Further- research 
Concluding Chapter 
Table 1. 2: Chapters and their Corresponding Research Methodology 
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1.8 Thesis outline 
The thesis follows accepted guidelines for the University of Waikato as to structure and word 
count. Table 1.3 outlines the full thesis structure. 
Chapter Title Short Description 
Chapter-1 Introduction Introduction in order to allow for context setting. 
Chapter-2 Principle-Based 
Cooperative Law 
The second chapter examines the Australasian cooperative 
laws 
The cooperative laws of New Zealand are examined 
looking in particular at the Companies Act, The 
Cooperative Companies Act, and DIRA. 
Australian Laws are examined, including the Corporations 
Legislation, Australian Uniform Cooperative Laws 
Agreement (AUCLA). The laws of each country will be 
mapped against the internationally accepted seven 
cooperative principles through the member governance 
lens. 
Chapter-3 The Cooperative 
Constitution 
Document 
The third chapter looks at the constitution (or replaceable 
rules in Australia) and how this enforces the rights of the 
farmers when looking at the seven international 
cooperative principles. 
An analysis of seven dairy cooperatives in Australasia will be 
undertaken. The cooperatives are: 
1. Fonterra (New Zealand) 
2. Tatua (New Zealand) 
3. Westland (New Zealand) 
4. Dairy Goat (New Zealand) 
5. NORCO (Australia) 
6. Australian Dairy Farmers Corporation Limited 
(Australia) 




The fourth chapter examines the governance issues that 
Cooperatives face and includes unique cooperative 
governance issues that New Zealand and Australia have as 
a result of policy such as DIRA in New Zealand and the 
2019 Dairy regulations in Australia.  
Chapter-5 Perceptions of 
Member Engagement 
and Governance 
The fifth chapter is a qualitative analysis of interviews of a 
sub-set of farmers of the seven cooperatives. Decisions that 
are publicly available were used to investigate member 
rights as far as these decisions are concerned.  
This chapter will build on the previous chapters looking at 
the law and constitutions to report on the effectiveness of 
the governance in each of the cooperatives as well as the 
compliance of the provisions that do exist. 
Chapter-6 
Conclusion 
Conclusion This chapter concludes the thesis, including implications 
and a research agenda.   
Table 1. 3: Thesis Structure 
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1.9 Summary 
The introductory chapter provides an overview of the thesis and identifies the foundational 
elements of cooperative governance.  
The chapter included the background to the research, the problem statement, the research 
questions broken up for each chapter, and a basic structure. Furthermore, the proposed 
research methodology for each chapter was provided as a summarised table.  
The following chapters explain and analyse each of the factors that contribute to that “layer” 
of governance. Together, the layers form the content element (Chapter-2,3,4) and the 
actuality of member governance (Chapter-5) as it has been implemented and executed 
operationally within the cooperatives in this study. The content portion of the thesis examines 
the effectiveness of each element contrasting that element with other regions and 
performing a comparative analysis to identify the limitations of Australasian models and what 
improvements, if any, can be made.  The real perceptions of the members as to their 
cooperative governance form the complementing final chapters of the thesis, providing a 
view on how governance has been implemented apart from the theoretical elements of the 
law and the constitutional document.  
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2. Chapter-2: Principle-based Cooperative law 
The Legal Application of Cooperative Principles 
2.1 Chapter-2 Introduction 
As with other business forms, there are many reasons why cooperatives are formed; these 
include: as a result of market failure (Mikami, 2002; Hansmann, 1996), imperfect competition 
(Sexton, 1990), information asymmetry (Hansmann, 1996), and social-democratic need 
(Dobrohoczki, 2006). According to Valentinov (2007), agricultural cooperatives form because 
it is a question of the scale of the farm and the limitation that single farms can never grow 
sufficiently to counter market power held by others. For example, in the case of dairy farmers, 
if many producers attempt to sell their homogenous products to a few large buyers, the 
imbalance is evident in the singular-farmer sense, however, when the dairy farmers band 
together, the market imbalance can be moderated through collective negotiation by the 
farmers. Cooperatives have become significant alternative business structures with the top-
300 cooperatives contributing more than USD$2 trillion in annual revenue to the global 
economy in 2017 ("World Cooperative Monitor 2019 | ICA Monitor", 2019). Furthermore, 
memberships in cooperatives globally reached over 1 billion in 2014. Excluding the 
employment figures from China's 982,000 agricultural cooperatives, cooperatives employed 
an estimated 12.6 million people or 0.2% of the worlds' population in 2017. Agricultural 
cooperatives make up of almost a third of all cooperatives worldwide. With regard to New 
Zealand, Fonterra is ranked as the 35th largest cooperative in the world based on turnover 
("World Cooperative Monitor 2019 | ICA Monitor", 2019). When compared to other business 
organisational forms, cooperatives are distinctive in that there is a relationship between the 
member-ownership and member-supply/ consumption, which other business forms such as 
IOFs do not have. The New Zealand cooperative organisation body has defined the various 
types of cooperatives as producer cooperatives which are generally farmers; purchasing/ 
shared services cooperatives; banking cooperatives; consumer Cooperatives; insurance 
Mutuals; and Worker cooperatives ("Types of Cooperatives", 2017). The Australian 
Government has described types of cooperatives as being consumer-owned, employee-
owned, enterprise owned and hybrid multi-stakeholder owned ("Cooperatives, Mutuals and 
Member owned firms – Parliament of Australia", 2017). Australian cooperatives are further 
differentiated as being either distributing or non-distributing cooperatives, in which the latter 
can distribute excess profit back to their members, and the former non-distributing 
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Cooperatives which are not allowed to distribute surplus profits ("Types of Australian 
cooperatives", 2017).  
 
The chapter inspects and analyses the Australasian cooperative business through a 
cooperative principle lens as a fundamental element of member governance. There is little 
other research that has taken the approach of examining the practical implementation of 
principles in the cooperative operating setting. Novkovic (2008) highlighted the gap in 
economics research. No detailed research could be found examining the Australasian 
cooperative policy environment in any detail. A sample of countries was chosen on the basis 
where variations or another set of cooperative principles existed; these were then mapped 
to the ICA set to understand the point of deviation and what the deviation could mean. 
Cooperative principles are academically accepted as the input to cooperative law (Münkner, 
2015; Cracogna et al., 2013; Hënry, 2012). This chapter examines cooperative principles from 
various geographies of the developed world to support the hypothesis that cooperative law 
is constructed on internationally accepted cooperative principles. Using guidelines for 
cooperative law (Münkner, 2015; Hënry, 2012; International Cooperative Alliance for the 
Americas, 2009), the laws of New Zealand and Australia are then analysed. Likewise, other 
laws in New Zealand and Australia are examined against the guidelines to gain an 
understanding of the effectiveness of the laws, which sections of the legislation are effective, 
and which sections of the legislation may need further consideration. The chapter examines 
the cooperative principles as applied in the cooperative law specifically for dairy cooperatives 
in Australasia as there are specific requirements in the New Zealand law that relate to the 
registration of a dairy cooperative and the prevalence of dairy cooperatives in the agricultural 
sector in Australasia. This research is important as it will highlight the effectiveness of the 
New Zealand and Australian Cooperative laws providing a view on the quality of the policy 
environment in which New Zealand and Australian cooperatives operate. The comparison 
against the guidelines will allow for an understanding of the maturity of the current policy 
environment taking a theoretical view when applying the cooperative principles. Finally, 
conclusions and recommendations are formulated, including recommendations for further 
research.  
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2.2 Chapter-2 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
This chapter examines the role of cooperative principles and how these have been 
implemented in the cooperative law for various regions and then specifically the Australasian 
implementation. The overarching research question and hypothesis for this chapter are 
specified below:  
2.2.1 Overarching Research Questions:  
How have the cooperative principles been accepted and applied in regions across the globe? 
How effective has the implementation of the principles been when translating the 
cooperative principles into cooperative law? What improvements can be made to the 
principles so that policymakers can apply these principles to the creation of policy to protect 
cooperative members? 
2.2.2 Overarching Hypothesis:  
The translation of principles into law is problematic, especially where the principles itself is 
less defined. Furthermore, New Zealand has not effectively implemented the principles of 
cooperation in their cooperative law, and the Australian cooperative laws may be at a relative 
disadvantage when compared to the law that governs IOFs.  
2.2.3 Chapter-2 Research Questions. 
The overarching research question is broken down into components as listed below that assist 
in the analysis of this element of governance. These are proposed as follows where S-RQn is 
the number of the Subordinate Research Question: 
S-RQ1: Globally, how have the different sets of cooperative principles been implemented?  
S-RQ2: How effective is the implementation of cooperative principles in Australasian law? 
 
2.3 Chapter-2 Methodology and Data Sources 
The primary methodology used in this chapter was Qualitative Content Analysis (Krippendorff, 
2013) and Document Analysis (Bowen, 2009). An analysis of the principles and their intent 
was performed by applying Content Analysis (Krippendorff, 2013) and Document Analysis 
(Bowen, 2009). The principles were tabulated, and in conjunction with literature, 
commentary on the understanding of what each of the principles represented was achieved. 
The limitations of this approach are that interpretations could be imprecise, especially when 
examining the “intent” of the application applying the principles in cooperative law. However, 
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the Content Analysis phase can be accurately achieved using other scholarly research as a 
baseline (Hill & Doluschitz, 2014; Reynolds, 2013; Birchall, 2005; Zeuli and Cropp, 2004) to 
ensure interpretation errors are kept to a minimum. 
2.3.1 Principles Data Sources 
Primary data sources: ICA Principles; USDA principles; Canadian basis of cooperation; UK FCA 
guidance. 
Secondary data sources: Literature on ICA principles; critiques on principles; ICA guidelines 
2.3.2 Law Data Sources 
A selection of countries was chosen based on their legislative structure. For example, 
Australia has a federal government, so a comparison of provisions within the laws of India 
(federal), Canada (federal), Brazil (federal), and the EU (federation) was made. Similarly, as 
New Zealand has a central government, so a comparison against France (central), Germany 
(central), the United Kingdom (central), and South Africa (central) was made. Both developed 
and developing countries were chosen to ensure a broad understanding was achieved. The 
remainder of the chapter examined and analysed the laws of New Zealand and Australia. The 
methodology used in this part Comparative Legal Analysis (Van Hoecke, 2015), Document 
Analysis (Bowen, 2009), and Content Analysis (Krippendorff, 2013) for the laws of the 
countries under study. In this way, an understanding of how the law was constructed was 
achieved. The interaction of the principles by direct or indirect means was then examined. 
This allowed for the law to be scrutinised for intent and mapped against the first stage 
principles achieved above. Once the mapping of the principles was completed, the output 
was mapped again against the Principles of European Cooperative Law (PECOL) work, which 
was chosen as being the framework against which all of the laws could be baselined. The 
reason for choosing PECOL as a framework is that no other comprehensive framework exists 
that has sufficient detail to compare against the laws chosen in this chapter. The authors 
(Fajardo-García, Fici, Hënry, Hiez, Meira, Muenker, Snaith) created the guidelines for Europe; 
however, they do maintain that it might be useful for other regions as well. Another 
framework that was considered was the Cooperative Law and Regulation Initiative (CLARITY, 
2020) which is an organisation promoting cooperative law in developing countries. CLARITY 
was considered for use as a framework; however, it is a non-academic handbook rather than 
a theoretical framework and was rejected on this basis. 
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Primary data sources Australia: Cooperative Law (State-based); Australian Uniform 
Cooperative Laws Agreement (AUCLA); other relevant laws that affect cooperative operation. 
Primary data sources New Zealand: Cooperative Companies Act; New Zealand Companies Act; 
Dairy Industry Restructure Act; other relevant laws that affect cooperative operation. 
 
2.4 The Principles of Cooperation 
This section analyses the sets of cooperative principles exploring the background, application, 
and implementation of the principle sets. Using comparative analysis, it contrasts their 
differences and similarities to understand the intention based on available literature. A 
principle can be defined as "A general scientific theorem or law that has numerous special 
applications across a wide field" (Oxford Dictionaries, 2017). In support of this definition, a 
legal dictionary defines principles as "Fundamental truths or doctrines of law; comprehensive 
rules or doctrines which furnish a basis or origin…" (Black's Law Dictionary, 2017).  Principles 
are important sources of the law with legal principles forming the basis of laws (Daci, 2010). 
The first cooperative principles were documented in the 19th century; however, it is widely 
acknowledged that the cooperative form had already existed for centuries. For example, in 
ancient India during the Vedic age between 1500 BC and 500 BC, some of the first cooperative 
forms were documented (Srivastava, 1962). The Rochdale weavers were seen as having their 
origins in Owenite-type philosophy which came from the works of the 19th-century social 
reformer Robert Owen. Owen stood for a radical transformation of society, subscribed to 
early forms of socialism, trade unionism, community-based organisation, and is considered a 
predecessor of the cooperative movement (Garrett, 1972). As the Owenite movement was 
active in Rochdale, this influenced the thinking of the Rochdale founders, which in turn 
influenced the documented Rochdale principles as many of the founders were Owenites 
themselves (Fairbairn, 1994).  
It is essential to understand these principles as these have formed or influenced the source 
of common law and the legislation of various regions over the past three hundred years. 
Scholars (Guzmán, Santos & Barroso, 2019) have positively linked the application and 
adoption of cooperative principles to cooperative performance in a study of worker 
cooperatives. Three types of implementations of the principles can be found globally. The 
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most common method of enactment is legislation based on the International Cooperative 
Alliance set of 7 principles (ICA-7). Alternative cooperative principles that can influence 
cooperative law enactment include the United States Department of Agriculture set of 3 
principles (USDA-3) although these principles have not been used other than to assess the 
cooperative nature of an entity. There are other enactments where regions/ countries have 
accepted the ICA-7 principles in some form by redefining or applying a subset of the 
principles. Examples of the latter implementations are the Canadian set of 8 (Canada-8) Basis 
of Cooperation principles and the United Kingdom (UK) Financial Conduct Authority's (FCA) 
definition of a cooperative. Other countries, such as New Zealand, do not refer to any 
cooperative principles within their policy framework.  Each of the regions, excepting the 
European Union (EU), examined in this paper are former colonies of Great Britain. Therefore 
the influence of the original Rochdale Principles and subsequent evolution to the current ICA-
7 principles is used as a base for the comparison. Table 2.1, below, maps the different sets of 
cooperative principles against that of the International Cooperative Alliance seven principles 
(ICA-7). The research led by the Study Group on European Cooperative Law (SGECOL) Draft 
Principles of European Cooperative Law is used to baseline the provisions. 
ICA-7 Principle Canada-8 USDA-3 UK (FCA) 
ICA-P1 Voluntary and open membership ✓  ✓ 
ICA-P2 Democratic member control ✓ ✓  ✓ 
ICA-P3 Member economic participation ✓ ✓ ✓ 
ICA-P4 Autonomy and independence   ✓ 
ICA-P5 Education, training and information ✓   
ICA-P6 Cooperation among cooperatives    
ICA-P7 Concern for community    
Table 2. 1 Mapping of ICA Principles 
(Source: ICA, Canadian Federal Government Website, United States Department of Agriculture; United 
Kingdom FCA website) 
*Please refer to Appendix 2.2 for details on mapping of the above principles. 
2.4.1 The ICA-7 Principles 
Often linked to the establishment of the Modern Cooperative Movement, the 
Rochdale Society of Equitable Pioneers was founded in 1844 in Rochdale, Lancashire, England 
("Rochdale Pioneers Museum", 2017). At formation, the cooperative created their Articles of 
Association containing statutes which elaborated on the activities of the cooperative. These 
statutes, contrary to some research, did not limit Rochdale to consumer type cooperation as 
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we know it today but included worker, housing, and agricultural cooperative activities 
(Fairburn, 1994). The original statutes contained wording that included certain cooperative 
principles. These principles included open membership (members had to be approved but 
could leave with notice), member control, sharing of profits, and democratically elected 
officers although no mention was made of one member one vote (Fairburn, 1994; Lambert, 
1963). In the next decade, several changes were made to the Rochdale principles including 
the introduction of one-member-one-vote (1845), the treatment of surpluses and creation of 
reserves (1854), and the provision for education (1854). In London in 1895, cooperatives from 
many parts of the globe agreed to form the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA). 
Significantly, the Rochdale principle of open membership was expanded to include broader 
anti-discriminatory wording. The following year, at the ICA Paris congress of 1896, the 
wording was added for the separation of the cooperative from any "party", or Government, 
thereby constructing the autonomous principle (Watkins, 1970). In 1937 more changes were 
made to the seven principles, of which four were stated as being essential (open membership, 
democratic control, distribution of surplus in proportion to patronage, and limited interest on 
capital). The remaining three (political and religious neutrality, cash trading, and promotion 
of education) were acknowledged as being features that would not preclude a cooperative 
from admission into the ICA if these principles were not complied with. By 1995, at the ICA 
Congress, the principles were reformed (there were other minor changes suggested by 
Lambert in 1959, the ICA in 1966, and by Watkins in 1986) to the seven current principles.  
The International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) currently defines a cooperative as "A cooperative 
is an autonomous association of persons united voluntarily to meet their common economic, 
social and cultural needs and aspirations through a jointly-owned and democratically-
controlled enterprise" (ICA, 2017). The ICA principles and definition have been widely 
accepted and can be found within laws, articles of association or founding constitutions and 
Cooperative organisations globally. The principles of cooperation apply to different types of 
cooperatives. However, they are not limited to any cooperative type in particular. The ICA-7 
principles of cooperation are Voluntary and open membership; Democratic member control; 
Member economic participation; Autonomy and independence; Education, training and 
information; Cooperation between cooperatives; and Concern for the community. In support 
of cooperatives and their contribution to the global economy, the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) published recommendation 193 in 2002 "Promotion of Cooperatives 
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Recommendation 2002". Included in this recommendation was an annexe which outlined the 
7 ICA principles (International Labour Organisation (ILO), 2002).  The recommendation was 
that member states of which, for this chapter, included New Zealand, Australia, Canada, 
European Union, United Kingdom, and the United States ("Alphabetical list of ILO member 
countries", 2017) implemented recommendation 193. It must be mentioned that the ILO has 
two methods for passing proposals onto member states, a ratified convention where the 
member states are obliged to consider the implementation of the resolution (Article 22 of the 
ILO Constitution), and recommendations, where the obligation on members is to ensure that 
the recommendation is brought before the relevant authorities within the member states for 
consideration (Article 19 (6d) of the ILO Constitution). It is pertinent to point out that the 
comprehensive work of Cragna et al. (2013) on International Cooperative law (Cracogna, Fici, 
& Hënry, 2013) argues that ILO Recommendation 193 is legally binding on member states as 
a source of international cooperative law; however, it is clear from the ILO constitution 
(Article 19 (6d)) that this is not the case and as a result, other modified cooperative principles 
have emerged in Canada and America.  New Zealand tabled ILO Recommendation 193 to the 
New Zealand Parliament (New Zealand Government, 2002) without further action or 
implementation. ILO recommendation 193 was tabled to the Australian Parliament as a paper 
(Australian Parliament, 2004). Subsequently, the principles were adopted in various forms in 
all Australian State cooperative legislation.  
Many scholars (Hill & Doluschitz, 2014; Reynolds, 2013; Birchall, 2005; Zeuli and Cropp, 2004) 
believe that the first three principles of Open membership, Democratic member control, and 
Economic member participation have been successful in application. The fourth principle of 
Autonomy and independence has been problematic in that many of the commerce laws within 
countries and regions tend to class a cooperative as a type of corporate firm without regard 
to the social aspects as contained in the ICA cooperative definition. The remaining three 
principles of Education training and information, Cooperation amongst cooperatives, and 
Concern for community are idealistic according to some (Hill & Doluschitz, 2014; Oczkowski 
et al., 2013; others) as the wording is seen as value-based and therefore is difficult to apply 
in law across different regions, cooperative types and ethnic groups. Furthermore, these 
principles were constructed for the ICA conference in 1995 and subsequently adopted as the 
definitive statement containing the set of principles, no changes were made to the seven core 
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principles notwithstanding the difficulty in applying or legislating the principles of Education 
training, and information; Cooperation among cooperatives; and Concern for community. To 
further assist in the implementation of the principles, the ICA published Guideline Notes to 
the Cooperative Principles in 2015. The Global Financial Crisis of 2008 and 2009 changed many 
of the rules on how commerce is carried out. For example, there were additional restrictions 
placed on the capital requirements of banks which has impeded the operation of cooperatives 
who are seeking to raise capital against their assets in order to remain competitive (Deloitte, 
2012; International Cooperative Alliance, 2012). The Rochdale principles have been built on 
and changed from time to time to the current ICA-7 principles we have today though some 
scholars (MacGillivray & Ish, 1992) believe the principles were never meant to be static and 
should be adapted to changing global economic conditions. Novkovic (2008) highlighted the 
principles as being one of the major differences between the more common IOF and 
cooperative organisations.  
2.4.2 USDA-3 Principles 
In the United States of America, deviation from the pure ICA-7 principles has taken place. The 
United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) has taken on the role of assessing 
cooperative laws on behalf of American cooperatives, notwithstanding many of the largest 
cooperative organisations in America are not agricultural (National Cooperative Bank (NCB), 
2016). In 1987, the USDA adopted a cooperative definition in which there were three 
principles: User-owner, User-control, and User-benefit, it must be pointed out that at that 
time, these three cooperative principles were derived from the then existing 1966 set of 8 ICA 
principles. In 2013, the USDA-3 principles were re-examined and validated without change by 
the USDA (Reynolds, 2013). The principles that have been adopted by the USDA do not 
address some of the ICA-7 principles, specifically the Open membership; Education, training 
and information; Cooperation among cooperatives; and Concern for community. There is no 
evidence that these principles have been used for any cooperative law enactments within 
America. However, many of the ICA-7 principles are entrenched in the United States state 
cooperative bodies and can be found in various bylaws of the cooperatives. Although the 
USDA-3 and the ICA-7 principles do not exist in the letter of the law, certain aspects are 
indirectly mentioned within provisions of the state laws.   
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2.4.3 Canadian Basis of Cooperation 
Canada accepted the ICA-7 principles following ILO recommendation 193; nevertheless, the 
legislation redefines the ICA-7 into a new set of principles, thereby making it easier to 
legislate. There are considerable overlaps with the Canadian version of the principles and the 
ICA-7. The Canadian redefinition of the principles was an attempt to allow for more 
straightforward application in the legislation. The Canadian redefinition of the principles 
maps closely to the ICA-7 principles in open membership; Democratic member control; 
Member economic participation; and Education, training and information. Significantly, the 
ICA-7 principles of Autonomy and independence, Cooperation among cooperatives; and 
Concern for community have no mapping in the Canadian cooperative legislation.  
2.4.4 United Kingdom Cooperative Assessment 
Similarly, the United Kingdom Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), which is responsible for the 
conduct and relevant prudential regulation for the UK, published guidance in which it defined 
cooperative entities based on the first four ICA-7 principles of Voluntary and open 
membership; Democratic member control; Member economic participation; and Autonomy 
and independence (Financial Markets Authority, 2015). The FCA went on to state that they 
did not consider the remaining principles of Education, training and information; Cooperation 
amongst cooperatives; and Concern for community as characteristics that could be evaluated 
to confirm a cooperative entity. A cooperative would be assessed against the first four ICA-7 
principles, the ICA definition and the ICA Values statement.  
 
Notwithstanding the deviation from pure ICA-7 principles in many regions, there is very little 
literature that links the principles, or the intent of the principles, to a practical 
implementation in the law. There are commentaries on the various laws (Cracogna, Fici & 
Henrÿ, 2013) which give us a good understanding of how the law has come about including 
the various implementations around the world, however, there are few frameworks that 
allow for the encapsulating of the principles in the law.  Münkner (2015) provides us with a 
discourse of how the ICA principles are reflected in the law; however, the book is mainly based 
on the 1966 ICA principles which were substantially changed in 1995 giving us the current 
ICA-7 principles. Hënry (2012) provided an excellent guideline for cooperative legislation and 
provides an "an ABC of cooperative law" it is specific enough to be used as a base to analyse 
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the cooperative laws. Hënry worked on a previous version which is used by ICA Americas 
similarly providing a clear guideline and is based in large parts of the practical legislating of 
the ICA first four principles into cooperative laws. This work, published in 2009, was created 
with the explicit purpose of standardising the South American and Caribbean cooperative law 
and was adopted by the ICA Americas in 2008 (International Cooperative Alliance for the 
Americas, 2009). In 2015, a European Union (EU) group of cooperative legal scholars 
published Draft Principles of European Cooperative Law (Study Group on European 
Cooperative Law (SGECOL), 2015) with the objective of providing guidance for cooperative 
law expansion and reform. While the book concentrates on European cooperative law, the 
intention of the authors was more extensive, "In that regard, it envisions PECOL's use as a 
guide for cooperative law expansion and reform throughout Europe, and beyond, and as a 
general orientation to and a set of established best practices for both legislatures adopting 
new, expanded or reformed legislation and for courts interpreting cooperative law". It is of no 
surprise that the scholars who created PECOL are recognised cooperative legal scholars who 
had published other cooperative legal papers; these authors included: Fici, Hënry, Münkner, 
and Snaith. Using a combination of the works of PECOL, Cracogna et al. (Cracogna, Fici & 
Henrÿ, 2013), Münkner (Münkner, 2015), Hënry (Henrÿ, 2012) and International Cooperative 
Alliance for the Americas (International Cooperative Alliance for the Americas, 2009), analysis 
and benchmark for the laws of any cooperative legislation are made possible. In the next 
section of this chapter, we will use these guidelines to analyse the cooperative laws of New 
Zealand and Australia. Nevertheless, it must be stated that many of the issues found with 
cooperative laws may not have their origin within the specific cooperative legislation but 
rather in other laws and regulation that deal with other policies on taxation, anti-trust, 
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2.5 New Zealand and Australian Cooperative legislative environment 
The legislative environments that cooperatives operate within New Zealand and Australia 
have both similarities and fundamental differences. Both environments have common 
ancillary laws that govern taxation, anti-competitive (anti-trust) behaviour, unfair contracts, 
and corporations/ companies. However, contained within the detail of the laws mentioned 
above, a different approach can be observed. Primary cooperative laws are dissimilar in their 
origins influences and implementation approach. For example, cooperative laws in Australia 
are state-based laws but have a commonality in that they are mostly modelled on a non-
compulsory standardised law agreement. 
On the other hand, the New Zealand national cooperative law relies principally on provisions 
in the Companies Act 1993 and the Dairy Industry Restructuring Act (DIRA) 2001. When 
contrasted, there are advantages and disadvantages to each approach, yet when compared 
to best practice, the limitations of each model become evident. This section discusses the 
legislative environments of New Zealand and Australia, providing an analysis of the laws when 
evaluated against the theoretical framework of PECOL with minor modifications. 
 
2.5.1 New Zealand policy environment 
The New Zealand legislative environment for cooperatives besides the Cooperative 
Companies Act 1996, includes two other essential Acts that guide the application of the law, 
the Companies Act 1993 and DIRA 2001 with its associated amendments for dairy 
cooperatives. Other laws affect the operation of a cooperative in the legislative sense include 
the Companies Act 1993, Income Tax Act 2007, the Commerce Act 1986, the Competition and 
Consumer Act 2010, and other ancillary legislation. Additionally, there is the Industrial and 
Provident Societies Act 1908 (New Zealand Government, 2020) that can influence 
cooperatives; however, these are only for cooperatives and societies whose purpose is not 
for profit.  
 
All cooperatives are obliged to register simultaneously under the Companies Act 1993 and 
the Cooperatives Companies Act 1996. Additionally, dairy cooperatives are subject to further 
provisions as contained in Part 3 of the Cooperative Companies Act, where they are required 
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to register as a dairy cooperative.  Additionally, the provisions of DIRA 2001 apply for all Dairy 
business entities, including Dairy cooperatives. Special provisions are in force for cooperatives 
as contained within the Tax Act that relate to dividends, transactional (product/ service) pay-
outs and surpluses. New Zealand has enacted legislation to handle competition and anti-trust 
behaviour which is similar to other countries. The Unfair Contracts legislation is a more recent 
development where the legislation attempts to protect consumers from onerous or unfair 
contract terms. While this has not yet had much relevance within New Zealand, it is 
interesting to note that this legislation has been applied to supply contracts in other regions 
such as Australia (Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes—Dairy) Regulations, 2019) and 
may similarly be applied to New Zealand supply contracts in the future most likely within DIRA 
amendments. Additionally, other legislation such as the Food Act 2014 and the Animal 
Products Act 1999 applies to all Dairy business entities though only cover off general food 
safety requirements. Figure-2.2 below illustrates the legislative elements that govern New 











Figure 2. 1 The New Zealand Cooperative Legislative Environment 
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During the timeframe between the enacting of the Companies Act in 1993, Cooperative 
Companies Act in 1996, and the enactment of DIRA in 2001, there were external influencing 
factors that provided the opportunity to influence the evolution of the New Zealand 
cooperative legislative environment. However, many of these opportunities including the 
1995 ICA conference, the ILO Recommendation in 2002 and the subsequent reading of the 
ILO Recommendation 193 to the New Zealand parliament in 2003, resulted in no changes to 
cooperative law by applying the ICA principles of cooperation. Figure 2.3 below provides a 








Figure 2. 2 NZ Co-op Legislation Timeline and ICA Principles (showing Dairy Cooperative impact) 
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compared to other regions, links the Act to other commercial entities such as for-profit firms. 
The Companies Act 1993 deals with all business entities and as a result, has overarching 
provisions which are in force unless the specific provision in another Act (such as the 
Cooperatives Companies Act) overrides the Companies Act provision. Other regions have 
separated the registration of cooperatives from for-profit IOFs (IOFs) to ensure the unique 
identity of a cooperative remains intact. 
In contrast to other international laws, the New Zealand law does not differentiate between 
divisible and indivisible reserves, which allow for any dividends, surpluses or other payments. 
Section 22(4) treats the consideration for the surrender of shares as unsecured debt, other 
international regions have treated this as equity which allows it to be applied for capital 
borrowing. Cooperatives have recognised and well-documented difficulties in raising capital, 
so when lending institutions examine the Balance Sheet, they treat shares as debt rather than 
equity which negatively influences standard financial calculations and ratios.  The Cooperative 
Companies Act 1996 makes multiple mentions throughout the Act to the use of the 
constitution, allowing the same to override the provisions in the Act in numerous key sections. 
For example, under Section 33 the voting rights of the shareholders are limited to transacting 
shareholders, which as mentioned above could include other parties not necessarily supply/ 
service contact members, even though this provision can be overridden by the constitution 
of the cooperative company. It is not within the scope of this chapter to examine the 
constitutions to see how these provisions have been implemented; this is examined in the 
following chapter. However, it is sufficient to state the reliance on anything outside the Act 
could have governance consequences for cooperative members. Under Part-3 of the Act for 
cooperative dairy companies, section 39 ensures only suppliers can be shareholders but once 
again is subject to the constitution. The strength in the Act in this regard is that changing the 
constitution requires at least 90% of the shareholder vote. No provision is made for the 
cooperative company to report on a subsidiary company's performance unless once again, it 
is in the constitution. This omission could create a situation, for example, where members 
have no oversight of subordinate business entities of the cooperative. Other ICA-7 
international principles of cooperation are not evident other than the mention of the 
Democratic member control and partial provisions for Member economic participation.  
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DIRA has had far-reaching implications for the cooperative dairy environment. Although DIRA 
applies to not only dairy cooperatives but other business forms as well, the impact it has had 
on cooperatives when viewing the Act through the ICA principles lens is evident. DIRA was 
enacted to create two new entities, Fonterra and Livestock Improvement Corporation (LIC). 
It was enacted to legislate the merging of two dairy cooperatives, New Zealand Dairy Group 
(NZDG) and Kiwi Cooperative Dairies Limited. Additionally, the Act also formed the Livestock 
Improvement Corporation (LIC) and disbanded the Dairy Board (Woodford, 2015). There is 
evidence of ICA principles, either supporting these principles or negating them in some cases. 
Voluntary and Open Membership is entrenched in section 73, yet it is without the 
discriminatory provisions as stated within the ICA principle. 
Again, in section 49 there is mention of Democratic member control in which limits the voting 
rights of members although, the Act also allows for voting rights to be limited to a maximum 
of 1% of the total voting rights by any person. This provision conflicts with the one-member-
one-vote principle. 
Furthermore, in section 161 of the Act, there is a provision that allows for a subsidiary of a 
cooperative to own shares in the cooperative, which could affect member control. 
Additionally, there are numerous sections which have the effect of negating the Autonomy 
and independence principle in that it allows for the government intervention either through 
the Minister, other Acts, or regulations to limit the self-control exercised by the cooperative, 
see for example; Sections 51; 63; 64; 65; 71; 115. The remaining principles of cooperation are 
not in evidence, notable the Member economic participation, which is left mainly to the 
constitution, which is outside the scope of this chapter. In 2019, an amendment to the current 
DIRA legislation was enacted by the New Zealand parliament. These changes included the 
provision that Fonterra no longer is forced to accept new members where these members 
are either a conversion or moving from another cooperative. The effect of this change is to 
negate one of the most contentious principles of cooperation, that of ICA-1, Voluntary and 
Open membership. Additionally, Fonterra may also refuse to take milk from non-compliant or 
is considered to be non-compliant in the future, farmers based on Fonterra Standard terms 
of supply. Other changes that were of note were that Fonterra's standard terms of supply 
included provisions that encompassed sustainability rules which included environmental, 
animal welfare, and climate change. 
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Other legislation, which serves to support or negate the ICA principles of cooperation include 
anti-trust legislation which is governed under the Commerce Act 1986. This Act does not 
explicitly exempt cooperatives from many of the cooperative operational practices that might 
be deemed as anti-competitive. Contract law and in particular the Unfair contract legislation 
is governed by the Competition and Consumer Act 2010, which could impact cooperatives 
when negotiating a supply contract with a dairy farmer, for example. The legislative 
environment in New Zealand is complicated when compared to other developed regions; the 
effect that DIRA legislation has had on the dairy cooperatives has seemingly impeded the 
natural development of the cooperative law. However, the mandating of a Milk Panel to 
calculate the price of milk (DIRA 2001 S150) received from the farmers using specific criteria 
and having to show all calculations in setting the milk price has contributed in part to the ICA 
principle of Education, training and information. It seems by the absence of farmers protests 
concerning the milk price and calculation that this method is working effectively.  
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2.5.2 Australia policy environment 
Australian implementation of the law on the creation and operation of a cooperative is 
complex mainly as a result of the federal nature of the Australian Government. The laws that 
affect and hold powers over cooperatives include the Australian Constitution, the 
Corporations Act 2001, and other laws or regulations such as taxation law, anti-trust laws, 
accounting reporting standards, and ASX listing rules. Laws directly affecting cooperatives 
include the Australian Uniform Cooperative Laws Agreement (AUCLA) of which a number of 
states have signed-up to, as of June 2020 all eight major states and territories have enacted 
their own state-based cooperative law based on the AUCLA guidelines. Furthermore, the 
taxation on Cooperative surpluses is regulated by the Income Tax Assessment Act 1997. Other 
regulation such as the ASX listing rules similarly applies to those Cooperatives that have listed 
cooperative capital units or trading shares on the stock exchange and is regulated under the 
Australian Securities and Investment Act 2001 (ASIC Act 2001). 
 
Before 1901, Australia existed as six separate British colonies governed by the British 
Parliament and British law. The British Parliament enacted the Australia constitution, which 
came into effect on 1 January 1901. With this enactment, certain powers were transferred to 
the Australian Commonwealth Government while any specific state laws that were not in 
conflict with the central federal government laws would apply to that state in question only. 
The highest law in Australia is, therefore, the Australian Constitution, changes to which can 
only be made by public referendum. In 1986, all of the remaining legal links between Australia 
and the British Government were removed (Australia Act, 1986). The constitution is broken 
up into eight chapters dealing with various aspects of Government. For this section, only the 
pertinent chapters are listed. Chapter 4 deals with financial and trade matters. Chapter 5 
deals with the legislative powers of Parliament including what powers remain within the 
States including a specific provision to deal with Federal-State law conflicts where if there 
were an inconsistency of laws between the state and federal laws, the federal law would 
prevail. Finally, Chapter 8 describes the method by way of a referendum way the constitution 
is altered and lays out the requirements for the change using a referendum. Examining 
constitutional provisions that could affect trade, finance and the operations of a corporate 
entity, a few specific sections and subsections require mention. Under the Constitution, part 
51 | P a g e  
 
5 describes the legislative powers that the Parliament can use; in particular, Section 51(i) 
affirms that the Commonwealth has the power to legislate trade and commerce with other 
countries and between the States. Section 51(xx) affirms the legislative power the 
Commonwealth has as regards to "Foreign Corporations and trading or financial corporations 
formed within the limits of the Commonwealth". Under section 55 the Commonwealth has 
legislative power dealing with Tax and Custom/ excise.  
 
The Corporations Act 2001 was enacted under section 51(xxxvii) of the Australian 
Constitution, which allows a law to be passed by the Commonwealth once a matter has been 
referred to the central Commonwealth parliament by the State parliaments. In this case, the 
laws dealing with companies and corporations were referred to the Commonwealth and 
hence the passing of a federal law that has jurisdiction over all states. However, the Australian 
Corporations Legislation, by definition, applies only to "for-profit" companies. This definition 
is problematic when applied to cooperatives, and thus this legislation does not apply to 
cooperatives, and thus the need to create a set of laws governing the cooperatives at a federal 
level has been argued (Apps, 2016). Even the existence of large cooperatives that have capital 
units listed on the Australian Stock Exchange, while still retaining the member-control 
foundation, has not allowed these cooperatives to be included in a hybrid company structure 
law and could place these cooperatives at a distinct disadvantage to investor-owned public 
companies (Limnios et al., 2016). The Corporations legalisation governs commercial entities 
within Australia and is a federal law with all states are obliged to comply with the provisions 
contained within. Cooperatives are excluded from the Corporations legislation, however, are 
governed by State legislation by an agreement reached in 2012 in the Australian Uniform 
Cooperative Laws Agreement (AUCLA). The Australian model law includes the International 
Cooperative Alliance (ICA) accepted international seven cooperative principles. However, the 
linking of the provisions to the principle is not always explicit. Table 2.2 below illustrates the 
Australia State and Territory participation in AUCLA, highlighting any deviation from the 
standard AUCLA Cooperative law agreement. Figure 2.4 below lays out the major laws that 
affect cooperative operations within Australia. 
 













Figure 2. 3 The Australian Cooperative Legislative Environment 
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(AUCLA) from 1 January 2015. Queensland, on its exit, stated that it would predominantly 
follow the same principles of law as the AUCLA and this is reflected in its enacting law. This 
changed in 2020 when the new Queensland cooperative law bill was accepted in Queensland 
State parliament based on AUCLA (Co-operatives National Law Bill 2020). 
No State/ territory Part of 
AUCLA 
(Y/N) 
State Enactment / 
Commencement Year 






1 New South Wales Y 2012/ 2014 3/3/2014 Partial1 
2 Victoria Y 2013/ 2014  3/3/2014 Partial1 
3 South Australia Y 2013/ 2015 22/5/2015 Partial1 
4 Northern Territory Y 2016/2017 1/5/2016 Partial1 
5 Tasmania Y 2015/ 2015 12/08/2015 Partial1 
6 Western Australia  Y 2010 amended 2017 1/1/2017 Partial1 
7 Australian Capital Territory Y 2017/ 2017 1/5/2017 Partial1 
8 Queensland Y  2020/ TBD2 TBD2   Partial1 
Table 2. 2 Australian Cooperative Law Agreement Participation – State View 
Source: (NSW Fair Trading,2020) 
1 The enactments are largely silent in the application of ICA-7 Principles 5, 6 and 7. 
2 Queensland Government, while it has not yet commenced its new cooperative law, has passed the Bill and 
enactment is scheduled for 2021. 
 
The CNL commences at Part 1.1 (s3(b)) with the objects of the law, which are the legal 
registration and formation, the promotion of cooperative philosophy including the principles, 
practices and objectives. The CNL continues in that a stated objective is to protect the 
interests of the cooperatives, the members, and the public in the operations of the 
cooperative. The law further has as its object the accountability of the directors to the 
members; to facilitate self-management of the cooperative at all levels while encouraging the 
development integration of cooperatives at local, regional and national levels. Part 1.3 (s10) 
is a direct listing of the seven International Cooperative Alliance principles. The law references 
the Australian Corporations legislation in that Section 5F of the Corporations Act 2001 
excludes matters declared by States and Territories to be an excluded matter. Cooperatives 
and participating cooperatives are thereby excluded from significant parts of the 
corporations' legislation. In Australian law, there are two types of cooperatives (s17) a 
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distributing cooperative (s18), which is allowed distributions on surplus or share capital, and 
a Non-distributing cooperative (s19) that is not allowed to distribute any surplus or give 
returns on share capital other than the nominal share when a member exits the cooperative. 
Distributing cooperatives must have share capital, and non-distributing cooperatives may or 
may not have share capital. New cooperatives are formed by calling a formation meeting (s21, 
s22) and drafting rules (s23) and submitting these to the Registrar for approval (s24) along 
with a formation disclosure statement (s25). A cooperative becomes a corporation on 
registration by the issuance of a certificate of registration by the Registrar (s28). Existing 
corporations can apply to be registered as a cooperative under this act (CNL) with the same 
requirements as a new cooperative except that a two-thirds majority of eligible members 
must vote for the proposal. In Australian cooperative law, the doctrine of ultra vires which 
describes acts attempted by a corporation that are beyond the scope of powers granted by 
the corporation's objects clause or articles of incorporation or in the laws authorising a 
corporation's formation does not apply, granting the cooperative leave to operate outside its 
intended objects (s40). Notwithstanding the doctrine of ultra vires not applying, the rules of 
the cooperative may contain restricting powers to operate outside the cooperative's 
objectives, but this does not render an act that is not in the objectives of the cooperative 
invalid (s43). A cooperative's rules are binding on the cooperative and each member and 
between the cooperative and each director, the chief executive officer and between a 
member and each other member (s55).  
Under the CNL legislation (CNL Schedule 1), the rules of a cooperative must make provision 
for general membership issues, the rights and liabilities of the members, charges payable by 
members and the restrictions (if any) on the powers of the cooperative, and the board. 
Additionally, director issues including the number, qualification and voting of directors, how 
financial issues are dealt with and the procedure of calling general meetings of members are 
catered for within the CNL. Furthermore, the procedure of voting at the meetings, including 
the rights of members, the method of voting, and the necessary majority to carry resolutions 
is similarly included in the law (CNL). Likewise, the way that postal ballots will be handled 
needs to be specified, including the manner of voting how the resolutions and votes will be 
carried out and how the rules of the cooperative are amended. The rules should state clearly 
for the members benefit whether they are a distributing cooperative, which will distribute 
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surpluses, or in the case of a Non-distributing cooperative how it will distribute property at 
winding-up (Schedule1 s2-3).  
Member shares are dealt with by legislating the rules on share allotment, the minimum 
amount that must be paid before the share is allotted, in the AUCLA legislation, this value is 
10% for nominal value shares (s76 to s 78). Shares can be issued at a premium (s8) but cannot 
be issued at a discount (s79), and a cooperative can have more than one class of share as long 
as this is specified in the rules (s76(4)) and complies with the cooperative principles. General 
shareholding is legislated by ensuring the law considers joint ownership of shares (s81) 
additional shares (s82) and bonus shares (s85-s85). Becoming a member of a cooperative, 
including qualification and corporate members are contained in s110 to s115. Additionally, 
how membership is terminated is covered (s117 to s119). The rights and liabilities of members 
are moreover contained within the CNL legislation  
Part-3 of the legislation covers the protection of members as far as the board and 
management of the cooperative are concerned. For instance, the AUCLA states that there 
must be a minimum of 3 directors and 2 of these should be ordinarily resident in Australia 
(s172ss2).  Furthermore, one of the qualifications of the board as a whole contains a provision 
stating that the majority of directors must be member directors (s174) thereby protecting the 
interests of the members in ensuring there is no divergence away from the interests of the 
cooperative. Moreover, there has to be at least 50% of the directors' present at any board 
meeting, and a majority of these must be member directors (s175). If the rules permit, the 
board can delegate some functions to board committees made up of either directors or 
members or members and other persons as long as the members outnumber the "others" 
(s178). A cooperative should have a secretary of the board, and this person has to be an 
ordinary person who resides in Australia (s190, s191). The secretary has the same 
responsibilities as contained in the Corporations Act (s188). In protecting the members there 
are several provisions in the AUCLA for directors, officers and employees of a cooperative, 
the basis of these provisions are that these parties must act in the best interests of the 
cooperative and should take the cooperative principles into account when exercising 
judgement (s192ss2). Directors and officers have civil obligations to act in good faith, which 
mirrors the provisions of the Corporations Act (s181) and protects the members from self-
interested behaviour from any of directors, officers and employees (s193).  
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Members have one vote per member unless the rules provide that a member can have 
multiple votes limited to five (maximum) at any voting of any resolution (s228). However, the 
member right to vote attaches to membership and not shareholding. The chairperson can 
have a casting vote in the case of a deadlock. Eligible members can only vote, and inactive 
members are not allowed to vote (s230). Voting can be carried out by proxy (s229), and a 
representative can vote on behalf of a member and is entitles to the same rights of a member 
in every way (s234).  Unless the rules provide otherwise every question taken to the members 
for a decision must be decided by an ordinary resolution (s237). A simple majority of members 
passes ordinary resolutions at a general meeting or by a postal ballot of members (s238). A 
special resolution is passed by a two-thirds majority of the cooperative or postal ballot and 
by three-quarters of a Special postal ballot of members (s239). Special postal ballots are 
required on a requirement by members or any proposed compromise or arrangement 
between the cooperative and its members (s249). Annual general meetings are legislated as 
having to take place within five months of the end of the previous financial year (s252) with 
special general meetings can be called by the board at any time (s253). Each member is 
required to get at least 14 days' notice of the meeting before each of the general meetings; a 
quorum is as per rules of the cooperative and decisions are a show of hands or a poll on the 
discretion of the chairman (s255/s256). Meetings can be held on the request of the members 
who between the members have at least 20% of the total number of votes. The cooperative 
rules can change this percentage in need (s257ss1). Financial reporting and auditing 
appointment and removal follow the Corporations Legislation Act 2001. 
The Australian legislation makes provision for Cooperative Capital Units (CCUs) in the AUCLA, 
thereby allowing cooperatives access capital funding (s345). CCUs are defined as "an interest 
issued by a cooperative conferring an interest in the capital (but not the share capital) of the 
cooperative" (s345ss1). CCUs can be issued to non-members of a cooperative with the 
redemption of a CCU not seen as a reduction in the share capital of a cooperative (s352). A 
cooperative board may resolve to retain all or part of a surplus arising in a financial year to be 
applied for the benefit of the cooperative as a reserve (s355). A distributing cooperative may 
apply a part of the surplus arising in a financial year from the business of a cooperative, or 
from its reserves, to its members as a rebate; the distribution is carried out in proportion of 
the business with each member that the cooperative transacts with (s357). 
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Notwithstanding the provisions discussed above for Australian cooperative law, the direct 
linkage between the ICA-7 accepted principles as contained section 1.1 (b) and section 1.1, 
where the ICA-7 principles are listed, can be problematic. For example, the connection 
between ICA Principle-1, Voluntary and Open Membership, and the provisions as contained 
elsewhere in the Act is cannot easily be found. Again, in ICA Principle-3 of Member economic 
participation, the provisions intimate to the Replaceable Rules of the cooperative rather than 
spell the requirements within the provisions. Moreover, no provisions can be found for the 
ICA Principles of Education, training and information, Cooperation between cooperatives, and 
Concern for community. The ICA Principles that have linkages to the specific provisions include 
direct relation to Democratic member control, indirect connection to Member economic 
participation, and indirect connection to the principle for Autonomy and independence in that 
the cooperatives are regulated in a way that allows for independent operation with little 
government interference.  
Other laws impact the Australian Cooperative environment. One such law is the Competition 
and Consumer Act 2010, which regulates anti-competitive and general anti-trust behaviour. 
It is of note that in this instance, in a report by the Economics References Committee in August 
2017, one of the areas of concern was the anti-trust component. This difficulty is closely 
related to the United States anti-trust laws at the turn of the 20th century, where the anti-
trust laws of the late 19th century (Sherman Anti-Trust Act 1890) made collective dairy 
marketing illegal. However, in 1922 the Capper Volstead Act was enacted to give farmers 
limited exemption for organising marketing cooperatives (Münkner, 2013). The Senate report 
mentioned above relates to the Dairy industry, although the above-mentioned anti-trust laws 
and exemptions in the Unites States relate to cooperatives only. Another law that has created 
a challenge for the Australian Dairy Industry is the unfair-contract law. This predicament, 
within the cooperative environment, should not be possible if the law made provisions that 
were associated with the ICA identity and principles. Finally, the Australian accounting 
standards (AASB) for cooperatives treat the member shares as debt, whereas cooperative law 
theory suggests that this disadvantages Cooperatives and should instead be treated as equity 
(Apps, 2016).  
58 | P a g e  
 
2.6 Chapter-2 Conclusion 
The International Cooperative Alliance principles are well established throughout the global 
cooperative operating environment. Nevertheless, when examining the manner in which the 
principles have been implemented in various cooperative laws, a consistent approach cannot 
be found. For example, the United Kingdom (FCA) believed some of the principles were 
ambiguous and has redefined the ICA principles, Canada has rewritten the principles of 
cooperation as a "basis for cooperatives" in their law, the United States has their own unique 
set for state and federal guidance, and some regions are silent on the principles within their 
law. Furthermore, many of the regional implementations only legislate some of the seven ICA 
principles. Generally, implementations can be found where there is the legislating of Member 
control, Member economic participation, with partial support found in the legislation for 
Voluntary and open membership, and Autonomy and independence. Little support is found 
for Education, training and information, Cooperation among cooperatives, and Concern for 
community. Therefore, improvements are possible in both the local and international 
legislative environments to cater for a more comprehensive approach in translating the ICA 
principles into a law which improves cooperative governance and therefore can protect the 
voice of the cooperative owners, the members. 
 
In examining the New Zealand cooperative environment, it appears that the evolution of 
cooperative law, while being described as flexible (Woodford, 2008), has been impeded in 
some way by the enactment of Dairy Industry Restructure Act in 2001. The provisions in the 
DIRA 2019 Amendment Act have extended the current DIRA regulation timeframes.  With the 
next report on the state of dairy competition due after 2020, some form of deregulation of 
the dairy industry may be considered within the next few years.  This anticipated deregulation 
will potentially leave a gap in the law as far as cooperatives are concerned which the current 
Cooperative Companies Act 1996 might not satisfy. The fact that New Zealand cooperative 
law has not been updated since 1996, and cooperatives are still seen as a special type of 
company will impede the development of cooperative law within New Zealand. 
Consequently, New Zealand legislators should re-examine and update the current 
cooperative law to include provisions for the core ICA principles as already adopted in other 
regions. Furthermore, the cooperative law should be separated from the Companies Act 
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1993, allowing it to operate in its own right. These suggested changes would allow for a more 
contemporary cooperative policy environment which recognises the unique nature and value 
of the cooperative entity. 
 
The Australian Constitution allows for federally controlled and legislated commerce and 
trade. The Corporations legislation is Federally enacted while in contrast the cooperative 
legislation is state-based. For cooperatives in Australia to co-exist on an equal basis without 
disadvantage, would require a federal law similar but separate to the Corporations Act. Other 
regions globally have resolved this disadvantage, for instance, the Canadian legislation is 
state-based if a cooperative operates only within a state, however, if it operates in more than 
one state or exports goods outside Canada, the cooperative then falls under the federal 
legislation. This legislative model would allow for community-based cooperatives as well as 
catering for the sizeable regional and international cooperatives within Australia. 
Substantial progress has made to modernise and standardise the Australian state cooperative 
legislation since the Australian Uniform Cooperative Law agreement. An analysis of the laws 
found that the link between the ICA principles as contained in the Act and the provisions 
elsewhere in the Act was sometimes problematic. Additionally, only certain of the ICA 
principles were found, leading to the deduction that more is yet required in the legislating of 
the principles. Other legislation, such as the anti-trust laws in the Competition and Consumer 
Act 2010 could be interpreted as leading to a distinct disadvantage for cooperatives. 
Cooperatives, by their very nature, require a high degree of collaboration between their 
member-owners which could, in some cases, lead to a flawed assumption of anti-competitive 
behaviour. The United States, in the early 20th century, exempted some agricultural 
cooperatives from collective marketing as this is was not deemed as collusion but rather 
cooperation. The newly implemented Dairy Code of Conduct (2020) removes some of the risk 
associated with contracting between farmers and Processors in the dairy industry; however, 
this can interfere with the member-based governance mechanisms of a dairy cooperative. 
This code forces all processors to pay out the contract price for the season regardless and 
thus may not deal with the normal fluctuations of the dairy product prices where a 
cooperative can take, for example, a downturn to their members and agree on a price 
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reduction rather than a position where the cooperative could face liquidation. In effect, it 
should be left to the members to govern their cooperative even if this entails a reduction in 
the contract price for their milk rather than a government-enforced code without 
exemptions. This code of practice could cause ICA-4 principle of Autonomy and independence, 
which is designed to remove interference from governments. 
 
Further research is needed to understand the problems associated with some of the ICA 
principles that have been found hard to legislate.  The analysis approach taken in this chapter 
should be validated by other scholars in other regions to understand if the methodology 
employed can be applied to other regions. Finally, cooperative law has been found to be at a 
disadvantage when compared to other organisational laws, for example, IOFs, an analysis of 
the approach taken by other regions to make equal the laws in order for both organisational 
forms to co-exist on an equal basis should be researched and where possible, applied to 
remediate some of the concerns listed in this chapter. 
 
It was found that there is a significant and substantial reliance on the constitutions (New 
Zealand) and replaceable rules (Australia). Numerous provisions in both sets of cooperative 
legislation defer to these documents which can override the Acts. The analysis of these 
documents was not part of the scope of this chapter, although an understanding of how the 
provisions as found in the constitution or rules of the cooperatives change the law is an 
essential next step in understanding the operating environment for cooperatives. The 
following chapter, Chapter-3 will provide the analysis and understanding of these documents 
in more detail.  
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3. Chapter-3: The Cooperative Constitutional Document 
A Significant Member-governance Mechanism 
 
3.1 Chapter-3 Introduction 
Good governance of cooperatives has been linked to business performance in many academic 
studies (Challita et al., 2014; Kyazze et al., 2017; Bijman et al., 2013, others). On 
establishment, a cooperative is incorporated under the law of the country governing 
cooperatives (or companies in some cases). Many countries have legislated specific provisions 
that a cooperative has to comply with within its constitutional document. The consequence 
of these documents is that they allow the overwriting or modifying of specific cooperative law 
provisions by the provisions contained in the cooperatives constitutional document. The 
practice of allowing constitutional provisions to replace specific general provisions found 
within the respective laws is a common practice throughout the global legislative 
environment. Constitutional documents serve many purposes. They serve to comply with the 
mandatory provisions as contained within the specific country’s cooperative law; they also 
serve a purpose to document the membership rules around the services or product the 
cooperative deals with. Furthermore, the constitution is used to break up the mandatory 
provisions into more easily understood terms. Most regions that have mandated cooperative 
constitutional provisions have given the minimum compliance level rather than the 
maximum; thus, many cooperatives use this document to increase provisions or redefine 
some rules that apply to membership. 
This practice covers many different forms of business structures, including IOFs (see, for 
example, the New Zealand Companies Act 1993; Australian Corporations Act 2001). Globally, 
the constitutional document is referred to by many different terms including constitutions, 
replaceable rules, by-laws, articles of association, and memorandums of association. Since 
these allowed replacements are implemented outside the law for each cooperative, it is 
possible that the constitutional provisions can have far-reaching consequences, sometimes 
years after formation. When exploring the intent and content of the constitutions, an IOFs 
constitution would likely differ from a cooperative’s constitution, especially in the obligations 
regarding the relationship the entity has with its shareholders. For example, in a dairy 
cooperative, the shareholders are the suppliers of milk. Throughout the lifecycle of the 
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cooperative, provisions and rules should be adapted to suit the changing business 
environment and ongoing changes in strategy. It is theorised that cooperative constitutions 
have significant sections dedicated to ensuring that the member-owner governance of the 
cooperative is protected. 
Furthermore, changes to an entity’s constitution may affect different groups of stakeholders 
in different ways which can impact operational efficiency. For example, there is potential that 
the operational management of the cooperative will want changes to the constitution which 
will serve their requirements yet may not serve the requirements of the owner-members. 
Having an ongoing understanding of the constitutional provisions is critical for members to 
retain control over the cooperative that they formed. According to Tim Mazzarol (2009), the 
strengths and weaknesses of the cooperative model lie in the democratic control that the 
members have over the cooperative. This factor is central to the required member 
governance within cooperatives.  
Much of the research to date regarding cooperative governance has focused on evidence (or 
the lack thereof) of common governance challenges such as the portfolio problem, the 
horizon problem, and agency conflict, for example. Few studies have examined the effect that 
the combination of the allowed constitutional document provisions and the law have on 
member governance. It is hypothesised that the member-owners of a cooperative rarely 
make effective use of the constitution to enhance and maintain the core governance principle 
of member control. 
Besides the membership rules which are specific to a particular cooperative, ideally, there 
should be no need for a document that specifies additional provisions for the governance the 
owners have over the entity as the cooperative law of the country should be sufficient. In 
reality, however, there are very few countries whose cooperative law is detailed to the level 
where most o the governance provisions are provided for. The consequences of not having a 
cooperative constitutional document can have dire consequences for the cooperative in a 
particular country. Furthermore, the constitutional document is seen as improving base 
cooperative law provisions to the benefit of the members. This thesis chapter examines 
constitutional documents through the members' lens and compares different cooperative 
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constitutional documents to understand the nature and raison d'etre for a constitutional 
document. 
The first part of this chapter is a comparative analysis of the global statutory, constitutional 
provisions for cooperatives. This is followed by an in-depth analysis of the constitutional 
provisions of New Zealand and Australian Dairy cooperatives. An understanding of how 
effective the allowed law modifications in the constitutional document is central to 
understanding how members maintain the governance of their cooperative. The second part 
of this chapter examines the dairy cooperative constitutional document implementation in 
Australasia. The dataset under consideration includes seven agricultural dairy cooperatives, 
four from New Zealand and three from Australia. This data is important as it links the 
cooperative constitutional document provisions via the law to cooperative member 
governance. Without effective provisions in the law and the cooperative constitutional 
document, member governance could be compromised. 
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3.2 Chapter-3 Research Questions and Hypothesis 
This chapter examines the role of cooperative the cooperative constitutional document and 
how these have been implemented for various regions and then specifically for Australasia. 
This chapter uses the same ten countries for analysis as those used in Chapter-2.  
 
3.2.1 Overarching Research Questions:  
Is a cooperative constitutional document necessary, and how important is the constitutional 
document when considering member governance? How have constitutional documents been 
applied in Australasia?  
3.2.2 Overarching Hypothesis:  
The cooperative constitutional document is necessary for member governance. There is a 
relationship between the number of mandated constitutional provisions in the cooperative 
law and the hypothetical potential of member governance. 
3.2.3 Chapter-3 Research Questions. 
The overarching research question is broken down into components as listed below that assist 
in the analysis of this element of governance. These are proposed as follows where S-RQn is 
the number of the Subordinate Research Question: 
S-RQ1: What is the role of the cooperative constitutional document?  
S-RQ2: What support can be found for the constitutional document in cooperative laws from 
a selection of countries? 
S-RQ3: What are the relative strengths and weaknesses of dairy cooperative constitutional 
documents when contrasting their implementation in Australia and New Zealand? 
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3.3 The Constitutional Provisions of different countries 
In this section, we consider the provisions found within the law as it pertains to the 
constitutional document. Contrasting the different mandated cooperative law provisions for 
the constitutional document gives an understanding of the next layer of governance. The laws 
of ten countries are contrasted by establishing which provisions are mandated in the 
constitutional document. Classifying the mandated provisions according to those that could 
affect member governance of a cooperative, gains an understanding of the effectiveness of 
the law and constitutional document. A combination of the first four principles of cooperation 
from the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA-7), the United States Department of 
Agriculture three principles (USDA-3), and the Canadian Basis of Cooperation (Canada-8) eight 
overlapping principles were used. An examination of the cooperative principles that have 
been adopted, an understanding of the perspective from which the law is gained, including 
how the constitutional document provisions align with the accepted cooperative principles. 
It is of note that having more provisions mandated within the law for the constitutional 
document does not necessarily indicate a more robust governance structure, although having 
more can indicate a superior level of governance is possible.  
 
Very little has been published on the role of the constitutional document and provisions 
contained as part of it. A paper published by the Central International Cooperative Alliance 
(Dutta, R., Kumar, S. 2013) where the authors’ state for New Zealand “The need for a separate 
By-law does not seem to arise as cooperatives are not registered under a separate cooperative 
societies Act”.  Nevertheless, this research found that all cooperatives in this dataset do have 
a set of constitutional provisions which approximate to the by-law as mentioned in the text 
of this paper. Again, for Australia, the authors refer to the repealed cooperative law in New 
South Wales as the prevailing law, this law has been repealed and replaced by the Cooperative 
National Laws agreement (CNL) in 2012. No federal law for cooperatives exists at this stage 
for Australian cooperatives.  
 
An analysis of the mandated constitutional provisions for each country was undertaken in 
order to understand what effect these can have, if any, on the member governance for a 
cooperative. The country cooperative law sections that comprise the compulsory 
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requirements for constitutional documents have categorised into provisions that deal with 
member governance, membership rules, the regulator, and operations. The provisions that 
deal with day to day activities of the cooperative were categorised under “Operation/ 
Management”. Regulators may have a requirement in individual countries that could affect 
the running of the cooperative therefore have a category named “Regulator”. The 
“Membership Rules” category is the set of rules that form the operational member 
requirements including entry, exit, share ownership payment and any non-governance type 
rules. Any constitutional provision that affects member control, member benefit (or economic 
participation), member ownership, or if there are provisions relating to the information a 
member is required to receive are classified under the “Member” category. Directors are 
included under the member category as the Board of Directors can affect member 
governance of the cooperative. 
 
3.3.1 Methodology (Analysis of Cooperative Law Constitutional Provisions) 
The initial focus of this chapter is an analysis of the laws concentrating specifically on the 
mandated constitutional provisions of the ten countries. A combination of Comparative Legal 
Analysis (Van Hoecke, 2015), Document Analysis (Bowen, 2009), and Content Analysis 
(Krippendorff, 2013) were performed. The laws were compared using the Comparative Legal 
Analysis and where it required, Content Analysis. Van Hoecke (2015) stated: “When one tries 
to improve one’s own legal system, be it as a legislator or as a scholar; it has become obvious 
to look at the other side of the borders”. This chapter compares multiple cooperative laws, 
and thus, this methodology is appropriate. Ten countries cooperative laws were chosen for 
the comparative analysis based on their similarity to either the central law of New Zealand or 
the federal State-based laws of Australia. The cooperative laws of the chosen ten countries 
were downloaded off the government website of each country. Where required, the laws 
were translated into English using multiple online translation tools. Figure 3.1 below 
illustrates the analysis logic-path. Where the meaning of a specific provision was not clear, a 
combination of Content Analysis and Document Analysis was used to understand the 
underlying provision. 
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Figure 3. 1 Logic-flow for Classification Method 
Eight of the ten countries had laws in English, so no translation was necessary. The laws of 
France and Germany were translated using the above methods, and comparison on the 
translations was made to maximise accuracy. Where documents had to be translated (only 
for Germany and France), the three translation tools were applied, and a comparative analysis 
was performed looking at the output of the tools. Where there were substantial differences, 
these were reinputted into the same translation tool and compared against the original 
language. Content analysis techniques were then employed to understand the meaning of 
provisions within the law.  
Stage-1 Translated (French, German, 
Brazilian laws) using the tools listed 
Tool-1 Translation tool 
(Bing-translate – a 
Microsoft service which 















Collect official version of the Cooperative law off the individual country Government website 
Perform Document 
Analysis (qualitative) to 
classify the themes 
(Bowen, 2009) 
Perform Comparative Legal 
Analysis (qualitative) to 
understand strengths and 
weaknesses (Van Hoecke, 
2015) 
Perform Content Analysis 
to classify and code the 
governance themes. 
(Krippendorff, 2013) 
Stage-2 Compared Translations from Tool-1, Tool-2, and Tool-3 
(translation necessary)  
Results 
Tool-2 Translation Tool 
(Convert Adobe document to 
MS- Word then use Microsoft 
Word Translate (web) 
 
Tool-1 Translation tool (used MS-
Word (local) translate for those 
countries who had a Word 
version of th ir foreign language) 
law) 
Tool-3 Google-Translate Translation tool  
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Chapter-2 linked the principles of cooperation to the cooperative law finding that there was 
an overlap of principles between the ICA-7, the USDA-3 and the Canada-8 principles. This 
chapter uses the overlapped principles as a basis to perform an analysis of the mandatory 
constitutional provisions. Figure 3.2 below illustrates the coding techniques used to analyse 









Figure 3. 2 Code Tabulation  
Without looking into the governance challenges in this chapter, which is covered in the next 
chapter (Chapter-4), we can nevertheless separate the stakeholders into discrete groups. The 
member-stakeholder group is self-explanatory, but it may be pertinent to define the use of 
this group within this context. Members are those individuals that, in a dairy cooperative, 
supply milk to the cooperative for processing. Operational management stakeholders are the 
group of professional managers and staff that run the operational area of the cooperative and 
take direction from the Board of directors. Regulators are a separate stakeholder group 
which, in certain countries, require specific mandated reports including the oversight of 
amendments made to the constitutional document. Others make up the rest of the 
stakeholders, which are not discussed in this chapter. However, they include suppliers other 
than members, the community, the government separate to that of the cooperative regulator 
and other interested parties as defined by Freeman (2007). We then reclassify “Member” into 




(Includes Finance) (O) 
Member (User) 
Ownership (MO) 
Country Cooperative Law 
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Canada-8). Referring back to Chapter-2, overlapping principles included User-owner, User-
benefit, and User-control. Membership Rules was then added as the majority of the countries 
analysed mandated constitutional rules for members, for example how to gain admission, 
how to exit, how to supply, and so forth. Additionally, Member Information was included as 
a separate category under Member Governance since several of the countries provided for 
mandatory member information.  
 
3.3.2 Application of the constitutional document within the law 
The following table illustrates metrics which are useful in understanding the construct of the 
law and how the constitutional documents are applied. The laws of ten countries were 
tabulated using the methodology as described above; the metrics nevertheless rely on 
interpretation; however, the analysis does provide a clear indication of the governance 
“strength” of a particular country. The table was constructed using Figure 3.2 and using the 
approach described in Figure 3.1. The results of the analysis are in Table 3.1 below. 







Operational 5 2 6 5 2 2   6 6 34 
Regulatory 2  1  1  1   1 6 
  Membership rules  6 1 8 1 2 1   7 2 28 
Member Governance (13) (9) (8) (6) (8) (4)   (20) (7) 75 
  Member Control  8 4 3 4 6 1 1  14 3 44 
  Member Benefit/ 
economic 
Participation 
1 3 1 1 1 1   3 2 13 
  Member Ownership  2 2 5 1  1   2 2 15 
  Member 
Information  




26 12 23 12 13 7 2  33 16 142 
Percentage of 
Member Governance 























*Having a constitutional document is not mandated in the Act/ Law of India and New Zealand 
Table 3. 1: Number and Category of Mandated Constitutional Provisions, Analysis by Country 
For the full analysis of the ten countries, please refer to Appendix-3.1 “Analysis of 10 
Countries Constitutional provisions”. The totals reflect the number of mandatory provisions 
found within the current law of that country. Examining the percentages is of note that of the 
eight countries that mandated constitutional provisions within their laws, 53% of the 
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mandated provisions were dedicated to Member Governance. Brazil had 75% of the 12 
mandated constitutional provisions dedicated to member governance while Canada had the 
least provisions, with only 35% of the 23 provisions dedicated to member governance. Canada 
has more mandated provisions than any other country devoted to the Operational and 
Membership Rules categories. It is more useful to note that Brazil had 9 out of the 12 
mandated provisions while Canada had 8 out of 23 mandated provisions dedicated to 
member governance. South Africa had the most mandated constitutional provisions where it 
had 32 in total with 20 of these dedicated to member governance. 
Out of the ten countries, it is interesting to note that India and New Zealand do not mandate 
constitutional document provisions in their cooperative law. Furthermore, while India 
mandates that all ‘bye-laws’ be registered with the Registrar of Cooperatives, and any 
changes have to be approved by the same, they only publish a list of optional bye-laws and 
have no mandated provisions. In contrast, New Zealand law is silent on constitutional 
document provisions both mandated and optional. Additionally, the countries with mandated 
provisions either dedicate a section, two sections, or a schedule in their cooperative law that 
describes the required constitutional provisions. Other countries such as Canada, France, 
Germany, and the UK have a dual approach to constitutional documents using a combination 
of two documents to require provisions in each document. A summary of each country’s 
approach follows:  
Australia adopted a uniform cooperative law (Cooperatives Adoption of National Law Act 
2012 No 29, 2012). However, the incorporation of a cooperative is implemented at the State 
level, not being a federal, centralised law. Additionally, cooperatives can incorporate under 
the Corporations Legislation rather than the cooperative law as the Corporations legislation 
is a centralised, federal law and thus has some advantages over its cooperative law 
counterpart. Furthermore, each state can choose whether or not to adopt, and therefore join, 
the Cooperative National Law (CNL). For example, as of 2020, Queensland has adopted the 
uniform law agreement, although the commencement date is unknown as of June 2020 (Co-
operatives National Law Bill, 2020). Australia has the second-highest number of mandated 
provisions in its cooperative law. Additionally, they have the second-highest number of 
provisions dedicated to member governance as a whole. It is interesting to note that Australia 
has all three of the core member governance principles in evidence, which includes member-
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control (x8), member-benefit (x1), and member-ownership (x2). There are regulatory checks 
(x2) in place within their constitutional document, which serves as a check against any 
changes that could contradict the intent of the constitutional document aim. Furthermore, 
Australia has ensured that members get the information they require by mandating the 
furnishing of company reports before the general meeting. 
Brazil has taken a centralised approach to cooperative law (Brazil Cooperative Law - LEI 
5.764/1971 (LEI ORDINÁRIA) 12/16/1971, 1971), requiring cooperatives in any of the federal 
states to incorporate under the central cooperative law. Brazil has a total of twelve mandated 
provisions which is the second least number of provisions for the eight countries that 
mandate constitutional requirements within their cooperative law. All of the member 
governance mechanisms are in evidence. However, there is no regulatory oversight on 
amendments made to the constitutional document. Brazil has further mandated a minimum 
contribution to statutory reserves (Reserve fund, Technical reserve, Educational reserve, and 
Social assistance reserve) of not less than 15% of the surplus in each accounting year. As an 
additional member governance mechanism, Brazil has mandated a Supervisory board that 
has as its primary function of monitoring the management (operation) of the cooperative. 
Finally, Brazil has mandated that the directors of a cooperative can serve for a maximum of 
four years without extension. 
Canadian federal law has been covered in the analysis (Canada Cooperatives Act, 1998). All 
Canadian cooperatives that either operate in more than one state or export goods outside 
Canada have to be incorporated under this act. Canada has taken a dual approach for its 
constitutional documents, which include the Articles of Association and By-laws. There is an 
overlap in function between the two documents in that they both cover off operational and 
administrative activities as well as member governance principles and mechanisms. The 
“Cooperative Basis” (Canada-8) are contained within the Act requiring all compliance by all 
cooperatives. The Articles of Incorporation can restrict the powers of the directors and the 
Board using a mandated provision. The construct of the law is such that all by-laws are 
member governance-related only. Under Canadian law, the Minister has the power to appoint 
a director on any cooperative board. Canada has also mandated that two-thirds of the 
directors have to be member directors and furthermore all directors have a maximum term 
of 3 years. There is no regulatory oversight on amendments to the constitutional documents. 
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The European Union (EU) law (Statute for a European Cooperative Society (SCE), 2003) has 
been constructed similarly to the other federal laws discussed above. As the EU law serves 
similar to a central government made up of various states, it was included. If a cooperative 
span more than one EU member country, then they will be incorporated under this 
cooperative law. There is a provision for a two-tier controlling structure having a supervisory 
organ and a management organ; this is not mandatory. However, a member may not serve 
on both of the organs simultaneously, although there is a provision that member states may 
require the management organ to be appointed by a general meeting rather than the 
supervisory organ (Board of Directors). The statutes (constitutional document) are broad and 
allow for interpretation as well as flexibility.  The supervisory organ may not represent the 
cooperative in contract negotiation or litigation; this is the accountability of the management 
organ. Three-quarters of the supervisory organ have to be members. 
Notwithstanding the EU law for all member states, a cooperative will be governed by the law 
in the member state in which it has its registered office. There is a mandatory requirement 
for the establishment of a legal reserve fund which needs to at least equal to the subscribed 
capital of EUR30,000. Until the reserve is reached, not less than 15% of the surplus will be 
added to the reserve. The EU law allows non-members to be admitted as investor-members, 
though they may not own more than 25% of the voting rights of the cooperative.  
French cooperative law (Law No. 47-1775 (Statute of Cooperation), 1947) has been updated 
many times since the original law was enacted, this analysis covered off consolidations until 
July 2018. France has allowed non-members to hold up to 49% of the total voting rights and 
has limited that non-members benefit by no more than 20% of the cooperative turnover. 
Board members (directors) are not paid and can only be compensated on expenses as well as 
time spent on the administration duties. The Mandatory articles (Article-7) are brief and are 
broad, similar as expected to that of the EU central law (see above). The constitutional 
provisions include the mandatory allocation to a statutory reserve of not less than 50% of the 
surplus. There are no member-owner provisions, and member-benefit provisions are limited 
to the “reserve” mandatory provision. There is a provision (Article 26) to allow for a two-tier 
structure with the management board acting under the control of the supervisory Board, 
similar as discussed within the EU section above.  
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German cooperative law (Law on the Cooperative and Business Cooperatives 
(Genossenschaftsgesetz – GenG, 1889) has the least number of mandatory provisions when 
compared to the other nine countries in this analysis. This law was last amended in 2017, 
which updated some provisions. German law has a system of dual constitutional documents 
having both a Statue §6 and Articles of Association §7. The statutes include provisions 
whereby, in the case of cooperative insolvency, the members have limited or unlimited 
liability.  The provisions, as contained in §6 of the law, are broad and are supported by §7 
which covers the Articles of Association. The German law further states in §9 that the 
cooperative must have both management as well as a supervisory board although this is 
waived for small cooperatives with less than 20 members in which case there will only be a 
supervisory board. 
Indian law (The Multi-State Cooperative Societies Act, Act No. 39 of 2002, 2018) is based on 
the ICA accepted principles of cooperation (See Schedule-1). It does not mandate what the 
contents of the by-laws (S10) are within its legislation. Nevertheless, it does require bye-laws 
to be present (see S5(b)). Additionally, the law mandates other member governance 
mechanisms within other sections. For example, it does mandate that any changes to the bye-
laws must be lodged with the Registrar of Cooperatives for approval and oversight (S11). 
Furthermore, the law does publish a list of what the bye-laws may contain (S10). Provision 
(S25) allows for either federal or state governments to sit on the Board of a cooperative 
despite the ICA “Independence and Autonomy” principle.  
Two primary laws govern New Zealand cooperatives, that of the Cooperative Companies Act 
(1996) and the Companies Act (1993). Furthermore, dairy cooperatives have to register under 
Part-3 of the Cooperative Companies Act as a Cooperative Dairy company (S34). Dairy 
cooperatives should moreover understand the provisions contained in the Dairy industry 
Restructure Act of 2001 (DIRA) and amendments. The Cooperative Companies Act (S7), 
requires a cooperative to apply for concurrent registration under the Companies Act (S12). 
When considering S12 (f) of the Companies Act, “(f) if the proposed company is to have a 
constitution, accompanied by a document certified by at least one applicant as the company’s 
constitution”, having a constitution is optional. However, when examining the Cooperative 
Companies Act, it mandates the registration of a cooperative dairy company “A cooperative 
company, the principal activities of which are, and are stated in its constitution as being, all 
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or any of the following…”. Likewise, the Act states that suppliers have to be shareholders with 
S39(3) stating “The Registrar must not register a cooperative company as a cooperative dairy 
company under this Part of the Act unless the constitution of the company complies with this 
section”. Finally, changes to the constitution under Section 42 of the Act require a vote of not 
less than 90% of the shareholders entitled to vote unless this number changed in the 
constitution. This section, in some ways, implies that a constitution is required for New 
Zealand cooperative companies. 
 
South African law (Cooperatives Act 14 of 2005, 2005) has thirty-three mandated provisions 
giving South Africa the highest number of mandated constitutional provisions when 
compared to the other countries in this analysis. Furthermore, South Africa has linked its law 
to that of the ICA cooperative principles in the definition (S1). Furthermore, the law states 
how it aligns with the cooperative principles (S3). The mandated provisions within its law 
encompass all the member governance mechanisms having twenty-seven separate provisions 
and of those, fourteen provisions for member-control. Moreover, the law caters for member 
information as well as mandating a Registrar of cooperatives who checks the constitution for 
compliance on registration as well as checking all amendments are consistent with the 
cooperative principles as set out in S3.  
 
The United Kingdom cooperatives legislation (Cooperative and Community Benefit Societies 
Act 2014, 2014) includes community benefit societies as well as cooperative societies. The 
mandated provisions for the cooperative are broad, and as a result, the law has to cater for 
both cooperatives and community societies. The Registrar for cooperatives is the Financial 
Conduct Authority (FCA) which is different from the Company Registrar for the United 
Kingdom. The mandated provisions for the constitutional document encompass all of the 
member governance mechanisms, including member control, member benefit, member 
ownership, and membership rules. The Registrar (FCA) checks the constitutional document 
for compliance on registration as well as any amendments.  
 
 
75 | P a g e  
 
3.3.3 Findings (constitutional provisions of different regions) 
Most countries’ cooperative law includes a section which makes it a mandatory requirement 
for the constitutional document to conform to specific provisions. New Zealand and India are 
exceptions to having mandatory provisions in the constitutional document. The provisions 
that had the highest number of mandatory provisions for cooperative constitutional 
documents was for member governance, with 53% of the total number of provisions 
dedicated to this. Out of the member-governance sub-categories (Member Ownership, 
Member Benefit, Member Control, and Member information), Member control was found to 
have the highest number of provisions with 44 out of 75 or 59%. Additionally, it was significant 
in that out of the total number of governance provisions within a constitutional document; 
member governance accounted for more than 30% of the total. Out of the ten countries, 
provisions that encouraged the sharing of cooperative information with members were found 
to have the least number of provisions with 5 out of a total of 142 provisions, or 3.5%. The 
countries that had the highest number of member governance provisions (South Africa and 
Australia) had provisions that mandated information sharing. 
Following the significant Member Governance category, the next highest number of 
provisions was found to be dedicated to the Operational category; this category covered the 
day-to-day operations of the cooperative business. After Member Information, Member 
Benefit was found to be the next least mandated provision for constitutional documents, 
several provisions were found within the Membership Rules that were associated with the 
Member Benefit category; however, the provisions were more related to the cooperative 
business stipulating the manner of transacting rather than mandating member benefits.  
As above, many of the mandatory provisions for Member Ownership was found to be more 
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3.4 The constitutional documents of New Zealand and Australia dairy 
cooperatives.  
In this section, a case-study approach is taken to analyse each of the constitutional documents 
of the seven dairy cooperatives from Australasia by examining the provisions for member 
governance. A new Australian dairy cooperative, Green Pastures, was not included in the 
dataset as the cooperative was formed recently (in 2018) and was not yet fully operational. 
The study identifies how many of the constitutional provisions in each cooperative can be 
linked to the accepted member governance principles of cooperation. By linking the 
constitutional provisions back to the law and therefore, the principles prove a clear path from 




An analysis of the constitutional provisions of each cooperative in this study was undertaken, 
in the context of the cooperative law of their home country. Australia has mandated 
provisions for its constitutional document (Rules) within its cooperative law. However, New 
Zealand cooperative law implies that a constitutional document (constitution) exists, 
although it has no mandated provisions. The constitutional documents for Australia were 
obtained directly from the cooperatives websites and confirmed with cooperatives that the 
Rules version is current. For the New Zealand cooperatives, each constitutional document 
was downloaded directly off the Companies Website (Companies Office, 2018) as it is a 
regulated requirement for companies (and cooperatives) to register their constitutions with 
the Companies Office. The constitutional document formed the primary data source for the 
analysis. A combination of Comparative Legal Analysis for the constitutional provisions found 
within each law, Document Analysis for the constitutional document itself to construct a table 
and confirm the major classifications, and Content Analysis for the coding of the 
constitutional provisions and assigning these to each major classification, an analysis of each 
cooperative was performed. The linking back of these to standard member governance 
mechanisms was examined, similar to the first section where the laws were analysed. Finally, 
a comparative table contrasting the provisions from each of the Australian and New Zealand 
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cooperative constitutions was produced. The following diagram, Figure 3.3, presents the 
















Figure 3. 3 Australasian Constitutional Document Analysis Logic-flow 
Earlier in the chapter, common themes were found when analysing the respective 
cooperative laws for mandatory constructional provisions, these were found to be Member 
Ownership, Member Benefit, Membership Rules, Member Information, and Member Control. 
Under Member Control the analysis was further analysed resulting in three distinct sub-
categories which included the control Member Control over Voting (MCV), Member Control 
over Member Meetings (MCM), and Member Control over the Board of Directors (MCB). We 
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seven cooperatives that the themes found were consistent with what was found in each 
constitutional document. The data within each constitutional document was broken down 
regarding provisions that applied to each of the major themes. Additionally, during the 
analysis and coding phase, we found that there were consistent common sub-themes across 
the cooperatives within the study. Appendix-B documents the full coding schema that was 
created to perform the content analysis of each of the cooperative constitutional documents. 
3.4.2 Australian Dairy Cooperatives Overview 
There are three established Australian dairy cooperatives which are ADFC, DFMC, and Norco. 
Two of them, NORCO and ADFC, are incorporated under the new cooperatives law 
(Cooperatives (Adoption of National Law) Act 2012 No 29, 2012) with ADFC un-incorporating 
itself as a cooperative and re-incorporating under the centralised federal Corporations Law in 
2016. Although ADFC incorporated under the Federal Corporations legislation, it remains 
wholly member-owned and member-controlled, a cooperative in all but name. As a result, 
ADFC has been included in the analysis. Furthermore, ADFC retained the cooperative 
constitutional document that it had before 2016, which was when it was incorporated under 
the Victorian cooperatives law. An evaluation of the annual reports was undertaken to 
tabulate some important metrics as a comparative tool as well to gain an understanding of 
the scale of operations. Table 3.2 highlights some key financial and other comparative metrics 











No of supplier shareholders 73 
 (Page, 2018) 
350 
("About Us - DFMC", 
2018) 
*215 
Revenue *AU$55.7m *AU$132m *AU$555.625m 






Payment for milk *AU$54.350m (Assumed 
cost of material = 
payment made to 
suppliers for milk) 
AU$130.3m *AU$132.945m (Pg39) 
Milk price equivalent per litre 
(average) 
*AU$0.437 per litre 
average (calculated)  
*AU$0.5225 per litre 
(average) 
*AU$0.5742 per litre 
(average) 
 
Length of time operated 







*denotes information found in Annual Report for each cooperative  
Table 3. 2: Comparative Table for Australian Dairy Cooperatives  
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Two of the three Australian dairy cooperatives perform milk collection only, both ADFC and 
DFMC sell all the milk to the respective partner companies on a contract basis. Norco 
processes the milk into several products, including milk for the retail market and second stage 
manufactured dairy products and ingredients. 
 
3.4.3 Australia Dairy Cooperatives Findings 
ADFC re-incorporated itself under the Australian federal Corporations legislation after 
removing itself from the Victorian Cooperative law (Cooperatives (Adoption of National Law) 
Act 2012 No 29, 2012). As found in Chapter-2 (“Cooperative Law”), there is evidence that 
suggests that it could be more beneficial for a cooperative to be incorporated under the 
federal Corporations law rather than under the state-based cooperative law. This re-
incorporation supports the findings in Chapter-2 that there is not a level playing field between 
the two laws in Australia. 
DFMC, which incorporated itself under the cooperative law of New South Wales, updated its 
constitutional document multiple times containing references to the repealed Cooperative 
Law of 1992, suggesting that either the Registrar is not functioning as it was intended or that 
DFMC did not comply with the requirements of Registrar signoff. The Registrar is accountable 
to register the new rules and additionally for vetting that the rules conform to the law. This 
example suggests that either the Registrar performs an administrative function only or that 
the constitutional document of DFMC was not sent, as required by the law, to the Registrar 
for approval. Furthermore, the fact that DFMC refers to repealed legislation in its 
constitutional document implies that the Board, the company secretary, and the members 
are not regularly reviewing this critical document.  
Some provisions in the NORCO constitutional document could be seen as anti-competitive in 
that a provision exists that allows the cooperative to force members to buy products and 
services from one of the cooperative businesses. The Registrar should have found these 
provisions when they examined the constitution. Furthermore, NORCO can force members to 
provide loans to the cooperative entity which would be seen as unsecured loans, although 
this would require a special resolution by its members. What is more, on analysis, it was found 
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that the constitutional document contains a number of both material and non-material errors 
which may indicate the level of importance that the cooperative entity places on this 
important document.  
 
3.4.4 New Zealand Dairy Cooperatives Overview 
As of January 2019, there were 4 New Zealand dairy cooperatives: Dairy Goat Milk 
Cooperative; Fonterra; Tatua; and Westland. All of the New Zealand dairy cooperatives have 
been registered under the Companies Act 1993, the Cooperative Companies Act 1996 and as 
Dairy cooperatives. Fonterra was formed by way of legislation, namely the Dairy Industry 
Restructure Act 2001 (DIRA) which consolidated New Zealand Dairy Group, Kiwi Cooperative 
Dairies, and the government-controlled Dairy Board (“NZ Dairy Timeline”, 2018). The Dairy 
Board, together with the cooperatives mentioned above, could be described as an ill-defined 
joint venture or public-private partnership. An evaluation of the annual reports from each of 
the cooperatives was performed to tabulate some fundamental metrics as a comparative tool 
as well as understanding the scale of operations. Table 3.3 highlights comparative key metrics 

























*$19,232m *$328m *$630m 
Milk collected 45m litres (2016) 
(Scholtens, Lopez-
Lozano & Smith, 
2017) 
*17,051m litres 167m litres *699m litres 
(pg20) 
Payment for Milk *$105.568m *$9,471m (pg14) *$106.241m *338.691m (pg25) 
Milk price equivalent per 
litre (average) 
$2.3460 per litre  
(calculated) 
$0.5556 per litre 
(calculated) 
$0.6362 per litre 
(calculated) 
$0.4845 per litre 
(calculated) 
Farm Gate price ($ per 
kg milk solids) 
*$18.50/ kgs MS *$6.12/ kgs MS *$7.10/ kgs MS 
(pg42) 
*$5.18/ kgs MS 
(pg20) 
Length of time operated 









*denotes information found in Annual Report for each cooperative  
Table 3. 3: Comparative Table for New Zealand Dairy Cooperatives 
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The New Zealand dairy cooperatives all perform the end-to-end functions of milk collection, 
manufacturing, the creation of speciality ingredients, and marketing and the sale of the 
products. Additionally, Fonterra setup a dairy commodity trading platform called Global Dairy 
Trade (“GlobalDairyTrade”, 2018). Although it is operated independently from Fonterra 
Cooperative Group, it is nevertheless a wholly owned subsidiary of Fonterra. In the next part, 
we analyse each of the cooperatives separately examining each of the constitutional 
documents. New Zealand does not have a separate Registrar for cooperatives companies; all 
companies, including cooperatives, register their required documents with the Companies 
Registrar. 
 
3.4.5 New Zealand Dairy Cooperative Findings 
The DGC constitution was changed in 2013 annual meeting but was only amended to reflect 
the changes in 2016 where it was uploaded under the 2015 date. This could indicate that the 
constitutional document may not be seen as important to the directors and that members 
perhaps do not reference this document regularly. Additionally, the change increased the 
number of non-member directors which could negatively impact member control. DGC (as 
with some of the other cooperatives in this study) restricts the availability of information to 
non-directors (including members) which does increase the risk of asymmetrical information. 
This provision refers back to the Companies Act 1993 S24 “secrecy of information”. This 
section should be reconsidered or agreed that it can be overwritten by the Cooperative 
Companies Act of 1996, although the Act does not bar the constitutional document from 
overwriting or modifying this section. 
When analysing the Fonterra constitutional document provisions, it was observed that under 
the Qualification of Directors rule that a person who was a shareholder of an entity that was 
a supplying shareholder in Fonterra could be elected as a member director. A check on the 
seven farmer directors in the 2017 annual report showed that three were possibly working 
farmers, the others consisted of a member director who was a full-time lecturer and the other 
two owned interests in a supplying shareholder but did not farm themselves. This 
qualification could weaken member control by electing member directors who are not full-
time, supplying farmer shareholders. The voting on postal ballots in Fonterra can skew the 
voting rights in favour of larger shareholders as the votes allocated are in direct proportion 
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to the number of Milk Shares a supplying shareholder owns, which is based on milk supply 
quantity.  
In the constitutional document of Tatua, the director quorum is five directors; however, there 
is no requirement for member directors to make up the majority. Examining the 2018 director 
make-up on the Tatua website (“Tatua”, 2018), there are seven directors which include three 
appointed directors. This can result in non-members having more say than members. 
Similarly, with Tatua, some member-directors would not pass other countries’ director tests 
as they would not qualify as suppliers. 
In the constitutional document for Westland the provision that covers the number of member 
directors’ states that there will be five member-directors yet the 2017 annual report 
(Westland, 2017) states that 6-member directors were employed indicating that the number 
of member directors has changed without updating the constitutional document.  
 
3.5 Discussion of Comparative Findings  
Both New Zealand and Australia cooperatives within this study of the dairy cooperatives in 
New Zealand and Australia had differing laws, noting that New Zealand does not mandate the 
creation of a constitution within its Companies Act (1993). However, constitutional 
documents were present for each dairy cooperative in this study with many similar provisions. 
Certain aspects of Australian cooperative member governance were found to be more 
developed than that of New Zealand member governance. The areas that Australian members 
had more advanced provisions over the New Zealand cooperative members were in the 
categories of Member Benefits, Member Information, and Member Control. Analysing the 
sub-categories of Member Control, Australian Members constitutional provisions were 
superior to that of their New Zealand counterparts in the sub-categories of Member Voting, 
and Board composition and procedure. Table 3.4 below displays the categories with the 
respective scores, for the detailed score, please refer to Appendix-3.3 attached hereto.  
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Item NZD NZF NZT NZW NZ 
Ave 
AUA AUD AUN Aus 
Ave 
Member Ownership Totals 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Member Benefit Totals 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 3.67 
Membership Rules Totals 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Member Information Totals 1 2 1 1 1.25 2 4 3 3 
Member Control 21 17 19 20 19.25 29 25 26 26.67 
Member Vote Totals 8 4 3 4 4.75 8 9 9 8.67 
Member Meetings Totals 8 8 11 10 9.25 12 10 9 10.33 
Directors and Board Totals 5 5 5 6 5.25 9 6 8 7.67 
TOTALS 26 23 24 25 24.5 36 35 36 35.67 
Key New Zealand:  NZD = Dairy Goat; NZF = Fonterra; NZT = Tatua; NZW = Westland 
Key Australia: AUA = ADFC; AUD = DFMC; AUN = NORCO  
Table 3. 4: Results from Content Analysis Phase  
 
As can be concluded from Table 3.4 above, the members in Australia had a distinct advantage 
in specific areas of member governance that their New Zealand cooperative members did not 
have. Please refer to Appendix 3.2 and Appendix 3.3 for the detailed analysis of how the 
numbers were reached. The implications of this finding are that Australia, through the 
adoption of ILO Recommendation 193 modernised their law and thereby allowed members 
greater control to the members. In contrast, New Zealand law was not modernised as a result 
of the ILO recommendation, and as Chapter-2 found DIRA has perhaps obstructed the natural 
evolution and development of contemporary cooperative law, this may be to the detriment 
of cooperative members however this statement will be more fully analysed in Chapter-4 
where the thesis examines cooperative governance problems. Common to both countries was 
the Membership Rules category where although the specific provisions differed marginally, 
overall the provisions only differed in the expected characteristics of the active member 
provisions which included how a cooperative member joined, how the member left, how the 
member transacted with the cooperative, and how member shares were treated. 
Furthermore, no provisions from this category were found that, on analysis of the seven (DGC 
Fonterra, Tatua, Westland, ADFC, DFMC, Norco) cooperatives in this study, affected member 
governance materially.  
There were common provisions that were observed in each constitutional document, besides 
the Membership Rules category already discussed above. For example, one-member-one-
vote was common to all Australian cooperatives, so too was the fact that a surplus from 
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operations would be dealt with in proportion to the patronage of the members. Again, the 
voting of member-directors was common as well as the method of voting in a member general 
meeting with the show of hands. All cooperatives used a simple member majority for voting 
on resolutions. Finally, of the Board of directors, none were limited by provisions in any of the 
cooperative constitutional documents. 
A cooperative member benefits through the services provided by the cooperative, in the case 
of a dairy cooperative the primary benefit is the collection and processing of the Milk into 
various products and the marketing of these products. However, the Member-Benefit 
category (mentioned above) analysis looked at the constitutional provisions for dealing with 
the surpluses, oversight of the debt and leverage of the cooperative, examining the dividend 
structure, and whether there was a dispute provision within the constitutional document. As 
already mentioned, the provisions that surplus would be dealt with has already been 
discussed above. However, on examination of the debt and leverage provisions, it was found 
that the oversight on these critical aspects of a cooperative by the members was only found 
in the Australian cooperatives through information requirements (ADFC Constitution, 2015; 
DFMC Constitution, 2017; Norco Constitution, 2017). In contrast, the New Zealand 
cooperatives (DGC Constitution, 2019; Fonterra Constitution, 2016; Tatua Constitution, 2015; 
Westland Constitution, 2017) had no provisions in this regard. This finding is significant as 
access to information does allow for an open and transparent operation which would be to 
the members’ advantage. Dividends are also an important indicator of Member Benefit and 
Member Control in keeping the correct balance between internal member-owners and 
external investors. The reality of the dairy cooperatives in this study was that the larger 
cooperatives were more likely to carry out an external capital raising to expand their 
operation, while the smaller cooperatives could raise capital almost exclusively from their 
members. The balance between the external parties and the members has been the topic of 
much research; it is not covered in this Chapter but is discussed in the next chapter, Chapter-
4. However, if there is tension between the internal member and external investor groups, it 
is clear that this is to the detriment of members and increases the complexity of the surplus 
division between the two groups. Australian cooperatives allow for a dispute or grievance 
process, except for ADFC (ADFC Constitution, 2015) which is incorporated under the federal 
Corporations Law. When examining the New Zealand cooperatives, Fonterra had a dispute or 
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grievance procedure that would deal with any member issues in this regard. Fonterra allows 
the dispute or grievance process to cover both the situation between members and the 
cooperative or between members and other members. The documenting of a provision in the 
constitutional document that supports member access to a dispute and grievance procedure 
is vital to member control and allows for an open and transparent operation. 
Asymmetrical information is examined in more detail in the next Chapter, Chapter-4. 
However, provisions were found in the constitutional documents of seven cooperatives that 
mandated member access to statutory information which included annual reports and 
member meeting minutes. Provisions for members to examine more than the statutory 
requirements were found in the Australian cooperatives, including allowing members to 
examine all registers of the cooperative (ADFC Constitution, 2015; DFMC Constitution, 2017; 
Norco Constitution, 2017). This access included the right to examine the Interests Register 
where directors have to enter any personal interests; but also the interest that the 
cooperative had in other entities as well as the register of securities to and by the cooperative. 
Information access is essential as members can obtain a full picture of the debt and leverage 
as this can impact their Member Benefit for both the payment for their products and the year-
end surplus distribution. An analysis of Member Engagement found that some cooperatives 
set up member-based committees tasked with supporting the directors with the supervision 
of the cooperative, these committees included members that did not sit on the Board of 
Directors (DFMC Constitution, 2017; Norco Constitution, 2017; Tatua Constitution, 2015). 
Fonterra has a membership committee (Fonterra Constitution, 2016), and two of the three 
Australian cooperatives had the same (DFMC Constitution, 2017; Norco Constitution, 2017). 
The majority of the cooperatives in this study had supervisory committees in addition to the 
ones mentioned; these were tasked with aspects of governance which, as they were external 
to all directors, reduced the governance workload on the Board as a whole.  
As discussed in the Methodology section above, the Member Control category was by far the 
category that had the most significant number of provisions that could affect Member 
Governance, this was expected and found within in all the constitutional documents. It was 
found that there were three major distinct sub-categories for Member Control which included 
Member Control over Voting (MCV), Member Control over Member Meetings (MCM), and 
Member Control over the Board of Directors (MCB). It is clear that these sub-categories 
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cannot be separated as they all have overlapping responsibilities and relationships with each 
other. 
In order to maintain control of the cooperative, members must have the right to vote for all 
directors, not only the member directors. As the appointed, or independent, directors can 
guide the cooperative in ways that are not always in the members best interests; members 
have got to have voting rights for these directors as well. The analysis found that all the 
Australian cooperative members had rights to vote for non-member directors. In one of these 
cooperatives, non-member directors were appointed by the Board; however, the 
appointment was required to be ratified at the next general meeting by the members.  
Common to all cooperatives was the requirement that members voted for the member-
directors. The procedure differed negligibly.  The rules around appointing directors were 
similar in the constitutional document provisions. Again, all cooperatives voted using a show 
of hands with each member having one vote. However, polls are treated differently between 
New Zealand and Australia cooperatives in this study. Australian cooperatives allow only one 
vote per member on polls in addition to the show of hands while the New Zealand dairy 
cooperatives are aligned more to milk-shares by allowing multiple votes dependant on how 
many shares the member had (DGC Constitution, 2019; Fonterra Constitution, 2016; Tatua 
Constitution, 2015; Westland Constitution, 2017). Fonterra (Fonterra Constitution, 2016) had 
no upper limit, and the votes a member has is in direct proportion to the number of milk 
shares he/she has. The other two New Zealand cooperatives have upper limits (DGC 
Constitution, 2019; Fonterra Constitution, 2016; Tatua Constitution, 2015; Westland 
Constitution, 2017), one being a maximum of 5 votes and the other a maximum of 10 votes 
per member. The central tenet of cooperatives is member democratic control, the allowing 
of multiple votes skews the votes in favour of larger members, who could be separate 
independent corporations. Supporting this finding was the provision in all cooperatives 
constitutional documents that voting was not attached to shareholding with the exclusion of 
one New Zealand Dairy cooperative, Fonterra.  
Member meetings are essential to exercise member democratic control over the cooperative. 
The Board calls general meetings so sufficient notice should be provided to members of the 
place, time, and date of the meeting in order to preserve the member control over the 
cooperative. The analysis on the constitutional provisions as regards the notice of general 
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meetings found, except for two Australian cooperatives, the cooperatives in this study all had 
provisions that set the notice period of 2 weeks or ten working days. One of the exceptions 
allowed for 21 days, and the other allowed for an informal notice of 90 days. As cooperative 
members can be geographically spread across regions in both New Zealand and Australia, an 
analysis of the provisions that allowed for attendance other than in person was undertaken. 
Only three of the seven cooperatives had provisions that supported the electronic attendance 
of members via an audio and video link (Fonterra Constitution, 2016; Westland Constitution, 
2017; DFMC Constitution, 2017). Flexibility in allowing members to attend general meetings 
via other means would encourage members to attend meetings and vote on resolutions. 
Member engagement is not covered yet in this chapter, but it is sufficient to state that more 
member engagement could support a healthy cooperative (Mazzarol et al., 2012; Hendrikse 
& Veerman, 2003). Common again to all cooperatives in this study was that a simple majority 
of members passed an ordinary resolution. Special resolutions differed between the two 
regions cooperatives with two Australian cooperatives having provisions in their 
constitutional documents that set the majority at 66% of members (DFMC Constitution, 2015; 
Norco Constitution, 2014); the last Australian cooperative is incorporated under the 
Corporations Legislation (ADFC Constitution, 2015) which mandated a 75% majority 
(Corporations Act 2001, 2001). New Zealand cooperatives relied on the Companies Act of 
1993 to leave the minimum majority of a special resolution to be passed if 75% of the 
members voted for it, no New Zealand cooperatives constitutions modified the percentage. 
Member quorum percentages for the cooperatives in this research ranged from 0.47% for the 
lowest, to 16% for the highest quorum percentage. Having a low quorum can place pressure 
on the democratic process in that resolutions could be passed without sufficient members 
supporting the resolution. The calling of special meetings is a tool that the member can 
employ to force a Special General Meeting, this right to call a special meeting is essential if a 
group of members do not believe the cooperative, including the Board, is acting in the best 
interests of the members as a whole. The analysis found that all the cooperatives had 
constitutional provisions in this regard. However, one cooperative from each New Zealand 
and Australia had higher member numbers or milk-share requirements to be able to call a 
special meeting. The General Meeting of members is a statutory annual event requiring the 
Board to provide the members with the chance to elect directors, cooperative annual financial 
position, an update on operations, and how a surplus, if any, will be distributed. The timing 
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of this meeting to maximise attendance requires both flexibility and adequate notice. It was 
found that all the cooperatives had constitutional provisions that called the Annual General 
Meeting within the peak-three months of the member’s milk production operations. 
Convening this meeting at the busiest time of the year for the members would possibly result 
in low attendance and engagement.  Except for a single New Zealand cooperative in this study 
(Fonterra Constitution, 2016), changes to the constitutional document are only allowed by a 
special resolution majority of the members. The single New Zealand cooperative (Fonterra) 
that did not have provision for changing the constitutional document had a provision 
delegating this to its Shareholder Council which alone could make changes to this critical 
document.  Having Government support while not eroding the autonomy and independence 
of cooperatives is imperative for the cooperative entity. Australia has a dedicated Registrar 
of cooperatives that are tasked with vetting any constitutional document changes; this 
supports member governance ensuring changes to the constitutional document is linked back 
to a special resolution passed by the required majority of members. 
Directors and the Board are critical ingredients of member governance maintenance (Carr et 
al., 2008; Gijselinckx et al., 2009; Birchall & Simmons, 2003). While all cooperatives in both 
New Zealand and Australia voted for member directors, albeit with slightly different rules, an 
analysis was undertaken of what constitutional provisions provided for a member-director 
majority, or not. The analysis found that in New Zealand, the definition of a member director 
was weaker than that of Australia allowing persons “who had an interest in a supply” to 
become member directors while Australia the member director had to be an active supplier. 
Furthermore, three of the four Boards of the New Zealand cooperatives could have a majority 
of appointed, or non-member, directors attending a board meeting. The Australian 
cooperative laws (which includes all the various state-based legislation) mandates a 
requirement to have a majority of member directors on the board as well as the quorum for 
a board of director vote. New Zealand, on the other hand, did not specify a member-director 
based majority in their Cooperative Companies Act 1996 and left the board makeup to the 
cooperatives themselves to manage. The effect of this omission is that independent, or 
appointed, directors could outnumber the member directors and thus take decisions that are 
not in the members best interests, therefore weakening member control in that cooperative. 
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All cooperative boards in this research were given unlimited powers to manage the 
cooperative business. 
Notwithstanding the constitutional provisions, members with limited information could find 
themselves in a situation where directors were making decisions that affected the member’s 
interests without any oversight. Furthermore, the notice period to call a directors meeting 
was found to be, on average, just two days. All the cooperative boards except for one New 
Zealand, catered for electronic meetings within their constitutional document, thereby 
making it easier for directors to attend when not close to the place of the meeting.  Moreover, 
it was found that the norm was that a single director could call a director’s meeting except 
one New Zealand and one Australian cooperative. Directors’ terms were all limited to either 
3- or 4-years although only one cooperative in Australia had specified a maximum number of 
years to serve as a director in their constitutional document. Director-quorums were 
examined to ensure that a quorum protected the member’s interests. However, it was found 
that out of the seven cooperatives in this study, the majority had not specified the make-up 
of the director quorum. The quorum is significant as a meeting called by a single director with 
little notice could result in the situation where not all directors attend the meeting resulting 
in board resolutions being passed without a member director majority or even in the worst-
case, any member involvement.  
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3.6 Chapter-3 Conclusion 
Constitutional documents are an allowed method of tailoring the law to suit the cooperative 
entity. This document serves its members by allowing the modifying of the provisions in the 
law and by the creation of rules for the cooperative to maintain good member governance. 
In many regions, there are mandatory requirements for cooperative constitutional 
documents. Even those countries that have not mandated a constitutional document such as 
New Zealand, the evidence in this study reveals that cooperatives have published a 
constitutional document regardless. The conclusion can, therefore, be reached that all 
cooperatives require a constitutional document, and the law should mandate minimum 
provisions that support the creation of the member governance document.  
In this chapter, those countries with more mandated provisions in the law resulted in more 
member governance provisions in their constitutional document. Certainly, in the case of 
Australasia, more provisions can be equated to more governance potential for members, we 
can conclude that having more mandated constitutional provisions within the cooperative 
law of a country can lead to more options for effective member governance.  
In the case of New Zealand, certain provisions were found to weaken member governance, in 
particular, poll provisions that gave votes in proportion to milk produced rather than a show 
of hands where each member present has just one vote. Additionally, on analysing the 
quorum required for member meetings, it was found that the numbers were unexpectedly 
low when compared to the minimum default requirement in the law of 50% for a cooperative 
without a constitutional document. The quorum ranged from less than 0.5% to 16% of 
member numbers using 2017-member statistics.   
Furthermore, it was found all cooperatives in this study scheduled their Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) within a month of the peak milk season. The scheduling of one voting meeting 
per year in the busiest time of the year for members to have their say can lead to long 
timeframes where the cooperative may be forced to make decisions on behalf of the 
cooperative without the necessary member input.  Furthermore, together with the AGM 
meeting schedule and the low quorum requirements, member engagement in the 
cooperative could be negatively impacted. 
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New Generation Cooperatives (as in New Zealand) have weakened the Democratic member 
control as part of their structure as voting rights are determined by milk shares rather than 
membership. It is unclear whether this is an efficient system, and the issue is addressed 
further in Chapter-5, which examines member-perception of governance. 
New Zealand cooperatives are incorporated under the Cooperative Companies Act 1996 
being a subordinate Act to the Companies Act 1993. A provision exists that restricts 
information to shareholders (S24 Companies Act “secrecy of information”). The requirement 
for access to information for cooperatives members differs from the information required for 
shareholders of IOFs. When comparing New Zealand to Australia, it was found that the 
Australian cooperative constitutions had all increased the requirement for information that 
members could access supported by the cooperative law. It is therefore concluded that New 
Zealand law is less effective when supporting open and transparent information access as a 
result of restricting member access to information which is vital for good member 
governance. 
Again, when analysing the New Zealand director qualifications, we found that a person can 
be classified as a member director if they own an interest in an entity that is a supplying 
shareholder. This indicates that it is possible that member directors are no more than equity 
shareholders, and it is possible that they do not understand dairy farm operation. The 
weakening of the qualifications for a director could result in a New Zealand cooperative 
having a Board of Directors that are not farmers which could result in decisions being made 
at the board level that could negatively impact member governance.  
We conclude from the New Zealand information access restrictions and qualifications for a 
director that undue emphasis has been placed on the Companies Act 1993 rather than 
understanding the nature of a cooperative which is formed and owned by its members. 
Although the Act does not bar the constitutional document from overwriting or modifying 
this section, these sections should be reconsidered or explicitly allowed to be overwritten by 
the Cooperative Companies Act of 1996,  
Australian law as regards the mandated constitutional document is more advanced than 
many of the other regions as can be seen from the analysis. However, when analysing the 
constitutional document of the dairy cooperatives, it was found that there were technical 
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issues within some of them. For example, in one cooperative by referring to a repealed law 
places both the cooperative members and the cooperative business in unnecessary risk. 
Additionally, the creation of a Registrar of cooperatives should remove the risk of non-
compliance with the cooperative law. Nevertheless, it was evident that the constitutional 
documents were either published without Registrar approval or that the Registrar performed 
administrative functions only without ensuring compliance of the provisions with the law. It 
can, therefore, be concluded that the function of the Australian Registrar of cooperatives is 
possibly misunderstood and could be more made effective by educating cooperative 
members and their cooperative business operations.  
Finally, the findings support the conclusion that the constitutional document is an under-
utilised tool for member governance as the emphasis in many cooperative constitutional 
documents is on the operational aspects and rules that members have to adhere to rather 
than supporting good member governance. The constitutional document, when effectively 
employed, has the power to enhance member governance of the cooperative.  
Understanding the implementation of the cooperative principles and the law, together with 
the constitutional document, should negate many of the governance challenges that 
cooperatives face. Further research is required to examine the mitigating effect that the 
Cooperative Principles and Cooperative Law (covered in Chapter-2), and the Constitutional 
document (this chapter) has on the unique governance challenges that cooperatives face.  
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4. Chapter 4: Cooperative Governance Challenges 
 An Inspection of Mitigation through the Layers of Governance 
 
4.1 Chapter-4 Introduction 
Hansmann (1999) stated that shareholders of IOF entities could be compared to cooperative 
members in that both have input to the central entity where the investors' input is capital and 
the cooperative member's input could be milk in the case of a dairy cooperative. However, 
the reason for the formation of the cooperative in the first place may have more to do with 
the structure it adopts than Hansmann takes into his account. Zeuli and Cropp (2007) mention 
reasons why cooperatives form, which include market failure, excess supply, new market 
opportunity, economic crisis, disrupting technology, farm organisation collaboration, and 
favourable cooperative policy. Of particular interest is the agricultural cooperative, which 
exists to manufacture products from perishable goods. This is not to say that an IOF could not 
perform the same function in the market, but the raising of the capital for the building of a 
manufacturing facility is more likely to be successful when committed parties provide equity. 
For instance, several farmers using their equity in land and livestock as collateral for a loan 
would be more likely to succeed when compared to an IOF trying to raise capital from financial 
institutions where the firm does not hold the equity. The advantage to farmers is they 
collectively control the price mechanism while an IOF would attempt to drive the input costs 
to the minimum.  
Oxford Dictionaries (Oxford Dictionary, 2020) defines residual as the “Remaining after the 
greater part or quantity has gone”. In this thesis, we use the word as described in the 
definition, meaning that after the process of mitigating the governance problem, what 
remains of a particular problem is the residue or the remaining residual problem. This chapter 
considers residual risks and challenges that cooperatives face when using a combination of 
principle, policy, and other governance practices to minimise the adverse effects identified 
by existing economic theories. In order to understand how cooperatives are affected, an 
examination of the Theory of the Firm is undertaken, followed by the more general economic 
theories. A study of the various problem mitigating tools at a cooperative's disposal is 
undertaken to understand what residual problems remain after the application of the various 
policy instruments. The array of mitigating tools includes the principles of cooperation, the 
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policy aspect of cooperative and other law, the constitutional document, and other 
governance tools which include industry bodies. It is hypothesised that evidence pertaining 
to the corporate governance theories would be found within cooperatives inferring that the 
governance difficulties faced by cooperatives are similar to those faced by corporate firms. It 
is further hypothesised that the combination of the problems that corporate entities and the 
unique additional problems of the cooperative entity are partially mitigated by principles, 
policy, and the constitutional document. When countries create legislation, it would be 
beneficial if the law minimised governance issues and, in that way, afforded more oversight 
to stakeholders and especially owners. In the case of cooperatives, the principles are used as 
a basis to create the law governing cooperatives in a particular country; it is suggested that 
the law should mitigate, to a substantial extent, the governance problems that cooperatives 
face. The remaining governance problems could be addressed by a well written constitutional 
document. Hence this analysis of the principles, the law, and the constitutional document to 
identify ways to minimise the governance issues of a cooperative. 
Figure 4.1 below depicts a hierarchy of theories resulting in partial mitigation by the use of 











Figure 4. 1: Economic Theory, Mitigation and Residual Problems 
Principles (Common Law) / Policy: Law & Legislation/ Constitutional Document/ Other Audit) 
Governance Problem Mitigation  
 
Economic (Firm) Theories 
Existential Theories - Theory of the Firm: Coase, Knight, 
Williamson, Grossman, Cyert & March, Alchian & Demsetz, 
Mitigation 
Residual Problems and Challenges 
• Control 
• Free Rider 
• Horizon  
• Portfolio 
 
Operational Theories: Incomplete Contracts, Moral Hazard, Agency, Resource 
Dependency, Asymmetrical Info, Adverse Selection, others 
• Portfolio 
• Influence Cost 
• Quality of product 
• Cherry-picking 
• Director Anonymity  
Residual 
Problems 
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The structure of this chapter has two sections. Initially, the chapter examines economic 
theories that relate to governance. The output from this analysis is then applied to 
understand how these theories of governance relate to cooperatives entities. This theoretical 
framework is then applied to the theoretical framework to cooperatives in Australia and New 
Zealand to understand their success (or lack of) in mitigating the governance challenges that 
cooperatives might face. The findings from the previous chapters concerning the Cooperative 
Principles, the Law, and the Constitutional Documents are employed to understand the level 
of mitigation from a general perspective.  Other governance artefacts such as the cooperative 
financial reports, website, and press releases are added to the analysis to form a 
comprehensive picture of the residual cooperative challenges faced by Australasian 
cooperatives.  
4.2 Economic Theories 
This section provides a brief synopsis of the major Theories of The Firm (ToF). Examing the 
various economic theories enables us to separate these into two categories, that of the 
reason for the existence of the firm and the operational theories that affect the control of the 
firm. The rationale for this separation is that the Theories of the Firm – the existential theories 
are all about why the firm exists while the remaining theories cover off the way firms operate. 
Although IOFs have different structures, objectives, and possibly differing strategies, it is 
necessary to understand the cooperative entity when viewed through this lens.  This section 
seeks to link cooperatives to the Theory of The Firm which has been built from a number of 
core contributions. There are a few other contributions to the theory; however, many of these 







Figure 4. 2: Theory of the Firm  
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The Theory of the Firm explains why a firm exists as a separate entity rather than relying solely 
on the market. Coase (1937) is acknowledged as being the first to postulate a theory of the 
firm. However, some scholars suggest that Knight (1921) may have predated Coase in the 
neoclassic theory of the firm. Coase's theory (1937) is based on the argument that a firm 
would exist if the internal costs of a transaction exceeded the external costs of a transaction. 
Relating this to cooperatives, specifically dairy agriculture cooperatives, one can understand 
that the cost of milk collection or a dairy processing plant would be far out of reach for a single 
farmer. The farmers setting up a separate entity to handle collection or processing could be 
seen as aligned with the neoclassic theory. 
Cyert and March (1963) extended the Theory of the Firm by developing a theory that is based 
on how decisions are made within the firm. It is known more commonly as the Behavioural 
Theory of the Firm; there are many extensions to the theory that have been proposed by 
other scholars. They believed that the firm should not be seen only as a single entity but 
consisting of individuals and groups of people within the entity, with all making decisions in 
complex situations based on their own cognitive ability. They further believed that firm 
behaviour is the outcome of the conflicting interests of the individuals and groups within the 
entity. They coined the phrase "bounded rationality" which is applied to individuals and 
groups that, when limited by their own cognitive ability, make decisions to achieve objectives 
that they can understand rather than maximise profit in all circumstances. Cooperatives suffer 
from the same limitations as a firm as they employ in a similar manner, and it is suggested 
that the cognitive ability in most circumstances would mirror that of an IOF. Generally, all 
firms, whether they be cooperatives or IOFs, suffer in a similar way from the limitations of the 
decision-making described in this theory.  
Williamson (1975, 1985, 1986) devised a theory of the firm based on asset specificity. Asset 
specificity refers to the use of an asset for a particular purpose and spans the physical asset 
through to the human asset or skill. The acquisition of such an asset would not be 
economically justifiable when used just once, in the same way, a human skill required 
infrequently would not be justifiable either. The theory postulates that a firm would form 
around the use of that asset in order to employ the assets for separate discrete purposes. A 
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cooperative milk processing plant, in keeping with the example of a dairy cooperative, would 
be an example, so too is the collection of milk using specific trucks that could not be used for 
other purposes.  
The Grossman, Hart and Moore (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995) 
approach to the theory of the firm was based on property rights and incomplete contracting. 
The three authors collectively over time argued that there are no contracts that are complete 
as a possible result of asymmetrical information and the fact that not every eventuality could 
be thought of at the time of the contract negotiations. As a result of incomplete contracts, 
the "incomplete" part of the contract would be solved by property rights, as the owner of the 
"property" would control the rights. This materially affects the future negotiation of the 
parties to the contract. Dairy (and other) Cooperatives, from the organisational perspective 
minus the ownership layer, would be susceptible to the property rights difficulty external 
from the cooperative organisation (not the input farmers) to the customers who use the 
cooperatives products as input to their production difficulty. The associated incomplete 
contracting problem would manifest itself here as well. This assumes the farmer-owners act 
in the same way as investors in a corporate IOF entity 
In the "Team Production" view of Alchian and Demsetz (1972), efficiency is gained by the 
creation of a team rather than operating as individuals. The group of individuals are guided 
and monitored, by the owners, in the creation of products which will then be on-sold to other 
households or firms. The concept of individual shirking required the monitoring of efficiency 
to the lowest level of the employee. Demsetz (1995) sums up the specialisation theory of the 
firm as, "the bottom line of specialisation theory is that firms exist because producing for 
others, as compared to self-sufficiency, is efficient; this efficiency is due to economies of scale, 
to specialised activity, and to the prevalence of low, not high, transaction costs" (Demsetz 
1995: 11). A cooperative is mentioned in the original work of Alchian and Demsetz as an 
organisational structure that could be less efficient than the other forms, notably the IOF. This 
was as a result of multiple ownership of the cooperative which is not easily synchronised to 
have a common goal for the "team". However, the inefficiency aside, the cooperative 
organisational form would have similar problems that are encountered by other forms of 
business as on that perspective the cooperative has no significant differences employing 
people who form part of teams and directed by managers reporting to a Board of Directors.   
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Jensen and Meckling Nexus of Contracts Theory of the Firm postulates that the firm exists as 
a series of contracts between the various stakeholders including the owners, directors, 
managers, employees, suppliers, and customers. "most organisations are simply legal fictions 
which serve as a nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals" (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976, p. 310). When examining contracting complexity in the stakeholders of a dairy 
cooperative entity, the supplier and owner are the same person which could simplify the 
contracting model by removing one item from the contract-chain. As the cooperative entity 
has a very similar structure at the organisational level to that of the corporate and other 
entities, there is no real substantial difference in the way contracts of the stakeholder are 
conducted.  
There are other models associated with the Theory of the Firm; however, many of these are 
variants on the major theories discussed above. One additional cooperative positioned 
Theory of the Firm is the Social Systems Theory of the Firm of Valentinov and Thomson (2019) 
where the authors base their argument on Marshall's book Principles of Economics (1890). 
They argue, using Marshall work, that "the principles of complexity reduction and critical 
dependence translate into the demand for and supply of social systems". They believe that a 
trade-off between complexity-sustainability results in a trade-off between coordination and 
cooperation. 
In addition to the above "existential" theories, there are a number of theories that have been 
postulated by different scholars that describe the theories that affect the operation of a firm, 
for the purposes of this analysis they have been labelled as the "operational" theories. The 
illustration below represents these theories. Please note that while these theories have been 
explained as being separate and able to "stand" by themselves, there are linkages to both the 
Theory of the Firm as well as the problems that firms encounter when the adverse effects of 
these theories are not minimised. 
 
4.3 Governance Problem Mitigation 
Governance mitigation tools are usually specific to the region in which they operate. For 
example, the mitigation of Governance problems in Australia would be reliant on how the 
Principles of Cooperation have been implemented in the Cooperative law (See Chapter-2 
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"Principle-based Co-operative Law "for more information on how the principles are 
embedded into Australasian Cooperative law). The Principles can be viewed as a type of 
"common" law; however, the policy implementation, as was seen in Chapter-2, is very 
different for the two countries.  Cooperative law exists in each State impact Federally other 
laws such as the Consumer Protection laws, and even the laws of taxation have an impact on 
cooperatives. Furthermore, regulation such as the Dairy Code of Practice announced in 2019, 
would also affect how the governance problems can be mitigated. In New Zealand, the 
situation is similar where cooperative governance problems are being mitigated by the 
Cooperative Law, the Companies Law, and DIRA to an extent. Any other regulation that could 
possibly favour one organisation structure over another would also have to be examined for 
both countries. So too is the application of provisions in the Constitutional document which 
(See Chapter-3 "The Cooperative Constitutional Document" for more detailed information) 
can have a substantial mitigating effect on the residual Governance challenges that 
cooperatives face.  For example, specific provisions to allow more member governance would 
allow for more oversight which could limit the Governance problems. However, costs 
associated with increasing governance challenges are real and have to be taken into account 
as will be discussed below as well.  Publicly listed companies are regularly checked by analysts 
and when financial reports are published, the analysts, as well as the stock exchange 
compliance officers, analyse the details and publish their opinions of how the company fared. 
This process is healthy as it opens all public companies to scrutiny that is not as evident in 
privately owned entities which include cooperatives.  
 
4.4 Residual Governance Problems 
No matter how much problem minimisation and mitigation take place, there will always be 
evidence of the residual, or parts of the governance problem, that could not be fully negated. 
After application of the mitigation tools, there are a number of known governance problems 
that continue to manifest themselves. This section looks at each of the Governance problems 
individually and analyses the symptoms, the background, and how the problem is affected by 
the Australian and New Zealand environments of Australasia. No matter to what extent the 
mitigation tools are applied, there will always be residual problems remaining. However, the 
effectiveness and impact of these problems can be minimised through a combination of 
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principles, law, constitutional documents, and good member engagement for cooperatives. 
Cooperatives face similar governance challenges to that of IOFs; however, due to the social 
nature of cooperation, there are a few additional governance concerns of cooperatives that 
could shape the governance structure. Before a comparison is made with the governance 
issues between an IOF and cooperative we first need to look at the cooperative specific 
problems and why these are distinctive to cooperatives generally and then look at the theory 
of the firm and how this is applied, or can be applied, to a different business model, the 
cooperative. Once again, the view taken is that of the dairy cooperative within Australasia.  
 
4.5 Method 
This chapter used Document Analysis (Bowen, 2009), and Content Analysis (Krippendorff, 
2013) and the output from the previous two chapters. The challenges that affect cooperatives 
are well documented with much research dedicated to the understanding of how these 
problems shape modern-day cooperatives. Nevertheless, the underlying mitigation factors 
that could minimise the impact of these problems have not been adequately researched. 
Notwithstanding the mitigation and minimisation of cooperative governance problems, 
residual governance problems will always remain. However, it stands to reason that the 
greater the mitigation, the smaller the residue of the governance problems, and the more 
successful a cooperative will be in its operation. Using a combination of the principles, the 
law, and the constitutional document as defined as the Cooperative Policy Framework (CPF), 
each of the known problems was examined to understand the level of mitigation when 
applying the CPF to the particular problem. Much of the analysis of the governance problems 
and how they relate to the cooperative policy environment has been completed in previous 
chapters. See Chapter-2, Principle-Based Co-operative Law and Chapter-3, The Cooperative 
Constitutional Document for further analysis on the Law and the constitutional documents of 
the two regions. It is therefore prudent to summarise the analysis of the previous chapters 
before we commence with the findings and discussions on the governance problems that 
cooperatives encounter and how these can be minimised or mitigated by the cooperative 
policy environment.   
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The principles of cooperation have been adapted over the years, notwithstanding the 
adaptation, some regions have created their own set of cooperative principles (USDA-3 in 
America), others have a subset of the ICA-7 principles to define a cooperative in their 
legislative environment (FCA in the UK); still, others have created a "basis of cooperation 
definition" (Canada in their Federal law), and others have decided to remain silent on the use 
of cooperative principles in their law (New Zealand). Table 4.1 below depicts the timeline that 
cooperative principles have taken over the past 150 years. 
1844-1899 1900 - 1949 1950 - 1999 2000 - 2019 
1844 Rochdale Equitable 
Pioneers 
Formation of the entity, 
no real organisational 
law for this form yet. 
1937 International Co-
operative Alliance (ICA)  
Adopts original Rochdale 
Principles as the 
Rochdale Principles of 
Co-operation. 
1966 International Co-
operative Alliance (ICA)  
 removal of "Limited 
Interest on Capital" and 
"Cash trading" principles 
from Rochdale-7, now 
ICA-6 (1966) 




193 - ICA 7 Cooperative 
principles adopted 
1895 International Co-
operative Alliance (ICA)  
Formation of the 
International 
Cooperative Alliance, 
Rochdale principles are 
adopted as the first set 
of principles 
  1987 United States 
Department of 
Agriculture (USDA)  
proposes three principles 
of cooperation, some 
overlap with Rochdale-8 
(from 1966 ICA 
principles) 
 2009 UN  
Resolution 64/136 
declares 2012 as 
the International Year of 
Cooperatives 





seven principles (ICA-7) 
2012 UN  
Launch of the 
International Year of the 
Cooperatives. Three 
main objectives: Increase 
Awareness, Promote 
Growth and Establish a 
legal framework for 
cooperative formation/ 
growth 
    1998 Canada  
Canada (Federal 
government) published a 
set of "cooperative basis" 
principles which included 
eight cooperative basis 
operation. These overlap 
with the ICA-7.  
2013 USDA  
re-examines USDA-3 
against the ICA-7 
principles and 
recommends no change 
(USDA-3 remain) 
Table 4. 1: Timeline for Cooperative Principles 
As can be seen, by the chronology above, the ICA principles have been subject to a number 
of changes since they were first crafted in Rochdale by the Weavers; however, it seems that 
the principles are not always adopted either in full or in part. The embedding of these 
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principles in the law is crucial to mitigate the effects of the governance problems that 
cooperatives face.  
The law has, in most cases, mandated the creation of a constitutional document which can 
have a material effect on the governance of a cooperative, Table 4.2 below displays mandated 
provisions for ten countries in the world including Australia and New Zealand.  







Operational 5 2 6 5 2 2   6 6 34 
Regulatory 2  1  1  1   1 6 
Membership rules  6 1 8 1 2 1   7 2 28 
Member Governance (13) (9) (8) (6) (8) (4)   (20) (7) 75 
  Member Control  8 4 3 4 6 1 1  14 3 44 
  Member Benefit/  
  Economic Particip. 
1 3 1 1 1 1   3 2 13 
  Member Owner 2 2 5 1  1   2 2 15 




26 12 23 12 13 7 2  33 16 142 
Percentage of 
Member Governance 























*Having a constitutional document is not mandated in the Act/ Law of India and New Zealand 
**This table is duplicated from Chapter-3 for ease of reading 
Table 4. 2: Number and Category of Mandated Constitutional Provisions, Analysis by Country 
When the mandated provisions were applied to Australasian dairy cooperatives, Table 4.3 
below shows the effect of having a cooperative constitutional document by contrasting 
Australia and New Zealand as far as member governance provisions are concerned. 
Item NZD NZF NZT NZW NZ 
Ave 
AUA AUD AUN Aus 
Ave 
Member Ownership Totals 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Member Benefit Totals 2 2 2 2 2 3 4 4 3.67 
Membership Rules Totals 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Member Information Totals 1 2 1 1 1.25 2 4 3 3 
Member Control 21 17 19 20 19.25 29 25 26 26.67 
Member Vote Totals 8 4 3 4 4.75 8 9 9 8.67 
Member Meetings Totals 8 8 11 10 9.25 12 10 9 10.33 
Directors and Board Totals 5 5 5 6 5.25 9 6 8 7.67 
TOTALS 26 23 24 25 24.5 36 35 36 35.67 
Key New Zealand:  NZD = Dairy Goat; NZF = Fonterra; NZT = Tatua; NZW = Westland 
Key Australia: AUA = ADFC; AUD = DFMC; AUN = NORCO  
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**This table is duplicated from Chapter-3 for ease of reading 
Table 4. 3: Results from Content Analysis Phase  
4.6 Chapter-4 Research Questions and Hypothesis  
In order to study these problems, the following overarching research question together with 
an overarching hypothesis has been proposed that will allow for a structured approach to 
proving the hypothesis. For this study, the combination of the cooperative principles, the 
cooperative law, the cooperative constitutional documents, and any related cooperative 
regulation is defined as the Cooperative Policy Framework (CPF).  
4.61 Overarching Research Question 
To what extent does the application of cooperative principles, the law, and the constitutional 
document mitigate the known governance problems in Australasian dairy cooperatives? To 
what degree are residual governance problems apparent in Australasia? 
4.6.2 Overarching Hypothesis 
Where the cooperative policy framework is not well defined or is incompatible with the 
cooperative ethos, more significant cooperative governance problems will exist. 
4.6.3 Chapter-4 Research Questions 
The overarching research question is broken down into components as listed below that assist 
in the analysis of this element of governance. These are proposed as follows where S-RQn is 
the number of the Subordinate Research Question: 
S-RQ1: Is the cooperative policy framework of Australasia effective in the minimisation of the 
Control Problems? 
S-RQ2: Do Free Rider Problems exist in Australasia to any extent, and in what form? 
S-RQ3: Is there evidence that the cooperative policy framework has mitigated the effects of 
the Horizon Problem  
S-RQ4: Does the cooperative policy framework minimise the risk that cooperatives members 
have in particular, the Portfolio Problem? 
S-RQ5: Is the Influence Cost Problem dealt with by the cooperative policy framework? 
S-RQ6: Are there other cooperative Governance problems that the cooperative policy 
framework addresses? 
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S-RQ8: Does the cooperative policy framework in Australasia create additional cooperative 
Governance Problems, and what are these? 
In the next section, we discuss the individual governance problems looking through the lens 
of the cooperative policy framework using the previous chapters that discuss Cooperative 
Principles and the Law, and the Constitutional Document. The problem is first discussed 
followed by an examination of how and what symptoms might be present if this problem 
existed in a large degree in a cooperative followed by an analysis of the evidence of any 
mitigation control as contained within the Australasian cooperative policy framework, 
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4.7 Review of Major Governance Problems 
This section provides a concise summary of the major governance problems that differ, in 
many aspects, to that of the IOF. For each governance problem, once the CPF has been 
applied, the best case is that the governance problem is largely mitigated. However, it is 
possible that some of the problem remains after the application of the CPF; this is the residual 
portion of the problem, or “Residual Problem”. 
4.7.1 Agency or Control Problem 
The Agency, or Control, problem gives rise to many other problems which are discussed 
below. Many cooperative problems seem to stem from this one problem, that of the 
separation between ownership and management, therefore much of this section is dedicated 
looking at the Control problem in light of the cooperative principles, the law, and the 
constitutional document. Agency problems (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) arise where the 
interests of the owners and their agents are not aligned. Often called the Control Problem, 
this problem exists in all organisations where ownership and control are separated. 
Cooperatives have some control over who sits on the boards but cannot, to all intents and 
purposes, govern the directors' interests if it deviates from the member population. Besides 
the divergence of interests between the directors and member-owners, it is possible that it 
could exist in a divergence of interests between the directors and the professional 
cooperative management. Cook (1995), citing Hansmann (1999), believes that smaller 
cooperatives suffer less from this issue than similarly sized IOFs due to the nature of the 
member's income, which was mainly from the cooperative. However, it could be argued that 
the aspect of size advantage could limit the agency problem when examining a small 
corporate entity as well. The nexus of contracts view of Alchian and Demsetz (1972) is another 
form of the principal-agent issue where management contracts do not differ from the 
contract between an internal and external party. Coase (1937) and Simon (1951) believed that 
the management had the authority, and, therefore, the contracts with employees were 
broader and more easily applied. Moral Hazard, which is related to the Agency, or Control 
Problem finds its roots within the asymmetrical information issue where owners and the 
managers have different information, and, therefore, the managers use this information gap 
opportunistically. Asymmetrical information would be found in cooperatives as the 
management contracts within a cooperative often do not differ from those of a traditional 
firm, and therefore neither is the information asymmetry likely to be any different. 
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Management Incentives, aiming to reduce the Agency Problem, within a cooperative are 
different from that of other organisational forms. Shares in a traditional cooperative are a 
closed pool not able to be allocated to parties that are non-suppliers; however, some 
cooperative in other regions have an investor-class member category, so this could be used 
to incentivise managers to align their interests with the owners. Williamson's work (1971, 
1973, 1975, 1979, 1985, and 1996) was based on bounded rationality and opportunism, both 
of which can result in incomplete contracts. Williamson mentioned many viable solutions to 
the Agency Problem in his work which could be applied to supplement governance 
mechanisms. As the management structure below the BoD layer is organised in much the 
same way as traditional organisational entities, cooperatives would likely suffer in a similar 
manner with the opportunistic behaviour of employees. Finally, Bonus (1986), found that 
increased cooperative size led to an increased heterogeneity and more Agency problems. 
 
4.7.2 Free-Rider Problem 
Free-Rider issues are described as issues that arise when property rights are unassigned or 
non-tradable (Cook, 1995; Royer, 1999). Cooperatives rarely have assigned property rights 
resulting in the Free-Rider problem of, for example, a non-cooperative dairy farmer is 
assigned the same prices (rights) that a large cooperative has negotiated without joining the 
cooperative. Using Fonterra as an example allows for a clear appreciation of how this problem 
comes about. Fonterra sets its milk price (farm-gate price) based on a number of variables, 
however, once this is set, other cooperatives and IOFs use this as a base for their farm-gate 
price calculation for their suppliers or members. Internal Free-Rider issues exist in the case 
where new cooperative members have the same rights and advantages of long-term 
members. When a new member joins, they enjoy the same privileges and rights as those 
members who have been in the cooperative for several years. Iliopoulos and Cook (1999) 
state that because of the continuing dilution of the rate of return of the members, there is no 
incentive for long-term members to invest in the cooperative.  
 
4.7.3 The Horizon Problem 
The horizon problem refers to the reason there is a disincentive to invest in long-term projects 
by members; it refers to a time horizon problem when the returns of the project could be 
shorter than the member's cooperative association (Cook, 1995). Many cooperatives that 
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form with similar member demographics can result in a time-horizon problem for the 
cooperative. Without new members continually joining the cooperative, the pressure for the 
long-standing members is to get the directors to reduce retained earnings and pay this out to 
the members for their benefit rather than invest in long-term projects. New Generation 
Cooperatives (NGC) use tradable stock to mitigate the horizon problems, but the success has 
been limited by the fact that the tradable stock is commonly restricted to active members of 
the NGC only. 
 
4.7.4 The Portfolio Problem 
The portfolio difficulty lies in the lack of transferability of the residual member equity, 
meaning members of a cooperative cannot buy and sell shares in a cooperative to match their 
risk preference. Some members would prefer a higher risk profile and more returns, while 
others prefer a more conservative risk avoidance approach. Royer (1995, 1999) states that 
cooperative members are more impacted by this problem due to the closed nature of 
cooperative investment which is closed to members only and does not allow external 
investors to buy shares. The gap between the risk profiles of the two views causes the 
portfolio limitation, therefore restricting the growth of the cooperative.  
 
4.7.5 Influence Cost Problem 
Influence cost problems exist in cooperatives more than IOFs due to the diverse nature of the 
membership and ownership. Royer (1999) defined the cost as being associated with 
influencing other members. The size of the cost is contingent on the central cooperative 
management; the process of decision-making; and the degree that members are similar in 
their thinking. Royer (1999) states that cooperatives suffer more than IOFs do with divergent 
interests, as the shareholders of a firm are more homogenous in that they want the firm to 
provide dividends and growth for their shares. In contrast, the members of a cooperative 
would have very varied interests along the cooperative supply-chain continuum. 
 
4.7.6 Other problems 
There are, in addition, to the above problems with cooperative governance, issues of 
anonymity with the directors serving the cooperative. These directors are often members of 
the local community sharing social interactions with the farmers they serve. This often places 
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the director in an awkward position, which is quite different from that experienced by 
directors of publicly listed companies. The shareholders of publicly listed companies are 
unlikely to interact with their directors socially and even less likely to have a detailed interest 
in the operation of the entity. Issues of Quality of Product can cause tensions within the 
member community, for instance, if a high-quality product were created the labour 
associated with the separate process for picking, grading and storing would be borne by all 
the members yet the proceeds of the high-quality produce would accrue only to a few 
members. Cherry-picking is often found within member-owned businesses where individual 
members can take advantage of the average return base to lower costs and thereby burden 
the cooperative with additional costs that should be borne by the member. 
 




How this manifests itself within a traditional cooperative 
Control This is the agency problem between the directors and the member-owners. A divergence of 
interests between the two parties can also exist between the directors and management of 
the cooperative as well. 
Free rider New members are afforded the same rights as long-standing members – same vote; same 
benefits; no appreciation of share value 
Horizon Disincentive to invest in long-term projects. Members usually have a similar timeframe (and 
lifespan) as members. Members want maximum pay-out rather than investing in projects 
that may not personally benefit them 
Portfolio Members have different risk appetites and, therefore, block more risky initiatives at the 
expense of higher returns. The member cannot buy more shares and thereby influence – one 
member one vote issue votes not based on the number of shares but the member vote. 
Influence Cost  Costs associated with activities that members engage in, in an attempt to influence the 
decisions that affect the distribution of funds. Cooperatives may experience more significant 
influencing costs due to the diverse nature of the membership. (Royer, 1999; cook 1995; 
Milgram and Roberts; 1990) 
Other problems There are other problems which have been dealt with in the text, including Quality of 
Product, Cherry-picking, and Director Anonymity, for example. 
 
Table 4. 4: Summary of the Major Cooperative Governance Problems 
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4.8 Discussion 
This section uses the output from the above QDA to discuss the various applications of the 
law and the constitutional document in order to understand how effective the mitigation 
provisions are in practice. The answers are Answered or Confirmed, Not Answered or 
Rejected, or not enough data exists for an answer of any sort. This discussion is theoretical in 
nature, and the next chapter seeks to find evidence that these problems have been mitigated, 
and to what extent they have been minimised or mitigated. 
4.8.1 Evidence of Agency or Control Problem 
S-RQ1: Is the cooperative policy framework of Australasia effective in the minimisation of the 
Control Problems? 
The International Cooperative Alliance set of 7 principles (ICA-7) have as Principle-2 
Democratic member control (International Cooperative Alliance, 2015) which supports the 
control that members have over their cooperative. This principle supports member control 
over their cooperative, including decision-making. The United States Department of 
Agriculture in its three principles of User-owner, User-control, and User-benefit supports 
member control through the second principle of Member Control. Furthermore, both Canada 
and the United Kingdom who in defining the characteristics of a cooperative both state that 
Democratic member control, taken from their partial adoption of the ICA-7 principles,  is one 
of the characteristics in which they believe the cooperative nature of an entity is confirmed. 
This implies that all the principles of cooperation support member control in making decisions 
and in voting. However, as found in Chapter-2, the law while in some cases states the 
principles of cooperation yet does little to mandate member control in the law. When 
considering the policy environments of the two countries in Australasia, it can be observed 
that they are quite different. In Australia, cooperative laws were adapted in some part to 
more closely align with the principles of cooperation from the International Cooperative 
Alliance (ICA-7). Furthermore, each state has its own law which, in many cases, is aligned with 
other states cooperative law following the Australian Uniform Cooperative Laws Agreement 
(AUCLA) in 2012. Although there is one state (Queensland) in Australia that is not yet a 
signatory to the AUCLA, their cooperative law is similar and from advice, has been enacted 
and will be in force in 2021. In contrast to the State-based cooperative law, the Australian 
Corporations legislation is federally based, which has certain advantages.  
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In New Zealand, the cooperative law is a subordinate law to that of the Companies Law (New 
Zealand Government Companies Law, 1993) which has the effect of cooperatives being seen 
as a special form of a company; this is not always in the best interests of cooperatives as was 
discussed in Chapter-2.  Furthermore, the enactment of the Dairy Industry Restructure Act of 
2001 (DIRA, 2001) has further complicated the policy environment that New Zealand 
cooperatives operate in.  
Cooperative Law in most countries mandate what is required to be provided for in the 
constitutional document; these provisions afford members certain rights and obligations. In 
the case of Australia, this holds true; however, in New Zealand, a constitutional document is 
not mandated, nor does the cooperative law follow the ICA principles. Chapter-3 has provided 
more detail, discussion, and findings on constitutional documents in Australasia. Perhaps the 
open nature of the legislation for cooperatives, the intention was to move the responsibility 
of Member Control to the constitutional document. However, where a constitutional 
document is not mandated, it would leave the responsibility of member control to the 
cooperatives themselves which are likely to be less efficient than where the cooperative law 
mandated a constitutional document and had provisions to ensure that member control was 
protected. 
Theoretically, in a perfect cooperative structure, members vote in their directors who then 
appoint a chairman from the director ranks. Once this structure is complete, the BoD looks 
for a suitable candidate to operate the business on behalf of the board and appoints a Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO), sometimes the chairman takes this role on as an executive chairman. 
The management layer below the BoD then employs suitably qualified or experienced 
employees to perform lower-level operational duties. In some regions members vote for all 
directors (some EU countries), other regions do not allow non-member directors (some 
American States) and still, other regions (example: South American countries) do not allow 
an Executive Chairman, preferring to separate strategy and management by the appointment 
of a CEO. The simple and common cooperative structure is therefore complete once this last 
step has been carried out. In Figure 4.4 below, a simple cooperative structure is shown, which 






















Figure 4. 3: Simple, Common Cooperative Structure 
 
Looking at where Agency or Control Problems can occur in a cooperative, it is clear that the 
problem can exist between the members and the BoD; the BoD, and the operational 
management. In some cases, the problem can exist between the member directors and the 
independent directors. Anything that removes the control intent from the members by 
moving it to another group can result in member governance control issues. It is also possible 
if the cooperative appoints a Shareholder Council that functions between the BoD and the 
membership, that agency or Control Problems can occur here as well. The basic premise is 
that control is delegated in an orderly fashion from the embers to those layers that require 
operational control. For example, the members would not be interested in being informed, 
or even voting on, decisions of a minor operational nature such as the replacement of worn 
parts in a processing plant except where this decision might impact the farm-profitability. On 
the other hand, any decisions that require substantial financing, yet were expected, might be 
made at the BoD level with information on the decision being shared with the membership. 
For those decisions that are strategic in nature and would have a significant impact on farm-
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profitability for the members, such as a reduction in the farm gate price; the building of a new 
plant; the signing of a major long-term contract; the expectation is that members would be 
informed about the potential decision prior to the decision being made by the BoD including 
member involvement from a governance perspective.  
What has been described above is a simple delegation authority in order to balance the need 
to make decisions without onerous governance processes against ensuring that the 
cooperative owners are involved in those decisions that have the potential to impact farm 
profitability and therefore cooperative supply.  
The voting in of member-directors is crucial to members having control over their cooperative 
and therefore in reducing the Control problem as it is assumed that the member directors 
would have similar views as the other members. The voting in of independent directors, while 
not common in New Zealand, is usually undertaken by the BoD. Members in some 
Australasian cooperatives have oversight and need to ratify any board appointments while in 
other cooperatives this is not required. Without having a say in who the independent 
directors are and their background, it is possible that multiple independent directors could 
make decisions that affect members without their input. So too is the quorum and makeup 
of the quorum of directors when voting at a board meeting, on resolutions. If independent 
board members can outnumber member directors in a quorum, it is possible that members 
interests may be compromised, giving rise to an increased risk of Control Problems. The 
maximum term for any director could be seen as a possible way to ensure that directors 
remain abreast of their membership with new ideas continually being brought forward in the 
lifecycle of the cooperative. Although many cooperatives limit the term, ensuring that the 
directors have to be voted in again each cycle of three, four, and five years they can be re-
elected. Without an "end-date" for directorship, it is possible that member director influence 
may be weakened, and a power base could evolve with long-term directors no longer fully 
representing their members' interests thereby increasing the likelihood of Control Problems. 
The definition of a member director is yet another possible source wherein Control Problems 
can arise. In many regions, a member director can only be appointed to the board if they are 
an active supplier while in other regions it is possible that member directors can be appointed 
even if they are not actively supplying and only have a financial interest in a supplier. 
Voting of members and directors is often difficult with many of the cooperatives in Australasia 
scheduling their Annual General Meeting (AGM) within the peak season. This conflict 
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between farm-operations at busy production times can result in low attendance and coupled 
with the member quorum to pass resolutions could result in the membership voice being 
compromised which will, inevitably, lead to a Control problem where a sub-group of members 
hold power. Electronic voting and video conferencing could be used to ensure that more 
members have the opportunity to voice their opinion on cooperative resolutions, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of Control problems. Member quorums in many cooperatives are 
determined by the law or by the constitutional document; however, where this number of 
members that have to vote on resolutions is low, the possibility exists that Control Problems 
will become more apparent.  
Voting rights of members are central to good governance and the mitigation of Control 
problems. Voting on strategic directions as well as voting on any major expenditure which will 
in a material manner affect farm profitability, is critical. One-member-one-vote is central to 
the democratic control that a member has in their cooperative. Milk shares are sometimes 
used in voting in Polls or Postal votes in Australasia; a milk share is usually determined by the 
quantity of product that a cooperative member supplies to their cooperative. In cases where 
milk-shares are used when voting on a particular resolution could shift the democratic control 
to those members who are able to attend the meeting and have a large number of 
cooperative milk shares. The shift in democracy from smaller to larger members can increase 
the possibility of Control Problems within a cooperative. So too is the oversight mechanism 
that members have over decisions that are being asked to ratify. A formal well-documented 
grievance procedure is often used in other regions, to address any concerns that a member 
might have about a particular decision which can reduce the Control Problem.  
In order to avoid Control problems, the use of information and communication to members 
is seen as reducing information asymmetry and thereby mitigating any opportunity of the 
Control problem. Some Australasian cooperatives have information restrictions which can 
lead to information asymmetry which leads to Agency or Control problems. The methods of 
information sharing are relatively simple, but successful cooperatives rely on multiple forms 
without the issue of over-communication, which has the same effect of under-
communication. Another method is to have multiple member meetings in the areas in which 
their cooperative operates where members get regular updates in smaller forums about 
strategy execution, allowing the members to ask questions and discuss alternatives. 
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In answer to the research question, S-RQ1: Is the cooperative policy framework of Australasia 
effective in the minimisation of the Control Problems? The findings are that Cooperative 
Principles support Member Control, except where the principles are either not adopted, or 
not followed in some form, by the respective country. Furthermore, Member Control should 
be found within the constitutional documents, and in Australia's case, it is, albeit not to a 
large degree; however, it does cover directorship, meetings, and voting. What is silent is the 
control of significant decisions by members where it was found that no cooperatives in this 
study included a provision in this regard in their constitutional document. In contrast, New 
Zealand does not have a mandated constitutional document leaving the Member Control 
principle the responsibility of each cooperative separately. The effect of this omission in the 
New Zealand Cooperative law is that the Control problem is likely to exist. No constitutional 
documents of the dairy cooperatives, similar to Australia, deal with large decisions that affect 
member Control except for changes to the constitutional document. S-RQ1 is confirmed for 
the Principles of Cooperation where they have been adopted and partially confirmed for the 
law and the constitutional document for Australia.  
However, New Zealand, as it has not adopted the principles of cooperation with no mention 
found in its law, has no mandated constitutional provisions within the cooperative law. S-RQ1 
is rejected for New Zealand. 
 
4.8.2 Evidence of Free Rider Problem 
S-RQ2: Do Free Rider Problems exist in Australasia to any extent, and how? 
Free rider problems occur in two respects, as was discussed above. The problem exists 
externally, for other cooperatives; other dairy companies; and other dairy suppliers, and 
internally between members and their cooperative. From the Internal perspective, the 
problem manifests itself where a new member obtains the same rights and entitlements as a 
member who has been a part of the cooperative for many years. As shares are nominal in a 
cooperative, there is no method of share appreciation of invested capital, which is in contrast 
to that of an IOF. Additionally, when a member exits, he is entitled to his capital within a 
certain period of time. Yet, if this same member then re-joins, often cooperatives will allow a 
few years for the members to raise the capital required for the shares which leave the 
member in an advantageous position.  
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When considering the ICA-7 principles of cooperation, it can be observed that the free-entry-
exit principle is found in the first principle of Voluntary and Open Membership. This principle 
allows the Free-rider Problem in principle.  
The law of Australia has no mention of the entry-exit provisions besides stating the ICA-7 
principles in the preamble of the Act. In practice, there is no single clause that supports or 
mitigates the problem, leaving it up to the constitutional document to deal with the 
theoretical problem. It must be stated that although the problem is not supported nor 
mitigated, it does not have a material effect on the cooperative other than the administration 
involved in member entry and exit.  
New Zealand law is similar in that there is no clause within the cooperative law, nor the 
superior Companies Act, that supports or mitigates the Free Rider problem. However, within 
DIRA, Fonterra has to take on new farmers that meet its criteria and can only refuse based on 
amendments enacted in 2019 which include environmental reasons and new dairy farms as 
examples of Fonterra rejection. Notwithstanding the fact that any other member can freely 
enter and exit Fonterra, there is minimal impact on the capital of Fonterra as another 
amendment in 2012 allowed Trading Among Framer (TAF) they opened a private share 
trading platform between members on the New Zealand Stock exchange. The constitutional 
documents of both Australia and New Zealand are silent on the issue of Free Rider problem 
with no additional provisions being made to either support or mitigate the Free Rider problem. 
There is one exception to this, and that is Tatua, which is a closed cooperative being of a New 
Generation cooperative. This enables them to choose their membership and reject any 
applications, without reason, from any farmer applying for membership with them. 
However, the equity between members will be impacted, which can, in some cases, have a 
negative impact on participation and loyalty. The problem itself, as mentioned, does not 
result in costs bedsides the increased administration costs; however, the intangible cost of 
losing supply may have longer-term impacts on the longevity of the cooperative.  
On S-RQ2, the finding is supported in all cases except for Tatua that Free Rider Problems exist 
in Australasia with evidence showing little has been done to mitigate this problem. 
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4.8.3 Evidence of the Horizon Problem 
S-RQ3: Is there theoretical evidence that the cooperative policy framework has mitigated the 
effects of the Horizon Problem?  
The horizon problem, as described above, refers to the reason there is a disincentive to invest 
in long-term projects by members. The problem exists in many of the cooperatives in this 
study as they were seen to impact the "Processing" dairy cooperatives from a theoretical 
point of view. New Dryers and new plants, besides other large capital outlays, are some of 
the projects that processing cooperatives require to maintain their competitiveness. When 
the cooperative plans a project that will deliver results outside the membership lifespan of a 
member due to their age, for example, a disincentive exists not to invest or agree to the 
project. In the previous century, often the capital required for a large-scale project was 
sourced from members, and any shortfall was financed through financing companies and 
banks. The practice of obtaining capital from the members has mostly seen a significant 
reduction in present times with most of the finance coming from a bank or a financing 
company. The membership, however, would need to agree to a reduction in their farm-gate 
price in order to allow for the repayments to be made until such time as the new project 
started producing results and became profitable. The reliance on external finance is difficult 
where the shareholding is nominal, and thus, the cooperative shares do not appreciate at the 
same rate when compared to IOF shares.  
When examining the original Rochdale principles, there was provision for loans to the 
cooperative at a fixed rate of interest. The original principles stated Capital should be of their 
own providing and bear a fixed rate of interest. In the present day, this practice is rarely seen 
but could be a partial solution in some ways the Portfolio Problem discussed below. In some 
region's retentions are mandated within the cooperative law ensuring that cooperatives build 
up a capital fund to be used in market downturns or be used to fund projects. This practice in 
Australasia is left to the discretion of each cooperative separately, and few of the 
cooperatives have made provisions in their financial distributions for allocation to a retention 
fund. 
S-RQ3 is therefore rejected with little being found in the law or the constitutions that mitigate 
the effects of the Horizon Problem in the CPF. 
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4.8.4 Evidence of the Portfolio Problem 
S-RQ4: Does the cooperative policy framework minimise the Portfolio Problem? 
The Portfolio Problem occurs where a particular member would like to take a different risk 
position to other members in the cooperative. This comes about as a direct result of the 
property rights structure of a cooperative (Plunkett, 2005). In summary, the members are 
unable to readjust their investment in the cooperative to suit their risk appetite. It is 
hypothesised that this problem is further impacted by the size of the cooperative, which in 
turn, is linked in other studies the heterogeneity of the membership. When examining the 
principles of cooperation, it is found that only one of the principles can be seen in any way 
related to the risk position of a cooperative member. The ICA-7 Principles of Cooperation have 
as Principle-3 Member economic participation, and the USDA-3 have as Principle-3 User-
benefit Principle. By reducing the farm gate price substantially to allow for investments in 
external assets would likely be met with some resistance in the membership if this resulted 
in a reduction in farm profitability. Nevertheless, this could be viewed as a necessary 
investment by some members who might prefer riskier investments as long as the benefits 
could be explained to them. 
Furthermore, surplus profits that should be returned to the patronage in proportion to their 
supply, in the case of a dairy cooperative. If this surplus profit could be diverted into other 
investments, some members may be in agreement, whereas others might not be. The 
heterogeneity of the risk profiles between members is a source of problems for cooperatives. 
As the principles do not specifically cater to different risk profiles, and nor does the 
cooperative law, it stands to reason that any rules around investment could potentially be 
dealt with in the constitutional document. A review in Chapter-3 of the constitutional 
documents of the seven dairy cooperatives found no trace nor mention of investments. 
However, some cooperatives dealt with this by allowing preference shares as a way of 
acquiring capital from members and then agreeing to a distribution of surplus profits as 
dividends. This could satisfy, in the short term, some members risk appetite for investment, 
but this would likely apply only to larger, more complex cooperatives.  
S-RQ4 is therefore rejected as there is no evidence that aspects of the CPF minimise the 
Portfolio Problem  
118 | P a g e  
 
4.8.5 Evidence of the Influence Cost Problem 
S-RQ5: Is the Influence Cost Problem dealt with by the cooperative policy framework? 
Iliopoulos and Hendrikse (2008) found that heterogeneous member preferences, older 
average member age, and investment in several product lines all are a factor in higher 
influence costs in agricultural cooperatives. Influence costs inevitably arise in any organisation, 
including cooperatives, when decisions that affect the distribution of benefits among 
members of the cooperative where the affected individuals or groups attempt to influence 
the decision for their own their benefit. Two conditions are necessary to create the conditions 
for influence costs (Milgrom and Roberts 1992), one being the presence of a decision or 
decisions that can impact how benefits are distributed among the members, and the second 
condition is the members who wish to influence the decision must have the means to do so. 
The influence costs problem is a major governance problem in agribusiness cooperatives 
(Cook 1995). The presence of asymmetrical information among members together with the 
Control Problem mentioned above, further complicates and causes the problem to get more 
severe.  
The Principles of cooperation do not have any specific mitigation other than the "blanket" 
principle of Democratic Member Control (ICA) and User-control (USDA), and as discussed 
above, the Control Problem is often not minimised in any significant way. The key to this 
problem and many of the other problems above is the availability of sufficient information 
which implies effective, targeted communication. 
Examining the cooperative laws, we find that information is sometimes suppressed (New 
Zealand, for example) which is counter to good governance. This will inevitably lead to 
asymmetric information problems with some members having more information than others 
which, in itself, can give rise to the Influence Cost problem. 
The remaining mitigation is therefore left to the constitutional document, where members 
can specify the form of communication that best suits the membership as a whole. However, 
in examining the Australasian constitutional documents, there is no evidence that the 
Influence Cost Problem has been dealt with in any way.  
S-RQ5 is therefore rejected as no evidence can be found in the cooperative policy framework 
that deals with the Influence Cost Problem. 
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4.8.6 Evidence of other Cooperative Governance Problems 
S-RQ6: Are there other cooperative Governance problems that the cooperative policy 
framework addresses? 
Other Governance problems exist to a lesser extent, in cooperatives. Cherry-picking is one 
example where members choose services or deliver raw material to suit their farms. This is 
evident in dairy farms where newer products such as A2 milk, colostrum, and Peak Season 
milk. The cost of the administration in each of these is averaged across the cooperative, 
thereby lowering the costs for a member and increasing their farm profitability, at the 
expense of the other members. Product Quality is another problem, similar to Cherry-Picking 
where members can take advantage of pricing for higher quality products whilst their cost 
base is being averaged out and therefore spread across the entire membership.  
The cooperative principles do not cover this in any specific principles; however, the ethos of 
the cooperative should make this difficult. The cooperative values of equity, honesty, 
openness, and social responsibility all point to the type of members that cooperatives would 
want to have. Notwithstanding the values, these problems mentioned above are found in 
most cooperatives, especially the larger, more complex cooperatives.  
The cooperative law does not cater to specific provisions for these types of problems, leaving 
it to the constitutional documents to maintain the equity value. By ensuring that when a 
product is in the design stage, the applicable checks, balances, and mitigation steps can be 
installed to ensure equitable treatment across the cooperative for all members although the 
cost of a separate administration for different high-value products might negate the benefits 
that the membership can accrue. S-RQ6 is rejected as evidence exists that indicates that the 
cooperative policy framework does not deal effectively with the Cherry-Picking and Product 
Quality problems. 
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4.9 Chapter-4 Conclusion 
Much of the prior research conducted on cooperative governance challenges have taken a 
governance-layer approach where the underlying governance mechanisms of the principles, 
the law, and the important constitutional document were not fully taken into account, the 
authors rather concentrating research and effort on the governance problem itself.  
Furthermore, the problems around cooperative governance are similar in nature to those 
found in IOFs. Observing the different perspectives of the theory of the firm and the effect of 
these on cooperative entities, it can be argued that the majority of these problems (nexus of 
contracts; moral hazard view, incentive view, authority view, governance mechanism and 
others - see Appendix 4.1 for a representation of the theory of the firm) similarly exist in 
cooperatives as they exist in IOFs. It seems reasonable to assume that if few governance 
differences are found between cooperatives and IOFs, that these problems for cooperatives 
can be concluded as existing in the ownership "layer", that of between the members-owners 
of a cooperative and the directors-management layer of the cooperative entity.  
Examining the problems facing cooperatives, we find that the issues that were said to be 
unique to cooperatives are mainly around ownership. The problems associated with 
cooperatives such as free rider, horizon, portfolio, control, and influence cost are more 
prevalent in cooperatives than in IOFs, but there is an overlap with governance theories, 
specifically the principal-agent problem. The problems of free-rider, horizon and portfolio are 
usually found only in cooperatives and not IOFs.  The problems of control and influence-cost 
could exist in IOFs, with some research making the point that they most likely exist in a higher 
incidence in cooperatives than IOFs (Royer, 1999; Cook, 1995). The central issue in 
cooperatives and, therefore, the difference in governance is the structure and nature can be 
concluded as being undefined property and decision rights. Many of the problems that 
cooperatives face could be traced back to the property rights and decision rights issues; the 
free-rider issue exists because some cooperative property rights are unallocated; similarly, 
the horizon and portfolio problems are both symptoms of the unallocated property rights in 
that a single member of a traditional cooperative usually has a single vote so in that way 
cannot influence investment decisions or strategic initiatives. The control problem exists in 
both cooperatives as well as IOFs, as does the influence cost problem albeit to a lesser degree 
(Royer, 1999).  
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Chapter-2 found that cooperative principles are not often effectively implemented in the law. 
A disconnect between the governance problems can be clearly deduced in that the principles 
do not, except in cooperative values, successfully mitigate the governance problems of 
cooperatives. Furthermore, the law which has attempted, unsuccessfully in some cases, to 
translate the cooperative principles into policy is similarly not clearly linked to the governance 
problems in that they do not always minimise the effect of the known governance problems. 
The constitutional documents are one mechanism that can be used to implement a series of 
provisions that will minimise, to a satisfactory degree, most of the cooperative governance 
problems, however, this will be an undertaking that is not straightforward as it would require 
the calling of a Special-member meeting in a number of situations. A notable exception to 
one of the governance problems, the Horizon problem, was Tatau who being an NGC, did not 
have an open membership policy and chose their members carefully, which largely mitigated 
the problem.  It can be concluded that having laws and constitutional documents that are 
targeted at minimising or mitigating the risk of governance problems for cooperatives would 
result in a more efficient cooperative environment. 
The implications are numerous. The policy documents as found in Chapter-2 (where the link 
between the principles and law was examined) found that while some cooperative laws 
explicitly stated their linkage to the cooperative principles, there was little real evidence of 
provisions that effectively legislated the principles. Furthermore, the constitutional document 
in Chapter-3 was found to have few, or any, provisions that could assist in the general 
governance of the cooperative entity. Therefore, to solve the dilemma, an approach needs to 
be taken that addresses the principles, which were found not easy to implement in 
cooperative law, the translation of the principles into a legislative instrument that mitigated 
many of these governance problems, and finally a constitutional document that could further 
minimise the cooperative governance problems to a degree where it protected the member 
interests.  
This research was purely theoretical in that it examined the known, well-researched 
governance problems that cooperatives could encounter. Further research is therefore 
needed to examine the actual view of Australasian cooperative members to analyse their 
governance rights in order to understand if the theoretical findings in this chapter are found 
in practice.   
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Chapter 5: Perceptions of Member Engagement and 
Governance  
Participation by Australasian Cooperative Members  
 
5.1 Chapter-5 Introduction 
Many cooperative organisations incorrectly treat engagement as an operational or 
administrative aspect of the cooperative, however, where members are not active in the 
strategic decision-making of a cooperative the impact that this can have on member-loyalty 
cannot be understated. A lack of active engagement will inevitably lead to dissatisfied 
members which can lead to a diminishing supply base through member exit and will erode 
the reason for the cooperative’s existence. Member engagement has been linked to 
cooperative success in many scholarly papers (Mazzarol et al., 2012, 2019; Nilsson & 
Hendrikse, 2009; Birchall & Simmons, 2004; others), so too has good governance been linked 
to positive commercial cooperative performance (Challita et al., 2014, Kyazze et al., 2017, 
Bijman et al., 2013, others). Furthermore, cooperative member trust has been linked to 
engagement in other research (Nilsson et al., 2009; Österberg & Nilsson, 2007; Barraud-Didier 
et al., 2019; Xiang & Sumelius, 2010; others). Therefore, effective cooperative organisations 
should strive to have a robust engagement plan to ensure that its members fully participate 
in the cooperative and in this way, build trust and form the necessary groundwork of good 
governance.  
 
The Merriam-webster dictionary (Merriam-webster, 2020) defines engagement as 
“emotional involvement or commitment”, and the Cambridge Dictionary (Cambridge 
Dictionary, 2020) defines engagement as being the “process of encouraging people to 
be interested in the work of an organization”. As there are numerous definitions of 
engagement when referring to members and the relationship they have with their 
cooperative, this thesis has defined engagement as being made up of loyalty, trust, identity, 
motivation, relationship, community, and the definition above from Merriam-webster 
concerning the emotional involvement. We equate influence to the above definition of 
engagement. Voice refers to governance which are the rights of the members. It is 
hypothesised that member influence and member voice are two sides of the same coin. Weak 
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member engagement can lead to weak member governance, and weak governance puts an 
unnecessary strain on member engagement and can raise tensions with the cooperative 
organisation stakeholders. It is further theorised that good engagement takes the pressure 
off governance as trust and participation are likely to be high, and the presence of a 
comprehensive governance structure does not necessarily imply that the cooperative 
organisation has effective member engagement. Performance is another term used 
frequently in various research papers to indicate how well the cooperative is executing a 
particular strategy. For clarity, this thesis places a word preceding “performance” to describe 
the type of performance. For example, the preceding word could be financial, non-financial, 
social, operational.  
Previous chapters have shown that cooperative principles generally form the guidance 
foundation of a cooperative policy framework. Very few developed countries are silent on 
either the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA) set of seven principles or the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) set of three cooperative principles. The fact that New 
Zealand has not adopted the principles in any form and has not used the principles to 
mandate specific provisions within the constitutional document can be seen as an example of 
policy limitation. It was further found in previous chapters that the purpose of the 
constitutional document is to underpin the members' rights as far as their governance inputs 
are concerned. It was hypothesised in Chapter-2 (Cooperative Principles and the Law) that a 
lack of mandated provisions in the cooperative law could be resolved by having these 
provisions within the constitutional document (Chapter-3 The Cooperative Constitutional 
Document). Inadequate cooperative member input can lead to decisions being made without 
much-needed involvement from the members, which usually leads to poor engagement, 
participation, trust and satisfaction. A lack of these crucial ingredients may unsurprisingly lead 
to cooperative failure or conversion. 
This chapter qualitatively analyses how member rights have been implemented in various 
dairy cooperative organisations from the member-lens viewpoint. The research includes both 
the engagement of the members as well as the governance rights assigned to members and 
examines previous significant decisions that the cooperative organisation has made. Major 
decisions often have the potential to adversely affect the member’s operational farm-
profitability, which could lead to member exits and result in a loss of supply.   
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5.2 Problem Statement 
Dairy cooperative members’ voice and influence is perceived to be problematic. Members do 
not always understand their rights under the cooperative policy framework of the country, or 
the rights assigned to them via the constitutional document. Decisions are often (legitimately) 
made by the cooperative operating structure without appropriate member input which can 
result in a higher risk profile for their members. This diminishing financial return based on 
inadequate member governance can cause the cooperative members to become more 
distanced from the cooperative organisation which, if the members then exit, can result in a 
shrinking supply-base resulting in a weaker commercial performance of the cooperative 
organisation. 
 
5.3 Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine cooperative member perceptions on, and input 
into, several aspects of member-governance and engagement. The analysis qualitatively 
surveyed how engaged members were in their cooperative, their overall understanding of the 
rights allocated them through the cooperative law and their constitutional document, and 
information they received, and input they had, concerning the strategic decisions of their 
Board of Directors. Furthermore, the members were asked to make suggestions on how to 
improve both their engagement and governance when major decisions were to be made.  
 
5.4 Significance of the Study 
This research is the first time a comprehensive, qualitative, in-depth study has been made 
into Australasian dairy farmer perceptions of engagement with their cooperative organisation 
and the involvement of members in the decisions that are made that can affect member farm 
profitability. Moreover, there has been little research conducted on the effect that policy and 
governance documents have on the operational execution of the cooperative organisation 
and the member perception. Furthermore, little research has been conducted looking 
through the lens of the cooperative member when examining their understanding of the 
cooperative policy framework. 
5.2 Literature Review 
Why does a member participate in their cooperative, and what makes the difference to a 
potential member when choosing a cooperative? This question has been at the centre of 
many research papers published over the course of more than 20 years. However, while some 
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scholars believed that one was the cause and the other an effect of other characteristics, it is 
not clear in the literature. In considering the literature, the linkages between these aspects 
are sometimes inconclusive and can be contradictory in nature. This literature review will 
tabulate the various aspects of cooperative membership, including those characteristics that 
are sentiment or preference based and those that are governance-based. Contained within 
these features, are the demographics of both the member and the cooperative itself. Finally, 
the other items that can affect the members' continuance in the cooperative such as finance, 
strategy, marketing, and risk are also included.   The grey areas of the tables are those aspects 
that are not being covered in a particular section and are “rolled-up”, so the individual aspects 
under each of the headings are not displayed. 
The literature review found numerous aspects that can be broadly categorised into the “soft” 
characteristics and those that were more tangible and therefore categorised into the “hard” 
attributes. Therefore, when viewed from a macro-level, for the purposes of this thesis, the 
researched literature can be categorised into the characteristics of (1) Influence or 
Engagement (as defined above), which includes the member perceptions and sentiment; 
these facets include, for example, commitment, loyalty, motivation, relationships, and 
community; and (2) Governance or voice, which involves material aspects including, for 
example, general governance, principles, equality, voice, ownership. Other research found 
that there are common attributes which contain both the “soft” and “hard” characteristics of, 
for example, satisfaction, transparency, information, and communication (Feng et al., 2016, 
Gijselinckx, 2009). Consequently, the two broad categories are not distinct, independent 
items as significant linkages have been found between engagement and governance in the 
literature from both empirical (Osterberg & Nilsson, 2007; Xiang & Sumelius, 2010) and 
theoretical research papers (Jussila et al., 2012; Hendrikse & Veerman, 2003; Nilsson, 2018). 
Additionally, there are demographic attributes for the members and the cooperative that 
have been found in the literature that affects the way members “feel” about their cooperative 
and how they perceive their ownership rights in the cooperative (Gray & Kraenzle, 1998; 
Chechi, 2013; Feng et al., 2016). Furthermore, other research has found that there is a 
relationship between supplementary aspects of the cooperative which can include strategy, 
integration, marketing, and risk (Feng et al., 2011; Carr et al., 2008; Nilsson, 2018) and both 
the governance and the engagement categories mentioned above.  The diagram below strives 
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to depict how this thesis defined the relationship categories of the high-level member 











Figure 5. 1: Literature Review Categories of Member Attributes. 
 
Characteristics The research papers that were aligned to the topic of Member Voice and 
Influence, and specifically those that examined the Australasian agricultural dairy cooperative 
members were the focus of this literature review. However, some important papers covered 
generic findings and other papers that researched other non-dairy agricultural cooperatives 
were also included. Engagement is linked to governance in that having good engagement 
implies that members are participating in their cooperative and therefore are privy to their 
cooperative’s decisions and strategy that could affect their farm operation. In an equivalent 
way having good governance affords the members multiple opportunities to engage with 
each other and their cooperative organisation.  
 
5.2.1 Engagement literature 
Many attributes form the “soft” sentiments and perceptions of the members when viewed 
through a member lens.  The structure of this section will look at the components of the high-
level engagement category and then discuss these individually describing the associations 
between this category and the others of governance, demographics, and the supplementary 
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Nilsson E Qn   y y           y y y y   
2019 
Apparao, D., 
Garnevska, E., & 
Shadbolt, N T Ql  Y    Y        
2009 Nilsson et al E Qn     y y         y y   y   
2010 
Xiang & 
Sumelius E Qn y y y           y y y y   
2013 Cechin et al E Qn         y       y y y y   
1998 Gray & Kraenzle E Qn       y         y y y y   
2012 Jussila et al T Ql y y   y         y y y y   
2019 
Barraud-Didier 
et al E Qn y y y     y     y y   y   
2007 Bhuyan E Qn y               y y   y y 
2011 Feng et al E Qn y   y           y y y y y 
2005 Dakurah et al E Qn   y             y y y y y 
2016 Feng, et al E Qn y   y           y y y y y 
2012 Mazzarol et al E Qn y y   y   y y y   y   y   
2019 Mazzarol et al E Qn y y       y     y y   y   
2011 Gray E Qn       y y       y y y     
2003 
Hendrikse & 
Veerman T na     y     y     y y       
2009 
Nilsson & 
Hendrikse T na y y y         y y y       
2008 Carr et al T na y               y y   y y 
2009 Gijselinckx E Qn           y     y y     y 
2018 Nilsson T na   y             y y   y y 
2004 
Birchall & 
Simmons E Ql y             y y y   y   
2012 
Barraud-Didier 
et al E Qn   y y     y     y y       
2018 Puusa et al E Qn y y y           y y       
2010 Bhuyan E Qn                 y y y y y 
1990 Gray et al E Qn y               y       y 
2019 
Barraud-Didier 
et al T na     y     y     y         
1999 Fulton T na   y               y   y y 
1995 Fulton T na   y               y   y y 
Table 5. 1: Engagement Attributes with Linkages 
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Loyalty and Commitment 
Loyalty can be explained as members’ sentiment to continue supporting their cooperative. It 
is sometimes described as the solidarity they feel with the other members and the collective, 
the cooperative. Loyalty has been positively linked to cooperative financial performance 
(Feng et al., 2011; Mazzarol et al., 2012; Nilsson, 2009) as it gives the member confidence in 
the cooperative sustainability. Furthermore, it is stated that cooperative protection from 
large retail and trading organisations is crucial (Feng et al., 2011). When the member can 
identify with their cooperative, loyalty is positively affected (Mazzarol, 2012; Jussila, 2012) 
and the member is less likely to search for alternatives. Furthermore, member loyalty is also 
positively linked to the relationship they have with their governing team, the directors 
(Barraud-Didier et al., 2019; Mazzarol, 2012; Xiang & Sumelius, 2010, Carr, 2008). 
Additionally, other research found that directors of a cooperative are different to that of an 
IOF as they need to have a relationship with their members (Barraud-Didier et al., 2019) and 
the members would like almost daily contact with their directors. Mazzarol et al. found in 
2012 that the key to loyalty can be found in the emotional connection that members have 
with the cooperative. 
 
Other studies found that there is a positive relationship between emotional connection and 
affective commitment which is a critical ingredient in member loyalty (Apparao et al., 2019; 
Mazzarol et al., 2012, 2019; Puusa et al., 2018). Meyer and Allen (1991) argue that 
psychological commitment, has three discrete elements being affective commitment (want), 
continuance commitment (requisite), and normative commitment (contract) to maintain 
employment in an organisation, this can be applied to the commitment that members have 
for their cooperative. Many studies found that loyalty was strongly linked to the 
communication by the cooperative and the information sent out to their members (Jussila et 
al. 2012; Mazzarol et al., 2019; Xiang & Sumelius, 2010; Puusa et al., 2018; Birchall & 
Simmonds, 2004).  Other research has shown the link between loyalty and satisfaction (Carr 
et al., 2008; Bhuyan, 2007) which can be looked at from both perspectives; when a member 
is satisfied, there is a positive link to loyalty; and when a member is loyal, there is a positive 
link to satisfaction. Loyalty has been linked to member education and training supplied by the 
cooperative; the more education and training the cooperative gives to its members the higher 
the loyalty ratings are (Jussila et al., 2012; Xiang & Sumelius, 2010). Finally, other research has 
129 | P a g e  
 
found that size and geography play an important role in member loyalty (Jussila et al., 2012; 
Feng et al., 2016).  The research from both authors found that loyalty was negatively impacted 
as the cooperative grew large and spread out geographically.  
 
Trust 
Trust and loyalty have been found to be strongly linked in research (Barraud-Didier et al. 2019; 
Puusa et al., 2018). The more trust the member has in the cooperative leadership, 
management, operations and other members, the more loyalty he/she will have with the 
cooperative. Trust not only affects member loyalty but also affects the commitment that the 
member has for the cooperative (Puusa et al., 2018). Cooperative commitment is represented 
by the Board of Directors in a cooperative with a link between trust and the board of directors 
found in research (Osterberg & Nilsson, 2009; Barraud-Didier et al., 2019). Furthermore, if the 
members do not trust their board of directors, they will not trust the cooperative decisions 
(Barraud-Didier et al., 2019). Similarly, satisfaction is linked to trust; if a member were 
satisfied, it was likely they would trust their cooperative (Nilsson et al., 2009). The size of a 
cooperative has been found to have a negative impact for a members’ trust in their 
cooperative, the larger the cooperative, the less trust the members have (Nilsson et al., 2009; 
Hogeland, 2006; Feng, 2016). Additionally, age of the member was also found to be a factor 
in trust in a cooperative (Osterberg & Nilsson, 2009) where it was found that members over 
the age of 60 had less trust in the board of directors and the cooperative than younger 
members. Barraud-Didier et al. in a research paper in 2016 found that trust and participation 
are linked meaning that the more trust a member had in their cooperative, the more likely 
they were to involve themselves in the governance. Furthermore, communication was found 
to be crucial in maintaining and increasing member trust (Xiang & Sumelius, 2010). Finally, it 
was found in other research (Osterberg & Nilsson, 2009) that trust was linked to democratic 
control, the more the member felt they had democratic control, the more trust they had in 
their cooperative.  
 
Ideology/ Motivation 
Research into aspects that keep members at their cooperative found that Ideology does not 
play any role (Feng, 2011). The members are part of the cooperative as they can get the price 
they need and use the cooperative to negotiate better prices in the market collectively. In 
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other research Fulton (1999) found that ideology appears to be breaking down. The author 
stated that historically, member commitment was supported by cooperative ideology; 
however, this was no longer a necessary ingredient of member commitment. The motivation 
that farmers have for joining a cooperative was found to be Wesenwille (essential will) being 
part of Gemeinschaft, which is the interaction between members in the cooperative case, 
according to Nilsson & Hendrikse (2009). 
 
Relationship/ Engagement  
Relationship in this context is to the relationship between members; the members and the 
management; and the members and the board of directors and their commitment to the 
cooperative, it is not used from the analysis of data perspective. Mazzarol et al. (2012) 
highlighted the importance of the relationship that the cooperative organisation has with its 
members. Furthermore, the authors stressed that the board need a different relationship 
with their members when comparing it to the relationship an IOF has with its shareholders. It 
was found that Directors have additional responsibilities in building and maintaining their 
relationship with their members. In later research by the same authors (Mazzarol et al., 2019), 
it was stated that cooperative organisations need to invest in the relationship that the 
members have in their cooperative in order to protect their supply. Kaswan (2014) 
concentrated on the interaction part of the member relationship stating that he found the 
number of and quality of interactions was inversely proportional to the size and complexity 
of the cooperative organisation. Furthermore, in another study on cooperative organisations 
(Hendrikse & Veerman, 2003), the authors suggested that when a cooperative reached the 
last stage in the cooperative lifecycle (see Cook, 1995, 2018) whereby they were restructuring 
the cooperative, the new organisation should invest in creating relationships built on 
confidence and the understanding of their members. When examining stakeholder-
management research, Gijselinckx (2009) found that stakeholder management could be 
hindered by the lack of relationship that the board of directors and the management had with 
their members. The author went on to point out that without a good relationship with their 
members, it was possible the cooperative might lose its cooperative advantage, and the 
members would view the cooperative as they do other IOFs. The degree of involvement was 
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further linked to the relationship in that the members have to have a high degree of trust in 
their cooperative in a study of French farmers (Barraud-Didier, Henninger & Anzalone, 2019). 
Directors are seen as the link between the members and their cooperative was found in 
research on governance participation of the farmers (Barraud-Didier et al., 2012), the authors 
stress that the cooperative directors' role is more complex than that of an investor-owned 
entity and the requirement is for directors to have almost daily contact with their members 
in order to gain their trust.   
 
Community 
In cooperative research looking at large complex cooperatives, the research found that the 
cooperative community between members was threatened by cooperative expansion 
(Hogeland, 2006). Again, other research highlighted the multifaceted role that members have 
in a cooperative (Mazzarol, 2019) stressing that they are part of a community which is very 
important for a loyal member base. Kaswan (2014) found that cooperatives were often used 
to protect communities from traditional development initiatives which can often leave the 
community worse off than before. In a study that looked at cooperative success factors, the 
author (Carr, 2008) found that one of the success indicators was the provision of support that 
the cooperatives gave in the local communities. 
 
Engagement Summary 
The literature review has taken the view that there are “hard” and “soft” member aspects, 
the “soft” aspects above have indicated that there are certain aspects that are linked to many 
of the “hard” aspects. The below diagram depicts the other linkages found in the literature. 
The left-hand side of the diagram depicts the area that was discussed in this section, namely, 
Engagement as it is defined within this thesis. The right-hand-side of the diagram depicts the 
other influencing factors – the arrows show that there are relationships between Engagement 
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5.2.2 Common Attributes 
There are attributes in the literature that have placed the attributes in Engagement, while in 
other research has been more aligned to that of Governance. These attributes were labelled 
common and discussed hereunder. The table below depicts the attributes that were found 



























































































































































Barraud-Didier et al 2012 E Qn y     y y       
Barraud-Didier et al 2019 E Qn y     y y   y   
Barraud-Didier et al 2019 T na y y   y         
Bhuyan 2007 E Qn y y y   y   y y 
Bhuyan 2010 E Qn       y y y y y 
Bijman et al 2012 E Ql       y y   y y 
Birchall & Simmons 2004 E Ql y   y y y   y   
Carr et al 2008 T na y y     y   y y 
Chechi et al 2013 E Qn y     y y y y   
Dakurah et al 2005 E Qn y y   y y y y y 
Feng et al 2011 E Qn y   y   y y y y 
Feng, et al 2016 E Qn y y y y y y y y 
Gijselinckx 2009 E Qn y   y y y     y 
Gray 2011 E Qn y y   y y y     
Gray & Kraenzle 1998 E Qn y y   y y y y   
Gray et al 1990 E Qn y     y       y 
Hendrikse & Veerman 2003 T na y   y   y       
Hueth & Reynolds 2009 T na     y y y       
Jussila et al 2012 T Ql y   y   y y y   
Kalogeras et al 2009 E Qn       y y   y y 
Kaswan 2014 T na       y y   y   
Liebrand, Ling  2014 E Qn   y y   y   y   
Mazzarol et al 2012 E Qn y       y   y   
Mazzarol et al 2019 E Qn y   y   y   y   
Nilsson 2018 T na y     y y   y y 
Nilsson & Hendrikse 2009 T na y     y y       
Nilsson, Kihlen, Norell 2009 E Qn y y y y y   y   
Österberg, Nilsson 2007 E Qn y y   y y y y   
Pozzobon & Zylbersztajn 2012 E Ql       y y   y   
Puusa et al 2018 E Qn y y   y y       
Smith et al 2018 E Qn     y y y     y 
Xiang & Sumelius 2010 E Qn y y y y y y y   
Table 5. 2: Common Attributes (to Engagement and Governance) 
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Satisfaction 
Satisfaction is common to both the sentiment section and the governance section in 
literature.  In extensive research covering the topic of member satisfaction, the authors found 
that member satisfaction was strongly linked to satisfaction with the cooperative 
management (Liebrand & Ling, 2014; Bhuyan, 2007) and the cooperative milk pricing policies 
(Liebrand & Ling, 2014). Furthermore, the authors found that there were strong correlations 
between member satisfaction and satisfaction with the costs of the cooperative. The board 
of directors was linked to satisfaction for members in several empirical and theoretical studies 
(Liebrand & Ling, 2014; Nilsson et al., 2009; Gray & Kraenzle, 1998; Bhuyan, 2007). Member 
participation was linked to satisfaction in many studies (Xiang & Sumelius, 2010; Gray & 
Kraenzle, 19098, Dakurah et al., 2005; Gray, 2011; Carr, 2008; Barraud-Didier et al., 2019), 
where the research considered the importance of satisfaction in the participation of the 
member in cooperative activities. Other research found that the size and complexity of a 
cooperative diminished member satisfaction when the cooperative got overly large and 
complex (Nilsson et al., 2009; Feng et al., 2016). Furthermore, the strategy of a cooperative 
was negatively linked to member satisfaction in other studies (Carr, 2008; Gray, 2011) where 
it was found that, for example, an expansion strategy was linked to the complexity of the 
cooperative operation which inevitably resulted in lower member satisfaction. Loyalty was 
linked to satisfaction with some research finding that the link was positive when satisfaction 
was high (Bhuyan, 2007), yet other studies found that when loyalty was low so was 
satisfaction (Puusa et al., 2018). Finally, satisfaction has been linked to cooperative longevity 
in research (Barraud-Didier et al., 2019; Carr, 2008), the higher the satisfaction, the higher the 
probability of cooperative longevity. 
 
Transparency, Information, Communication 
Transparency was found to be positively correlated to both member participation (Cook, 
2018) and with the perception of member inclusiveness in cooperatives (Smith et al. 2018). 
Information was linked to participation in yet another study (Nilsson et al., 2009), the more 
information a member received the more participation a member had in their cooperative. 
Furthermore, the dissemination of information by the cooperative to the members can, in 
some ways, negate the effects of member-conflict when looking through a member 
heterogeneity lens was found in other research (Kalogeras et al., 2009). Again, the lack of, or 
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poor, information on cooperative activities was found to contribute to member exit (Feng et 
al., 2011). Good information on the cooperative activities was positively correlated to 
member satisfaction (Feng et al., 2016). However, Birchall and Simmons (2004) found the 
potential for both too much and too little information; both could impact loyalty and member 
satisfaction. Finally, Hansmann (1999) states that information is crucial in order to reduce 
costs and increase the effectiveness of management monitoring in a cooperative.  
 
Participation and Involvement 
Member participation was found to be contingent on several factors. For instance, more 
democratic control resulted in higher participation in governance (Osterberg & Nilsson, 2009; 
Gray, 2011). However, it was stressed that the most important factor in participation was a 
belief in the members' participation in governance. Participation has been linked to 
commitment in other studies, the higher the commitment, the higher the participation and 
vice versa (Xiang & Sumelius, 2013; Barraud-Didier et al., 2019). Even demographics can play 
a part in a member’s participation (Gray, 2011), for example, Osterberg and Nilsson (2012) 
found that older members participation (>60 years) was positively linked to governance in a 
cooperative whereas Bhuyan (2010) found that farm size was not linked to participation in 
any way. However, the education of the member was a factor in participation where more 
educated members were more likely to participate in a cooperative (Bhuyan, 2010). Again, it 
was found that economic motivation was a driver for a member’s participation (Cechin et al., 
2013) while the same author found that economic motivations were not linked to a member’s 
willingness to serve on either the board of directors or a committee.  Trust is a factor in 
member participation was found in another study (Barraud-Didier et al., 2012, 2019). If a 
cooperative is performing well, the participation was likely to be higher was found in a study 
linking cooperative financial performance to participation (Bijman et al., 2012). Other factors 
that improve participation are adherence to cooperative principles (Gray, 2011), low 
heterogeneity (Pozzobon & Zylbersztajn, 2012) and size of cooperative which can be linked to 
heterogeneity (Gijselinckx, 2009). Low involvement has been linked to a lack of trust and 
solidarity (Nilsson, 2009). Gray and Kraenzle (1998) found that members involvement was 
linked to the members' view of their leadership. As with participation, good member 
136 | P a g e  
 
involvement has been linked to smaller cooperatives (Feng, 2016). Finally, Bhuyan (2007) 
found that cooperative survival is linked to good member participation.   
 
“Common” Summary 
The common items that relate to member perceptions or their tangible governance 
involvement are contingent on a number of factors including high rates of satisfaction, high 
participation in both the governance of the cooperative as well as the information, 
communication and transparency of the cooperative organisation including the directors and 
the management. Larger cooperatives are seen to have more challenges regarding these 
“common” attributes. 
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5.2.3 Governance Attributes 
The previous research has already shown that there are tangible links between member 
perception and sentiment (Engagement) to the health of the cooperative in terms of 
governance. In this next section, the research and linkages between Governance are 
examined, there is much literature on cooperative governance; however, this review of the 
literature concentrates on the empirical (mainly) research looking through the member lens 

















































































































































































































Nilsson 2007 E Qn y y 1     1   1   y y   
Nilsson, 
Kihlen, 
Norell 2009 E Qn y y       1   1 1   y   
Xiang & 
Sumelius 2010 E Qn y y       1 1 1 1 y y   
Cechin et al 2013 E Qn y y 1     1   1   y y   
Gray & 
Kraenzle 1998 E Qn y y 1 1   1 1 1   y y   
Jussila et al 2012 T Ql y y       1 1 1 1 y y   
Barraud-
Didier et al 2019 E Qn y y 1         1     y   
Bhuyan 2007 E Qn y y       1 1 1 1   y y 
Feng et al 2011 E Qn y y       1 1     y y y 
Dakurah et 
al 2005 E Qn y y           1 1 y y y 
Feng, et al 2016 E Qn y y       1 1 1   y y y 
Mazzarol et 
al 2012 E Qn y           1 1     y   
Mazzarol et 
al 2019 E Qn y y         1 1 1   y   
Gray 2011 E Qn y y   1   1 1     y     
Hendrikse 
& Veerman 2003 T na y y       1 1 1 1       
Nilsson & 
Hendrikse 2009 T na y y 1   1 1   1 1       
Carr et al 2008 T na y y 1     1   1 1   y y 
Gijselinckx 2009 E Qn y y 1 1   1   1       y 
Nilsson 2018 T na y y     1 1 1   1   y y 
Birchall & 
Simmons 2004 E Ql y y     1 1 1 1 1   y   
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Barraud-
Didier et al 2012 E Qn y y           1         
Puusa et al 2018 E Qn y y         1           
Bhuyan 2010 E Qn y y           1   y y y 
Gray et al 1990 E Qn y y                   y 
Barraud-
Didier et al 2019 T na y y                     
Fulton 1999 T na y         1 1 1     y y 
Fulton 1995 T na y     1     1       y y 
Pozzobon & 
Zylbersztajn 2012 E Ql   y 1   1 1   1     y   
Liebrand, 
Ling  2014 E Qn   y         1 1 1   y   
Kalogeras 
et al 2009 E Qn   y 1     1 1   1   y y 
Kaswan 2014 T na   y   1   1   1 1   y   
Hueth & 
Reynolds 2009 T na   y         1 1 1       
Smith et al 2018 E Qn   y   1       1 1     y 
Bijman et al 2012 E Ql   y 1 1   1   1 1   y y 
Grashuis 2018 E Ql     1 1               y 
Iliopoulos 2018 T na     1   1 1 1 1     y   
Chaddad 
and 
Iliopoulos 2012 E Ql     1   1 1 1 1 1       
Hansmann 1999 T na         1 1 1       y y 
Holmstrom 1999 T na             1       y   
Nilsson 1999 T na     1 1   1 1       y   
Grashuis & 
Cook 2018 E Ql           1 1       y   
Hueth & 
Marcoul 2015 T na         1 1 1   1       
Fulton & 
Hueth 2009 E Ql         1       1   y   
Benos et al 2018 T na         1     1     y   
Grashuis 2019 E Qn                   y y y 
Reynolds et 
al 1997 E Qn       1   1   1   y y   
Harte 1997 E Ql           1         y   
Holmstrom 1999 T na             1   1   y   
Hogeland 2006 E Qn                       y 
Hind 1997 E Ql           1             
Hendrikse  2010 T na               1 1       
Cook 2018 T na     1     1         y   
Feng & 
Hendrikse 2011 T na     1                   
Iliopoulos & 
Hendrikse 2008 T na     1       1     y y   
Bijman 2018 E Qn     1 1             y   
Iliopoulos & 
Valentinov 2018 T na       1     1     y y   
Grashuis 2018 T Ql       1   1 1     y y y 
Carney et al 2015 T na                     y   
Chaddad & 
Cook 2004 E Ql           1 1   1   y   
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Iliopoulos 2015 E Ql     1   1 1 1       y   
Birchall 2017 E Ql     1 1 1 1 1 1 1 y     
Nilsson & 
Ohlsson 2007 T na       1               y 
Eversull 2011 E Qn         1           y   
Table 5. 3: Governance Attributes  
 
Governance 
Research found that trust impacted participation which impacted governance in a 
cooperative (Barraud-Didier et al., 2012). Other research by the same author similarly found 
that there was a positive link between trust and governance (Barraud-Didier et al., 2019). 
Furthermore, research by Osterberg and Nilsson (2009) found that the most important aspect 
of participation was that members had a voice in the governance of their cooperative. Other 
research found a link between commitment and member governance (Barraud-Didier et al., 
2019). Many studies have considered the large cooperative organisation finding that large 
cooperatives encounter challenges with governance (Feng et al., 2012) and the governance 
structures of cooperatives do not adapt sufficiently when they get larger, causing 
misalignment between the strategy and the governance structure (Nilsson, 2018). Another 
study had a similar finding in that internationalisation or growth required changes to the 
internal governance structures which did not always occur and could negatively impact 
member governance. According to Chaddad and Iliopoulos (2012), there have been various 
governance structures that have been adopted in various parts of the world. In the literature, 
the authors proposed a continuum of governance from member control to that mirroring an 
IOF. The study questioned Hansmann’s (1996) hypothesis that management opportunity 
would remain negligible when the members had delegated full control and decisions rights to 
management. 
 
Principles and the Law 
There are main two sets of cooperative principles; being the International Cooperative 
Alliance set of seven principles (ICA, 2019), and the United States Department of Agriculture 
set of three principles (USDA, 2019). While they seem different, they both find their roots in 
the Rochdale principles which scholars see as the genesis of the modern cooperative 
movement (The Cooperative Heritage Trust, 2019). Research has found that participation was 
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found to be related to the member belief in cooperative principles (Gray & Kraenzle, 1998).  
The authors went on to state that cooperatives should understand the importance of the 
cooperative principles. In other research, Gray (2011) stated that in his previous research 
participation was linked to the cooperative principles and members were generally 
supportive of the cooperative principles with the except of the Open-Entry principle. Kaswan 
(2014), in his research, stated that democracy in a cooperative was dependant on the 
alignment the cooperative has with the cooperative principles, in particular the one-member-
one-vote democratic principle. In other research, Gijselinckx (2009) found that the 
institutional relationship between members and their cooperative cannot be fully realised 
without adherence to the cooperative principles.  In a study on the effects of the law on 
cooperatives, it was found that most national laws based on cooperative principles allowed 
for a flexible internal governance mechanism (Bijman et al., 2012). Innovations in the 
principles and law for cooperatives in America yielded the Limited Cooperative Association 
(LCA) which was seen to be a new type of cooperative structure based on differing 
cooperative principles; however, a quantitative study found that there were very few 
registrations of these new types of cooperatives and additionally the number of agricultural 
registrations were even fewer (Grashuis, 2018). 
 
Monitoring, Measurement and Reporting 
How do the cooperative members track the functioning of their cooperative and their elected 
representatives? This section examines the measurements and monitoring that have been 
proposed or studied within cooperative literature. Holstrom (1999) states in his research that 
cooperatives are at a disadvantage in terms of monitoring, the cooperative being a private 
organisation is usually not listed on stock exchanges, and thus under the watchful eyes of 
regulators, stock market compliance officers, and analysts in general. He sees this a weakness. 
Again, in other research (Nilsson & Hendrikse, 2009), the authors made the point that as 
cooperatives expand, members find it increasingly difficult to monitor the management. In 
other research by Nilsson (2018), the author states that as the cooperative grows 
incrementally, the monitoring of the management process does not change and due to 
member passivity and it is likely that the monitoring becomes ineffective. Democratic costs 
are related to monitoring costs was found in a study (Pozzobon and Zylbersztajn, 2012) where 
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the authors point out that agency costs are directly related to monitoring costs. In another 
research study (Carr et al., 2008), the authors suggest that members turnover should be 
monitored by the cooperative and these statistics made available to the membership 
regularly in order for the collective to understand growth limitations. In a conference paper, 
Illiopoulos (2018) presented a paper where he links member heterogeneity to the challenges 
of large cooperatives to monitor their management effectively.  
Cooperative overall performance measurement has also been a topic of research with Benos 
(2018) stating that despite much research being completed on cooperative financial and non-
financial performance, there have been few studies examining the process of measurement. 
In other research, it was postulated that commitment could be one such measure which 
would indicate the relative success of a cooperative (Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009) and in yet 
another research publication, participation was proposed as a measure of cooperative 
success (Gray and Kraenzle, 1998). Both commitment and participation were suggested as 
correct measures of cooperative success (Barraud-Didier et al., 2019) while Fulton (1999) 
states that member commitment is what differentiates a cooperative from an IOF.  
Examining reporting, Birchall (2017) found in his research conducted in the United Kingdom 
that some cooperatives are, as part of their governance structure review, implementing 
measures of success. Fulton and Hueth (2009) found that some cooperative failure could be 
due to financial misreporting and fraud; however, this was not unique to the cooperative 
organisational structure. In a study on monitoring and measurement of a cooperative, it was 
found that cooperative reporting concentrated on the “corporate” metrics and excluded, to 
the cooperative’s detriment, membership metrics. Chaddad and Iliopoulos (2012) analysed 
several agricultural cooperatives, finding that switching to alternative governance models 
implied a trade-off between monitoring and measuring the management versus the cost of 
making decisions. They further state that there were five distinct factors involved that this 
trade-off was dependant on namely: the degree of homogeneity of the members' 
transactions and preferences; the costs that would be incurred as a result of balancing 
different member’s interests; the efficiency of the board of directors and how effective it was; 
and implementing measurements that would track overall cooperative performance. 
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Member Democracy 
Member democracy is served by exercising a vote and ensuring all members are treated 
equally. Osterberg and Nilsson (2009) found that age was positively linked to member 
democracy, explaining this could be due to older members having more cooperative ideology 
than younger ones. Size was listed as a negative factor in multiple research papers (Nilsson et 
al., 2009; Kaswan, 2014; Birchall and Simmons, 2004; Birchall, 2017), as cooperatives grow 
their size is negatively associated with member democracy. Heterogeneity was also found to 
be negatively linked to member democracy and the exercise of member voting (Osterberg 
and Nilsson, 2009; Gray and Kraenzle, 1998) which supports the previous assertion by 
researchers about size as this is found to be linked to heterogeneity. Members’ involvement 
in the democratic process in a cooperative was found to one of the most substantial factors 
in the willingness of members to serve on the board of directors (Osterberg and Nilsson, 
2009). In Brazilian research, the authors found that a member’s primary motivation to be 
involved in cooperative democracy and voting was due to their economic motivation (Cechin 
et al., 2013). A factor in member participation in voting was also found to be linked to equality 
in the cooperative and more specifically, one-member-one-vote (Gray and Kraenzle, 1998). 
Furthermore, it was found that one of the success factors in a cooperative was causally linked 
to democratic control and the carrying out of member democracy.  
 
Member Ownership  
Central to traditional cooperatives is the member-ownership requirements. However, other 
forms of ownership have been attempted with not very much success. The Limited 
Cooperative Association in America is an ownership structure that allows external investors 
to share ownership and therefore control with the members (Grashuis, 2018). The author 
found there was little success in this, and no agricultural LCA’s are still operating at the time 
of this research. Another cooperative form that was popular in the early 2000s was the New 
Generation Cooperative (NGC). The NGC has closed membership and has high equity entrance 
costs for a member. Many of the NGC’s have since been either converted to other 
organisational forms or liquidated for non-unique cooperative problems (Grashuis and Cook, 
2018). The authors state in their research that they found that many of the conversions were 
carried out as a result of equity or liquidity problems which indicated a limit to their longevity. 
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Research into traditional cooperatives found that ownership in a cooperative was contingent 
on how future technology will affect how the two competing components of ownership 
interact, the costs of contracting and the costs of control (Hansmann, 1999).  In other 
research, Gray and Kraenzle (1998) found a positive link between ownership and 
participation, and in yet another research paper, it was found that affective commitment was 
positively correlated with ownership (Jussila et al., 2012). In a study into affective 
commitment, it was found that a member had many roles with ownership being considered 
important (Mazzarol et al., 2012). In his book “Ownership of Enterprise” Hansmann (1996) the 
author states that if ownership is problematic due to changes in the cooperative, exit may be 
a more attractive choice for the member rather than voice. Illiopoulos (2015) found there 
were nine different ownership models within traditional cooperatives, each one slightly 
different. In another study, researchers found that when cooperatives expanded and take on 
external investors, this can weaken ownership rights (Chaddad and Cook, 2004). Iliopoulos 
(2018) presented an ownership continuum as per the below diagram: 
 




Figure 5. 4: Ownership Rights (Adapted from Chaddad and Iliopoulos, 2012) 
 
Iliopoulos (2018), using case studies of agricultural cooperatives around the world, found that 
there was a continuum of governance, and therefore, decision rights. On the one side was full 
member control, although the author found very few of these, and on the far side, a total loss 
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Member Influence and Voice 
Member Voice can be considered as the right to be heard in a cooperative. In the same way, 
influence in a decision implies being heard and having a voice. This will, of course, be subject 
to the specific cooperative democracy rules as far as action being taken once the member has 
been heard.  Research has found that the loss of member voice and influence in a cooperative 
can result in member exit (Bhuyan, 2007; Holmstrom, 1999; Feng et al., 2011). Other research 
found that member voice and influence is positively linked to satisfaction (Liebrand and Ling, 
2014) and participation in their cooperative (Barraud-Didier et al., 2019; Nilsson et al., 2009; 
Gray, 2011). Furthermore, Nilsson (2018) postulates that cooperative failure can be traced 
back to diminishing member influence when the influence moves from members to non-
member investors. Other research found that large complex cooperatives caused member 
influence to contract over time (Nilsson et al., 2009; Feng et al., 2016). Birchall (2017) states 
that there are three authorities required for effective cooperative governance, and one of 
these essential ingredients is member-voice, the other two are representation and expertise. 
Osterberg and Nilsson (2009), found that the board of directors would secure more support 
from their members if the members believed that they could influence the decision and that 
their voice would be heard. 
 
Board of Directors, Education, and Management 
A board of directors is essential in the interface between member democracy and the 
cooperative. Research has found in terms of trust, that members over 60 years old had less 
trust in the Board of directors than younger members (Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009); 
furthermore, trust in a cooperative diminished with cooperative size (Nilsson et al., 2009); 
However the more the member is involved in the cooperative, the more they trust the Board 
of Directors (Nilsson et al., 2009) and a members satisfaction is related to the satisfaction they 
have in their board of directors (Liebrand and Ling, 2014). Having more trust in the board will 
also result in more support for a decision that has to be made regardless of whether they 
agree or not with the decision (Nilsson, 2009). It was found that the relationship that the 
director has with the members is different from that of an IOF (Mazzarol et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the relationship that a director has with the members is suggested as having to 
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be far more profound and broader than that of an IOF (Mazzarol et al., 2012; Barraud-Didier 
et al., 2019). Barraud-Didier et al. (2012) suggest that directors should be in almost daily 
contact with their members. A study conducted in Brazil found that economic motivation was 
not related to the willingness to serve on a board of directors (Cechin et al., 2013). Having 
members serve on a board of directors is a factor in the success of a cooperative was found 
in another research paper (Carr et al., 2008). Other research found that cooperative financial 
performance is affected by board composition. Education plays a vital role in a member’s 
willingness to participate in cooperative governance and in particular, the Board was found 
by another research paper (Xiang and Sumelius, 2010). Additionally, the same research found 
that a member’s education level influenced their willingness to participate as a board member 
of the cooperative.  Again, in other research, it was found that member participation was 
linked to the cooperatives’ willingness to educate its members (Gray and Kraenzle, 1998; 
Jussila et al., 2012). Finally, it was found that members’ education was an important factor in 
a member supporting his or her cooperative (Dakurah et al., 2005).  
Members own the cooperative; however, few if any, members can be intimately involved in 
every detail of the operation. Thus, they appoint a board of directors which in turn appoints 
a management team. Hogeland (2006) points out that as the cooperative grows in size and 
complexity, more heterogeneity is apparent, which can lead to member-conflict, and as a 
result management control grows. The author found that as management control increased 
so too, in equal proportion, does the members control diminish and with this, the trust in the 
cooperative, which leads to a shrinking member-base. Another study (Nilsson et al., 2009) 
found that the more that members are satisfied with their cooperative, the more trust they 
have in the management. Bhuyan (2007) found that dissatisfaction with cooperative 
management led to lower member loyalty. Furthermore, the same research found that the 
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“Governance” Summary 
The Governance attributes that apply to members are represented in Figure 5.5 below. These 
attributes include Principles and the Law; Monitoring and measurement of the management 
which include the Board of Directors; Member democracy including voting rights; ownership 
and property rights; voice and influence meaning members are heard, and their voice is 
translated into action; and the board of directors. Larger cooperatives are seen to have more 
governance challenges than their smaller counterparts. 
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5.2.4 Demographic and Supplementary Factors 
Demographics are said to affect both member Engagement and Governance. This section 
examines the linkages and relationship between the two types of demographics; that of 
member demographics, and cooperative demographics that affect member sentiment and 
member governance. Member, Age, farm size, and profitability are analysed in relation to the 
aspects mentioned above of membership followed by how cooperative demographics of size, 
financial and non-financial performance, heterogeneity, debt or leverage, and reasons for an 
exit, affect the general operation. 
 
Member Demographics 
Member demographics can have a noticeable effect on the sentiment of members, especially 
when examining agricultural cooperatives. For example, member age is a factor in 
cooperative participation; the older the member is, the more likely he will take an active 
approach to participation (Osterberg and Nilsson, 2008; Gray, 2011). However, influence 
costs are higher in older members (Iliopoulos and Hendrikse, 2008). Furthermore, age was 
found to be a factor in commitment, where researchers found a negative link between age 
and commitment (Feng, 2011; Jussila et al., 2012). Nevertheless, other research, analysing 
empirical data, found that there was no statistically significant relationship (Osterberg and 
Nilsson, 2009) between age and commitment.  Age was additionally found to be negatively 
linked to trust for the board of directors (Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009); the older members 
had less trust in their directors. 
So too, can geography influence a cooperative members sentiment and governance choices.  
Research has shown that the compactness, or geography, of members, affects the member-
identity, where more dispersed cooperatives suffer from lower member commitment (Jussila 
et al., 2012). In empirical research conducted in Sweden, the authors found that smaller 
cooperatives, in terms of member proximity and geography, had higher social capital 
(Apparao et al., 2019; Feng et al., 2016). Social capital in this paper was defined as a 
combination of Involvement, Trust, Satisfaction, and Loyalty. The same paper found that the 
larger cooperatives were spread out geographically, and this resulted in complexity and more 
heterogeneity amongst members which gave rise to lower social capital. 
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Profit was also found to be a factor in a member’s decision-making behaviour. Bhuyan (2010) 
found that the degree of solvency was a factor in a member’s decision to use a cooperative. 
Satisfaction was positively linked to farm profitability in another study (Osterberg and Nilsson, 
2009) so too in the same paper it was found that farm profitability was linked to both trust 
and commitment but found there was no relationship between the profitability of the farm 
and the trust the member has in the board of directors. Again, in other research conducted 
in Brazil, it was found that economic motivation, which is a contributor to farm profitability, 
was a key driver or participation of members (Cechin et al., 2013).   
 
Cooperative Demographics 
Cooperative demographics affect how members feel and participate in their cooperative 
according to research. For instance, Grashuis (2019) found that cooperative age was a factor 
in the survival of the cooperative and Hind (1976) found that the orientation to more 
corporate values was linked to cooperative age where member values were diminished over 
time in favour of the corporate values. In a study conducted in America, it was found that 
governance structures were affected by the geography of the members (Reynolds et al., 
1997). Often cooperatives would split their geography into regions for efficiency reasons, 
especially large cooperatives. Grashuis (2019) and Bonus (1986) found that as cooperatives 
grew by geographical expansion, this resulted in lower collective social capital (Apparao et al. 
., 2019) and more heterogeneity and could contribute, down the line, to eventual exit. Again, 
in other research, Birchall (2017), proposed a regional or district voting system in order to 
maximise the representation of the members' interests.  
Cooperative financial performance has been found to be linked to a number of member 
attributes. Research found that members assess the management of cooperative based on 
specific metrics; financial performance is one of them (Hansen et al., 2002). Again, 
participation in the governance of a cooperative was positively linked to cooperative financial 
performance in another study (Gray and Kraenzle, 1998). Kalogeras et al. (2009) noted that 
cooperatives were subject to less scrutiny than IOFs, and as a result, their financial 
performance was seldom analysed. Hind (1997) stated that performance measures of a 
cooperative should not be limited to just financial ratios but should include membership 
metrics as well, for example, participation levels and satisfaction. In other research, it was 
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found that members assess the cooperative as being competent by looking, amongst other 
metrics, at the cooperative financial performance (Dakurah et al., 2005). In the cooperative 
lifecycle Cook (2018) postulates that the cooperative, in phase 2 of its lifecycle, defined what 
the measurement should be for cooperative health; however, these metrics were rarely 
reviewed. The financial performance of a cooperative was moreover linked to board 
composition and member participation in another study (Bijman t al, 2012). Fulton (1999) 
similarly postulated that there would be a strong linkage between member commitment and 
cooperative financial performance. Finally, Benos et al. (2018), in defining measurements for 
cooperative performance, found that most cooperatives concentrated on business financial 
and efficiency measurements for cooperative financial performance, leaving out the very 
important member view on non-financial performance. 
The use of member equity was always used for a cooperative to satisfy capital requirements; 
however, a trend has been found that debt is used more frequently (Eversull, 2011). Although 
the measures of leverage and liquidity were not found as being a significant measure of 
cooperative survivability (Grashuis, 2019), it was found in the same research that 
cooperatives with strong liquidity have a higher survival rate. It was noted in other research 
(Grashuis and Cook, 2018) that when analysing the failure of large New Generation 
Cooperatives (NGC), liquidity and equity were fundamental constraints which contributed to 
the failure.  
Cooperative size has been linked to heterogeneity and was a contributing factor in failure, 
restructures and conversion in many studies (Hogeland, 2006; Nilsson et al., 2009; Grashuis, 
2019; Reynolds et al., 1997; Iliopoulos and Hendrikse, 2008; Nilsson, 2018). In other research, 
a member’s participation levels were found to be linked to cooperative size (Kalogeras et al., 
2009), the larger the cooperative, the lower the participation levels. Cooperative size was also 
negatively linked with social capital in another study in Sweden (Feng et al., 2016), the larger 
the cooperative, the less social capital was observed. Furthermore, in another study, it was 
found that democracy in cooperatives was eroded by growth in the cooperative size (Kaswan, 
2014). 
The final stage of Cooks cooperative lifecycle (1995, 2018) involves the cooperative 
reinventing, restructuring, or exiting by either liquidation or conversion to another 
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organisation form. Grashuis (2019), found that comparatively small and relatively larger 
cooperatives were less likely to fail (Grashuis, 2019) and mid-size cooperatives were more 
likely to fail. Additionally, the same study found that member heterogeneity was a factor in 
cooperative failure. Iliopoulos (2015), when looking at Cook’s lifecycle (1995, 2018) found that 
tinkering had its limits if a cooperative was to avoid exit. In another study on NGCs, the 
authors found that the main reasons for NGC exit were no different from that of other 
organisational forms; being bankruptcy or liquidation.  
 
 
5.2.5 Supplementary Factors 
Other attributes affect both members and the cooperative. These are contained within this 
last section and include strategy; risk; marketing and others mostly relating to the cooperative 
organisation which affect member perceptions and sentiments.   
 
Strategy and Integration 
The strategy category was included in this section as the cooperative strategy is often linked 
to other supplementary factors such as risk, marketing, capital, and equity. Research found 
that most cooperative members have a similar preference for the strategy the cooperative 
adopts (Kalogeras et al., 2009). Other research found that where technology might offer an 
advantage to a cooperative, younger members wanted to invest in it; however, older 
members were more conservative as regards the adoption of technology. Expansion was the 
preferred strategy for cooperatives was found by research (Nilsson et al., 2009) and in other 
research (Nilsson, 2018), it was found that cooperatives adopt one of three different 
strategies being vertical integration, horizontal integration, or portfolio diversification. 
However, the same research found that vertical expansion was the dominant form of strategy 
(Nilsson, 2018) which came with risks due to the requirement that the cooperative had for 
professional managers who acquired considerable power due to the nature of the complex 
environment they operated in. Cooperative laws generally had sufficient flexibility for a 
cooperative to match their governance model to the strategy (Bijman et al., 2012) although 
other research found that in large cooperatives the governance models were not aligned with 
the chosen strategy. Another study (Feng et al., 2016) found that when cooperatives started 
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replicating the strategies of other organisational forms such as IOFs, members no longer felt 
associated with the cooperative which could lead to cooperative exit. Carr et al. (2008) found 
that the strategy a cooperative adopts is linked to member satisfaction. It was found in 
competitive markets that many cooperatives adopted a strategy of earnings payments on top 
of the farm gate price which could lead to the cooperative exit as a result of the member 
expectations being set on always receiving an additional payment (Fulton and Hueth, 2009). 
Fulton (1995) found that as a result of increased vertical integration and contracting, 
cooperatives also started disappearing. The danger in horizontal and vertical integration, even 
though the cooperative was seen as being more efficient, was that this could lead to lower 
social capital among the members (Feng et al., 2016).  
 
Marketing and Risk 
Members usually joined a cooperative as they wanted to get better marketing of their 
products (Xiang and Sumelius, 2010). Member satisfaction was related to the success the 
cooperative had in marketing the members' milk (Liebrand and Ling, 2014) as long at the costs 
did not seem excessive.  Members entire farm output was usually marketing through their 
cooperative was found in another study (Gray et al., 1990).  
Risk was found to be a factor in member preference in a study of heterogeneity (Kalogeras et 
al., 2009), the same research found that, in general, members who had large farm output 
exhibited less risk-averse preferences; however, members with smaller farm output were 
more risk-averse. Bijman et al. (2012) found that internalisation carried the risk of loss of 
member control.  
 
Capital and Equity 
Fulton (1999) found that cooperatives generally suffered from a lack of capital and were trying 
innovative ways of obtaining capital, sometimes with repercussions. The author used as an 
example, the New Generation Cooperatives (NGC) as an example of innovation. In other 
research Nilsson (1999) found that the creation of subsidiaries wholly owned by the 
cooperative was another innovative way of accessing capital. However, a study found that 
the NGC model was not always successful with most of the NGCs formed now liquidated or 
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converted (Grashuis and Cook, 2018). The authors suggested that retention was one way to 
avoid some of the capital problems for a cooperative. Other research (Eversull, 2011) found 
that capital funding from members was found to have dramatically reduced from just over 
57% in 1954 to 32% in 2008. In yet another study, it was found that cooperatives continue to 
suffer from a lack of capital (Fulton and Hueth, 2009). The authors found that agricultural 
capital requirements had significantly increased over time, and this trend was expected to 
continue. 
 
Demographic and Supplementary Factors Summary 
Demographics of both the individual member, the total membership size, as well as the 
cooperative itself, play a significant role in member sentiment, governance, and survivability. 
It is not always possible to balance the different factors as many of the demographic 
attributes could be present together, further complicating the cooperative environment.  
 
Figure 5. 6: Representation of Literature Review Characteristics 
 
  




MEMBER  CHARACTERISTICS 
Common 
Demographic Factors Age; Geography; Size; Profit/ Performance; 
Debt/ Equity/ Liquidity; Exit; Heterogeneity 
 
Supplementary Factors Strategy; Integration; Marketing; Risk; 
Capital; Equity 
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5.3 Research Methodology 
The purpose of this study is to understand the member sentiment and perceptions when 
examining member voice and influence in an Australasian Cooperative setting. The study is 
based on grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 2006) and conducted using qualitative, in-depth, 
one-on-one interview methodology (Creswell, 2014 p 234). There are very few qualitative 
studies that interviewed cooperative members; the majority of research into cooperative 
member organisations was conducted using quantitative methods. Therefore, the theory of 
sample sizes for in-depth interviews influenced this research design. The Principle of 
Saturation has been widely discussed in academia (Mason, 2010, Leech, 2005; Creswell, 2014 
p 234) as to what sample size is sufficient for a qualitative study; it differs between the 
different types of studies, however, in the case of in-depth interviews for PhD studies, 31 
participants were an average. (Mason, 2010). The goal of qualitative research should, 
therefore, be a sample broad enough to cover the majority of different cases while small 
enough to allow for an in-depth analysis of the data. The population sample is small and looks 
to understand the underlying reasons for the responses given during the interviews. It follows 
a semi-structured approach using 24 base questions with probing and clarifying questions 
being used to understand the answers. The population and setting are explained below, 
however, in summary, 32 participants from 7 dairy cooperatives from Australia and New 
Zealand were interviewed of which 31 transcripts were analysed and formed the primary data 
source for this study. NVIVO was used as a qualitative analysis software tool. 
There has been much research carried out examining how cooperative maintain their 
member satisfaction in other regions (Feng et al., 2016; Feng et al., 2011; Barraud-Didier et 
al., 2019; others) however; there is little empirical, qualitative, or quantitative, evidence for 
the Australasia region and no studies can be found that are designed using the principles, the 
law, and the constitutional documents as a starting point. The question of loyalty and 
participation have also been explored in detail (Mazzarol et al., 2012; 2019; Nilsson & 
Hendrikse, 2009; Xiang & Sumelius, 2010; others) attempting to understand what factors are 
present in members that are loyal and which ones are lacking in those members whose loyalty 
is not what it should be for continued continuance with their cooperative. This study seeks to 
understand the farmers' sentiment with specific regard to engagement and governance. 
Engagement is seen as a sentiment as much of it is contingent on how a member perceives 
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and feels about their cooperative. On the other hand, governance and participation, while 
these have links to sentiment and perception, are more tangible in that it can usually be 
measured, reports drawn, and action is taken. All of these factors contribute to member 
involvement and participation.  
The previous chapters have shown that the policy governing cooperatives in the two countries 
is different, Australia basing their legislation on the accepted International Cooperative 
Alliance Cooperative principles while New Zealand has no reference within their legislation to 
these principles. Furthermore, the Cooperative Companies Act 1996 in New Zealand is 
structured as a subordinate law under the Companies Act 1993, which, when looking through 
the member-lens, can result in a less optimal result for member rights due to the 
implementation being that of a “special” type of company which may cause complexity in 
implementation of cooperative values.  
 
5.3.1 Research Questions 
The research questions attempt to understand how members from dairy cooperatives in 
Australasia compare to those studied in other regions. Using what other scholars have 
studied, the research questions seek to understand what can be derived from members on 
how their cooperative engages with them and how it involves them in decisions as 
cooperative owners.   
Overarching Research Question:  
What are the views and perceptions of Australasian dairy cooperative members when 
considering participation and governance in their cooperative? What is optimum Australasian 
cooperative member voice and influence? 
Subordinate Research Questions:  
The overarching research question is broken down into components as listed below that assist 
in the analysis of this element of governance. These are proposed as follows where S-RQn is 
the number of the Subordinate Research Question: 
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S-RQ1: How do members perceive their cooperative in terms of their willingness to continue 
in their cooperative as a member? 
Proposition a: Loyalty of Australasian members is related to the size and geography of 
the cooperative 
Proposition b: Loyalty of Australasian members is related to the amount and quality 
of contact with the cooperative organisation.  
Proposition c: Loyalty of Australasian members is higher if they served on a committee 
or were directors or ex-directors.  
Proposition d: Satisfaction of farmers is related to the farm gate price and the 
operational performance of the cooperative. 
 
S-RQ2: What strategy is employed by the cooperative organisation to maintain a relationship 
with their members? 
Proposition e: Member participation at the annual meeting is problematic, especially 
with larger cooperatives. 
Proposition f: Members perceive the formal contact with their cooperative as not 
effective when it comes to the annual meeting but feel that other meetings, such as 
supplier meetings, are effective. 
Proposition g: Member engagement with the cooperative is mainly limited to 
operational contact.  
Proposition h: Contact with the member-directors is infrequent. 
Proposition i: There is regular informal contact between members. 
Proposition j: Members are generally satisfied with their operational engagement, 
including the resolution of issues.  
 
156 | P a g e  
 
S-RQ3: How do members feel about participating in the cooperative from both a non-
governance perspective and a governance perspective? 
Proposition k Besides the governance aspect of serving on the board of directors, 
members remain willing to get involved in their cooperative. 
Proposition l: Members are willing to be more involved in the governance of the 
cooperative, including serving on committees and the Board of Directors. 
 
S-RQ4: How familiar are the members with the cooperative legislative framework and the 
internal constitutional documents? 
Proposition m: Members, including member-directors, have little understanding of 
the cooperative law of their region. 
Proposition n: Members have little understanding of their cooperative constitutional 
document that governs the rules of their cooperative; however, the directors do have 
a good understanding of the constitutional document.   
Proposition o: Members, including member directors, believe that they would benefit 
from education on the cooperative legislative framework and their constitutional 
document. 
 
S-RQ5: How are dairy cooperative members engaged in making decisions that could affect the 
farm-gate price? 
Proposition p: Members receive very little information regarding strategic (farm-
impacting) decisions of their cooperative. 
Proposition q: Members have few opportunities to query and clarify cooperative 
decisions.   
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Proposition r: Most members believe that cooperatives do not share sufficient 
information with them, and there are opportunities for improving information quality 
and distribution.   
 
S-RQ6: What evidence is there from dairy cooperative member-farmers as to their 
consultation and input to decision-making by the operational management when reviewing 
major strategic initiatives that the cooperative has undertaken in the past five years? 
Proposition s: Members are often not involved in decisions that could impact farm 
financial performance or profitability. 
Proposition t: Cooperatives tend to make decisions at the board level without input 
from members.   
Proposition u: Members do not always have a defined process to query decisions or 
strategies of their cooperative organisation. 
Proposition v: Cooperatives often use confidentiality as a reason for not involving their 
members or giving them information on farm-impacting decisions.   
Proposition w: Members believe that they should be involved in strategic decisions 
that the cooperative makes, especially if this can impact their farm-gate price or farm 
profitability in any way. 
Proposition x Directors believe that the board of directors should make the decisions; 
however, keep the members informed.    
 
S-RQ7: How do members keep up to date on industry changes? 
Proposition y: Members do not keep abreast of industry changes that may affect their 
farm operation. 
Proposition z: Members expect their cooperative to update them on industry changes 
that affect their farm operation 
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S-RQ8: What is the role that technology currently plays in cooperative engagement and 
governance, and what opportunities are there to expand the deployment? 
Proposition aa: Most cooperative members have access to both a PC and a 
Smartphone. 
Proposition bb: Cooperative members are open to the use of video-conferencing 
technology in meetings and other contact. 
Proposition cc: Cooperative members would support the use of a smartphone app, in 
conjunction with other methods, to vote on resolutions. 
 
S-RQ9: In the members' perception, what law/ regulation/ policy, if improved, would most 
benefit cooperative members from Australasia? 
Proposition dd: Members from Australia would like the law to examine the role of 
large supermarkets have in the dairy industry. 
Proposition ee: New Zealand members believe that DIRA should be adapted for 
changing market conditions 
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Setting 
Figure 5.7 depicts the population that will be used to conduct the research in Australasia.  
 
(Freeusandworldmaps.com, 2019) 
Figure 5. 7: Interviewee Geography – Australia and New Zealand. 
 
Population 
Participants in the research will be taken from Cooperative members from seven dairy 
cooperatives in Australia and New Zealand. The study, being qualitative in nature, interviewed 
members from each of the cooperatives, including one director or ex-director where possible. 










Figure 5. 8: Data Source in Relation to Cooperative Environment 
Partnerships – Private Companies – Cooperatives – Public Companies – Not for Profit/ Other 
Mutuals – Consumer – Producer – Worker – Hybrid/ Other 
Artist/ Crafts – Agricultural – Fishing – Other 
Fruit – Grain – Dairy – Livestock – Services 
Africa -Europe – America – Australasia – Canada – South America 
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While the primary data source for the data collection was the interviews, some secondary 
data sources were used that were covered off in previous chapters. Many decisions that the 
cooperative had taken were listed in annual reports, press releases from the cooperative, and 
in other media articles. These decisions were used as a basis for the governance questions. 
DGC was included in the study as it is a dairy cooperative, and while the milk comes from 
goats, member voice and influence factors remain the same as other cow-milk cooperatives. 
In total, 32 interviews were conducted, taken from the various cooperatives which operated 
in regions around Australia and New Zealand. The schematic below shows the spread of 
participants as far as their cooperatives are concerned with the relative percentages of the 
total sample. In summary, there were 15 participants from Australia and 17 participants from 
New Zealand. Although Westland was recently (2019) sold to an IOF, the engagement and 
governance data collected from the Westland participants remains valid as at the time of the 
interviews as the members did not have sufficient details on the outcome of the 
organisational review and therefore remained cooperative members. Figure 5.9 (below) 
shows various percentages of the whole of 7 cooperative and 31 participants.  
 
  
Figure 5. 9: Demographic Data: Participants by Cooperative 
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Remembering that this was a qualitative study, the demographics are important, although 
the sample numbers are low, ranging from over 6% of the total population to under 1% of the 
individual cooperative populations. Table 5.4 below sets out the participants per cooperative 
that were interviewed.  
Cooperative Country No of 
Participants 
 Cooperative Country No of 
Participants 
Dairy Goat  New Zealand 2  ADFC Australia 5 
Fonterra New Zealand 5  DFMC Australia 6 
Tatua New Zealand 5  NORCO Australia 4 
Westland New Zealand 5     
  17    15 
Table 5. 4: Participants per Cooperative 
Sampling methods used were two-fold and slightly different. Prior to the research being 
conducted, the researcher wrote a letter informing the cooperatives of the intention to 
interview members from their cooperative as the members were not bound by any 
cooperative rules as far as participating in the research. This approach was taken to ensure 
that members could take part in the research even if their cooperative did not respond to the 
researchers’ letter. Furthermore, the letter asked for a contact person and a list of potential 
members that would take part in the research. The results were as expected, with some 
cooperatives responding and others not responding or not wanting to take part in the 
research.  
Some cooperatives responded to the research request with contact details from the 
cooperative and a list of members’ names. Where insufficient, or no, names were forwarded 
by the cooperative, a snowball approach was taken asking potential participants that had 
agreed to the study on contacting them, to suggest other cooperative members.  
Other cooperatives either did not respond to the research request or did not want to assist 
with the research. In this case, the interviewer approached other people not associated with 
the cooperative but may have had family or friends in the cooperatives asking them to suggest 
potential participant members. Once again, once names were received, a snowball approach 
was used for enlisting the participation of other members. For example, Westland 
Cooperative responded saying that they did not want to assist in the research study; as a 
result, the interviewer phoned a few businesses in the Westland area that the cooperative 
members had dealings with and asked for names. Names were forwarded, and the 
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interviewer then phoned the suggested members. Using a snowball approach, other 
members were suggested and contacted until a sufficient number had been reached.   
Some differences were found between the various geographical regions. The Northern 
Victoria region was in a prolonged drought and had very little pasture, resulting in farmers 
having to buy water and feed to keep their farms operating. In Northern New South Wales 
and Southern Queensland, a drought had affected the cooperative members in these regions. 
On the other hand, members in the Southern Victoria region, the Westland region of New 
Zealand and the Waikato had no droughts and had sufficient rain for operation. Figure 5.11 
below, a graph illustrates the distribution of farmers in various regions. 
 
Figure 5. 10: Participant Geography – State and Region 
 
5.3.2 Ethical Considerations 
At the time of the interviews, many farmers in Australia were suffering from a prolonged 
drought.  The drought in Australia affected all regions that this research was conducted in, 
including South and Northern Victoria, Northern New South Wales, Southern, Central and 
Western regions of Queensland. In Northern Victoria, together with the drought, farmers 
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were limited by their water allocation. Having no water to grow pasture, the farmers relied 
on feed sources from granaries for their dairy herds. Furthermore, the Australian Victorian 
State Government had allowed private investors to buy water rights from farmers giving rise 
to substantial water price increases from between 300% to 500% which resulted in additional 
stress being placing on the farmers. The interviews were conducted with the stress in mind 
when gathering information related to their personal on-farm circumstances.   
In New Zealand, the interviews that were conducted in the Westland region of the South 
Island, the farmers associated with the single dairy cooperative in this region had been told 
that a substantial restructuring of the cooperative was being considered, however, did not 
have sufficient details at the time of the interviews. The lack of information that the farmers 
had was apparent in many of the interviews; care was taken not to broach subjects that would 
be considered insensitive. As of October 2019, Westland was sold, and as such, the 
cooperative exists only in name only while some legal action from former members is 
concluded. 
Fonterra farmers have also been through a challenging time. Late in 2018, the advance 
payment for milk was reduced without notice. The Fonterra Chairman of the Board of 
Directors and the Chief Executive Officer published a high-level strategy in late 2018 and early 
2019 whereby it was proposed that the cooperative would sell off underperforming assets 
and undertaking a restructure which was completed in early 2020 after the interviews were 
completed. Consequently, the Fonterra interviews took place within this time of potential 
stress for their members.  
 
5.3.3 Research Design 
The research went through a number of phases to reach the final stage, that of the findings. 
While each phase can be seen as distinct, the timing of the phases often overlapped to reduce 
the time taken for the data gathering.  
1. Identification of Cooperatives: This stage involved the identification of which cooperatives 
would be used. As can be seen from the Data Sources in Figure 5.8 above, the Dairy 
Cooperatives in Australia and New Zealand were used as a sample. At the time there were 
seven Dairy Cooperatives in Australasia with a further one that had started formation but 
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was rejected as the cooperative, while being registered, and had not yet fully started 
operation at the time of the interviews. The cooperatives that were chosen were the 
following: 
i. Australian Dairy Farmers Corporation (ADFC) – Australia 
ii. Dairy Farmers Milk Cooperative (DFMC) – Australia 
iii. NORCO – Australia 
iv. Fonterra – New Zealand 
v. Tatua – New Zealand 
vi. Dairy Goat Milk Cooperative (DGC) – New Zealand  
vii. Westland Cooperative – New Zealand 
2. Contacting the Cooperatives: The chosen cooperatives were contacted using a letter 
written to the Chairman of the Board of Directors (see Appendix-A); this was conducted 
electronically and additionally, via standard postal methods. In Australia, responses were 
received from all of the cooperatives. NORCO was hesitant at first; however, once more 
detail was supplied, they were happy to forward “seed participants”. In New Zealand, 
Tatua and Dairy Goat Cooperative responded to the letter and the request for “seed 
names”. The lack of response from Fonterra and Westland was not unexpected and using 
various sources seed names for Fonterra and Westland were obtained.   
3. Obtaining the Participants: Between the response received from the cooperatives, which 
included some names and the contacting of people associated with the cooperatives that 
did not respond, members contact details were obtained. The members that were 
contacted were moreover asked for names of other members that potentially might be 
amenable to taking part in the research.  
4. Contacting the Participants: the members were contacted using both email (see 
Appendix-B) and via the telephone to obtain their agreement to take part in the research. 
The emails included the Participant Information Sheet (PIS) (see Appendix-C) which 
explained the background to the study as well as a Consent Form (see Appendix-D) which 
the participants had to sign agreeing to the interview and additionally, that the interview 
would be recorded and transcribed.  
5. Interviewing the Participants: Once a scheduled time had been agreed, the interviewer 
travelled out to the farm and interviewed the participant, sometimes in attendance with 
their spouse, son or other family members. The Interviewer outlined the research to each 
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participant who was given a hardcopy of the Participant Information Sheet and asked to 
sign the Consent Form prior to any interviews being conducted. Once the necessary 
paperwork was completed, the interviews were conducted, most of which took between 
30 and 60 minutes. The interviews were all recorded on a laptop and a Dictaphone to 
assist in the transcription process.  
6. Transcribing the Interviews: Once the audio files were uploaded onto a secure encrypted 
site, all of the interviews were transcribed by the interviewer. The completeness of the 
interviews was checked and checked for accuracy. There was no need for the interviewer 
to clarify any answers from the interviewees. Thirty-one transcriptions were verified as 
being ready for the software tool, NVIVO, one having been rejected due to conflicting and 
incomplete answers. 
7. Anonymising the Participant Information: The transcriptions were then anonymised, and 
a random code assigned to each interviewee to ensure answers could not be tracked back 
to any members; this was made clear in the participant information sheet that all 
participants received.  
8. Creating the attributes in NVIVO: The demographic data were analysed and, using the first 
part of the interview questions, a demographic table was created to be applied when 
coding the interviews. 
9. Inputting the Transcription set into NVIVO: The full set of 31 transcriptions in text form 
were then imported into the software tool, NVIVO. Initially, each interview was coded as 
separately to be employed in later analysis. 
10. Coding and analysis (in NVIVO): Using the framework suggested by Saldana (2013), 
analysis and coding of the responses using each question as a base for analysis were then 
performed.  
11. Tabulation of the results and findings: The findings were tabulated and discussed in the 
next section “Findings” and “Discussion” however, this phase tabulated the results so they 
could be used in the discussion and flow through to the conclusions/ recommendations 
and implications.  
12. Conclusions/ Recommendations and Implications: This phase wraps up the findings and 
forms conclusions based on the “Findings” and “Discussion” section and relates these to 
the hypothesis  
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The below diagram describes the various stages of the research  
 
Figure 5. 11: Phases of the Adopted Methodology 
 
5.3.4 Interview Instrument and Protocol 
All interviews were semi-structured in nature and used a base set of 24 questions to elicit 
responses from each of the participants. Mostly, probing or clarifying questions were used to 
provide detail and rationale on the answers from each of the participants. The questions that 
were used were split up into four distinct but overlapping themes; these are as follows: 
1. Questions on the background of the participant including the number of years 
farming, their status as either a member or director; herd and land size to get an idea 
of their farm environment; how long they had been a member of their current 
cooperative; what other cooperatives they were involved in and how long for; and 
technology that was used on-farm in the home office as well as any automation that 
the member had implemented,  
2. The second part concentrated on understanding the participants' sentiment and 
perceptions of their cooperative. These questions including probing questions on 
loyalty; participation and the reasons for participation or non-participation; what 
contact the member had with their cooperative organisation from a non-operational 
perspective; what contact the member had with other members where are how often; 
their operational relationship perceptions; and how willing they were to get more 
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3. The third section asked questions on tangible governance aspects. The questions 
asked questions to understand the members' involvement in the governance of the 
cooperative, including satisfaction rating (Likert scale of 0 to 10). Furthermore, 
probing questions that strove to understand their understanding of the legal 
framework that each member has recourse to being the Cooperative Law and the 
Cooperative Constitutional document and their willingness to be educated on these 
topics; their involvement in the ownership of the cooperative such as involvement in 
decisions and the reasons for the involvement; information on decisions received from 
the cooperative and the reasons and opportunity members were given to validate the 
suitability of the decision; and the perceptions they had on the use of technology to 
overcome some common cooperative governance challenges. 
4. Finally, a question was asked on what regulation/ policy/ legislation, in their mind and 
the reasons behind their answer, would be appropriate for the government or 
regulatory body to change in order to support members of a cooperative and farmers 
in general. 
 
Please refer to Appendix-5.5 for an overview of the questions that were asked, bearing in 
mind some questions and answers were combined, and other clarifying questions were 
required to understand the members' perceptions or experiences fully. 
 
5.3.5 Data Analysis 
Data analysis took place using the transcripts, which were anonymised and imported into 
NVIVO software. The techniques used in coding followed academic research for qualitative 
research using Creswell (2013), for the coding techniques, and Bazeley and Jackson (2013) for 
the specific usage of NVIVO using qualitative data coding techniques. The analysis of the 
qualitative data referenced both Schreier (2012) and Gibbs (2015). Saldana (2013) formed the 
base of what coding techniques were employed in the analysis of the data. 
According to Saldana (2013), coding and analysing of qualitative data passes through at least 
two phases as per below, this research extended the phases to three of which the third stage 
included Theorising (Saldana, 2013 p249): 
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i. First Cycle Coding – Attribute loading; Structural Coding to give an overview of the 
dataset; Descriptive Coding; and InVivo coding when going through the interviews, 
where items became apparent or were considered of interest. 
ii. Second Cycle Coding – Refining of First-Cycle coding which involved creating new 
codes from emerging themes, combining codes; splitting codes and deleting codes 
that were not relevant. Pattern coding which created a new set of codes based on 
the other codes and themes. Focused coding was applied using the structure as 
described in Saldana (2013 p213)  
iii. Theorising – As this research is based on Grounded Theory, the analysis and coding 




The next section applies the theoretical analysis framework against the data using NVIVO as 
a software tool resulting in a number of findings that are then discussed and applied in 
crafting a set of conclusions, implications, and recommendations. By using a robust 
framework and data collection process, executing against the research design while building 
up Grounded Theory (Charmaz, 2008) resulted in structured Findings and Discussion sections.  
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5.4 Findings 
As mentioned in the Methodology section prior to this one, a total of 7 cooperatives took part 
in this research study which was, at the time, the total number of active dairy cooperatives in 
Australasia. One other cooperative, Mountain Milk, was rejected because it was in its 
formation stage and had less than ten members signed up as of April 2019. It has since 
expanded its membership base, and as of October 2019, it had over 20 members. The 
researcher travelled to Westland to start the interviews, followed by South Victoria, North 
Victoria, Southern Queensland, Northern New South Wales, and then returned to New 
Zealand where the final interviews took place in the central North Island.  
 
5.4.1 Participant and cooperative demographics commentary 
The interviews formed the primary source of data in the analysis stage, discussed hereunder; 
however, some demographic data was obtained using observation. For example, age, 
whether or not the spouse attended, and the general environment of the participant was also 
taken into account. 
The cooperatives were further categorised as those having a complex or simple structure. The 
simple-structured cooperatives were centralised, meaning that all, or a significant majority, 
of the membership was located geographically in close proximity.  The cooperatives that fell 
into this category were Dairy Goat (New Zealand), Tatua (New Zealand), Westland (New 
Zealand), ADFC (Australia). Similarly, those cooperatives whose membership was dispersed 
over a large geographical area included Fonterra (New Zealand); DFMC (Australia), and 
NORCO (Australia). This categorisation is important as the literature has linked lower member 
participation and commitment (Jussila et al., 2012; Feng et al., 2016) and governance 
(Reynolds et al., 1997; Grashuis, 2019) to geographical demographics in many regions. Other 
literature has linked smaller cooperatives in terms of member proximity and geography to 
higher social capital (Feng et al., 2016). 
The number of interviews totalled 32; however, one transcription was rejected after initial 
analysis as the participant was uncooperative in answering the questions for various reasons 
not part of this study, it was unfortunate to reject this particular participant as the person had 
been a director serving on the largest cooperative. 
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Australian Cooperative Demographics 
The first Australian cooperative, Australian Dairy Farmers Corporation (ADFC), was receptive 
to the research study, and numerous phone calls made to the nominated contact person who 
happened to be their operational manager. The cooperative is a supply dairy cooperative, 
selling the entire milk production to a number of organisations with which the cooperative 
had short-term and long-term supply contracts. The cooperative was considered smaller, 
having approximately 100 active supply members. Furthermore, the chairman acted as 
executive officer and had been in office for many years. This cooperative had reincorporated 
under the Australian Federal Corporations Legislation (ADFC had cancelled its cooperative 
registration and re-registered as a corporate entity) a few years prior to this study being 
conducted; however, the constitutional rules of the corporation remained a cooperative, and 
the members were the only shareholders of the organisation. Geographically, it has two main 
membership regions, that of Southern Victoria where the majority of members resided and 
Northern Victoria, where the chairman also resided. Many of these members joined the 
cooperative (corporation) following the demise of Murray Goulburn cooperative in 2017. 
The other Victorian-based cooperative, Dairy Farmers Milk Cooperative (DFMC), was larger, 
and although it had its headquarters in Victoria, it had members along the entire south-east 
coast of Australia from Cairns to South Australia. They had also recently taken on a few 
suppliers in Western Australia. This cooperative was larger with approximately 500 suppliers; 
the majority were in two main regions, that of Victoria and the other being South Eastern 
Queensland. Additionally, this cooperative was a supply cooperative supplying all its milk to 
one large organisation. To complicate the situation, at the time of the interviews, the 
organisation that bought DFMC’s milk was being divested off the foreign-owned corporation 
and up for sale. Following the completion of the interviews with members from this 
cooperative, it was announced that divestiture of the organisation was completed, and the 
buyer was another foreign-owned corporation, Saputo, which was the same organisation that 
Murray Goulburn was sold to.  
Members from the last Australian cooperative, Norco, followed the interviews in Victoria. This 
was a mid-size cooperative with more than 200 member suppliers. The cooperative had two 
major lines of business being the supply of a large retail supermarket chain and the processing 
of the milk into other dairy products.  The members were based in the Northern New South 
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Wales and South-Eastern Queensland regions. The cooperative had been operating for many 
years and was seen as the oldest surviving dairy cooperative in Australia.  
New Zealand Cooperative Demographics 
The Interviews commenced with participants from New Zealand. They all came from a 
cooperative that, on examination of the past few years’ annual reports, had financial 
challenges and had reduced the farm gate price on numerous occasions. This cooperative, 
when asked to take part in the study, responded negatively saying it was not a good time. It 
must be stressed that initial letter to the cooperative chairman and operational management 
did not ask permission from the cooperative organisation to conduct the interviews, however, 
took the approach of asking for their support in the way of a list of potential members and a 
contact person which further communications could be used as a primary contact.  
Members from the largest cooperative in Australasia, Fonterra, were then undertaken. This 
cooperative had been the result of mergers of cooperatives leading up to the enabling 
legislation, the Dairy Industry Restructure Act 2001, which formed the cooperative. The 
cooperative did not respond to the letters outlining the research, so members were contacted 
using lists of names that the interviewer had from friends and family. Following the contact 
list being obtained, a snowball approach resulted in the required number of participants being 
found. Fonterra is a processing cooperative with 27 factories around New Zealand which 
processes the raw milk into several dairy products, mainly milk powder and other dairy 
ingredients. The cooperative was stressed as an organisation due to various circumstances 
and was undergoing a review of its entire operation. When the interviews took place, the 
members were, as a result, anxious about the outcome of the review. Fonterra cooperative 
members are spread out geographically on both the North and South Island of New Zealand. 
It is worth mentioning that Fonterra operates in Australia as a corporate entity, not a 
cooperative and similarly, Fonterra operates in many other regions outside Australasia; 
however, none of these are cooperative based entities. 
Another smaller centralised dairy cooperative was then contacted in the Waikato (located in 
the centre of the North Island of New Zealand), and a list of names received for potential 
interviews. This cooperative was one of the few that did not merge with Fonterra when they 
had an opportunity to, in early 2000/2001. The members are all geographically close to the 
cooperative processing factory. Tatua has under 100 members as of October 2019 and is a 
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closed cooperative in that it does not subscribe to the “Open entry” cooperative principle. 
This cooperative has been in operation for many years and creates speciality ingredients 
mainly for input into other products. 
The final cooperative is also situated in the central North Island with members spread 
geographically between the Waikato and the Taranaki regions. The cooperative, when 
contacted, supplied the names of directors to be interviewed. They are a single factory 
cooperative and process their milk for input to be used in specialist ingredients. Dairy Goat 
(DGC) cooperative is different in that while it is a dairy cooperative, it is not cow-based but a 
goat-based dairy cooperative.  
The diagram below displays the various cooperatives and the respective percentage of the 
total sample. 
Figure 5. 12: Cooperatives and their Relative Sample Percentage of the Total 
When considering geography, there was a mix of cooperatives, the smaller cooperatives 
which were mainly centralised with perhaps one other region but not considered too far away 








n=7 (Cooperatives)/ n=31 (Participants) 
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complex) cooperatives were those cooperatives that were geographically dispersed and 
included DFMC, Fonterra and NORCO.  
 
Participant Demographics 
As stated above, 32 participants were interviewed using a base of 24 questions. Out of these 
31 transcriptions were inputted into NVIVO, which was used as the qualitative analysis tool. 
The first questions of the interview were to understand the member demographics by asking 
environmental questions. Besides the base questions that were asked directly, other 
observational data was recorded to assist in the analysis. This section concentrates solely on 
demographic data. This is a qualitative research study; therefore, the data shows trends, 
however, not conclusive pictures. The study was more concerned at understanding the 
underlying reasons for the answers than the quantitative aspects of the members' 
demographic data. 
It was decided as part of the research design that obtaining participants that included 
directors or ex-directors would be of interest to test the answers against that of the members; 
as a result, a number were included. The graph below shows the relative split between 
members and those that were serving as directors or had been a director at some point in the 





174 | P a g e  
 
 
Figure 5. 13: Member vs Director Participants 
 
Participants ranged in age from 22 to 79 years of age, of which there were four female 
members and 27 male members. However, 12 members had their female spouse with them 
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Farm size and herd size was additionally recorded to ensure a good spread of participants 
which could relate to farm profitability, for example.  
 
Figure 5. 16: Participants Land Size 
 
Herd size, while it was recorded for the Dairy Goat Cooperative, was not reported as they 
were the only goat cooperative and goats produce less milk; therefore, a comparison as to 
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Aus average: 315 
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n=31 
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Figure 5. 17: Participants Herd Size 
 
Furthermore, data were collected on a timescale. The time that a participant had been 
farming was considered relevant when viewing their answers as well as the number of years 
that the member had been part of their current cooperative. 
 




0 - 10 
31 - 40 
21 - 30 
11 – 20 
11 – 25 years 
25+ years 
0 – 10 years 
n=31 
n=31 
177 | P a g e  
 
Figure 5. 19: How long Participant had been part of their current Cooperative 
 
Other demographic data that was considered relevant were also collected, including what 
cooperative they had been with previously and what other cooperatives they were currently 
associated with. Not all members from all cooperatives had moved within the previous ten 
years. 
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Figure 5. 21: Participant is a Member of other Cooperative (New Zealand) 
 
Once again, not all participants were members of another cooperative as in Figure 5.21 above, 
however many of them were making the results interesting as it goes to cooperative ideology 
support. 
As part of the background and demographic questions, the participants were asked about the 
availability of technology on-farm that they used. Most of the members had a personal 
smartphone that they used and additionally, access to a home office with the usual 
equipment being a Personal Computer or Laptop and a printer.  
 
Figure 5. 22: Participant Owns a Smartphone 
 
Just two members of the total of the participants interviewed had no access to a smartphone, 
although they both had older-style mobile phones for basic use. The figure above represents 
participants access to a smartphone and below the access to a PC/ Laptop. 
Own a 
Smartphone 
Own a Mobile 
(Not smart) 
n=31 
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Figure 5. 23: Participant has Access to a PC or Laptop 
 
Only two of the participants did not have direct access to a PC/ Laptop, although one of these 
used an accountant, therefore, could potentially access equipment via this method.  
 
5.4.2 Engagement findings 
The findings have been broken down into various themes and sub-themes, which are related 
somewhat to the structure as contained in the Literature Review chapter of this thesis.  The 
main themes are the sentiment and perceptions-based theme being the Engagement Theme; 
the tangible theme called Member Governance; and the Policy theme, which is cross-themed 
with the Engagement and Governance themes.  
Engagement Theme (Perceptions and Sentiments) 
The loyalty and satisfaction data came as a result of an answer based on a Likert scale of one 
to ten. The data was collected from the participants at the beginning of the interviews. 
Probing questions were asked about each sub-theme as to the reasons why the participant 
asked answered as he/she did. 
Own a PC/ 
Laptop 
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Loyalty 
Loyalty was measured on the Likert scale of one to ten, with one being not loyal at all, and 
ten being very loyal. The findings ranged from low to high; low was taken as six or below, 7 
and 8 were taken as moderate, and 9 and 10 on the scale were taken to be high. Where the 
participant gave a low score, it was confirmed that the option of leaving the cooperative was 
high, and where the score taken was high it was interpreted, and confirmed during further 
questioning, that the participant had no plans to leave their cooperative. Loyalty scores were 
as Table 5.5 below.  
Loyalty Item Loyalty Score 
(/10) 
Comment 
All Cooperatives  8.0 Medium 
Australian  8.0 Medium 
New Zealand  8.0 Medium 
ADFC  9.0 High 
DFMC  7.0 Medium 
NORCO  8.4 Medium 
Dairy Goat  9.8 High 
Fonterra  7.8 Medium 
Tatua  9.5 High 
Westland  5.8 Low 
Small Cooperative  8.3 Medium (ADFC, DGC, Tatua, Westland) 
Small Cooperative 
(Excluding Westland) 
9.4 High (ADFC, DGC, Tatua) 
Large Cooperative  7.6 Medium 
Table 5. 5: Loyalty Scores across all Cooperatives 
When discussing loyalty and the score that participants gave, a range of reasons were given, 
both positive and negative. Some participants responded to the question saying they were 
actively examining offerings from other cooperatives, while others stated that they were not 
looking actively; however, they were open to other opportunities and keeping an eye out. 
Other participants said they would not move; for example, none of the Tatua members stated 
that they move with one member responding adamantly:  
“Won’t move, very loyal to Tatua.” 
Notwithstanding the restructuring strategy that was underway, Fonterra farmers stated that 
they would not move as they remained loyal to the cooperative. One Fonterra farmer stated: 
“We have always been viciously loyal to Fonterra really, even though we've been we're still 
really really disappointed with the performance.” 
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Other farmers from drought-affected areas in Australia noted that price had become more 
important to them now as the survival of the farm came first and. As one farmer stated: 
“…...but now ultimately, the price comes first now.” 
Moreover, another member in the same area testified that there were suppliers who were 
actively soliciting them to move their milk supply. 
“Loyalty in this region is different because we got the option of supplying six to eight factories.” 
One of the New Zealand members from Westland that was similarly undergoing a change that 
the members were anxiously awaiting, stated that in explaining his response that his loyalty 
was tied to a lack of information on the new strategy: 
“having to make my mind up with staying with Westland is the right option.”  
and, 
“…. we have talked to Fonterra “ 
 
On what could improve their loyalty with their cooperative the participants had several 
suggestions including; they did not want the tiered pay structures that were implemented in 
ADFC which was echoed by other members from the same cooperative; the treatment as a 
shareholder was not equitable with what a cooperative stood for and that the cooperative no 
longer acted like a cooperative but more like a corporate. Fonterra members were adamant 
in their position that New Zealand needed a cooperative, and even if Fonterra had made 
mistakes, they were watching to see what would happen. They stated that they wanted to be 
more involved as that would help them keep their loyalty levels up. Others pointed at a lack 
of information as one area that could be improved, stating that: 
“…. I honestly don't know what's happening “ 
On the positive reasons for remaining with their cooperative, the members across the various 
cooperatives maintained that; their cooperative was doing OK as few were doing better than 
they were; the cooperative was centralised and small, and they enjoyed the closeness with 
the other members; there was good solid leadership in their cooperative; and that the worst 
had happened already, so better times were about to start. There was an equal number of 
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members that were positive as those who were negative when clarifying loyalty responses. 
However, there were no positive comments from Westland members. One member summed 
up a few responses by saying: 
“We wouldn't leave just for a couple of cents, put it that way.” 
 
On general negative comments, there were varied responses, including that shareholders 
were not treated equitably; the cooperative was no longer a cooperative. One member 
further declared: 
“I don't want to be the last rat on a sinking ship.” 
 A significant source of negative comments about loyalty came from Westland members 
who felt they no longer had control of their cooperative and were frustrated.  
When asked what their reasons would be to move cooperatives, or to move to a corporate 
processor, the responses were similar: the members would only move if they felt the 
cooperative was in danger of imminent collapse. Additionally, the members felt that they 
would move if the strategy of the cooperative were going in a direction that they did not agree 
with, for example, one member, when asked why he had left the other cooperative he stated: 
“…. bought out by a group from overseas and they were heading down a different path to 
where I thought they should be in a cooperative …” 
Many of the members in Victoria, Australia had left to join another cooperative when the 
Murray Goulburn cooperative failed in 2017. Other members had left when one cooperative 
was sold to a corporate organisation, and others had left Fonterra Australia (non-cooperative) 
due to general dissatisfaction. Some members had moved between the cooperatives in 
Australia citing reasons for leaving as being part of a smaller cooperative and a different 
strategy. In New Zealand, some members had left Fonterra for Dairy Goat Cooperative citing 
size and complexity as a reason. 
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Satisfaction 
Satisfaction was measured on the Likert scale of one to ten, with one being not satisfied at 
all, and ten being very satisfied. The findings ranged from low to high; low was taken as six or 
below, seven and eight were taken as moderate, and nine and ten on the scale were taken to 
be high. Participants were asked to clarify their score by further questions regardless of the 
actual score itself.  
Satisfaction scores were as follows: 
Satisfaction Item Satisfaction 
Score (/10) 
Comment 
All Cooperatives  7.8 Medium  
Australian  8.6 Medium 
New Zealand  7.1 Medium 
ADFC  8.5 Medium 
DFMC  8.5 Medium 
NORCO  9.0 High 
Dairy Goat  8.0 Medium 
Fonterra  6.1 Low 
Tatua  9.2 High 
Westland  5.5 Low 
Small Cooperative  7.8 Medium (ADFC, DGC, Tatua, Westland) 
Small Cooperative 
(Excluding Westland) 
8.6 Medium (ADFC, DGC, Tatua) 
Large Cooperative  8.0 Medium (Fonterra, DFMC, NORCO) 
Table 5. 6: Satisfaction Scores across all Cooperatives 
In calculating the score for satisfaction, as with Loyalty (above), the responses were further 
clarified to understand what each of the participants meant by their score, whether low, 
medium, or high. The reasons for satisfaction scores were varied; many members believed 
that the price was the reasons why they were satisfied stating that some of the reasons they 
had left their previous cooperative to join their current one was the size of the cooperative 
and that they felt valued, one member, answered: 
“…. appealed to us because of its size and your milk, and you are valued.” 
Although many of the smaller cooperatives in size and geographic spread satisfaction ratings 
were higher than that of the larger cooperatives, many of the members, including directors, 
stated that there was room for improvement. One of the directors from a smaller cooperative 
stated: 
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“You are never going to be happy with everything in the coop things are never going to suit 
your particular farm 100% “ 
Of the members whose satisfaction was lower, these included Fonterra and Westland 
members in particular. The reasons for their dissatisfaction were similar, which were based 
around returns for the farm gate price, and the general health of the cooperative, for example:  
“I'm just a bit doubtful the way things are going and the hole they are in “ 
The way the members felt they had been treated and a diminishing control in their 
cooperative was also a factor with two different members explaining: 
“… there have been things in the past that happened that shouldn't have happened.” 
And 
“…. I think we lost control of our company. And I when I say that, I think that includes the 
directors. “ 
Mention was made to the past in other cooperatives, citing a reason why they had left being: 
“… Murray Goulburn. We signed for another 12 months, and we were quite determined. In the 
end, their price and their management was just screwing us totally. We had to go.” 
Another reason for dissatisfaction among Westland farmers was the lack of information that 
the members were getting around the organisational review. One Westland farmer summed 
it up after giving a low score for their cooperative for satisfaction, declaring: 
“That's as low as it’s ever been.” 
 
Participation 
The Annual General Meeting attendance, which is mandated in the cooperative laws as well 
as reinforced in the constitutional documents of the cooperative, was found to be 
problematic. The question was asked if the member had attended the Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) and the reasons for non-attendance if they had not. There was a clear split 
between larger geographically diverse cooperatives and those that were considered smaller 
and more centralised. The below graph shows total member attendance at the AGM, 
directors were included. 
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Figure 5. 24: Participant Attendance at AGM – All Participants 
 
Although, on the face of the attendance shown above in Figure 5.24, when the results are 
split between the two types of cooperatives, large and geographically diverse and the smaller 
more centralised cooperatives the results show a distinct pattern. 
 
Figure 5. 25: Participant Attendance at AGM vs Cooperative Size 
 
However, one of the reasons for most of the members not attending the AGM from the 
geographically diverse cooperatives could be due to the fact that the meeting was held in 
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attend the AGM is shown below with the findings mostly due to the AGM being held in or 
very close to peak milking season and as a result on-farm commitments take precedence.  
 
Figure 5. 26: Participant Reasons for Non-attendance at AGM 
 
In general, the comments from those who did not attend the AGM had a common theme of 
being negative with many members stating that it is scheduled in the peak season and as a 
result, they cannot attend. Other comments included the AGM purpose as far as the members 
were concerned, was not being met. One member responded with: 
“.. didn't feel as though I got enough out of that AGM to warrant sparing the time, to be 
honest.” 
And another stating: 
“The AGM is not as effective as you'd like.” 
With a director from a smaller cooperative noting: 
“…. we are conscious that we're possibly getting a little bit of a drop-off.” 
and 
“Is it that we've got a changing demographic, where a lot of our farm owners are in their 60s, 





Not Worth it 
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n=31 
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Several members had practical suggestions as to how to make it more effective, these 
include: 
“I've often sort of thought late January or early February is a good time to have it.” 
And 
“AGM’s never suits everybody yeah so I suggested to them at the last advisory committee 
meeting and at the last annual meeting that they look to put it online.“ 
On the other hand, the positive comments from the members who attended the cooperative 
AGM had similar reasoning in that the AGM was only once a year and that there were other 
meetings during the year which were more effective.  
In summary, the AGM is not useful for most cooperative members; they believe that the AGM 
serves its purpose in smaller cooperatives as a gathering of members, however, for the larger 
cooperatives the sentiment was that it was not effective, some even stating it was a waste of 
time. The scheduling of the AGM is problematic with cooperatives scheduling the AGM during 
the peak farm season, which resulted in low attendance. Additionally, the AGM was said to 
be more financial and more one-way from the cooperative organisation to the members, the 
interaction was low and, in some cases, not available. Splitting the AGM up into multiple 
smaller (for example quarterly) and ensuring that it is not held in the peak milking season 
would increase participation as can be deduced from the comments of the interviewees.  
Engagement with the Cooperative 
Many of the members have regular contact with their cooperative. There are different contact 
types which are discussed below, for instance, it was found that the formal contract with their 
cooperative included two main categories, the day to day operational contact with the milk 
pick-up and milk testing and the contact with the directors and the chairman of the board. 
The other type of contact found was informal, where they usually phoned or met up with the 
directors and Chairman. Of the contact with the Chairman, the vast majority of the members 
reporting having positive contact, for example 
“… we have a lot of faith in Scott.” 
and 
“.. there's never a drama speaking to the chair.” 
When asked about the contact they had with their director, the comments were similar in 
188 | P a g e  
 
nature to the chairman with many reporting positive contact. A finding that the members felt 
comfortable enough to call their directors at any time was apparent throughout the 
cooperatives.  For example, members’ comments on the directors were: 
“I talk to our directors that are for the area, and they're very approachable …” 
and 
“… the whole of the board as a whole incredibly personable, very relatable and very 
approachable.” 
As well as 
“… one of the things I do I do like about the co-op is those farmer directors.” 
However, there were negative comments that were limited to a few cooperatives in particular, 
for instance: 
“I think you know; there's…..you just wonder how much information they're giving you?” 
and 
“Sometimes you think they're just telling you all the rosy stuff and not telling you the other 
stuff.” 
Other members commented: 
“… things start to go wrong. It's like I know who the hell made that decision, you know, we 
paying you guys good money, we are relying on you, basically, to keep our company strong. 
And to get the return back to us.” 
Still, another member stated: 
“.. we certainly don't see directors like we used to.” 
and 
“…but we certainly don't have that same engagement now.  Mainly because the directors 
aren't farmers and there's less of them.” 
The negative engagement comments came from Fonterra and Westland, which may be 
understandable, given the organisational reviews that were underway at the time of the 
interviews in 2019.  
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In summary, the contact that members had with the cooperative on a formal regular basis 
was found to be broad with some members contacting all parts of the cooperative at least 
once a month.  
 
 
Figure 5. 27: Whom the Participant Contacted at the Cooperative 
 
Taking an informal perspective on contact, many of the members reporting have good 
informal contact with many parts of the cooperative similar to the formal contact. Members 
from the larger cooperatives such as Fonterra reported that they had minimal on-farm 
contact, for example, when probing the interaction with the on-farm representative: 
“We have never met him, and so so it's, it's pretty disappointing.” 
and 
“No, never. The new guy in town that has taken over,” 
and another member: 
“I haven't seen him.” 
n=31 
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Once again, the Westland farmers had similar comments about their engagement saying that 
they used to get directors coming out to the farms to chat to the members, but that had not 
happened for a few years. 
The supplier meetings are valued by many of the cooperative members as this is where they 
see they can ask questions and be heard. Most of the cooperatives had at least two supplier 
meetings per year in addition to the AGM; the Christmas get-together often served as a dual 
purpose having a supplier meeting then moving on to the social function. Some of the 
comments about the supplier meeting summed up the general perception of the meetings 
saying that this was where they got the real information as they could talk to a director who 
attended, or even the chairman in some cases, and ask them the questions that they needed 
answers to. This form of communication was seen as an integral part of the cooperative. 
When speaking about informal contact, in particular the Christmas get-together, it was found 
that the members valued this type of social gathering and many of them had made an effort 
to attend.   
Formal contact with the operational side of the cooperative was mainly concerned with milk 
collections and testing with most members commenting that they were satisfied with the way 
their queries had been handled and accepted an adverse testing outcome even where the 
outcome had not been the preferred choice of theirs.  Of the total sample, 19 had had an 
operational query in the past year mostly due to some testing result or change of milk 
collection time. Of these, most of the cooperatives had resolved the query to the satisfaction 
with only three members reporting the query had not been resolved to their satisfaction. Out 
of the total sample, only two queries related to finance or payment type issues. 
In summary, as far as both formal and informal contact is concerned, it was found that 
members preferred the smaller, more personal supplier meetings when compared to the 
larger AGM. They felt they could voice their opinion and be heard more at these forums even 
though there was no formal voting opportunity. The Christmas and supplier meeting get-
together showed the value the members place on interacting with each other and the 
leadership of the cooperative in a non-formal way. The way the AGM is handled showed that 
there are two main reasons for non-attendance being that the scheduling of the meeting was 
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not optimal for most members and the other reason given was that members did not value 
the meeting as it was rarely effective. 
Views on getting more involved in the Cooperative 
When asked about getting more involved in their cooperative from a non-governance 
perspective, many members cited time constraints and on-farm commitment as the reason 
they could not or would not. This question looked at the willingness of members to serve in 
roles associated with their cooperative excluding governance roles. These types of roles 
included community liaison roles and internal roles for communication, some of which were 
more socially orientated roles. Older members were also reticent to get more involved stating 
that they had done their time, and it was up to the younger members to step up to these 
commitments. However, out of the older members who responded positively, there was 
interest in mentoring the younger members in the long-term interests of the cooperative with 
some older members already informally doing this. For example, one older member for a 
larger cooperative stated: 
“I’d probably get more satisfaction out of trying to mentor younger farmers than trying to go 
on something.” 
Moreover, another older member responding that he did not have the time, although: 
“…I would mentor though” 
Although other members stated that their cooperative should be asking them and that they 
would not volunteer unless asked by their cooperative to get involved. Overall, more 
members did not want to get involved; more than half of the participants responded with 
negative answers or with reservations. Those that were serving as directors did not want to 
get more involved either as they said the directorship was a full-time role in itself. Additionally, 
those members who were serving on Advisory Committees were in the same way time-
constrained and responded that they could not do more than they already were. There were, 
however, some members who said they would be willing, and it was found that the willing 
members would, under certain circumstances such as in a mentoring role, to get involved to 
some degree.  
The comments from the members on why they would or could not get involved in their 
cooperative in a non-governance capacity ranged from the age perspective, as an example: 
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“Not at my age.” 
and  
“Not for me I am too old …” 
Others stated that they were not sure of what they could offer or that they were time-
constrained.  
“I just don't know that I have that much to offer.” 
and  
“too time-consuming for me to go back and do it again.” 
However, when asked the same question of the members but this time asking how willing 
they would be to get involved in the governance aspects of the cooperative, including serving 
as a director or serving on a governance committee, the majority of members were positive. 
The below graph shows the willingness for members to get involved in roles in their 
cooperative. The finding indicates that governance roles are more highly valued that other 
community type roles. The responses were from members only; no directors were included. 
 
Figure 5. 28: Willingness to Participate in Cooperative 
Where the response was negative to serving in a governance role, the reasons given for not 
wanting to serve on governance roles were from DFMC, where four out of the six participants 
responded negatively. Two members from the other cooperatives cited that they had served 
already and so had done their time. Some members believed that they were not qualified for 








Willingness to Participate in Cooperative Roles
Wilingness to get involved in Non Governance roles
Wilingness to get involved in Governance roles n=24 
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“And being a director, I think you need to have done courses to do it properly. And I haven't 
done anything like that. I would feel out of my depth really.” 
and  
“But again, you've got to get the right people. Not just who might have some ability to think 
through those things, but how you seat them, get them involved.” 
Many members cited problems serving in a governance capacity stating that the members 
were chosen by the board or a committee,  
“so, if you were not chosen, you could not serve”.  
Other members cited an informal policy of choosing directors, including that members had 
to be invited by the chairman or board of directors. Other members responded by stating 
that their cooperatives boards chose whom they would send on a director’s course, and as a 
result, they would not serve unless they were chosen or asked.   
 
In summary, non-governance roles are not as valued as the governance roles with members 
responding negatively to being involved and giving up their time. However, older members 
were open to acting as mentors to the younger farmers with some of them from larger 
cooperatives already involved in informal mentoring programs. 
Whereas considering the governance roles, it was found that these are generally more valued 
than other roles with the member viewing them much more favourably. There were a number 
of members from smaller cooperatives involved in governance roles such as serving on a 
committee which had governance responsibilities and as a result, those cooperatives 
members had not responded positively or negatively. Age was found to be a factor, so too 
was if the member had previously served in a governance capacity. If the member considered 
themselves older or had previously served in a governance role, they were no longer willing 
to serve in any capacity. It was further observed that some cooperatives had moved away 
from pure member-elected directors by choosing who would go on directors’ courses and 
who would serve; these cooperatives included Westland, Fonterra, and Tatua. In the other 
cooperatives, any member could be nominated to serve as a director and could be voted in 
based on a member vote. 
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5.4.3 Governance findings 
This section examines the tangible aspects of membership which included: 
1. The policy framework,  
2. The constitutional document,  
3. How involved the members had been in previous decisions that had been made by the 
cooperative, whether the member had voted on the decision or not and the reasons 
behind the voting,  
4. What information they had received regarding the decisions,  
5. What recourse the members had if they did not agree with a decision or a direction 
their cooperative was taking, and  
6. What involvement respondents thought that they should have in the decision-making 
of the cooperatives when decisions being made would have a material impact on the 
farm gate price or returns in general.  
Furthermore, the members were asked about their perceptions and knowledge of industry 
regulation initiatives that were underway at the time of the interviews, the two that were 
chosen was the Dairy Code of Conduct in Australia and the review of the Dairy Industry 
Restructure Act 2001. 
 
Policy Framework  
The members' knowledge of the cooperative law was examined, their perceptions of how 
much they knew, if they knew enough, and should they know more about cooperative law.  
It is of note here that ADFC in Australia had reincorporated under the Corporations legislation 
a few years prior when they were considering raising capital to build a processing plant which 
had later been abandoned. At the time of the interviews, ADFC was still considered a 
Corporation in the eyes of the law. Both DFMC and NORCO being Australian cooperatives 
were incorporated under the state-based New South Wales cooperative law.  
Notwithstanding the fact that ADFC was incorporated under the Corporations legislation and 
not under the Cooperative law, the questions directed to the members appraised their 
understanding of both laws (Corporations Legislation and the state-based Cooperative law) 
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with additional probing questions asked on the knowledge of the effect of the reincorporation 
as far as cooperative protections that the law holds for members.  
It was found that very few members had knowledge of the cooperative law under which their 
cooperative operated. The graph below indicates the member knowledge of the law, 
separating the directors and ex-directors, and the members.  
 
Figure 5. 29: Participants Knowledge of the Cooperative Law 
It was observed that the directors had some knowledge of the law either through their 
directors' training or self-study. However, when it was asked if they thought they knew 
enough of the law, the majority of them responded that they did, however, when asked about 
AUCLA in Australia and the structure of the New Zealand subordinate cooperative law (to the 
companies law), the directors were found to have very little knowledge. Very few members 
had knowledge of the law, yet two-thirds of the members believed that they should know 
more about the cooperative law. The third of the members who believed they did not need 
to know anything further about the cooperative law cited reasons being that it was the 
responsibility of the directors to know that law. For instance, comments from the members 
who believed they did not need to know more about the law were: 
“… I think we vote for the directors for them to know that.” 
and  
Member - no 
Director - yes 
Director - no 
Member - yes 
n=31 
196 | P a g e  
 
“Well, we've got a company and one of the plants up here and directors are held responsible, 
and it's probably not a lot more than that.” 
Similarly  
“Not as a member supplier, no, because those decisions are to be made by the board and 
management.” 
The Australian cooperative members, ADFC, incorporated under the Corporations legislation, 
was unaware of the cooperative law protections and relied solely on their constitutional 
document. One of the members stated that: 
“Probably farmers, in general, should know more about the cooperative law and knowledge 
is always good.” 
Moreover, other similar comments from the other cooperative members from ADFC 
indicated that the members were unaware of the differences between the Cooperative law 
and the Corporations legislation that their entity was incorporated under. This finding further 
suggested that when the change was made, it was likely that insufficient information was 
given to the members on the effect that this change might have for them as members.  
Constitutional Document 
All cooperatives as part of this study have a constitutional document which describes the rules 
under which members of their cooperative operate under. It is pertinent to note that previous 
chapters (Chapter-2 and Chapter-3) which dealt with the principles, the law, and the 
constitutional document, found that the New Zealand Law had no provisions within its 
cooperative law that a cooperative by law, had to have a constitutional document; however, 
all four New Zealand cooperatives had created one regardless.  
Common provisions contained within most cooperative constitutional documents have 
provisions or rules for the governing the rights of members and how they can vote, the rules 
governing shares including the buying and disposing of shares, the rules and details 
administering milk collection, the timing and detail around annual meetings, reporting and 
election of director with the rules governing directors and meetings, and how the 
constitutional document can be changed and the rules regulating how many votes are 
required for the change to be accepted, as examples.  
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When asked how much the members knew of the rules, or provisions, governing their 
cooperative as contained within their constitutional document, the members were found to 
have very little knowledge. All directors, however, believed that they were familiar with their 
Constitutional Document. Two members had been trained by their cooperative and had been 
familiarised with their cooperatives constitutional document. Members responses were 
shown to be consistent about their knowledge of their constitutional document, for instance: 
“No, I haven't read through it, and certainly when we first joined, I glanced at it, but I 
wouldn't have read anything, so you rely a lot on when you go to AGM's and probably 
through Ron if there is any queries.” 
and  
“Not as familiar as I think I should be.” 
again  
“Not very, to be honest. “ 
With a few participants saying: 
“… only very basic.” 
The below diagram shows the familiarity with the constitutional documents, a members-only 
graph, excluded directors. 
 
Figure 5. 30: Members are Familiar with their Constitutional Document 
 
When asked if the member would like to know more about their constitutional document by 
means of a training session given at a central location, the overwhelming response was 
92%
8%
Member Knows their Constitutional Document
No Yes
n=24 
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positive. Furthermore, the members preferred to have the Cooperative Law explained at this 
session as well.  When probing questions were asked on if the cooperative should provide the 
training and conduct the session, there was a split of members between those of smaller 
cooperatives who wanted their cooperative to conduct the training and the larger 
cooperatives where most members stated that they would prefer the training be conducted 
by an external independent party. The below graph indicates the participants' response to 
the question if they would attend a training seminar for the Law and the Constitutional 
Document; this graph includes directors. 
 
Figure 5. 31: Participants want a Training Session on the Law and their Constitutional Document 
There was only one participant that would not attend a seminar on the law and the 
constitutional document responding by saying he has enough knowledge on both. The 
participant had served as a director for many years, with one of the larger cooperatives. 
In summary, the finding that the knowledge that the members had of the law and their 
constitutional document was surprisingly low, the members stated quite openly that they had 
little knowledge of both governance artefacts. Although ADFC was incorporated under the 
Corporations Legislation, they had very little knowledge of the change that they had 
undertaken when the move from the cooperative legislation to that of the corporation's 
legislation. Furthermore, they had little knowledge of the protection that the cooperative law 
held for them. The constitutional document was not understood as a governance tool for the 
members, and few of the participants had read it in any detail. The ones that had read the 
constitution had read it a few years prior even though many of them had approved minor 
Yes No 
n=31 
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amendments to the document when voting on the changes. The participants almost all stated 
that they should know more; some cited the language used others the content as reasons 
why they did not read it through. However, many of the participants were familiar with the 
rules around the shares and operational milk collection. As far as learning more, the response 
was almost 100% positive; all of them acknowledging the lack of knowledge they had in these 
critical internal and external policy documents. As to who would conduct the training was not 
consistent except for the difference between the smaller and larger cooperatives. The lack of 
trust was observed in the comments from the larger, more geographically diverse 
cooperatives.  
 
Background to major member-impacting decisions by Cooperatives in this study  
This set of questions and the resulting findings looked at what major decisions had been made 
by the cooperative, what information the members had received regarding the decisions, the 
link to a known strategy that the members had been briefed about, and the communication 
effectiveness of the decision as it was being implemented. All of the cooperatives in this study 
had, over the past few years, made significant member-impacting decisions. The interviews 
conducted used open-ended questions to encourage the participants to talk about decisions 
that their cooperative had made and their perceptions on the process.  
Coop Decision-1 Decision-2 
ADFC New Dryer + Reincorporate under 
Corporations legislation 
Tiered Pricing (season-high/low) 
DFMC Resign of 10-year Contract Sale of Lion Drinks and Dairy 
NORCO Coles decision Increasing the number of Suppliers 
DGC Constitutional Change New Share Issue 
Fonterra Selling of Assets (Tiptop for example) Reduced advance pay-out (December 
2018) 
Tatua Dryer build – a few years ago  
Westland Organisational Review  
Table 5. 7: Major Decisions for all Cooperatives 
 
The background of each of the decisions is as follows: 
ADFC, being incorporated under the Victorian Cooperative law, which aligned with the 
Australian Uniform Cooperative Laws Agreement (AUCLA), looked at building a processing 
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plant after the appointment of a new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) in 2014. As the cooperative 
required investment capital to build the processing plant, it looked at the capital from internal 
members and external investors. The cooperative decided to reincorporate under the 
Corporations legislation in order to attract external investment capital more easily. The 
members were required, under the cooperative law, to vote on this change and approved the 
change at a special general meeting. However, the members were not satisfied that this 
strategy was sound and made many informal submissions to the Chairman, eventually 
resulting in the CEO being removed and the processing plant plan being abandoned. 
Additionally, due to contractual issues, one of the main organisations that ADFC sold its milk 
to, wanted a flatter milk supply with more milk than currently produced at the shoulder 
seasons forcing ADFC to bring in Tiered pricing. The Tiered pricing would result in farm 
operations adjustments, including calving schedules and would result in less being paid for 
peak-season milk and more being paid for shoulder and off-season milk. 
DFMC sells its entire milk production to one organisation, Lion Drinks and Dairy (LDD) who is 
owned by Kirin, a Japanese organisation. The contact renewal came up, and after 
renegotiation, the cooperative re-signed the milk supply agreement for an additional ten 
years. However, in late 2018 Kirin decided that LDD was no longer part of its long-term 
strategy and decided to sell that part of their business operation in Australia. At the stage of 
the interviews, it was not clear who would be the successful bidder on the LDD business 
operation. DFMC would be potentially impacted by the sale and thus was considered relevant 
when asking participants about their governance involvement. Subsequently, LDD was sold 
to Saputo, a Canadian owned firm that had bought Murray Goulburn in 2017. 
NORCO processed milk into ingredients and dairy products as well as supplying milk to a large 
retail organisation, Coles. In 2017 the contract was re-signed, and the Coles’ milk contract 
with Norco was extended until 2023, with Coles having an option to further extend it until 
2026. In effect, this extended the contract for a significant portion of the total volume of milk 
that NORCO collects by a further 5 to 8 years. Furthermore, NORCO had as part of their 
strategy, expansion. The expansion would result in a significant number of additional 
suppliers being brought on, some of these outside their regional area of operation was being 
considered, some of which was ion other Australian states. In June 2019, Coles announced it 
was going to bypass their traditional source of milk, including NORCO, and concentrate on 
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soliciting milk directly from the farmers. This event has been included, although this occurred 
after the interviews were completed; however, the contract still stands between NORCO and 
Coles. 
Dairy Goat Cooperative (DGC), situated in the Waikato, is a goat dairy cooperative. The 
cooperative has two pending decisions, one being the constitutional change and the other, 
albeit connected, a new share issue. They have a strategy of expansion currently looking at 
growing their footprint. A substantial portion of their input is aimed at ingredients for goat 
Infant Formula. 
Fonterra announced in 2018 that it was reviewing all of its operations with the result that 
many of its assets were to be sold off. For example, the assets included Tiptop, an ice-cream 
factory situated in southern Auckland, and other ingredients joint ventures in Europe and 
South America. Furthermore, in December 2018 it was announced by the chairman and the 
CEO that the advance-payout would be reduced by 20c per kilogram of milk solids. The 
advance payout is a substantial portion of the total price paid for the milk received from 
individual farmers and allows Fonterra to pay farmers most of the price retaining enough for 
adjustments in need. These two decisions have a bearing on the cooperative members in a 
number of ways regardless if they are considered local, in New Zealand, or foreign, being 
outside New Zealand operations.  
Tatua, one of the smaller dairy cooperatives in the Waikato and operating for more than 100 
years, increased the number of processing dryers in 2015 by adding an additional dryer, dryer-
3, to their operation which was partially funded by the members.  It resulted in the reduction 
of farm-gate price for a few years, which affected members’ on-farm profitability. 
Westland members were interviewed in February 2019 before the eventual sale of the 
cooperative in October 2019. At the time of the interviews, the members had not been told 
what their organisational review entailed except that it was looking at various strategies. 
Westland had consistently been the lowest paying cooperative when compared to the other 
New Zealand cooperatives and less than the other non-cooperative dairy companies 
collecting contract milk such as Open Country and Synlait. The members were concerned 
about the outcome, which was apparent in the interviews. 
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This section looks at the decisions that were made and the member involvement in them, 
including the information that they received and asked the members perceptions on the 
decisions. Each cooperative is examined separately as to the member involvement and what 




It was found that the ADFC participants agreed that they had all voted on the reincorporation 
of the cooperative in a Corporate entity. However, one of the comments around the 
information available for the decisions was as follows: 
“I don't know if we necessarily got risks, but we definitely got, this was the reason why it was 
needed, this was perhaps the plan going forward.”  
The reincorporation was executed with the next stage linked to it being the building of a milk 
processing factory (dryer) at a suitable location. Although the planned factory was cancelled 
before any vote, members’ comments on the process leading up to the eventual cancellation 
indicated a lack of information, one member commenting about the meeting where it was 
proposed: 
“And there was the opportunity to ask the questions. I asked plenty. But yeah, I just never 
got the answers I was comfortable with.” 
On the third decision that ADFC members were involved in was the Tiered-pricing change. 
None of the members got to vote on this, yet it must be noted at this stage they were 
operating under the Corporation legislation; therefore, no longer a Cooperative. The 
members attended a meeting where the decision was presented to them, comments from 
two members were: 
“We had a big meeting for the tiered pricing when it was brought in. “ 
and 
“That's a bit hard to answer because on that milk pricing thing because I was there when it 
first got presented to us.” 
Many of the ADFC participants expressed dissatisfaction with the amount of information that 
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was given to them about the change in pricing, stating that: 
“… I still think a lot of farmers didn't know what was going on. “ 
and 
“And I think they're all just a bit not sure what was going on.  I didn't think it was just me to 
stand up in front of everyone and sort of say are you aware this is happening? I wanted them 
to be proactive to ask the question. But nobody really asked the questions.” 
and others: 
“… not detailed information probably a lot of that done verbally or in a presentation.” 
There is evidence that suggests that ADFC made some decisions that affected their members 
without consultation, such as the Tiered pricing decision. As far as the reincorporation 
decision was concerned, it was voted on since their constitutional document is explicit, and 
so is the cooperative law, concerning what members have to vote on by law. The decision to 
cancel the dryer without a vote indicates that members do have informal options to stop 
decisions before they are taken, and the data pointed to general dissatisfaction with the 
strategy. Furthermore, it seems that there was a general lack of formalised information on 




DFMC had recently (in the past year), extended the contract with LDD. When the members 
were asked about the decisions generally, it was evident that members had been told about 
the decision once it was signed and therefore did not vote on this. When probed about the 
information received on this decision, the evidence was that there was little information given 
to members, with one member stating he had only got an email with very little detail. On the 
information received, some members commented: 
“… from a farmer's point of view, you'd say not enough.” 
and 
“We're being told as much as they're allowed to tell us. They're not allowed to say which 
parties they're are looking at buying or-- That's what we found. “ 
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and again 
“Personally, I could get a little bit more [information], but I do understand that there are 
probably some things that they can't tell us.” 
On the sale of LDD, which had a potential impact for members, the participants recounted 
that they had only received emails about the sale saying it would not affect them. Meeting 
invitations were sent to the DFMC members by Kirin, the holding company of LDD, in which 
the members could attend and ask questions.  
It is apparent that DFMC did not vote on decisions over the past few years that could have 
impacted them. Furthermore, the members believed that the available information on the 
decisions that had been made lacked suitable detail as far as the members believed.  
 
NORCO 
Norco had not made many member-impacting decisions over the past few years except for 
the re-signing or extension of the long-term contract that had with Coles. In this decision, no 
members had voted, and little information was sent out to the members about it, some 
members mentioning they had seen it first in the local press only. It was, however, discussed 
at a supplier meeting. 
 
DGC 
Dairy Goat was making two decisions that were not yet at the stage that members would be 
involved. Information had been sent out, and meetings had been held about the changes 
which were to the constitutional document, which is mandated that it has to be voted on in 
the DGC constitution. On the matter of a new share issue, it was in its early stages so there 
was little evidence of whether it would be voted on and if sufficient information had been 
sent out on it. One of the directors did mention that if the members wanted information on 
either decision, they could ask for it.  
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Fonterra 
Fonterra had told its members and published articles in the open press that they were 
reviewing their operation in 2018. As a result of this strategy, many of the Fonterra assets 
were sold off, including Tip-Top, an ice-cream factory in Auckland. It was apparent that the 
members had not voted on any of the decisions nor the strategy of the sale of assets. Once 
the sale had been completed, the members got information on the website, the Fonterra 
portal, and the Fonterra smartphone app. Some participants were not happy with the 
decision with one member saying: 
“I had a real bee in my bonnet about the TipTop thing, because I just kind of feel okay, if it's 
not making money that needs to be addressed, but it is a real Kiwi icon thing, and I'm just, 
you know, I'm just not happy about that being owned by some bloody foreigner, sorry, and 
not necessarily a foreigner. “ 
Furthermore, another commenting on the information received about the decisions stated: 
“Look, it's pretty basic or minimal.” 
When asked about the decision and information received on the reduced payout, one 
member responded: 
“I thought it was a load of rubbish, to be honest.” 
 
The responses indicated that in the decisions discussed by the Fonterra participants, Fonterra 
generally made decisions without consulting their members. As far as the information 
received, the comments from the participants indicated that there was a general lack of 
quality information and seemed to be “one-way”. 
 
Tatua 
Tatua, in the course of their decision for a new dryer, had communicated often to their 
members on the stage and progress of the feasibility study. Members had voted on the 
decisions before it was implemented, and many supplier meetings were held regarding the 
new dryer explaining the expected impact of the decision on the member base. The 
comments from the participants were positive with members stating: 
“We were fully engaged with that and the members the cooperative event they voted on it. “ 
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and 
“…got lots of information on it.” 
and  
“I would say we are probably getting as much as the as we could legitimately expect to get. 
There is a fine line between just bombarding people with too much information and you just 
put it in the Delete box.”   
 
and again 
“It was well penned at several meetings.” 
It was found that Tatua involved its members in all its decisions from an early stage with 
information going out, meetings being held and eventually culminating in a member vote. The 
effects and the risks associated with the decision were also explained to members before they 
voted on it.  
 
Westland 
Westland had commenced an organisational review and had previously entered into a Joint-
Venture with a foreign-owned milk-canning factory. The members were aware of the review 
and some of the reasons behind it, but no information on what the possible outcomes would 
be was given to any members. Members’ comments about the review indicated a lack of 
information and transparency as to the progress, the process, and the strategy, some 
members responding: 
“They always said its publicly sensitive, granted, but it doesn't matter you can tell people, so 
they know what's going on. There's a lot of people with frustration at the moment as there's 
not enough information and everybody's waiting to March.” 
and 
“… so, we each got an email saying we can’t ask these because they can’t answer them so 
people don't ask questions because they can’t answer them.  I think people are actually as 
shareholders we should be entitled to an answer by now.” 
and again 
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“… we've seen very little, and we won't see anything apart from the party that they deem to 
be the best option for us.” 
 
It was found that, looking at the review, that members would eventually vote on it which they 
did. However, there was little in the way of information with the Board citing confidentiality 
as the primary reason why they could not share any information. 
 
General comments on improving information 
Many comments and suggestion were made on the information and communication received 
by members for major cooperative initiatives. There is evidence that most cooperative 
members, with the exception of Tatua members, said that more quality information would 
help them support their cooperative’s decisions and strategies. Information improvement 
suggestions by participants contained four main themes, Confidentiality restriction removals, 
more frequent supplier meetings, more transparency and information, and more 
communication. Examining what the participants had suggested in terms of improvements is 
shown in the following graph: 
 




















Suggestions to Keep Members Better Informed
n=24 
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When asked about how the members could be kept informed of cooperative initiatives, the 
participants believed that more and better communication would help. Some comments from 
the participants on communication included: 
“… Sometimes you do feel you are left in the dark a bit… “ 
and 
“They don’t give us enough information, as said previously. They tell us what they think we 
should know.” 
and again 
“Perhaps more insight as to the reasoning for decisions. “ 
Moreover, on the subject of supplier meetings which was linked by several participants to 
communication, the responses included: 
“Maybe just a few more supplier emails or meetings or something.” 
“… as we spoke about earlier is that extra supply meeting.” 
“if you had another supplier meeting, I think it would really help.” 
“… we have our discussion groups as well, actually. That's another thing …not as often as we 
should ….” 
“…. even better to do small meetings like that.” 
The findings are clear that most participants wanted more meetings included in their 
communication strategy. On the negative side, a number of the participants believed that 
there was insufficient transparency when getting information from the cooperative, 
comments such as the below highlighted the problem. 
“… which was the first time I had ever seen that letter come to tell us what's happening. I 
thought that was really good. That is a change.” 
“The outcome was far less than what I envisioned it to be. I had to turn around and do the 
stuff myself.” 
“I wish we could get be getting more of this …“ 
“So, at times, I'm not 100% comfortable with the transparency. “ 
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This finding, read in conjunction with the comments above, indicates that there is a lack of 
trust, which was mainly confined to the larger cooperatives once again. The removal of 
confidentiality was also seen as an adverse finding in that the participants who suggested this 
to improve overall quality and information believed that cooperatives used this as a reason 
not to communicate their decisions.  
“They tell us what they think we should know.” 
“But we actually need to know some of the details.” 
“…. they don't really want to disclose that …” 
“… and they are claiming … as its strictly confidential …” 
“Well, that's the thing, very little because it's confidential to the parties involved.” 
“…. mindful of the commercial sensitivity everything.” 
“They always said its publicly sensitive…” 
Additionally, it was found that the member participants from the smaller cooperatives tended 
to view the information received more positively. The only positive comment on the quality 
and regularity of information received was from Tatua, where the participants' perception 
was positive. Comments from a few respondents included: 
“… got lots of good information on it.” 
“It was well penned at several meetings.” 
“Heaps [of information]” 
“We were fully engaged with that.” 
The following graph shows the perceptions of members on significant decisions. The question 
asked was if they had voted on these major decisions. This was a member-only question; it 
was assumed that directors voted amongst themselves on these decisions.   
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Figure 5. 33: Voted on Major Decisions 
 
In summary, this section found that members rarely vote on decisions that a cooperative 
takes even if that decision could have a significant impact on member-farm profitability. 
Furthermore, there was a lack of information on the decisions, including the process, the 
rationale behind the decisions, and the specifics of implementation. As a result, a cause and 
effect finding was that participants believed they did not get enough information, there were 
not enough communication-type meetings, there was a lack of transparency and therefore 
trust especially in the larger cooperatives. Certain cooperatives used confidentiality as a 
reason not to involve or inform their members. The suggestions for improvement matched 
these in that members should be more involved in decision making, more communication 
was required before a decision was to be taken, transparency in the process, and that a 
compromise should be reached in the confidentiality of information when negotiating 
contracts. Tatua was an exception to this where all the participants believed the 
communication was adequate and that the cooperative kept them well-informed. On voting, 
the finding is that there is an inconsistency in most cooperatives as far as when members vote 
or not, with the default position being the board takes the decision and, sometimes, informs 
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perhaps the only time that a vote is taken. Even where there was a significant decision to be 
made, the participants were unsure if a vote was in fact taken which can indicate that 
members were perhaps not involved or they decided not to involve themselves due to a lack 
of participation. In the next section, member recourse in large cooperative critical decisions 
is examined.  
Member wants to vote on significant Decisions  
Participants were asked if they should be involved in those decisions that affected their farm 
gate price, in other words, major farm-profitability impacting decisions, the responses 
indicated that they wanted involvement with a low percentage wanting something else. Some 
farmers said that the members should leave it to the directors, and others stated that it was 
not practical, the cooperative should just get on with it. Figure-5.35 below displays responses 
based on the question of whether members wanted involvement in major decisions.  
 
 
Figure 5. 34: Members wanting Involvement in Major Decisions 
Members were adamant in their involvement in the major decisions. The question was 
framed as a major decision that substantially affected the farmgate price, not the operational 
decisions that the cooperative organisation made to keep the cooperative efficient. Examples 
of the responses included: 







No, Leave it 
Directors 
n=24 
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“.. talking about the Constitution, they must be rules and regulations within that, which say, 
okay, you must go to your suppliers if you need to make a decision about this the source and 
this and that..” 
“With respect to consultation, prior to the decision being made, yes….” 
Other participants, which were a minority, believed the decisions should be made by the 
directors and responded with: 
“I think if also you've voted directors on to represent you, I think to a point; we should leave 
them to make those decisions.” 
“... we do have a vote because we elected our directors ...” 
When members were then asked about what type of involvement they should have, the 
participants responded with three different types of answers, some believed they needed to 
vote on it, other believed that information was sufficient, and others believed they should get 
nothing. The majority wanted a vote on the major decisions as can be seen by Figure-5.36 
below.  
  
Figure 5. 35: What type of Involvement Members want in Major Decisions 
The participants who believed that the involvement should be left to directors or that it was 
not practical to involve members in decisions even if these were major decisions that had the 
potential to impact farm-profitability, all came from larger and more geographically dispersed 
cooperatives. Furthermore, it was of interest to note that all seven director-participants 
wanted the members to have a vote as well. No directors suggested that members should not 
be involved or should not have a vote, some directors stated that they were never sure that 
Want a Vote 
Want Information 
Only 
Do not want 
anything 
n=24 
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the decisions they were making suited their members, and they would appreciate more 
member involvement even in minor decisions. 
 
Member recourse in Decisions  
Members need to be able to clarify the rationale and the decision-making process. This 
section looks at how participants handled a query, what options were open to them, and what 
the result of the query was. Most of the participants responded that they would phone the 
chairman directly and ask for clarification; others said they would phone their local director 
or someone on the board of directors. Other members stated that they would bring this up 
at a meeting, meaning it would be mostly be brought up at the smaller supplier meetings. 
There were a few participants who stated that at that stage, they would exit the cooperative 
if they were in disagreement with a particular decision that affected them. The below graph 
indicates what members would do when they disagreed with a major decision that their 
cooperative had taken or was about to; this question assumed they had no vote. The options 




Figure 5. 36: Member Recourse-type in Major Decisions 
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There were inconclusive findings on which participants from which cooperatives would take 
specific actions with participants from all cooperatives spread between the major recourse 
actions. 
 
In summary, this section found that decisions are being made by the board as per the previous 
section; however, the opportunities for recourse and oversight by the cooperative members 
are limited due more to the fact that most cooperatives, including the smaller more 
centralised ones, do not have a well-defined grievance process for members to use. As a result, 
a secondary finding is that members often get frustrated with their cooperative when 
decisions have been made, which can impact farm-profitability or operation, as was found in 
the Engagement section above. This lack of decision involvement and recourse can affect 
many different aspects of members’ perceptions and sentiments. 
 
What involvement is needed by participants for major farm-impacting decisions 
This section looked at what involvement members should have in the making of significant 
farm-impacting decisions in their cooperative. On decision that would materially impact the 
farm gate price of the members, it was found that a vast majority of participants, 75%, wanted 
to be involved with of the remaining 25%, 18% wanted it left to the directors with 7% saying 
it was not practical but offered no view on who should make the decisions. Most members 
were adamant about their involvement, some notable comments from participants were: 
“Absolutely, it's my money. “ 
“Absolutely yes. “ 
“Well, yes we should be involved, but we're probably, we're not.” 
“On major decisions, yes.”  
“With respect to consultation, prior to the decision being made, yes.” 
One of the interesting findings was when the director participants were asked if their 
members should be involved in these significant decisions, all of the directors said they 
wanted member involvement with six out of seven saying they wanted members to vote on 
the decision as well, with one saying the members should not have the final say. The caveat 
in these decisions, in the opinion of the directors, was that members would not be involved 
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in every stage of the decision making process with involvement only coming in at the last 
stage where the board of directors would present a few options to the members who would 
then vote on their choice. The directors, in this final stage,  would recommend a course of 
action with the rationale behind it as long as sufficient information could be sent out to the 
members for them to familiarise themselves with the various options prior to the meeting 
and vote being held. Some comments from the directors explaining why they believed 
members should be involved included: 
“… you must go to your suppliers if you need to make a decision about this.” and 
“I think we should let the board sort out options. And once they are comfortable with the 
management on the board that these are best options for us. And then they should do what 
they did. I can say here is option A B, what do you think? Our recommendation is this.... you 
can vote on it.” 
 
One finding was clear, and that was regardless of whether the participant agreed with voting 
on the decision or not, all participants agreed that information and communication was 
necessary prior to any decisions being made. In this way, they stated that they could have 
input to the decision, and therefore the decision-making process would be transparent. 
Comments about information dissemination included: 
“… that type of information gives you a better feeling.” 
“… should be given all the information all the time because…” 
“I think you should be informed about it …” 
“... keep that information coming to us then spend…” 
 
In summary, most members believed that they should have sufficient quality information 
from the cooperative on significant decisions prior to the making of these decisions so they 
could assess the impacts to their farm. Furthermore, it was found that the majority of the 
members expected and required a vote on these decisions. Additionally, an additional finding 
was that the directors that were interviewed wanted members to have a vote on these 
significant decisions. Those members who stated that they wanted the directors to make 
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these decisions “as this is what they are paid for”, still wanted to have access to information 
on the decision even after it was made. The members did, however, suggest that the directors, 
in their role, should come up with a shortlist of options to present to the members for a vote 
and not involve the members through the entire process as it would be, in the words of a 
member-participant, “not practical”. 
 
Participant Perceptions on the Use of Technology to support Cooperative Governance 
Previously in the demographics section, it was found that almost all the members owned a 
smartphone and had access to a PC/ laptop in their home office. This section asked the 
Participants what their views were on the use of technology to extend and supplement the 
current governance practices at their cooperatives.  
The first question asked what their perceptions were around the use of videoconferencing to 
allow members in remote regions or even those who could not leave their farm for a meeting. 
The responses found that the larger cooperatives all believed that members should be 
allowed to attend using available technology as far as video-streaming on their smartphone, 
or PC/laptop, or even a TV in their house. Those members who had come from a smaller, 
more centralised cooperatives generally did not believe that this would be good for the 
membership base as a whole as it negated the effects of personal contact. However, directors 
from all cooperatives, including those from small more-centralised cooperatives, believed it 
would help them in having board meetings and could be extended to members as well. 
Overall, the finding is that generally for large, geographically diverse cooperatives, 
participants wanted their cooperative to implement a videoconferencing or a video streaming 
service to accommodate members. The graph in Figure 5.37 below indicates preferences for 
small vs large cooperatives using a technology solution to supplement their governance 
meetings.  
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Figure 5. 37: Technology Meeting Requirements by Cooperative Size and Geography 
When asking participants if they would use an app on their smartphone to get information on 
a resolution of the cooperative, to vote, or to request clarity the finding was an overwhelming 
response of ‘yes’. This voting smartphone-app would be used to supplement the one-man-
one-vote show of hands or the use of milk shares used in polls. The below graph displays 
participants preference as to the use of a voting app; three participants declined to respond.  
 
Figure 5. 38: Technology Meeting Requirements by Cooperative Size and Geography 
Of the two participants who said that it was not an option they would require, one wanted a 





218 | P a g e  
 
In summary, the participants want the use of technology to be considered in cooperatives, 
including video conferencing and the use of a smartphone app to vote on. Even the smaller, 
more centralised cooperatives participants said the voting app would help as they could use 
this app when attending meetings and it would not detract from the social networking aspects 
of their member base. Two members pointed out, both from larger geographically diverse 
cooperatives, that the use of an app would be preferred as they did not always trust the voting 
system; they did not know who had voted when asked for a show of hands and sometimes 
they believed that the resolution passed even though less than a majority had raised their 
hands. Additionally, another member pointed out on a show of hands more than one person 
from the same farm could vote, even if they were not supposed to, without anyone knowing. 
On the matter of polls, the same participant mentioned they could not know who had what 
votes and this app would increase the transparency rather than relying on officers manually 
totalling polls. 
For directors, they all agreed that the use of technology in meetings and voting would be a 
good option to have. They further mentioned that it could be an option for their board 
meetings as well. However, one director pointed out that they would need to know who was 
in the room when using the video conferencing to ensure confidentiality of information was 
not compromised and another commented on the use of the app would have to be 
guaranteed safe enough for use to protect confidentiality and data.    
 
How informed are Cooperative Members on Industry changes? 
This section looked at two major regulatory initiatives, the Dairy Code of Conduct in Australia, 
and the 2019 Dairy Industry Restructuring Amendment Bill (No 3) of 2019 (DIRA, 2019) in New 
Zealand.  
The Australian initiative was enacted in 2020, Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes—
Dairy) Regulations 2019, which would enforce certain codes of conduct for all processors. This 
code of practice was not limited to cooperatives but involved all dairy farmers who supplied 
milk to a processor or processors. It was seen as an initiative coming out of the failure of 
Murray Goulburn in 2017.  
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It was found that most while participants had heard about the Competition and Consumer 
(Industry Codes—Dairy) Regulations 2019, (DCoC), more than half of the participants had not 
read it any detail, with some commenting that they were not interested in it. It was clear from 
the answers that the cooperatives had left it up to their members to get involved or not, 
although they mostly did not know of the details of all the proposed provisions.  Those that 
had read the proposed DCoC had attended meetings; however, most participants that had 
some knowledge of it were cynical about it saying: 
“…. Government, as soon as it's got government anything government touches goes to ***. 
That's how I feel now. They try to do something with one hand, and they lose it with the other.” 
“… my overall view of it now is that there's so many splinter groups that they're trying to 
include too much in it, when they should be getting it back to basics, the more rules you put 
in, the more difficult it becomes to manage.”  
“I worry that they will have a negative impact on opening milk price, two of the mechanisms 
particularly.” 
 
The New Zealand initiative was an examination of the current provisions of DIRA to 
understand if changes were required. In 2018, a Terms of Reference (ToR) was published for 
consultation.  The ToR proposed changes to the original act, Dairy Industry Restructure Act 
2001 (DIRA, 2001) to remove an expiry date whereby DIRA would be repealed for the South 
Island in May 2019, the open entry and exit clause were modified to allow Fonterra to ensure 
that the milk collection met all standard including environmental, animal welfare as examples, 
and the removal of the obligation Fonterra has to supply milk to independent suppliers in part. 
Fonterra currently supplies milk to Tatua, Dairy Goat Cooperative, and other independent 
non-cooperative dairy processors. 
When the participants were asked about their knowledge of the ToR and proposed changes 
to the Act, the finding was that besides a minority of New Zealand participants, the remaining 
participants, including those from other New Zealand cooperatives, knew of the proposed 
changes and most were quite familiar with the ToR. Comments from Fonterra participants 
included: 
“I'm pretty familiar ...” 
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“Oh, reasonably, I think. “ 
 
Of interest was the comments from other cooperative participants, excluding Westland, 
which were: 
“So Yeah, actually, when you talk about the DIRA and our company. Yeah, please leave it 
alone which is unfair…” 
“I can't actually see why our coop should get cow's milk for a certain price. Anything else I'm 
just marketwise. I mean, it was good for us. Yeah. But I don't think it's just and equitable 
really…” 
“I don't think Fonterra should have to pick up anyone's milk for various reasons…” 
 
All participants from Westland cooperative responded by saying the proposed changes to 
DIRA was not anything that affected them, so they had not read it. Interestingly, before the 
amendment came into force in June 2019, the Westland farmers could have approached 
Fonterra to join the cooperative, an alternative cooperative, and Fonterra would have been 
forced to allow them to join; with the changes to DIRA, this would no longer be possible if 
Fonterra responded in the negative. 
 
In summary, it was evident that the cooperatives did not assist their members by analysing 
changes to the DCoC in Australia and the proposed changes to DIRA in New Zealand and send 
out the information. The strategy that all the cooperatives took was to leave it to the 
individual members to read, or not, the documents and make their mind up. The finding 
further confirmed that Fonterra was seen by all participants, except Westland, as being 
necessary for New Zealand with some comments by non-Fonterra participants including: 
“We are really for a strong Fonterra. I think that is pretty crucial to New Zealand's dairy 
industry.” 
“My feeling is obviously a strong Fonterra as a strong industry.” 
Other responses, including the agreement with one of the proposed changes stating that it 
was unfair that Fonterra had to pick up milk from “dirty” farmers as it was Fonterra’s 
reputation that was being impacted. 
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Perceptions of supporting policy changes 
The final question asked the participants what laws or regulation or policy framework/s 
should be changed. In other words, what government support to change policy would help 
them feel more part of their cooperative. Two major themes came from the answers to this 
question, the first being that the participants wanted more ownership-control, and the 
second theme was that the large retail companies in Australia had too much power and were 
using their scale and size to drive down the farm-gate price for cooperatives and other 
processors adversely. Other common responses included environmental concerns, farm 
invasions, and DIRA in New Zealand. Some responses included: 
“… the laws around control. “ 
“The law should align more with the owner to give you more rights. “ 
“Owner-control is probably the one you …” 
“Control of ownership is always something in the back of my mind.”  
“Milk supply price almost is predatory pricing.” 
“… the abuse by the supermarkets in our community.” 
“The other really, really big thing, ….. must be getting this right this environmental.” 
“I guess there is a lot of stuff coming at us at the moment in the area of the environment. “ 
“They should change DIRA.” 
 














What Law/ Policy/ Regulation needs Changing 
(Participant Perception)
n=31 
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5.4.5 Findings Summary 
The findings section, being the largest, has analysed the findings from various perspectives 
and demographics. It is clear from the findings that many of the responses were split between 
the large-diverse cooperative and the smaller, more centralised cooperative. Furthermore, 
the finding that cooperatives engagement remains problematic and yet the participants did 
not see it as a complex problem to be solved. Their suggestions on how to better engage, feel 
more part of their community, and participation, was of note. Governance in cooperatives 
remains a problem, findings that in most cases, cooperative members do not have a say in 
their cooperative’s decisions that could affect their farm-profitability and therefore, 
livelihood was apparent. Furthermore, it is clear the trend indicates that the vast majority of 
members do want a say, and additionally, the directors want the members to be involved in 
large decisions as well. 
Members’ knowledge of the law and the constitutional document is found to be vague and 
not sufficient; the members do not understand their rights as far as policy documents are 
concerned, and therefore they do not know how to apply or enforce their rights. The laws 
that were needed changing mostly centre around the laws of ownership. The control of 
cooperatives seems to be delegated to a few directors who, especially in large, diverse 
cooperatives, sometimes hide their decisions behind a veil of confidentiality which all 
contributes to the eventual decline of the cooperatives as members become more distanced.  
 
5.5 Discussion 
This chapter takes the literature review and the findings from the above sections and links 
them to confirm or refute the major themes. The structure of this chapter, Discussion, firstly 
examines the overarching Research question and Hypothesis and then breaks down the 
research mentioned above questions into Subordinate Research questions with the related 
propositions for each of the research questions to understand their relevance to previous 
studies. The most important findings are summarised in tabular form (Table 5.9) below, 
comprised of the major findings from each of the Findings sections; this will be used as a guide 
to argue the case that they confirm the propositions, that they do not support the 
proposition, or they do not support previous studies.   





Finding Section Finding Short Description 
1 Engagement Small Cooperatives have higher loyalty scores than larger cooperatives 
2  Large, Geographically Diverse Cooperatives have lower loyalty scores on 
average 
3  Members rated Fonterra and Westland of the lowest as far as satisfaction is 
concerned. Both cooperatives are undergoing a structural review 
4  Tatua scored the highest with satisfaction rating mainly due to the members' 
community being fully engaged. 
5  While most members attended the cooperative AGM, the participation was 
highest from smaller cooperatives and least from geographically dispersed 
cooperatives. 
6  The main reasons for non-attendance were due to on-farm commitments as 
the AGM was scheduled, for all cooperatives, in peak season. 
7  Generally, the AGM effectiveness perception was negative. 
8  Cooperative members contacted a range of people within their cooperative 
regularly; this was seen as an essential facet of their relationship. 
9  Members were generally not willing to get more involved in non-governance 
roles within their cooperative, mainly due to time constraints. 
10  Members are generally willing to take on governance roles within their 
cooperative, including serving on the Board of Directors. 
11 Governance Members’ knowledge of the law that their cooperative was incorporated 
under was seen as limited. However, directors generally were more familiar 
with the cooperative law. 
12  The vast majority of members were not familiar with their constitutional 
document (“Rules” in Australia; “Constitution” in New Zealand)  
13  An overwhelming majority of members wanted to learn more about their 
constitutional document and the law their cooperative was incorporated 
under. 
14  The top four items that members stated would benefit them in information 
sharing by the cooperative was: 
• Removal of Confidentiality restrictions 
• More frequent and smaller supplier meetings  
• More Transparency and information 
• More communication 
15  Generally, members did not vote on major decisions that the cooperatives 
made; the exception to this was anything related to constitutional changes 
or something that was mandated in the constitutional document. 
16  Generally, participants believed they should vote on major decisions and 
further wanted communication in this regard prior to any meeting or vote 
being called. 
17  The recourse that a member had when clarifying or querying a decision was 
unstructured pointing to a lack of process in all cooperatives in this study. 
18  Members were split on the use of technology-based videoconferencing to 
supplement meetings. Larger, more dispersed cooperatives were positive 
about the use while smaller centralised cooperatives believed that this might 
detract from their member community contact. 
19  Members generally believed that the use of a smartphone voting app would 
assist in the voting process. They further believed they should have the 
ability to vote on many  
20  Cooperative members do not keep themselves abreast with regulation and 
policy changes that can impact their farm operations. 
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Furthermore, members believe that the cooperative organisation should 
keep them informed about any industry changes and explain these to the 
members preferably in meetings where they can ask questions. 
21  Members when asked which law they believed should be changed to support 
them overwhelmingly responded ownership, this is usually covered in the 
cooperative law.  
Table 5. 8: Summary of Findings 
 
As expected, many of the findings overlapped as the questions that were asked, including the 
probing or clarifying questions, were designed to understand the participants’ responses from 
various perspectives. Many minor findings were not tabulated above; however, some of these 
will be discussed below in the linking of previous research and this study. The next section 
looks at the research questions, how they are broken down, and how they are linked to other 
studies that have been conducted in other regions around the world. 
 
5.5.1 Research Questions 
Initially, the research proposal had three parts to the overarching research question which 
considered from a macro-level, cooperative membership challenges and opportunities. The 
questions, being broad had to be broken down to more discreet elements which to enable a 
more granular study. The Overarching Research Questions were proposed as follows:  
• What are the governance challenges and opportunities associated with dairy 
cooperatives in New Zealand and Australia?  
• What factors influence these issues, and to what extent are these issues related to 
cooperative governance?  
• What is the optimum governance framework for cooperatives? 
This was then supported by the Overarching hypothesis, which was additionally broad for the 
purposes of this study and had to be broken down as well. The initial Overarching Hypothesis 
was proposed as follows:  
New Zealand and Australian cooperatives are not always aligned to the International 
Cooperative Alliance seven cooperative principles for good member governance. Farmer-
members are not always aware of a decision that the cooperative business structure 
legitimately makes in the course of the business operation which could directly or indirectly 
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affect farmer income and viability. Furthermore, the law and cooperative constitutions which 
are foundational elements for farmer governance are sometimes not effective.  
To enable a thorough study especially for the interview chapter, the research questions were 
broken down into those questions that examined cooperative member perceptions and 
sentiment, members governance and actual participation in the cooperative, the alignment 
of the participant to a framework by Limnios et al. (2018), and the support that they believed 
they required from the regulators and government to more fully enable the participants as 
cooperative members. As a result, the research questions were broken down into nine 
discrete questions covering the categories as mentioned above of membership which is 
supplemented by a further 35 propositions. The propositions take a granular view, some of 
which are linked to previous research in other regions. The structure of the remainder of this 
chapter looks at the subordinate research questions and their respective propositions to 
explore cooperative membership. The Subordinate Research Questions are in the format of 
S-RQn, where n is the number from 1 to 10. 
 
 S-RQ1: How do members perceive their cooperative in terms of their willingness to continue 
in their cooperative as a member? 
This question examines the perceptions and reasons for the members continued loyalty for 
their cooperative.  
 
Proposition a: Loyalty of Australasian members is related to the size and geography of the 
cooperative 
Feng et al. (2016) found that in an empirical research study conducted among Swedish grain 
farmers, there was a positive link between the amount of social capital a member has invested 
in their cooperative and their loyalty. Furthermore, the authors found that social capital, is 
linked to, what we term as loyalty in this study, the size of the cooperative and how 
geographically dispersed the cooperative membership is. They found that the more 
centralised the cooperative is in relation to their members, the more involved the members 
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were in the cooperative and therefore, the more participation they had in their cooperative. 
The findings were confirmed in part in other studies (Grashuis, 2018, Jussila et al. 2012, 
Reynolds et al., 1997) where the geographical spread of membership was linked to poorer 
social capital and therefore reduced loyalty.  
In this research study conducted in Australasia, it was evident that from the findings, loyalty 
was higher in smaller more centralised cooperatives (mean score of 8.3) than those 
cooperatives that were large and had a dispersed membership base (mean score of 7.6). The 
trend confirmed the previous studies.  
As a result, Proposition-a is confirmed.   
Proposition b: Loyalty of Australasian members is also related to the amount and quality of 
contact with the cooperative organisation.  
Other studies have attempted to understand member loyalty from the perspective of regular 
contact and communication with their cooperative representatives. Puusa et al. (2018) found 
that trust was positively linked to all forms of commitment of which continuance commitment, 
or loyalty, was one. In other research, the link between commitment to their cooperative was 
found (Barraud-Didier et al., 2012). Trust is linked to loyalty and trust that a member had for 
their cooperative manager was found to be linked to communication that the member had 
with their cooperative and that the cooperative had with the member in another study (Xiang 
& Sumelius, 2010).  
The study of Australasian cooperatives found similar trends with members stating that their 
loyalty was affected by the lack of information and communication they had expected but 
were not receiving from their cooperative manager. Members whose loyalty was in question 
stated that they were ready to leave the cooperative as often they had no communication or 
there was a lack of information from their cooperative. In the case of Australasian cooperative 
members, a trend was found linking communication and loyalty.  
Therefore Proposition-b is confirmed.  
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Proposition c: Loyalty of Australasian members is higher if they served on a committee or 
were directors or ex-directors.  
Gray and Kraenzle (1998), in an empirical study conducted in America, found that the serving 
on a board or a committee was important to build social capital as serving members would 
identify with their cooperative more than those members who did not serve the cooperative 
in any capacity other than being just members. Gray (2011) found that serving on a committee, 
or a board of directors, positively influenced member participation which was linked to trust 
in another study (Barraud-Didier et al., 2019) which in turn was found to be linked to loyalty 
in the same study.  
In Australasia, the research showed a trend whereby members who were serving as directors, 
ex-directors, or actively serving a committee of sorts in the recent past, loyalty was 
substantially higher generally (mean score of 9.3) when compared to those members who 
had never served on a committee or a board of directors (mean score was 7.7). Serving on a 
committee or serving on the Board of Directors in Australasia, as in other regions, shows a 
definitive trend of increasing loyalty for that member.  
Therefore, Proposition-c is confirmed.  
Proposition d: Satisfaction of farmers is related to the farm gate price and the operational, 
financial performance of the cooperative. 
Dakurah et al. (2005) found that satisfaction of a member can be linked to the operational, 
financial performance of the cooperative, this finding was confirmed by a later study (Carr et 
al., 2008) where a member’s satisfaction was positively linked to the cooperatives success or 
operational performance. Additionally, another study (Bhuyan, 2007) found that a member’s 
dissatisfaction with their cooperative was found to impact their loyalty negatively. 
Furthermore, a study in America conducted by the United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) found that member satisfaction was correlated to satisfaction with the cooperative’s 
milk pricing policies and that their cooperative was returning the best price for the members' 
milk. Osterberg and Nilsson (2009) found in their research that members’ satisfaction was 
linked to farm profitability. 
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Satisfaction for Australasian cooperatives, in contrast to the finding that loyalty was higher 
for those members serving their cooperative in some way, indicated no difference between 
those that were serving their cooperative in some way and the members who were not. 
Furthermore, there was no trend found that linked satisfaction to loyalty; in fact, the converse 
was found whereby even if a member’s satisfaction was low, it was possible that the 
members' loyalty could remain high. The finding of the weak linkage between satisfaction and 
loyalty for Australasian cooperatives was found to be similar to a finding by Puusa et al. (2018). 
In this, the Australasian study, members required a good return on their product in order for 
them to maintain a positive satisfaction rating, milk price being one factor that was repeated 
regularly.  
In this case, Proposition-d is confirmed as was the case with other regions; members’ 
satisfaction is correlated by the farm-gate price for their milk; and the overall cooperative 
financial performance. 
 
S-RQ2: What strategy is employed by the cooperative organisation to maintain a relationship 
with their members? 
Keeping the members engaged and “connected” to their cooperative is vital for the 
continuance and overall operational and financial performance of the cooperative. Different 
strategies have been employed by various cooperatives to maintain, increase or improve 
member relations; this section explores the findings from the research study and contrasts 
these with other studies conducted in other regions.  
 
Proposition e: Member participation at the annual meeting is problematic, especially with 
larger cooperatives 
Gray and Kraenzle (1998) found that meeting attendance was linked to their relationship with 
their director in a study of American farmers. In another study (Xiang & Sumelius, 2010), it 
was found that meeting attendance was dependant on trust and the satisfaction of the 
members had in their cooperative. However, in researching Brazilian cooperative farmers, the 
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authors (Cechin et al., 2013) found that attendance at the Annual General Meeting (AGM) 
was linked to the members' economic motivation. In yet another study, the authors 
(Hendrikse & Veerman, 2003) suggested that agricultural cooperatives, in order to remain 
relevant to their membership, needed to increase the frequency of their meetings.  
In this study conducted in Australasia, it was found that the large cooperative’s members 
generally believed that the AGM was not effective and usually did not attend, however, 
smaller centralised cooperatives believed that the AGM was one opportunity to engage with 
other members and the cooperative leadership which made the AGM worthwhile in their 
experience. The reasons put forward for non-attendance were limited with the main reason, 
for those members not attending their AGM, due to on-farm commitments as the meeting 
was held in the peak milking season. Some farmers believed it was not worth the time 
investment while others did not attend for personal reasons.  
Proposition-e is therefore confirmed for large cooperatives although the proposition is 
rejected for smaller cooperatives where members believed their AGM was effective and 
therefore the members' attendance was good.  
Proposition f: Members perceive the formal contact with their cooperative as not effective 
when it comes to the annual meeting but believe that other meetings, such as supplier 
meetings, are effective. 
As in Proposition-e, above, it was confirmed for larger cooperatives was similar to a finding in 
a European study (Kaswan, 2014) where the author found that the larger the cooperative, the 
fewer the meetings and the lower the quality of those meetings or interactions. Hendrikse 
and Veerman (2003) suggested that large cooperatives should restructure themselves to 
survive and should increase the quality and interaction of meetings between suppliers and 
managers. In yet another study the authors (Birchall & Simmons, 2004) concluded that the 
rotation of venues for the meetings was not always a solution to increasing participation and 
making the meetings more effective, however, increasing the frequency of meetings was seen 
as a possible solution. 
In this study for Australasian dairy cooperatives, the smaller more centralised cooperatives 
had frequent meetings with their members keeping them up to date on the activities and 
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financial and operational performance of the cooperative, these meetings were seen as very 
effective. In contrast, the larger cooperatives relied on larger meetings which involved a high 
degree of planning and logistics and were more formalised; these meetings were seen as less 
effective. For example, Fonterra used to have supplier meetings at various farms within a 
region which were well attended and seen as effective but after an internal restructure these 
meetings were largely changed to the larger more-infrequent format which the members 
believed to be ineffective.   
Proposition-f is therefore confirmed for larger cooperatives in that larger cooperative 
members saw the AGM as being ineffective however saw the smaller supplier meetings as 
effective whereas smaller cooperatives, in contrast, believed both the AGM and the smaller 
supplier meetings were effective. Therefore, the proposition is partially rejected for smaller 
cooperatives. 
Proposition g: Member engagement with the cooperative is mainly limited to operational 
contact. 
There have not been many studies that cover this important aspect of cooperative member 
engagement, once again it could be due to, as in the case of Australia, tanker companies 
collecting milk for various cooperatives and processors and thus the milk collection person is 
usually not part of the members' cooperatives operational staff.  
Once again, this study found a difference between the smaller more-centralised and the 
larger more-dispersed cooperatives. The smaller cooperatives had various contact points 
where directors were available and often in contact, whether over the phone or in-person on-
farm. Possibly the high level of contact encountered by the smaller cooperatives members 
was due to the locality of the directors. In addition to the Director contact, there was 
operational contact for milk-collection. The tanker drivers were well known to all small-
cooperative members and were seen as an extension of the information network, often 
providing the members with news on other members or processors. In contrast, the larger 
cooperatives were reliant on the milk collection for their contact; however, this was not 
effective in Australia due to the tanker drivers being contracted and not being part of the 
operational staff. Other operational contact included the operation manager of the 
cooperative who was seen as extremely important, especially to smaller cooperatives where 
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a personal relationship had been built between the member and this operational manager. 
Larger cooperatives often have a Member Service Desk that takes calls from members and 
deals with milk collection and testing results. As there is no single operational contact, in this 
case, there is little chance of a relationship being built. Additionally, larger cooperatives make 
use of a Farm Representative that visits the members on their farm and deals with some 
operational queries. However, it was found that the contact was infrequent, and often, the 
Farm Representative was out of touch with the specific members' challenges and thus was 
seen as ineffective.  
Proposition-g is therefore confirmed for larger cooperative and rejected for smaller 
cooperatives. Furthermore, Operational contact showed a concerning trend for larger 
cooperatives. 
Proposition h: Contact with the member-directors is infrequent. 
Contact with the directors and the chairman in a cooperative is seen as necessary, particularly 
in smaller cooperatives. Osterberg and Nilsson (2009) in an empirical study conducted on 
Swedish farmers, found that directors needed more training in order to be more equipped to 
deal with the cooperative members. In another study, Gray and Kraenzle (1998) found that 
the regional director was seen as necessary, positively contributing to members satisfaction 
and participation. Barraud-Didier et al. (2019), in their study, confirmed the importance of 
regional directors and suggested that directors should have frequent contact with their 
cooperative members. Again, in another study (Mazzarol et al., 2019), the authors stated that 
directors should be well versed in relationship marketing, highlighting the importance of 
direct member contact.  
In Australasia, once again it was found that there was a split between larger cooperatives and 
those cooperatives that were more centralised and smaller. Larger cooperatives had minimal 
director contact unless they were geographically in the same region as a director. Additionally, 
it was found that some of the larger cooperatives had moved away from the practice of having 
regional directors by making all directors responsible for all members, which were seen as 
ineffective by the interviewees. As a result of the larger cooperatives director-challenges, in 
the minds of the members, the contact was infrequent and mostly ineffective. In contrast, the 
smaller cooperatives had almost weekly contact with their directors phoning them frequently 
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and having visits to their farms. The level of contact in smaller cooperatives was seen as very 
effective and frequent. The members, furthermore, felt they had a good relationship with 
their directors and chairman.  
Proposition-h is therefore confirmed for larger cooperative and rejected for smaller 
cooperatives.  
Proposition i: There is regular informal contact between members. 
Very little literature has examined the contact that members have with each other. The 
literature has concentrated on the formal contact and engagement with their cooperative. 
However, the contact that the members have with each other is seen by Mazzarol et al. (2019) 
as an essential facet in marketing the cooperative to potential members.  
Australasian members have contact almost on a daily basis with other members. Additionally, 
the community in which they are considered part of, is usually found to be geographically 
localised to the area where the farm is found. The members have regular conversations with 
each other over farm fences, over the phone, and at the local retail stores and community 
organisations such as schools, church, and sports clubs. This contact with each other is not 
specific to any size cooperative and can be found in both smaller centralised and larger 
geographically dispersed cooperatives.  
Proposition-i is, therefore confirmed.  
Proposition j: Members are generally satisfied with their operational engagement, including 
the resolution of issues.  
Operational issues include the collection of milk, the testing results of the milk to examine for 
contaminants both biological and otherwise and payment issues. 
Overall, the participants were found to be satisfied with the cooperative operational area, 
which supported them in their farming. Most of the members had had an operational query 
within the past 12 months with all of these being resolved, including some resolutions which 
were not in favour of the farmer. Members generally accepted the outcome of the query 
without complaint even if it was not in their favour.  Proposition-j is, therefore confirmed. 
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S-RQ3: How do members feel about participating in the cooperative from a non-governance 
perspective and a governance perspective? 
Proposition k Besides the governance aspect of serving on the board of directors, members 
remain willing to get involved in their cooperative. 
Little research has looked at the non-Governance aspects of member participation in their 
cooperative. This study examined the answers to why members would participate, or not, in 
their cooperative, excluding any governance roles. Members were generally found to be not 
in favour of getting more involved in their cooperatives in roles that excluded governance. 
The vast majority of members cited on-farm commitments as the reasons, however when 
examining the spouse’s answers from the participants, many of the spouses had taken up 
non-governance roles in member engagement, organising a Christmas get together, or a 
committee, or other informal get-togethers for their cooperative community.  
Therefore Proposition-k is rejected. 
Proposition l: Members are willing to be more involved in the governance of the cooperative, 
including serving on committees and the Board of Directors. 
In contrast to the non-governance roles, the members, when queried about their willingness 
to get involved in governance roles, were mostly willing. The exception to the members not 
willing to get more involved in a governance role were those members who were already 
involved in a governance committee or those that had either served on the board of directors 
or a committee and felt they had “done their time”.  
Proposition-l is, therefore confirmed. 
S-RQ4: How familiar are the members with the cooperative legislative framework and the 
internal constitutional documents?  
Proposition m: Members, including member directors, have little understanding of the 
cooperative law of their region. 
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Knowledge of the law that the cooperative operates under is essential to understand the 
member rights and the recourse available to them. Additionally, many of the more modern 
cooperatives laws have protections within them to support the members. As Chapter-2 has 
shown, the laws in Australia are considered as more modern while the cooperative law of 
New Zealand is seen as more outdated, having very little in the way of protection for members.  
In this study, the participants were asked what their knowledge was of the cooperative laws 
of the country. The majority of members admitted having little or no knowledge of the 
cooperative laws. The majority of directors, however, believed that they had a good 
knowledge of the cooperative laws. This finding of the directors knowing the law was in 
contrast to one of the findings from Chapter-2 and Chapter-3 where one of the smaller 
cooperatives had reincorporated under the Corporation's legislation in Australia which 
removed all the specific cooperative protections where it was found the directors had little 
specific knowledge of the difference between a corporation and a cooperative in Australian 
law. Other cooperative directors in Australia were further questioned on their knowledge of 
the cooperative laws and the limitations, for instance, that those states had in terms of not 
being part of the Australian Uniform Cooperative Laws Agreement (AUCLA), it was clear from 
the answers that while the directors believed they had a good knowledge of the law, they had 
in fact, very little. New Zealand cooperative law is subordinate to the Companies Act 1993 
and as a result, takes on any provisions from the companies Act that the cooperative Act 
expressly does not alter. When New Zealand cooperative directors were asked clarifying 
questions on their understanding of the law, they were mostly unaware of the consequences 
of the legal structure. Directors from both countries mostly understood cooperative 
obligations as far as registration, and financial reporting were concerned.   
Proposition-m is therefore confirmed notwithstanding the directors believing they sufficiently 
understood the cooperative law. 
Proposition n: Members have little understanding of their cooperative constitutional 
document that governs the rules of their cooperative; however, the directors do have a good 
understanding of the constitutional document.   
The constitutional document or Constitution in New Zealand and Replaceable Rules in 
Australia is an essential list of provisions that can replace specific Cooperative law provisions. 
235 | P a g e  
 
It is used to govern the specific cooperative from the membership, voting, and rights 
perspective. Little research has been conducted on the effect this can have on the member 
relationship with their cooperative. 
In this study in Australasia, it was found that the members who took part in this research had 
little or no working knowledge of their cooperative constitutional document. More than 90% 
of the member participants admitted a lack of constitutional document knowledge. In 
contrast, the directors all believed they had a good working knowledge of the constitutional 
document and were able to apply or explain it to any members who queried it. When 
clarifying questions were asked of the directors on the constitutional document, it was clear 
the knowledge of the document was sufficient.  
Proposition-n is therefore confirmed in both parts. 
Proposition o: Members, including member directors, believe that they would benefit from 
education on the cooperative legislative framework and their constitutional document. 
Having a working knowledge of the law and the constitutional document would assist in 
member governance, and whatever shortcomings are found within the law can be 
supplemented, for both Australia and New Zealand, in the constitutional document. When 
the members and directors were asked if they believe they should have more knowledge of 
the constitutional document and the cooperative law, the overwhelming majority confirmed 
the need for further education on this subject.   
Proposition-o is, therefore confirmed.  
S-RQ5: How are dairy cooperative members engaged in making decisions that could affect the 
farm-gate price? 
This section looked at the involvement and participation that cooperative members had in 
their cooperative when examining significant decisions that could potentially affect farm-
profitability or long-term strategy. For example, when a decision was being taken or had been 
taken that affected farm-gate price in a major way, this was considered to be one of those 
major decisions.  Decisions that were examined included the building of a new processing site, 
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re-signing of a large long-term contract at a fixed price, changing the constitutional document, 
reduced payouts, divestiture of strategic cooperative assets, and an organisational review. 
Proposition p: Members receive very little information regarding strategic (farm-impacting) 
decisions of their cooperative. 
Nilsson et al. (2009); found that member trust in the cooperative and the board of directors 
was related to the information that they received from their cooperative, this was confirmed 
in a separate study (Barraud-Didier et al., 2019). Again, in another study, Feng et al. (2011) 
linked loyalty to the truthfulness of the information members received from their cooperative. 
One of the challenges that large cooperatives encounter is believed to be from information 
asymmetry (Nilsson & Hendrikse, 2009), members are sometimes given insufficient 
information about the cooperative overall operational and financial performance and 
decisions.  
In this study, the information was seen to be problematic with many of the cooperative 
members frustrated with the lack of information they were receiving from their cooperative. 
This was excepting for Tatua who received adequate information according to their members. 
The remaining cooperative members in this study all stated they did not get sufficient or 
timely information.  
Proposition-p is therefore partially confirmed. It seems that smaller centralised cooperatives, 
in addition to the other advantages discussed above, do not suffer as much from the lack of 
information the larger cooperatives are faced with, this was expected. 
Proposition q: Members have few opportunities to query and clarify cooperative decisions.   
When decisions are made, and the information the member receives may not be adequate 
for the members to understand the strategy, what recourse does the member have in order 
to satisfy his query or understanding? Xiang and Sumelius (2010) found in their study 
conducted with a Finnish cooperative that members wanted decisions to be clarified and 
explained by the directors. Bhuyan (2007) found that a member is more likely to exit from 
their cooperative if the member feels their voice in a decision is not heard by the cooperative 
management. Again, in other research, Dakurah et al. (2005) linked the satisfaction of 
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members to the decision-making process, which generally includes a cycle of information and 
clarification.  
In this Australasian study, it was found that members often have no say in what decisions are 
made and the reasons that a particular decision was made. They further have little recourse 
options in the decisions. This indicates that many decisions are made by the cooperative 
board without regard to the members. When asked what recourse they had, half the 
members stated that they would query it with a member of the board while others said they 
would take it to a meeting. Still, others stated they would either call a special meeting or 
would exit. It was clear from the data analysed that the cooperatives did not have a standard 
process whereby members could query decisions or strategy.  
Proposition-q is, therefore confirmed. 
Proposition r: Most members believe that cooperatives do not share sufficient information 
with them, and there are opportunities for improving information quality and distribution.   
Research by Birchall & Simmons (2004) concluded that there are problems in information 
flows to members, and the balance had to be right between too little and too much 
information. Gijselinckx (2009), using the research from Birchall and Simmons 2004 study 
pointed out that consultation was a crucial factor in information flows which assumes that 
feedback mechanisms are built in the ensure members have opportunity to provide feedback 
and seek clarification. 
When asked what could improve information sharing, there were four main themes. The 
removal of confidentiality restrictions, this was found in both New Zealand, where the 
cooperative law did not deal with information except through the superior Companies Act 
where there was a clause that restricted information to shareholders, and Australia where 
the cooperative management refused to share information on long-term strategic contracts 
as a result of commercial confidentiality. Additionally, the members wanted more frequent 
supplier-type meetings to increase the available forums in which the cooperative could share 
information; they moreover required more transparency pointing to a lack of sufficient detail 
in the information shared with them to the point they did not understand the initiative. Lastly, 
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the members all wanted more information and communication due to the discussed reasons. 
Proposition-r is, therefore confirmed. 
 
S-RQ6: What evidence is there from dairy cooperative member-farmers as to their 
consultation and input to decision-making by the operational management when reviewing 
major strategic initiatives that the cooperative has undertaken in the past five years? 
Decisions that were used in this research included those from the table below duplicated here 
from the Section on Findings above. The propositions below, together with previous research, 
are used to understand the decisions and membership participation in decision-making. 
 
Coop Decision-1 Decision-2 
ADFC New Dryer + Reincorporate 
under Corporations legislation 
Tiered Pricing (season high/low) 
DFMC Resign of 10-year Contract Sale of Lion Drinks and Dairy 
NORCO Coles decision Increasing the number of Suppliers 
DGC Constitutional Change New Share Issue 
Fonterra Selling of Assets (Tiptop for 
example) 
Reduced advance pay-out (December 
2018) 
Tatua Dryer build – a few years ago  
Westland Organisational Review  
Table 5. 9: Major Decisions for all Cooperatives 
 
Proposition s Members are often not involved in decisions that could impact farm financial 
and operational performance or profitability. 
Decisions that could affect farm profitability are those decisions that, when taken, have a 
substantial impact on the farm gate price. These decisions are seen as strategic decisions 
which the cooperative should weigh carefully in order not to impact their members in some 
way. Furthermore, there are decisions taken by the cooperative organisation that can affect 
farm viability and efficiency; these decisions are those that change the rules for their 
members, for example, feed types, calving schedules, or testing requirements. These 
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decisions are, therefore, significant to the cooperative members and should be discussed with 
them prior to implementation. 
From the findings, the members fell into three categories, those that believed they had voted 
for the major decision, those that believed that they were not involved at all in the decision 
except for being informed in some way post the decision being made, and those who were 
unsure about their involvement and could not recall one way or the other. Using those 
members for a specific cooperative that believed they had not been involved and contrasted 
against those members who believed they had been involved, showed that in many cases 
there was no involvement from any members in individual strategic decisions. The “unsure” 
category, after further clarification, indicated a lack of rules as far as decisions were 
concerned. This implies that besides anything stated explicitly in the cooperative law or the 
cooperative constitution; members seldom were involved. For example, individual 
cooperatives had more than one strategic decisions in the past year, where it was mandated 
that members had to vote, the vote was taken, however, where the law and the rules were 
silent on the member involvement, members were not involved.   
Proposition-s is, therefore confirmed. 
Proposition t: Cooperatives tend to make decisions at the board level without input from 
members.   
Following on from the previous section which covered the involvement members had in the 
strategic, significant decisions that the cooperative made, the directors confirmed that they 
had voted on these at the board-level and had kept the members informed. In individual 
smaller cooperatives, there was evidence that the membership base had been kept informed 
and the decision or strategy had been brought up at supplier meetings. In contrast, the larger 
cooperatives had sent very little in the way of information back to their members on the 
rationale of the strategy or decision. Furthermore, the larger cooperatives often released 
items to the public press prior to anything been sent out to their membership, and evidence 
was found that in some instances there were no member updates regarding the decision or 
direction at all besides that which could be found within the media releases. It must be 
stressed that in these examples of strategy and decisions, the cooperatives acted within the 
legal boundaries set by the law and their constitutional document through a clause whereby 
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the Directors were given full authority on behalf of the cooperative.   The comments from the 
members were concerning, as, in many examples, the members believed that the directors 
were knowingly withholding information from them or members were being told only what 
the directors had decided to inform them of.   
Proposition-t is confirmed the majority of decisions being made at the board level only unless 
these were explicitly stated within the Law or constitutional document. 
Proposition u: Members do not always have a defined process to query decisions or strategies 
of their cooperative organisation. 
Having a mechanism or process for members to query decisions or clarify the direction of 
their cooperative was seen as very important to all members from all cooperatives within this 
study. Furthermore, the interviews found that there was little evidence of a formal process 
whereby the members could query these decisions.  
The members mentioned several ways that the decisions or strategy could be queried 
including taking it to a meeting, this comprised of the smaller supplier meetings or the Annual 
General Meeting (AGM) however as we have found that the supplier meetings were irregular 
in many cases. The AGM was generally negatively perceived, which would make this option 
inefficient in most cases. The majority of the members stated that they would contact the 
chairman or board of directors directly. This was predominately the preferred course of action 
for the smaller cooperatives who had a healthy relationship with their board; however, the 
larger cooperatives this was more difficult and the members that were not located close to 
their directors and chairman, did not have this option, therefore, leaving them to few 
alternative courses of action. The final actions which could be taken, as mentioned by the 
members, was to call a special meeting which indicated that those members had understood 
their rights given to them by their constitutional document, however, had very little idea of 
how to execute on the special meeting. This option was favoured by members that came from 
a cooperative undergoing a major review and since has ceased operation as a cooperative. It 
is clear that there is a lack of process either through the law, the constitutional document, or 
other governance artefacts that member can use when they are concerned about a decision 
or a strategy that their cooperative is taking.  
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Proposition-u is, therefore confirmed.  
Proposition v: Cooperatives often use confidentiality as a reason for not involving their 
members or giving them information on farm-impacting decisions.   
New Zealand Cooperative law is subordinate to the Companies Act. How the provisions are 
defined within both laws is that if a provision is contained within the Cooperative Act, it 
overrides any provision within the Companies Act. If the Cooperative Act is silent on a specific 
provision, but this is stated in the Companies Act, the Companies Act provision stands for 
cooperatives. The New Zealand Cooperative Act does not contain any reference to 
information given to their members although there is a provision for information sharing with 
shareholders contained within the Companies Act, this then applies. Companies Act 1993 
S(178) limits the information access that shareholders can have in their company and 
therefore their cooperative. The members interviewed in this study stated that too often the 
cooperative used confidentiality of information to members as a reason why they could not 
share the information for a particular decision with their members.  
In Australia, a similar provision is made in that information that is considered sensitive and of 
a commercial nature can be withheld from its shareholders, which includes cooperative 
members.  
Notwithstanding the provisions that limit access to information in both countries, the 
constitutional document can override these provisions while retaining the actual details as 
confidential and therefore give members limited information while keeping them informed.  
The findings support that Proposition-v is confirmed.  
Proposition w: Members believe that they should be involved in strategic decisions that the 
cooperative makes, especially if this can impact their farm-gate price or farm profitability in 
any way. 
A vast majority of members in this study confirmed that any decisions that had the potential 
to affect farm profitability in any way should involve the members. A small number of 
members believed that it should be left to the directors as this was why they were employed, 
and two participants believed that it was not practical. The rationale given by those that 
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wanted involvement was that it was their money, and therefore, they had to be involved. 
They mentioned and agreed that their involvement in smaller operational decisions was not 
required and the cooperative should just execute these smaller decisions on their own as the 
directors remained in oversight positions. Of those members that required involvement, a 
majority of them believed that, for these significant farm-impacting decisions, they should 
have an opportunity to vote on the decision. A small number of members stated that they 
just wanted information. The remainder of these were those who believed the directors 
should make these decisions.  
It is clear from the findings that members want to be involved in the decisions that their 
cooperatives make that are not seen as operational decisions. This finding is in line with other 
studies which concentrated on participation in the governance of the cooperative. In one 
study, the participation of a member in their cooperative was statistically linked positively to 
the one-member-one-vote cooperative principle (Gray & Kraenzle, 1998). In another study 
(Xiang & Sumelius, 2010), the authors found that participation in the governance of a 
cooperative was linked to a members’ perception that they had equal rights, including voting, 
to other members. Members who voted and were given votes participated more in the 
governance of their cooperative and were more satisfied and were found to be more 
committed in their cooperative (Osterberg & Nilsson, 2009). Having higher participation in 
the governance of a cooperative leads to higher loyalty. Therefore, the more members are 
involved in decision-making or strategy, the higher the members' loyalty which is linked to 
higher cooperative profitability.  
Therefore Proposition-w is confirmed. 
Proposition x: Directors believe that the board of directors should make the decisions; 
however, keep the members informed.    
In this study, several directors were interviewed and were asked about how much 
involvement they believed their members should have in decision-making. The findings 
(above) indicated that every director interviewed wanted more member involvement in their 
cooperative, including voting on the decisions. Directors felt that they were often making 
decisions that their members should be involved in or having a vote on. This finding leads to 
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a conclusion that directors feel partially removed from their member-base, although they 
have the power to change this.  
From the findings, Proposition-x is rejected as the directors want more member involvement, 
including voting on major cooperative decisions.  
 
S-RQ7: How do members keep up to date on industry changes? 
Often there are industry regulatory or law changes that can affect a farm operation. This 
section looked at the findings (above) that looked in particular at significant industry 
regulatory changes, that of the proposed Dairy Code of Practice (DCoP) which affects the way 
contracts are initiated and executed with farmers and their processors of which cooperatives 
are part of; and New Zealand changes to DIRA in 2019 which removed some provisions 
regarding new farmers wanting to join Fonterra. Under the DIRA amendment, new farmers 
could be refused entry to Fonterra due to environmental non-compliance and distance; and 
obligations under DIRA to supply milk to competing entities which included other 
cooperatives. 
 
Proposition y: Members do not keep abreast of industry changes that may affect their farm 
operation. 
In Australia, from the findings, it was clear that the members of the cooperatives in this study 
mostly did not keep up to date with the proposed changes that might take place 
notwithstanding the availability of regular update meetings in the various regions across 
Australia. Their understanding of the proposed changes was limited, mainly have obtained 
updates from the public media. No submissions had been sent in from the 15 cooperative 
members in Australia, and it is unclear whether any of the cooperative organisations had sent 
any submissions in either. When talking to the directors, they had similar views that the 
members had, and once again, no submissions had been made from them either. Out of the 
15 members interviewed, two had attended a single briefing about the proposed changes, 
one director and one member that sat on an advisory committee. Additionally, no members 
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were aware of any updates, other than the public media press releases, that they had received 
from their cooperative explaining the changes and what the possible effect of these proposed 
changes would have on their member’s operations. 
In New Zealand, the situation was similar to Australia with the changes to DIRA not being well 
understood despite these changes affecting each of their cooperatives in some way. The 
changes limited the milk that Fonterra had to supply to other processors and cooperatives 
under the provisions contained within DIRA. Westland members believed that these changes 
could not affect them, however, on closer examination of the proposed changes, the fact that 
any of the Westland members could have individually approached Fonterra to become 
members and Fonterra would have had to allow the application was not well understood. The 
amendment’s effect was to remove Fonterra’s obligations as to accepting every farmer who 
wanted to become a Fonterra member. 
Proposition-y is therefore confirmed in that members and their cooperatives do not 
adequately keep abreast of the industry regulatory changes. 
Proposition z: Members expect their cooperative to update them on industry changes that 
affect their farm operation. 
On further clarification on proposed industry regulatory changes that affect, or have the 
potential to affect, cooperative members it was found that members generally expect their 
cooperative organisation to keep them up to date with any of the proposed changes. In 
Australia, the expectation was that if any changes could affect the cooperative members, the 
cooperative organisation would send information out to their members with explanations as 
to how these proposed changes would affect farm operations.  In a previous section above 
on communication and information, it was found that members expected more information 
from their cooperatives as the information on significant decisions was seen to less than what 
the members expected, this finding supports that previous result.  
In New Zealand, the findings were analogous to Australia’s finding in that the members 
expected that their cooperative organisation to keep them informed. This finding similarly 
supported the assertion that many of the cooperatives, in the opinion of their members, do 
not keep them informed to a satisfactory level. It is possible that other organisation, other 
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than the cooperative organisations, could keep the cooperative members informed including 
the dairy industry bodies and the cooperative organisations of both countries; however, this 
was not confirmed for either country.  
Proposition-z is, therefore confirmed. 
 
S-RQ8: What is the role that technology currently plays in cooperative engagement and 
governance, and what opportunities are there to expand the deployment? 
This section explored access to technology in the form of a Personal Computer and 
Smartphone. The section in this study looks at the role that technology can play in the 
governance of a cooperative when looked at from the member perspective. Members are 
often unable to vote on resolutions due to farm commitments was found above, however, if 
the place of decisions was moved to the farm and included members as a virtual group in a 
meeting, what would the result be in the members' perception? Often the logistics that a 
cooperative has to resolve to get information out to their members and for their members to 
vote on is too difficult.  
 
Proposition aa: Most cooperative members have access to both a PC and a Smartphone 
In this study, the members, scattered across many regions in two countries almost all had a 
smartphone and access to a home-office where a computer or laptop was used for various 
record-keeping purposes. Only two participants did not have their own computer; however, 
used other staff to fulfil this task. One member had a phone that had no “smart” capability.  
Proposition-aa is, therefore confirmed. 
Proposition bb: Cooperative members are open to the extended use of video-conferencing 
technology in meetings and other contact 
The study showed that members are willing to examine technology use to extend the 
cooperative governance to members. There was an expected split between the larger and 
more decentralised cooperatives and those that were smaller and more centralised. The 
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smaller cooperatives had members that travelled to local meetings; this resulted in a high 
attendance rate for all meetings, both supplier and AGM. They believed that technology 
would inhibit the close relationship they had with their cooperative, and it would detract from 
the inter-member relationships. However, the larger cooperatives that were dispersed across 
regions in both countries believed that the use of technology would improve member 
attendance with many of them stating they would be more willing to participate in their 
cooperative and more often. Directors from all cooperatives held a uniform view that they as 
a group, would benefit from the use of video-conferencing for some of their meetings and 
committees as the burden on them to travel was high and compromised their on-farm 
presence.  
Preposition-bb is therefore confirmed for larger cooperatives and confirmed for directors 
however rejected for smaller cooperative members. 
Proposition cc: Cooperative members would support the use of a smartphone app, in 
conjunction with other methods, to vote on resolutions 
The use of an application (app) to supplement the traditional voting methods was then 
explored. The mechanism would be on the smartphone but could be extended to the use of 
the home-office personal computer. Members did not always trust the voting in large 
cooperatives, with some of them stating that sometimes when a resolution was called and 
voted on, they were not convinced that it had sufficient votes to pass as it was difficult to see 
on a show of hands where there was a large audience. Furthermore, some members 
mentioned that they were not always convinced that some member farms did not have 
multiple votes on a show of hands as they believed that sometimes family members of the 
primary farm member would also put their hand up when voting. This level of distrust in the 
voting was not found in smaller cooperatives but was confined to the larger, more 
geographically dispersed cooperative members. Two members did not want the Smartphone 
app, one of which preferred the paper voting method, and the other did not have a 
smartphone and therefore felt it would not suit him. Of note was the fact that the question 
of a voting-app generated many positive discussions about the advantages that this app 
would give the membership to supplement but not replace the current traditional voting 
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methods whether they be one-member-one-vote or the polls which use the number of Milk 
Shares (mainly in New Zealand). 
What the finding indicated was that the use of a secure app used by members wherever they 
were which could include being on-farm or in attendance at a supplier meeting, would 
improve the voting transparency for the cooperative. Additionally, the use of the app due to 
on-farm commitments would improve their participation in the governance of their 
cooperative.  
Proposition-cc is, therefore confirmed.  
 
S-RQ9: In the members' perception, what law/ regulation/ policy, if improved, would most 
benefit cooperative members from Australasia. 
The interview questions supplemented by probing questions attempted to understand what, 
in the members' views of what would assist them in their farm operations and cooperative 
relationship as far as supporting policy or regulation was concerned. It was interesting that 
central themes were evident in the interviews, different for the two countries on specifics; 
however, a central theme was identified in cooperatives members across the regions form 
Australasia.   
 
Proposition dd: Members from Australia would like the law to examine the role of large 
supermarkets have in the dairy industry. 
Many of the Australian members believed that they were, in some ways, being held to ransom 
by the large supermarket organisations.  It is of note that two of the three cooperatives that 
operate in Australia have contracts with the large supermarket chains. These supermarket 
organisations had signed up a 10-year supply contract with one cooperative for all of their 
milk, and the other cooperative had signed a 5-year supply contract. These contracts were 
signed, as was mentioned in other discussions above, without the members' input and 
understanding as to the contract specifics which locked the price in at a rate per litre for the 
contract period. It allowed for minimal price movement in that period. The signing of long-
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term contracts when Australia was in the middle of a prolonged drought would place the 
cooperative under immense pressure to deliver the minimum quantities. In 2019 it was 
evident that milk had become scarcer due to the drought and sufficient supply to fulfil these 
contracts was becoming more problematic. The legislative policy that would need to be 
reviewed to address this would be the Competition Law as the embers believed that often 
their cooperatives were forced into sub-optimal contracts by these large supermarket chains.   
Proposition-dd is, therefore confirmed. 
 
Proposition ee: New Zealand members believe that DIRA should be adapted for changing 
market conditions 
New Zealand Fonterra members had support from other cooperative members who believed 
some of the provisions of DIRA were unfair to the cooperative. As this research interviewed 
only a few Fonterra members, it was difficult to come to any conclusion. However, it was clear 
that across all the cooperatives, all members believed that New Zealand needed a strong 
Fonterra to weather the increasingly competitive business environment.  
Proposition-ee is therefore not confirmed as there is insufficient data to confirm or reject this 
proposition. 
 
Proposition ff: Members believe that cooperative ownership provisions should be improved. 
When asking the question of where the members needed more support from regulation and 
policy, a common theme became apparent that the members wanted more ownership in 
their cooperative. When clarified, the members believed they needed more control in various 
aspects of their cooperative in order to increase information, communication, and to allow 
for more participation in major farm-impacting decisions and strategy. All these aspects 
would increase participation as has been discussed above. Several members mentioned that 
they believed that the other laws including Australian Competition law, Environmental Laws 
governing all farmers to prevent poor environmental farming practices, Trespass Laws in 
Australia to enforce trespass laws and prevent farm invasions, and DIRA provisions be 
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adapted to protect farms in general. However, the majority of farmers perceived control and 
ownership policy changes over their cooperative to be the most important change to support 
them as cooperative members, sometimes in addition to the other laws previously mentioned.  
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5.6 Chapter 5 Conclusion 
There are two essential ingredients for cooperative membership in order for the member and 
their cooperative to thrive. The first ingredient is the influence that a member has either 
singularly or collectively in their cooperative, and the second ingredient is that of voice, 
allowing the member to have input into cooperative direction and strategy. Having just the 
voice without influence will result in a situation where the member will be ignored, and this 
inevitably will lead dissatisfaction and potential for member exit. However, having influence 
can overcome incomplete governance, or voice, structures. Tatua is one example where 
membership is well connected to their cooperative, giving them the ability to examine all 
strategies from being intimately involved, notwithstanding that the law and constitutional 
document is weak in governance voice.  For the larger cooperatives, the membership should 
have both influence and voice as we know from this study and other conducted in other 
regions, the larger the cooperative, the more heterogeneous the membership which implies 
a weakening of social capital and thus the influence of a member. The larger cooperatives 
must strive to build an inclusive governance structure to allow for a member’s voice, as when 
this is effective it will build and positively support the social capital that a member has in their 
cooperative thereby increasing participation which will predictably lead to a more financially 
and socially successful cooperative. Even the smaller cooperatives that are less complex, and 
therefore have very few problems in this area, should build a governance configuration that 
utilises their strong social capital in order to prepare for the future when the cooperative 
grows in size or complexity and becomes increasingly heterogeneous. However, where one 
or both ingredients are lacking, the result can be undesirable for a cooperative as can be seen 
from the two recent Australasian cooperative failures.  
This chapter confirmed the central hypothesis that there are two primary factors for positive 
membership, that of the engagement characteristic between the members and the 
cooperative organisation; and the governance characteristic that provides the cooperative 
members with the means to participate in and assess their cooperative’s overall performance 
and decision-making effectiveness. It is concluded that without these two foundational 
characteristics, the basis to build confidence in their cooperative and the related operational 
farm performance can be compromised. Literature has shown that one without the other will 
result in a sub-optimal result for the cooperative in the long term, and this research similarly 
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concluded the same. Having a strong member relationship without the basic fundamentals of 
governance can lead to poor management decisions which inevitably can lead to the 
possibility of liquidation or conversion to another business form. Yet, good governance 
without an effective member engagement can lead to the same outcome of failure as weak 
member relationships place the important cooperative supply at risk due to a lack of 
commitment, participation, and loyalty of the members.   
 
The themes of this study confirm many of the findings from other cooperative research 
conducted in other regions. Loyalty was concluded as being greater in the smaller, more 
centralised cooperatives and less in the larger, more geographically dispersed cooperative 
memberships. Furthermore, the loyalty of the members was concluded as being linked to the 
frequency and quality of contact with their cooperative organisation, including cooperative 
leadership. The fact that a member served as a director, or had served as a director, did seem 
to increase the loyalty for their cooperative organisation; however, this would need a further 
empirical study to confirm. In contrast to loyalty, satisfaction was concluded as being similar 
in that it had tangible ingredients, closely linked to the farm gate price and the overall financial 
stability of the cooperative. 
Attendance, or participation, at the Annual General; Meeting (AGM) is problematic for most 
members, excepting those members in smaller more centralised cooperatives. The fact that 
almost all of these AGM meetings are held in the peak season seems firstly to negate 
attendance from its members, and secondly can be seen to be counter-intuitive to attempting 
to increase cooperative member participation in general. Generally, the study determined 
that smaller supplier meetings were preferred, and members believed they could have open 
and frank discussions, whereas the larger meetings they were reluctant to take part in the 
meeting in any form. In contrast to the larger cooperatives, the smaller cooperatives all had 
high attendance ratings at their AGM as well as supplier meetings. Additionally, the larger 
cooperatives all stated that the engagement with their cooperative organisation was limited 
to operational contact mainly with few or any directors ever visiting them on their farm or 
even had contacted them. The lack of contact with their leadership once again was confined 
to the larger cooperatives; smaller cooperatives seemed to have a regular contract, especially 
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with the Chairman of the Board. Members all had regular contact with each other whether it 
took place at community events or “across the fence”, cooperatives matters were generally 
discussed among other topics such as the price of milk and farming challenges in general. 
Those members in regional areas where there were very few members from their 
cooperative, believed they lacked in this vital facet of engagement. All cooperative members 
were generally satisfied with the operational aspects of their cooperative, including the milk 
collection and the testing regime, although they did not always agree with the results. Tatua’s 
engagement was found to be stronger than the other cooperatives, including those that were 
smaller and more centralised. Tatua members were generally satisfied with their level of 
engagement, which was found to be high, and their level of knowledge in decisions that the 
cooperative made. This higher satisfaction was due to the multiple meetings their cooperative 
convened to discuss whatever initiative they were considering and obtain their member's 
views and input. All this pointed to a healthy relationship between the members and their 
cooperative organisation which confirmed the findings of other studies in other regions 
where it was found that good engagement contributed to higher levels of satisfaction and 
higher participation rates. It would have been expected that Tatua members might have had 
more concern about the voting systems as their cooperative is an NGC which votes based on 
milk shares which can skew the voting in favour of larger members, however, this was not the 
case. It is that this result with the Tatua members indicates that where there is good 
engagement, this is able to override other governance concerns and deficiencies. 
 
Members were willing to become involved in the governance of the cooperative; however, 
did not believe getting involved in other aspects in a non-governance sense was an effective 
use of their time. 
An important implication is that the contact with the directors cannot be stressed enough; 
the members view their directors in an almost political sense, they believe the directors 
should visit them regularly and have an intimate knowledge of their farm situation. The 
directors, especially for the larger cooperatives need to understand their local members and 
their specific challenges, the directors of a cooperative have to be closer than their corporate 
counterparts where corporate-director contact with shareholders is generally not performed 
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and not expected; this is a substantial difference between the expectation of the corporate 
shareholder versus the cooperative membership bases. 
This study deduced that there was a lack of knowledge from almost all the participants in the 
applicable cooperative law and their constitutional document. Not understanding the rights 
of the cooperative member can possibly lead to agency problems and other governance 
challenges for members. It was evident that even the directors, while they had some basic 
knowledge of the law and their constitutional document, had little in-depth understanding 
and was limited in most cases to operational aspects such as entry, exit, directorship, and 
similar provisions. The role that the law and policy play in cooperative membership is evident 
from the findings of this research. Principles embedded in the law which have sufficient 
provisions to ensure that members have the foundational support in their constitutional 
document is essential for the longevity of the cooperative. Generally, the members in this 
research all believed and expressed an interest in understanding more about the law and 
especially their cooperative constitutional document.   
When the study examined the participation in the major decisions that the cooperatives had 
recently made or were about to make the results were of concern. It was found that unless 
the constitutional document had specific provisions about a particular item, the members 
generally were not involved and did not vote on the strategy or decision even though these 
decisions had major farm-profitability impacts. The conclusion is that members are not 
adequately involved in major decisions. The reasons behind the lack of involvement seemed 
to stem from a lack of information for the members, directors using confidentiality as a reason 
to maintain secrecy or a belief that the directors were paid to take these decisions on behalf 
of the members. When the directors were asked about this challenge, they all maintained 
they wanted more involvement, including voting in some cases, by the members. Once 
decisions had been made, the cooperative organisations exhibited a lack of recourse process 
whereby the members could clarify decisions or voice their concern. This study found most 
decisions, other than the ones mentioned before that required member involvement in their 
constitutional document, were made by the board. The vast majority of the members 
believed, however, that they should have involvement in these decisions or strategy and vote 
on the decision as well.  
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Both members and directors had little understanding of policy and Industry changes such as 
the Dairy Code of Conduct in Australia and the 2019 amendments to DIRA in New Zealand 
concluding that generally, members do not keep abreast of regulatory changes in their 
industry that can affect their farm operation. Furthermore, the members believed that the 
cooperative organisations were responsible for understanding the changes and disseminating 
the information regarding the changes to their members.  
As regards using technology to supplement members’ participation at meetings in the form 
of videoconferencing found that members in large cooperatives believed this would be a 
necessary addition to assist them in attendance and participation. In contrast, the smaller 
cooperatives believed that this would detract from the important relationship-building 
opportunities they had with other members and their cooperative leadership. However, on 
the use of a smartphone voting application to be used in voting for resolutions the members 
almost all believed this would be beneficial to themselves and the cooperative as current 
voting methods were archaic and prone to inaccuracies.  
Members believed that they had undefined ownership rights as they believed that they had 
little or no control over their cooperative when they believed they should. The members all 
wanted more voice in their cooperative and wanted the policy to be changed, which would 
afford them the rights they believed they were entitled to. The ownership in a cooperative 
has been linked to participation, loyalty, and satisfaction, (Feng et al., 2016; Puusa et al., 2018; 
Xiang & Sumelius, 2010) and when members are given the opportunity to vote, this will result 
in the best outcome for cooperatives. The members did not believe they should be involved 
in the operational decisions as the Board was capable of handling these, they wanted a say in 
the strategy and the direction the cooperative was taking and this they said would increase 
their loyalty.   
Cooperatives are unique entities and are formed for the benefit of their members (Mazzarol 
et al., 2012; Levy and Davis, 2008; Novkovic, 2008). Two classes of benefits that have been 
researched, those of the “soft” benefits which are intangible and are related to the social 
aspects of membership (Fulton, 1999; Fulton and Giannakas, 2001; Morrow et al., 2004); and 
the other more tangible benefits which are the economic benefits of membership (Birchall 
2004, Nilsson, 1999, Cook, 1995). The benefits that accrue to members are seen as 
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complementing the discussion and conclusions of this chapter. It is concluded from the 
responses of the member participants in this research that members do require both classes 
of benefits in order to maintain membership, that is, they require the influence as well as 
voice in their cooperative to remain as active, functioning members.  
No members were found to resist the larger decisions, in theory; they wanted the best for 
their cooperative and therefore would go along with what the collective membership wanted 
notwithstanding they perhaps did not agree with it. This finding concludes that the Horizon 
problem that cooperatives face is not as critical as has been found in other cooperative 
literature.  
It cannot be stressed sufficiently to involve the members. The two key elements of 
cooperative success are the engagement the cooperative organisation has and the 
involvement the members have in the strategy. It was clear that the members wanted more 
leadership contact, preferably on-farm; more smaller meetings; and more voice including 
voting in the strategic decisions.  
 
5.6.1 Recommendations and Implications for Theory, Research, and Practice 
There are numerous implications from this chapter, including the need for growing social 
capital to overcome governance weaknesses. If this is not possible due to the size and relative 
distribution of members, then the cooperatives would need to construct a governance 
framework to include the maximum number of members even if this necessitated the use of 
technology to bridge the member-to-member direct contact deficiencies. Furthermore, an 
understanding of governance was missing in the cooperatives of this study, although it was 
recognised as a deficiency. Improved understanding is recognised to be valuable. By involving 
more members in governance roles within their cooperative would allow members to have 
more participation and therefore more “connection” as well as affording an understanding of 
the complex environment that their cooperative operates in.   
This study was a qualitative research study and used a relatively small population size of 31 
members from 7 different cooperatives. More quantitative research based on the themes 
above that examines statistical information on what the engagement and governance 
involvement metrics are for cooperatives in Australasia is needed to support the conclusions 
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drawn from this qualitative research study. The new research should be broadened to include 
other agricultural cooperative entities, however, should take a proportional cross-section of 
the agricultural cooperative to ensure that the various primary environments are not lost in 
a study that is too broad. Finally do these findings and conclusions match other regions where 
little research has been undertaken that match this research design? It would be of interest 
to all stakeholders, including policymakers, government organisations, cooperative members 
and the cooperative organisation as well as researchers and scholars to understand more on 
how policy affects the cooperative organisation.  
There is further insight to be gained exploring the role of the law and the constitutional 
documents in different regions where little research has been undertaken. The link between 
the foundational aspects of the principles, the law, the constitutional documents, the 
legislative framework, and the actual perceptions of cooperative members as a whole should 
be compared against other regions to ensure that the framework contained within this thesis 
for Australia and New Zealand is optimal for the organisational success of the cooperative. 
This should allow for visibility of the linkages between policy and cooperative success. 
Please refer to the following chapter, Chapter-6, concluding this dissertation for details on 
what steps can be taken to bridge the gaps found in this study. 
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6. Chapter 6: Conclusions, Implications, and Further Research 
Safeguarding Member Voice and Influence  
 
6.1 Conclusions 
In this thesis, the elements of governance were analysed separately and then cumulatively to 
obtain an understanding of the various aspects of governance in cooperatives. A new 
methodology has been employed in that member voice and influence was seen as having 
multiple elements supporting each other, the principles, the law, the constitutional 
documents, the governance mitigation or minimisation, and the actual member perceptions 
of governance via his/her engagement with their cooperative. Each element was analysed 
separately; from the basic level of cooperative principles to the actuality of what members 
perceive as their governance rights. The hypothesis was confirmed that there are elements 
of governance for members that support or detract insomuch that a strength in the preceding 
element carries forward to the next element although a weakness in one element will 
inevitably result in a weakness in a subsequent element. For example, principles are applied 
in the law; the law mandates self-governance for members through the constitutional 
document, and the members then use the three elements to apply their rights. If the law is 
strong, then it is likely the constitutional document will be strong, and members rights are 
supported and protected. Unfortunately, the converse was also found to be true where 
weaker law resulted in weaker member governance rights. As a result, the approach of this 
thesis was validated as to using the elemental approach to build up a view of governance for 
a country, a region, a cooperative, and a membership. Previous research on cooperative 
governance has not used this approach in governance analysis and largely ignored the role of 
the various governance elements of the principles, the law, and constitutional document and 
taken the approach of researching the problems in the single-element dimension. 
Cooperative principles are foundational for the modern cooperative movement. The 
evolution of the principles, however, has not been without problems. There are noticeable 
deviations from the International Cooperative Alliance (ICA, 2019) set of seven principles. For 
example, the United States Department of Agriculture has created its own set of three 
principles (USDA, 2019) to assess whether or not an entity is a cooperative, and other 
countries have accepted some ICA principles ignoring the remainder. Canada has added to 
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and reworded, the ICA principles to create their own "Basis of a Cooperative" assessment 
(Government of Canada, 2019). New Zealand is one example where the principles were read 
before their parliament; however, never applied in their cooperative law (New Zealand 
Government, 2002). Australia, on the other hand, has accepted the principles (Australian 
Parliament, 2004) and implemented them in their State-based cooperative laws (Government 
of Australia, 2017).  
Where countries have applied the ICA principles, many have grappled with the 
implementation of the less defined principles to the general disadvantage of cooperatives in 
that region. Many regions have chosen not to implement particular ICA Principles, such as 
Autonomy and independence; Education, training and information; Cooperation among 
cooperatives; and Concern for community, instead implementing only the first three 
principles. While many countries acknowledge that the full set of principles are essential, 
there remains an opportunity for the application of the less defined principles. Education, 
Training, and Information is key to cooperative governance, yet in many cases, there has not 
been a successful implementation (ICA, 2019). The principles of Concern for community and 
Cooperation among cooperatives have not been widely accepted; however, some regions 
have implemented Autonomy and independence (ICA, 2019).  This research is important as it 
highlights the difficulties that are associated with the implementation of cooperative 
principles. Having the principles defined and legislated is seen, from this study at least, to 
support member governance and additionally support cooperatives by minimising the effects 
of the major governance challenges encountered in their operation. 
One of the most contentious principles of cooperation for the ICA set is the Voluntary and 
Open Membership (ICA, 2019), where any potential member can approach a cooperative and 
should be admitted. The open-membership principle can, in some circumstances place an 
unnecessary burden on a cooperative by accepting a new member where the member had 
already been rejected by non-cooperatives for some deficiency. For example, agricultural 
cooperatives should have a choice as to which members would be admitted, especially where 
acceptance due to the application of ICA-1 (ICA, 2019) might have the effect of subsidisation 
by the exiting member-base.  
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The other set of cooperative principles, the USDA set of three principles (USDA, 2019), has 
taken the position that their principles are defined and therefore, more readily accepted and 
applied. The drawback with the USDA principles is that it is missing the key to cooperation, 
that of the ethos of cooperation. USDA principles are silent on the community aspect of 
cooperation which is central and required as a vital ingredient of the cooperative 
organisation. In contrast, the ICA definition of a cooperative is "… an autonomous association 
of persons united ..." which has as its central tenet, a community. The limitation of the USDA 
principles is that the aspects of social cooperation are silent. The USDA omission of the social-
network aspects of a cooperative could be attributed to an attempt to simplify the set of ICA 
principles (ICA, 2019) to allow for more straightforward policy implementation.  
Cooperative principles are the basis of cooperative laws; the current set of cooperative 
principles have strengths and weaknesses. As long as the weaknesses remain, countries may 
continue applying corporate type legislation to cooperatives and thus weaken the 
cooperative advantage. There are other mechanisms available to members to strengthen 
their governance rights; these are short-term quick-fix type solutions and should be 
considered where the principles are deficient. Cooperative laws should be based on the 
cooperative principles as much as possible to ensure that the owners have sufficient 
governance over their cooperative. The use of the definition of cooperation of being an 
autonomous association of people who together own the cooperative and to which the 
benefits accrue would not seem to be difficult to legislate (ICA, 2019); however, in reality, 
while many have the principles or the definition in their law preamble, few regions have 
successfully implemented these as specific provisions. 
Regardless of which set of principles are used in legislation across the globe, there are few 
examples of full implementations of cooperative principles. In this research, where ten 
countries cooperative laws were examined, cooperative laws that had provisions that related 
directly to the principles of cooperation were rare. The exception to this is the economic 
principle found in both the ICA (Member economic participation) and USDA (User-benefit) set 
of principles (ICA, 2019; USDA, 2019). It is worth mentioning that even though the original set 
of Rochdale principles were used in some form in drafting both sets of cooperative principles; 
these were not drafted by legal scholars but were composed for the Rochdale membership 
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association only. Little did they know that these would be used for the modern cooperative 
movement.  
Other legislation and regulations can often interfere and continue to weaken cooperative 
operation. For example, in the United States at the turn of the 20th century, standard 
contracting terms and conditions for all suppliers of agricultural cooperatives was viewed as 
collusion and was deemed as anti-competitive. Only after successful lobbying did resolution 
come in in the form of the Capper-Volstead Act of 1922 (Co-operative Marketing Associations 
Act (7 U.S.C. 291, 292), 1922) whereby cooperatives were exempted from certain of the anti-
trust laws confirmed in research undertaken (Münkner, 2013). However, similar-intended 
legislation in other regions has met with limited success with some countries still applying 
blanket anti-trust laws, indicating a lack of understanding of the cooperative organisation. 
Furthermore, the accounting treatment of cooperative versus investor-owned-firm 
shareholding remains a challenge for financing (AASB, 2018). In an investor-owned-firm, the 
shares are treated as equity while in cooperatives, the shareholding is treated as a liability; 
this is related to the redemption of shares. This treatment creates a handicap for cooperatives 
when financing due to the perceived weakness of the cooperative Balance Sheet. 
The New Zealand cooperative law structure is that of a law subordinate to the Companies Act 
(Government of New Zealand, 1993), which implies that if the cooperative law (Government 
of New Zealand, 1996) does not explicitly replace any provisions, the Companies Act provision 
applies. The structure of the law is disadvantageous to cooperative members in that there are 
Companies Act provisions, for example, that restrict Information to shareholders which can 
inhibit member-governance. The Dairy Industry Restructuring Act 2001 (DIRA, 2001) 
simplified the dairy industry of New Zealand and opened up foreign investment in dairy 
processing and marketing. The Act (DIRA, 2001) legislated the creation of Fonterra by the 
merger of the remaining two large dairy cooperatives and the disbanding of the government 
dominated Dairy Board. The enactment of DIRA was close to the time that many nations and 
regions were modernising their cooperative law following the 1996 ICA Congress (ICA (History 
Department), 1996), which tabled the current seven ICA principles of cooperation. As a result 
of DIRA, the New Zealand cooperative law modernisation could not take place by virtue of 
the fact that DIRA legally mandates Fonterra to operate in a specific manner, for example, 
mandating membership acceptance. This is in contrast to the ICA principles of Autonomy and 
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independence. While other regions cooperatives relied on their cooperative laws for 
operation, New Zealand relies on cooperative law, the Companies Act, and DIRA, which 
applies to all dairy entities. DIRA is regularly reviewed, and it appears only a matter of time 
before DIRA is repealed either in part or in full. At that stage, the Cooperative Companies Act, 
subordinate to the Companies Act, would remain. This structure and the fact that the law is 
almost 25 years old and has not been modernised may not be an optimal state of affairs for 
cooperatives in New Zealand. 
Australia modernised its state-based cooperative law from 2012 (Government of Australia 
(b), 2017) to align more to the ICA principles of cooperation. Modernisation was achieved 
through the Cooperatives National Law (CNL) that would standardise the cooperative laws in 
each State and remove the restrictions on cross-border cooperative trade and supply. 
However, each State had to subscribe and enact the legislation separately within their State. 
In contrast, the Corporations Act (Government of Australia (a), 2017) federal legislation 
applying to IOFs amongst other entities. The Corporations Act has robust oversight through 
government and other agencies, for example, the Australian Securities Investment 
Commission (ASIC), The Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and others. The advantages in the 
Federal law is that one law applies to all IOFs, and changes are relatively simple and apply to 
all commercial non-cooperative entities when coming into force. In contrast to this is the 
cooperative State-based laws that have to be synchronised between states which can lead to 
some States having (slightly) different versions of the central agreed law. Additionally, once 
an entity is incorporated through the federal Corporations legislation, it can raise capital as 
the shares are seen as equity once again, in contrast to cooperatives in which the treatment 
of shares, as mentioned, is a liability. This was the case of one of the dairy cooperatives in this 
study; they reincorporated under the Corporations legislation in order to raise capital. 
Another regulation that affects cooperatives is the recently introduced Dairy Code of Conduct 
(DCoC) (2019) as part of the Competition and Consumer (Industry Codes – Dairy) Regulations 
2019. This code enforces certain behaviours from all dairy processors, including cooperatives. 
As an example, one of the codes enforced is that of not allowing contact repricing within a 
season. Cooperatives are owned and governed by their members, unlike IOFs. When 
environmental changes take place such as drought, bushfire, and COVID-19, cooperatives, in 
order to survive, might consider contract repricing in order to survive. Cooperatives should 
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be allowed to change contract prices without interference as long as they have explicit 
approval from their members collectively. The DCoC provisions should apply to IOF processors 
but not to cooperatives entities; this is an example of corporate-type laws and regulations 
being applied to cooperatives without understanding their unique characteristics. 
 
The cooperative constitutional document is usually enabled by the applicable cooperative law 
of the region. Together with the principles of cooperation, a cooperative constitutional 
document can be a powerful tool for member governance. Regardless of any weaknesses in 
the applications of cooperative principles in the law, the constitutional provisions are usually 
broad and flexible, thereby allowing for the "shoring-up" of member governance where 
needed. Nevertheless, as was discovered by the analysis of the cooperative laws, there are 
certain countries such as New Zealand and India, who do not mandate a constitutional 
document. Chapter-3 examined the effect of mandating constitutional provisions on a sample 
of Australasian dairy farmer cooperatives. The purpose of mandating provisions is to ensure 
that critical mechanisms are given to members without explicitly dictating what these would 
be in the cooperative law. This allows for a more flexible governance regime and empowers 
the members to govern their cooperative. When examining three dairy cooperatives from 
Australia and four from New Zealand, there was a marked difference in the level of member 
governance between the two countries. Remembering that New Zealand does not mandate 
a constitutional document and therefore provisions, the finding that both countries 
constitutional documents were similar, led to the conclusion that it is often copied without 
appreciating its purpose. In Australia, the three cooperatives had a similar set of rules in their 
constitutional document, including the cooperative that had reincorporated under the 
corporation's legislation. Furthermore, the documents had a similar format which was broken 
down into sections which were based mainly on guidance from their cooperative business 
association for their region; this indicated that the cooperative industry bodies were 
functioning well and supported their association members. New Zealand does not require a 
constitutional document, and as the cooperative law is subordinate to the companies law 
(Government of New Zealand, 2017), it was concluded that the omission was possibly due to 
the companies law being more aligned to corporate-type entities than cooperatives. It was 
observed that all New Zealand cooperatives did have a constitutional document which led to 
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the conclusion that these documents are seen as vital for the functioning of the cooperative 
entity. The implication for policymakers is that they should take this into account when 
revising the cooperative law and mandate these documents as well as guiding what these 
documents should contain. 
The analysis of constitutional documents uncovered a marked difference in the strength of 
governance provisions when contrasting Australia and New Zealand. Australia scored higher 
in all governance categories of this document. The comparative analysis of the constitutional 
document provisions in Australian and New Zealand dairy cooperatives led to the conclusion 
that mandating a document which included guidance on constitutional provisions had clear 
benefits for member governance. As this research was qualitative, a thorough study with a 
more significant sample set is required to confirm this trend. The lack of mandated guidance 
in New Zealand was concluded as a primary contributor to weaker controls such as the 
definition of a supplier and qualifications of a member director. The law protects the 
document in that any changes would require the majority vote of members. Additionally, 
when analysing the changes made to these documents over the past few years, the changes 
were usually operational concluding that changes to this document were initiated by the 
corporate function of the cooperative rather than the membership. It was further concluded 
that the document's purpose is not well understood and that it is not owned by the members 
but is treated as an operational document, changed by the Board to amend functioning rules. 
The constitutional document is concluded as being central for effective member governance; 
however, it has been largely neglected in academia. Furthermore, it remains the most 
effective method to improve or resolve member governance when members themselves 
understand the purpose and process of implementing variations to this document. 
Three elements of governance have been discussed, that of the principles of cooperation; the 
cooperative laws; and the cooperative constitutional document. Each element is designed to 
support the next element while itself being supported by the former element. The law, when 
based on the principles of cooperation is efficient in that it grants power to the constitutional 
document. However, an analysis of the law found that many of the principles of cooperation 
were not transcribed in the law. While the first four ICA principles could be relatively easily 
implemented (ICA, 2019), the remaining three were not and thus had been generally ignored 
by policymakers. Out of three that had been overlooked by policymakers, the principle that 
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could be used to remedy some of the troubles associated with member governance is the 
Education, training, and information principle (ICA, 2019). When examining the USDA 
principles, there is no provision for the Education, training and information, resulting in a very 
corporate view of cooperatives and excluding the important cooperative ethos characteristic 
of social sustainability. Australian cooperative law does state the principles of cooperation in 
its preamble, although it remains difficult to find direct linkages between the principles (even 
the first four) and specific provisions in the law. However, the law does contain well defined 
mandated provisions for the constitutional document which may always have been intended 
to fulfil this need.  
 
As found in Chapter-3 (Constitutional document), it was found that several factors 
contributed to control problems as found by Jensen and Meckling (1976). For instance, the 
characteristics of a supplier in Australia is more defined than that of New Zealand. The New 
Zealand definition was worded as "having an interest in a supply" (Government of New 
Zealand, 1996) which opened the supplier definition to anyone who, for example, had a farm-
share. In contrast, Australia defined a supplier in its AUCLA (Government of Australia, 2012) 
as those farmers who were supplying their cooperative only. Additionally, in New Zealand, if 
a person had an interest in a supply, they could stand for election as a member-director, 
notwithstanding the conflict with the principle of member control. Furthermore, New Zealand 
cooperative law (Government of New Zealand, 1996) had a minimum ownership of 60% by 
members, although this was not found to be the case in the sample where all cooperatives 
were wholly owned by their members. Australia, and other studied regions, do not allow for 
non-member ownership (Government of Australia, 2012; Government of Brazil, 1971 
Government of Canada, 1998; Government of France 1947; Government of Germany, 1889) 
The dilution of ownership and supplier definitions can contribute to a weakening of member 
controls and could be detrimental to the continued survival of the cooperative. 
Similarly, the free-rider (Cook, 1995; Royer, 1999), horizon (Cook, 1995), portfolio (Royer, 
1995 1999), and influence cost (Royer, 1999) challenges are not provided for in the Australian 
or New Zealand cooperative laws. When policymakers want to improve governance for 
cooperatives, they should be looking at the challenges that cooperatives (and other entities) 
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face and find methods to minimise these as much as possible to support member governance. 
In enacting DIRA (2001), New Zealand has in some way, exacerbated the problem of free-rider 
in Fonterra.  Horizon challenges have been partially mitigated in both countries by 
cooperative capital units (Australia), and Fonterra's trading amongst farmers (New Zealand), 
although the latter is specific for Fonterra members, leaving the remainder of New Zealand 
cooperatives without a solution. So too, the portfolio problem has remained without an 
effective solution. It is therefore concluded that the most effective treatment of these 
challenges could be by the support of a comprehensive member-owned and controlled 
constitutional document. This would require the cooperative principle of Education, training, 
and information (ICA, 2019) to be supported by the applicable cooperative law. 
 
While the previous sections of this chapter discussed the conclusions drawn from the analysis 
of prior literature concerning cooperative member governance, this section covers the reality 
of member governance from their perspective, derived from the analysis of primary 
information gathered from members.  
The conclusions drawn from Chapter-5 included that the two essential ingredients for a 
successful cooperative are member engagement and member governance participation. 
When both are present, the cooperative will be successful. An interesting finding was that 
when member engagement was good, formal governance participation was less important. 
The converse was found not always to be accurate; good formal governance participation 
processes did not always result in good member engagement.   
Member engagement was better in smaller, more localised cooperatives (Jussila et al., 2012; 
Feng et al., 2016) while more extensive cooperative suffered from a weaker engagement 
which matched studies of cooperatives in other regions (Reynolds et al., 1997). Members 
wanted to see their directors on-farm and keep them up to date with operational changes in 
their cooperative. The conclusion that can be drawn for the members' perceptions on 
engagement is that large, more dispersed cooperatives did not retain the engagement quality 
when compared to smaller more-centralised cooperatives. Member directors are viewed 
more as engagement contacts with farmers expecting the director to understand their farm 
circumstances. The appointment of member directors is concluded as being socially-
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orientated in that the directors are expected to have a relationship with their members in 
contrast to their investor-owned director counterparts. Larger cooperatives will always suffer 
in engagement quality; however, some steps can be taken to improve engagement. Many of 
the members from larger cooperatives, less-satisfied with engagement and contact, believed 
that a regional structure would work far better than their current "all directors look after all 
members" framework. The local directors would thereby have quality engagement with their 
local members. In Fonterra, which had more than 9,000 members in 2020, the members 
understood the logistics involved with the directors keeping in touch with the member base. 
In this case, the engagement structure, as Fonterra has, is employing a shareholder council 
where engagement could be delegated as part of a hierarchy. However, the members 
interviewed from Fonterra believed that the council was ineffective due to the lack of power 
they had in keeping the Board to account. In this way, member-influence is a crucial ingredient 
in cooperative success. 
Members want to understand their rights and obligations in terms of the law and the 
constitutional document. However, the lack of understanding of the purpose of the 
constitutional document contributed to a perceived lack of member voice. Many of the 
strategic decisions in cooperatives are made by directors without adequate member 
consultation. Here we are not talking about small operational decisions but those decisions 
that can affect the livelihood of members. Other studies have shown that participation can 
contribute to increased cooperative financial performance see, for example, Bijman et al. 
(2012) and Bhuyan (2007) who found that continued survival for a cooperative is linked to 
member participation. An important facet of participation was found to be governance 
participation (Osterberg and Nilsson, 2009). Furthermore, The involvement of the member is 
crucial as we already know that good participation, and therefore involvement builds on the 
trust and commitment of the members, which positively contributes to cooperative success. 
The lack of information could similarly detract from a lack of member decision-making 
involvement. Cooperative boards often limited member information access for strategic 
decisions which had the effect of distancing the members and weakening member 
engagement. The weakening of engagement can lead to dissatisfaction and eventually to 
member exit. Member exit affects cooperative supply (in the case of dairy) which can also, 
therefore, lead to cooperative collapse. 
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As can be concluded from the different chapters, the separate characteristics of engagement 
and governance start with cooperative principles and the implementation thereof. The 
governance problems that are encountered are directly related to the acceptance of 
cooperative principles, the implementation into the law, and the quality of mandated 
constitutional provisions. When all these elements work together, they will result in a high 
level of member voice and influence minimising the cooperative governance challenges. 
Furthermore, engagement or influence is seen as an essential ingredient to the voice, or 
influence, that a member needs when maintaining their cooperative relationship. Smaller, 
more centralise cooperatives have an advantage in that the members can interact regularly, 
and the directors are local to all members. When the cooperative becomes more dispersed, 
the quality of engagement diminishes and the cooperative needs to find innovative ways to 
maintain the relationship. Technology could be adopted to bridge some engagement 
challenges that larger cooperatives face, for instance, the use of videoconferencing or remote 
voting on resolutions by the use of a smartphone app. In this way, member voice is being 
heard, which increases participation and contributes to better engagement as the member 
believes they can influence their cooperative. Together with a regional or even localised 
framework for engagement, the cooperative will flourish as members fully participate in their 
cooperative. The collapse of both Murray Goulburn and Westland can be linked to a failure 
of policy and implementation. In Murray Goulburn, the members were dissatisfied with their 
voice, and with Westland, a similar situation existed before the eventual collapse and 
subsequent sale to a foreign-owned entity. Furthermore, the offering of bonuses to Westland 
executives on completion of the sale (NZ Herald, 2019) would be in direct conflict with 
cooperative ethos, that of a socially-connected, mutually-owned entity controlled by its 
members. Cooperative success is inexorably tied to the critical role that member voice and 
influence plays.  
Having voice or Governance opportunity supports participation which supports engagement 
which supports  loyalty and satisfaction which supports cooperative financial and social 
performance and mitigates the risk of loss of supply 
Having influence or engagement builds greater social capital in the cooperative, which 
supports involvement in critical farm-impacting decisions which allows for input into the 
major cooperative decisions which can overcome governance weaknesses.  
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6.1 Implications 
The implications of this research are three-fold; it has implications for policymakers, 
cooperatives, and members. For member governance to be fully supported, it may require 
changes from all three sets of stakeholders. 
 
6.1.1 Implications for Policymakers 
Policymakers should strive for the practical implementation of the cooperative principles, 
even if this is not easy. Principles are foundational to the drafting of legislation; selecting only 
certain principles can weaken the cooperative ethos and could leave the cooperative 
operating environment with unnecessary challenges. Policymakers should avoid applying 
legislative and regulatory instruments that were designed for IOFs to cooperatives.  
Australian policymakers should also assess the impact of having federal legislation for IOFs 
while cooperatives are enacted under a state-based legal system, this can have the effect of 
favouring one and discriminating against the other when both coexist in the same commercial 
environment. The current Australian constitution applies to all entities for “trade and 
commerce” which encompasses both IOFs and cooperatives; federal cooperative law is thus 
justified.  
New Zealand policymakers face challenges that require serious contemplation and, where 
appropriate, correction. The New Zealand cooperative law (New Zealand Government, 1996) 
is a subordinate law to the companies law (New Zealand Government, 1993); this research 
found that cooperatives can be disadvantaged when provisions that were designed for IOFs 
are applied to cooperatives. When contrasting this structure with other regions, it was found 
that this structure is unique to New Zealand and could be seen as inefficient although some 
scholars (Evans & Meade, 2006) believe this to be a flexible implementation of cooperative 
law. The fact that DIRA (2001) has constrained the ability for policymakers to develop 
cooperative law could be seen as a basis of improvement. Separation from IOF legislation is 
the first step in this regard. Furthermore, the enactment of DIRA in 2001 had many 
advantages for the dairy industry in New Zealand; however, it has also interfered with the 
recognition of the unique nature of the cooperative entity by not applying cooperative 
principles to support the modernisation of New Zealand cooperative law. 
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6.1.2 Implications for cooperatives 
The implications for cooperatives are numerous. Cooperatives should be structuring their 
Board with directors who are proficient in relationship management as well as other 
important disciplines such as marketing, sales and supply chain logistics. In this research, 
members suggested that many of them, in particular from the larger cooperatives, had not 
had contact from their cooperative for an extended period, some more than two years. When 
members do not feel that their voice is being heard, they assume that they have no influence, 
and as a result, participation and engagement suffer.  Anything that negatively impacts the 
way members feel about their cooperative is likely to cause adverse downstream effects, and 
collectively, this could result in the failure of supply, or even the cooperative. Additionally, 
the involvement of members in governance roles, not limited to board positions, can lead to 
a more satisfied member community and therefore, more significant engagement. For larger 
cooperatives, the implications of having members spread across vast areas can be partially 
solved through the creation of a relationship management structure to maintain active 
member contact, as long as the structure is empowered to act on behalf of members. 
Members do want a say in their cooperative; they do not, however, need all the details, 
especially for operational decisions. They want an opportunity for their voice to be heard 
which cooperatives should strive to provide.  
Information restriction in cooperatives is incomprehensible; this is likely to lead to a 
distancing of members who understandably believe they have no voice. To support member 
participation, the implementation of electronic meetings can ameliorate low meeting 
attendance. So too is the number and placement of meetings in the calendar a problem. More 
frequent meetings where members have a greater opportunity to have their voice heard will 
increase participation and engagement with a positive result for the cooperative.  
 
6.1.3 Implications for members 
Members were found to be unaware of their rights. The cooperative constitutional document 
is the most straightforward manner in which to correct any member-related shortcomings. 
However, the members need to take control of this vital instrument and ensure it is kept 
current to provide an effective solution to having more voice and influence.  
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It is not sufficient to argue that directors take all the decisions without member input when 
members are within their rights to challenge any decision within current constitutional and 
legal procedures. Neither is it constructive to say that they did not vote on a particular 
resolution when they did not attend a meeting. Directors are members; therefore, if a 
member wishes for increased contact with a director, the member could initiate it as they 
would with a neighbour or an adjacent farming operation. Finally, members should form a 
community supported by the cooperative; this community could be local or virtual. The sense 
of belonging to a community supports engagement and allows for a collaborative approach 
to building the future of a cooperative. 
 
6.2 Further research 
The first major contribution of this research was a new methodology to evaluate cooperative 
voice and influence. This methodology analysed the theoretical impact of policy on 
cooperative governance by analysing the implementation of cooperative principles; the 
enactment of the principles within the law; the support afforded by the law for the 
constitutional document and how these three vital elements could be used to mitigate some 
of the known cooperative governance problems. The theoretical chapters (Chapter2-4) 
addressed concepts, contrasting other regions accomplishments with the acceptance and 
implementations of cooperative principles.  The law was examined concentrating on the 
Australasian geography and specifically dairy cooperatives. Further research is required to 
expand the selection of ten countries to analyse other cooperative environments other than 
dairy agriculture which could potentially uncover solutions to policy challenges that Australia 
and New Zealand face.  
The second significant contribution was an empirical qualitative study of Australasian dairy 
cooperative member perceptions as to their governance rights. A further longitudinal 
quantitative study of member perceptions performed by an independent body would allow 
for the defining and strengthening of the Australasian cooperative environment.  
The third contribution was to provide the basis of a governance theory for cooperatives by 
addressing the underlying elements that make up the theoretical governance for a 
cooperative.  
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Many factors contribute to a successful cooperative; factors ranging from the law, the 
constitutional documents, and the relationships that members maintain with their 
cooperative. The identification of a tool-based assessment for resilience should be researched 
and developed, allowing for a practical, realistic appraisal of factors that any Australasian 
cooperative can undertake to strengthen member voice and influence.  
 
As each chapter in this thesis was one view on this representation of member governance, 
there were separate recommendations for each chapter as to what research would further 
define and support member governance; these are listed in summary form in Table 6.1 below. 
Item Topic Reference 
Chapter 
Details on further research 
1 Principles 2 Some ICA principles have been found difficult to 
legislate; more research is needed to understand why 
this is the case and what can be done about it. 
2 Law 2 Cooperative law has been found to be at a 
disadvantage when compared to other organisational 
laws, for example, IOFs. An analysis of the approach 
taken by other regions to allow for both organisational 
forms to co-exist on an equal footing is required. 
3 Law 2 New Zealand cooperative law was found to be less 
current than other regions; more research is required 
to understand if the findings of this research can be 
confirmed for other cooperative forms. 
4 Constitutional 
Document 
3 Constitutional documents were found to be powerful 
mechanisms for members to apply their governance 
rights; more research is needed to understand the 




3 Further research is required to examine the 
mitigating effect that the Cooperative Principles and 
Cooperative Law (covered in Chapter-2), and the 
Constitutional document (this chapter) has on the 
unique governance challenges that cooperatives face 
6 Governance 
Challenges 
4 Further research is needed to analyse governance 
rights in other cooperative types to understand if the 
findings for dairy cooperatives can be broadened to 
other cooperative forms. 
7 Governance 
Challenges 
4 The role of the cooperative director was mentioned 
briefly; however, more research is needed in order to 
understand the challenges of compromise that a 
director faces as a contributing member and as a 
director  





5 This research was qualitative and reported on trends. 
Longitudinal quantitative research should be 
undertaken to analyse trends and the change over 
time of member perceptions based on changes their 




5 The link between the foundational aspects of the 
principles, the law, the constitutional documents, the 
legislative framework, and the actual perceptions of 
cooperative members as a whole should be 
compared against other regions to ensure that the 
framework contained within this thesis for Australia 
and New Zealand is appropriate in other contexts 
10 Member Voice 
and influence 
6 The identification of a tool-based assessment for 
resilience should be researched and developed, 
allowing for a practical, realistic appraisal of 
factors that any cooperative can undertake to 
strengthen member voice and influence 
11 A different 
view of  
member 
engagement 
New Research conducted taking a different view of 
the member-cooperative relationship by looking 
at the competitive market environment and 
other policy implication such as export and 
import. There is a trade-off between large 
cooperative bargaining power and member 
engagement – what can work for both parties? 
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Abbreviations in Use 
 
AASB – Australian Accounting Standards Board 
ADFC – Australian Dairy Farmers Corporation (Australia) 
ASX - Australian Stock Exchange 
AUCLA – Australian Uniform Cooperative Laws Agreement 
AUD – Australian Dollar 
Australasia – Australia and New Zealand 
BOD – Board of Directors  
CCU – Cooperative Capital Units (Australia) 
CLARITY – Cooperative Law and Regulation Initiative 
CNL – Cooperatives National Law 
CPF – Cooperative Policy Framework 
DFMC – Dairy Farmers Milk Cooperative (Australia) 
DGC – Dairy Goat Cooperative 
DIRA – Dairy Industry Restructure Act 2001 and amendments 
EU - European Union 
EU - European Union 
FCA - Financial Conduct Authority (UK) 
ICA - International Cooperative Alliance 
ICA – International Cooperative Alliance 
IFRS - International financial reporting standards 
ILO – International Labour Organisation  
IOF – Investor-Owned Firm 
IPS - Industrial and provident society 
MAF - New Zealand Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry 
NGC - New generation cooperative 
NZD – New Zealand Dollar 
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NZDB - New Zealand Dairy Board 
NZX - New Zealand Exchange 
PECOL – Principles of European Cooperative Law 
QDA – Qualitative Document Analysis 
SGECOL - Study Group on European Cooperative Law 
TAF – Trading Among Farmers (New Zealand – Fonterra) 
TBD – To be Determined (future) 
UK – United Kingdom 
UN – United Nations 
USD – Unites States Dollar 
USDA - United States Department of Agriculture  







Chapter-2 Appendix 2.1: Cooperative Principles and Selected Laws timeline 
 
 
1844 Rochdale Equitable Pioneers
Formation of the entity, no real 
orgnisational alw for this form yet.
1966 International Co-operative 
Alliance (ICA) 
 removal of "Limited Interest on 
Capital" and "Cash trading" principles 
from Rochdale-7, now ICA-6 (1966)
1995 International Cooperative 
Alliance (ICA) 
rewrites cooperative principles, 
publishes 7 principles (ICA-7)
2002 United Nations (UN), 
International Labour Organisation (ILO) 
Recommendation 193 - ICA 7 
Cooperative principles adopted
2012 UN 
Launch of the International year of the 
Cooperatives. 3 main objectives: 
Increase Awareness, Promote Growth, 
and Establish legal framework for 
cooperative formation/ growth
1895 International Co-operative 
Alliance (ICA) 
Formation of the International Cooperative 
Alliance, Rochdale principles are adopted as 
first set of principles
1937 International Co-operative 
Alliance (ICA) 
adopts original Rochdale Principles  as 
the Rochdale Principles of Co-operation.
1987 United States Department of 
Agriculture (USDA) 
proposes 3 principles of cooperation, 
some overlap with Rochdale-8 (from 
1966 ICA principles)
1998 Canada 
Canada (Federal government) 
published a set of "cooperative basis" 
principles which included 8 cooperative 
basis operation. These overlap with the 
ICA-7. 
 2009 UN 
Resolution 64/136 declares 2012 as 
the International Year of Cooperatives
2013 USDA 
re-examines USDA-3 against the ICA-7 
principles and recommends no change 
(USDA-3 remain)
1787 - 1899 1900 - 1949 1960 - 1994 1995 -1999 2000 - 2009 2010 - 2013 2014 - 2020
1787 US United States Consitution
Commerce and trade was listed in the 
United States Constitution (Article I, 
Section 8, Clause 3) and states that the 
United States Congress shall have power 
"To regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations and inter-stae trade....." . Whilst 
there has been some argument about this, 
the interpretation is widely held that 
transactions affecting inter-and extra-state 
trade and commerce is goverened by this 
article. Additionally, any indirect commerce 
transactions is seen as being goverened by 
this article in the consititution.
1901 AUS Australian Constitution Act 
1901
In particular, Section 51(i) of the act 
affirms that the Commonwealth has the 
power to legislate trade and commerce 
between the States. Section 51(xx) 
affirms the legislative power the 
Commonwealth has as regards to 
“Foreign Corporations and trading or 
financial corporations formed within 
the limits of the Commonwealth”.
Any changes still required the United 
Kingdom Parliment signoff.
1957 EU Treaty on the functioning of 
the European Union (EU) signed
This treaty sets economic principles of 
the cooperation between the EU 
member states (establishing the 
European Economic Community).
1993 formation of European Union 
This formation absorbed the EEC and 
renamed it the European Community 
(EC).
2001 AUS Corporations Act 2001 
This is the non-cooperative legislation 
for companies, some sections are still 
applicable to cooperatives. Many 
Australian cooperatives registered 
under this act to enable cross-state 
expansion in the future.
2012 AUS Co-Operatives (Adoption of 
National Law) Act 2012 (NSW)
This Act repeals the previous New 
South Wales cooperatives legislation by 
adopting the Co-operatives National 
Law and Regulations. The national law 
contains all ICA-7 principles.
2014 AUS Co-operatives National Law 
(Victoria) 2014 
This Act repeals previous cooperatives 
legislation by adopting the Co-
operatives National Law and 
Regulations. The national law contains 
all ICA-7 principles.
 1852 NZ New Zealand Constitution Act 
1852 
The British Parliament still had final say in 
the running of New Zealand. No mention 
was made of trade and commerce in this 
Act.
1914 United States passed Clayton Act
This act had the effect of exempting 
cooperatives not having capital stock. It 
had the effect of helping non-stock; non-
profit it did not excluded treatment of 
capital stock cooperatives.
1982 CA Canada Constitution Act 1982
The act covers the constitution of 
Canada, it's provinces and territories by 
updating the 1867 Consititution Act. It 
removed any and all links to the British 
justice system and parliment. Its 
original name was the British North 
America Act, 1867  this Act ameded the 
olrginal Act  to Canada Consitution Act, 
1867.
Any changes still required the United 
Kingdom Parliment signoff.
1996 NZ Cooperative Companies Act 
1996  
The Act covers cooperatives, however, 
all cooperatives have to register under 
the Companies Act as well. The Act 
makes no mention of cooperative 
principles or cooperative identity.
2001 NZ Dairy Industry Restructuring 
Act 2001 
DIRA- This law covers both cooperatives 
and investor-owned firms (or private 
for-profit firms). However, some of the 
sections within this Act can affect 
cooperatives. This act further 
consolidated the Dairy cooperatives in 
New Zealand into one entity called 
Fonterra.
2013 AUS Co-operative National Law 
(South Australia) Act 2013 
This Act repeals the South Australia 
Cooperatives Act 1997 by adopting the 
Co-operatives National Law and 
Regulations. The national law contains 
all ICA-7 principles.
2015 AUS Co-operatives National Law 
(Northern Territory) 2015 
This Act repeals the Northern Territory 
Cooperatives Act 2002 by adopting the 
Co-operatives National Law and 
Regulations. The national law contains 
all ICA-7 principles.
1787 - 1899 1900 - 1949 1960 - 1994 1995 -1999 2000 - 2009 2010 - 2013 2014 - 2020
1852 UK Industrial and Provident Societies' 
Act of 1852
Industrial and Provident Societies' Act of 
1852 was passed into law. This Act  
provided for the creation of Co-operative 
Societies, giving them separate legislative 
authority and removing them from the 
Friendly Society legislation
1922 United States passed Capper-
Volstead Act
This act had the effect of partially 
reversing the Sherman Act by 
authorising the right of farmers to unite 
for processing or marketing without 
violating antitrust laws. This was aimed 
mainly at agricultural cooperatives but 
included capital stock cooperatives
1986 NZ Constitution Act 1986 
The Act repealed the New Zealand 
Constitution Act of 1852 and removed 
the last linkages with the Britsh 
parlimnet and judiciary. This Act 
allowed New Zealand to ammedn its 
own constitition.
1997 AUS Queensland Cooperative Act 
1997  
The Act is based on the ICA-7 principles 
(Divison-3) with the statement that the 
Act should be interpreted to promote 
cooperative principles. Objectives 
include to "promote cooperative 
philosophy, principles, practices and 
objectives..."
2002 AUS ACT Cooperative Act 2002 
Similar to the Queensland Cooperatives 
Act, the ACT Cooperative Act states it 
should be read to promote cooperative 
principles. Division 1.3 lists the ICA-7 
principles as current.
2015 AUS Co-operatives National Law 
(Tasmania) 2015
This Act repeals the previous Tasmania 
Cooperatives Act by adopting the Co-
operatives National Law and 
Regulations. The national law contains 
all ICA-7 principles.
1867 CA Canada Constitution Act 1867
Canada was created by an act of the 
Parliament of the United Kingdom called 
the British North America Act, 1867 (now 
known as the Constitution Act, 1867). 
Section 91(2) dealt with the regulation of 
trade and commerce which limited the Act 
to inter- and extra- provincial (foreign) 
trade but had no application in inter-
provincial trade. 
Any changes still required the United 
Kingdom Parliment signoff.
1926 United States passed Cooperative 
Marketing Act
This act allowed cooperatives that 
qualified under the Capper-Volstead act 
to share marketing information.
1993 NZ Companies Act 1993
The Act covers all companies. 
Cooperatives are required to register 
under this act, however, not all sections 
are applicable to cooperatives and are 
thus replaced by sections within the 
cooperatives companies act.
1998 CA Canada Cooperatives Act 
(v2017)
The act covers all cooperatives in 
Canada, it is a federal law required of all 
ten provinces and three territories (13) 
if operating in two or more provinces; 
and (b) it will have a fixed place of 
business in more than one province. 
The principles overlap but do not mirror 
the ICA-7.
2003 EU adopts the Statute for a 
European Cooperative Society  (SCE)
This EU statute made it possible for EU 
member states cooperatives to operate 
across member states borders.
2017 AUS Co-operative National Law 
(ACT) Act 2017 
This Act repeals the ACT state 
Cooperatives Act 2002 by adopting the 
Co-operatives National Law and 
Regulations. The national law contains 
all ICA-7 principles.
1887 United States, Wisconsin passed first 
Cooperative Law
Cooperative marketing laws were in force 
before this between 1865 (Michigan) and 
others. Laws were based on the Rochdale 
principles - decrees included: Cooperatives 
could issue shares but had to limit the 
number; voting rights were tied to 
membership not investment; one member 
one vote; profits could be distributed, it 
was up to cooperative to decide how 
1998 CA Canada Cooperatives Act 
(v2017)
The act covers all cooperatives in 
Canada, it is a federal law required of all 
ten provinces and three territories (13) 
if operating in two or more provinces; 
and (b) it will have a fixed place of 
business in more than one province. 
The principles overlap but do not mirror 
the ICA-7.
2009 AUS Western Australia Co-
operatives Act 2009 
Similar to the Queensland Cooperatives 
Act, the Western Australia (WA) 
Cooperative Act states it should be read 
to promote cooperative principles. 
Division 3 lists the ICA-7 principles as 
current.
1890 United States passed Sherman 
Antitrust Act
This act had the effect of viewing  
cooperation as collusion and hence anti-
trust, this law made collusion and 
collaboration between farmers illegal.  
Cooperative Principles
(Rochdale, International Alliance, United States Department of Agriculture, Canadian Co-operative basis)
Cooperative Laws

















































Canadian (Cooperative Basis - 
Canadian Cooperatives Act)
1. That capital should be of their own 
providing and bear a fixed rate of 
interest.
1. Voluntary and Open 
Membership 1. User-Owner Principle
1. membership in the cooperative is 
open, in a non-discriminatory manner, to 
persons who can use the services of the 
cooperative and who are willing and able 
to accept the responsibilities of 
membership;
2. That only the purest provisions 
procurable should be supplied to 
members.
2. Democratic Member 
Control 2. User-Control Principle
2.  each member or delegate has only 
one vote;
3. That full weight and measure should 
be given.
3. Member economic 
Participation 3. User-Benefits Principle
3.  no member or delegate may vote by 
proxy;
4. That market prices should be charged 
and no credit given nor asked.
4. Autonomy and 
Independence
4. interest on any member loan is limited 
to a maximum percentage fixed in the 
articles;
5. That profits should be divided pro rata 
upon the amount of purchases made by 
each member.
5. Education, Training 
and Information
5. dividends on any membership share 
are limited to the maximum percentage 
fixed in the articles;
6. That the principle of ‘one member one 
vote’ should obtain in government and 
the equality of the sexes in membership.
6. Co-operation among 
Co-operatives
6.  to the extent feasible, members 
provide the capital required by the 
cooperative, with the return paid on 
member capital not to exceed the 
maximum percentage specified in the 
articles;
7. That the management should be in the 
hands of officers and committee elected 
periodically.
7. Concern for 
Community
7.  surplus funds arising from the 
cooperative’s operations are used to:
(i) to develop its business, 
(ii) to provide or improve common 
services to members,
(iii) to provide for reserves or the 
payment of interest on member loans or 
dividends on membership shares and 
investment shares,
(iv) for community welfare or the 
propagation of cooperative enterprises, 
or 
(v) as a distribution among its members 
as a patronage return;
8. That a definite percentage of profits 
should be allotted to education.
8.  it educates its members, officers, 
employees and the public on the 
principles and techniques of cooperative 
enterprise
9. That frequent statements and balance 
sheets should be presented to members.
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Co-operative Items (Constitution/ Rules/ 
Articles/ Bylaw etc.) in the law or other 
documents.  
Key:  = (Comply);  = (Does not comply); P = (Partial 
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Company does 



















1 Co-operative Principles (ICA-7 version or USDA-3 or 
other) mention 
P    P 1 P 2 P 3 4   5  




U U U 7 
 
U 8  9 
3 Rules/ Constitution/ Rules/ Bylaw found in which 
document (called constituent documents) 




Law11 No separate 
section 





Law16 Law17 Law18 
4 Other documents (constituent documents) that can 
change the Law 
R + O U Yes19 Yes20 U Yes - Articles U U U U U Y21 
5 Mandatory information that constituent documents must 
contain within the Law/ Act 

































5a Name of Co-operative M  (M point 1)           
5a(i) Address of Co-operative Head Office O  (M point 2)           
5a(ii) Type of Coop (Primary, Secondary, Tertiary) O            
5a(iii) Objective of co-operative O  (M point 3)  P         
5b Active membership provisions (Transacting 
Shareholder NZ) 
M  (M point 4)           
5c Conditions of admission to membership  M  (M point 5 + 6)           
5c(i) Payments to be made M  (M point 6)           
5c(ii) Share or Interest to be acquired M  (M point 5)           
5d Rights and Liabilities of members M  (M point 7)           
5e Circumstances in which members can be 
expelled/ suspended (and rights of the suspended  
M  (M point 4)           
 
1 BRAZIL: Societies of persons; Voluntary Membership; 1 member 1 vote; non-discriminatory;  
2 CAN: Partial – mentions “coop principles but does not elaborate; open; non-discriminatory; 1 member 1 vote; talk about co-operative basis and has a list describing same. 
3 EU: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:l26018&from=EN see preamble (10) 
4 FR: See Article 7 of https://www.legifrance.gouv.fr/affichTexte.do?cidTexte=JORFTEXT000000684004  
5 RSA: Found in preamble and S(2) + S(3), specifically mentions ICA principles https://www.acts.co.za/co-operatives-act-2005/index.html  
6 AUS: https://www.coopdevelopment.org.au/govtagencies.html : Each state and territory has a statutory officer created under Co-operatives National Law called the Registrar of Co-operatives, who is responsible for administering their respective co-operatives acts. The Registrar is located within a 
government department which also administers other business structures (except companies and aboriginal corporations) 
7 FR: See article 25 
8 INDIA: https://indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1914/1/200239.pdf see Chapter-2 
9 UK: Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) see S3b 
10 Note: The ILO Guidelines for Cooperative Legislation 3rd revised edition (Hagen H, 2012) states that the adoption of bylaws (constitutions/ rules, articles etc.) should not be made compulsory, the guideline has the next section entitled “Minimum obligatory content of bylaws” at 5.2.2.1.2.1.  
11 AUS: https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/#/view/act/2012/29 : See Section 60 
12 BRAZIL: Article 21 Law No. 5.764 of December 1971 (consolidated as at 7 July 2018) 
13 CAN: Canada Cooperatives Act S.C. 1998, c. 1 http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-1.7/index.html  
14 EU: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=LEGISSUM:l26018&from=EN see Article 5 (4) 
15 GER: See https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/geng/ for full text in German.  
16 INDIA: See S10 of Chapter 2 
17 RSA: https://www.acts.co.za/co-operatives-act-2005/index.html see S(13) 
18 UK: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2014/14/pdfs/ukpga_20140014_en.pdf  
19 AUS: From the Act: the constitution of the corporation or any rules or other document constituting the corporation or governing its activities, and includes a memorandum or articles of association and replaceable rules or other rules 
20 NZ: Dairy Industry Restructure Act 2001 and amendments - http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/2001/0051/69.0/DLM106751.html  
21 UK: FCA guidance 
22 NZ: http://www.legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1996/0024/latest/DLM376810.html  
23 BRAZIL: Article 21 Law No. 5.764 of December 1971 (consolidated as at 7 July 2018) 
24 CAN: Articles 11(1) and 15(1) mandatory for articles of incorporation and bylaws resp. http://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/C-1.7/index.html  
25 GER: See S6 and S7 




Co-operative Items (Constitution/ Rules/ 
Articles/ Bylaw etc.) in the law or other 
documents.  
Key:  = (Comply);  = (Does not comply); P = 
(Partial Compliance); U = Unknown; preceding M 










Preceding M = 
Mandatory; 







NOTE: Coop or 
Company does 



















5f Circumstances in which membership ceases M  (M point 4)           
5g Charge/ Subscription payable by member to co-op M            
5h Circumstances in which fines and forfeitures may 
be imposed on members of the cooperative 
M            
5h(i) Amount of fines M            
5h(ii) Max amount (prescribed where)  M  National 
regulations 
         
5i Grievance Procedure for settling disputes 
between members & co-operative or between 
members 
M  (M point 18)           
5j The restrictions (if any) on the powers of the co-
operative & board 
D            
5k Directors: D   26  
Companies Act 
        
5k(i) Number of directors D  (M point 10)           
5k(ii) Qualification of directors D  (M point 10)           
5k(iii) Way of electing D             
5k(iv) Renumeration D            
5k(v) Removal of directors and filling a vacancy D  (M point 10) 
partial 
          
5k(vi) Period for which directors are to hold 
office 
D  (M point 10)           
5k(vii) How directors retire (rotation/ otherwise) D            
5k(viii) Method of holding annual elections D  (M point 9)           
5k(ix) Government representation on boards R         27   





5m Device Custody and use of the seal of the co-
operative 
D  (M point 8) 
partial 
          
5n How funds of co-operative will be managed O  (M point 13)           
5n(i) Mode of drawing and signing cheques, 
Drafts, Bills of exchange, Promissory 
Notes, for the co-operative 
O            
5o Custody of Securities belonging to co-operative O            
5p How debentures may be transferred O            
5q Date of the financial year end of the co-operative D + M  (M point 10)           
5r Preparation of the financial reports of the co-
operative and: 
A            
5r(i) Provision of reports to members (how) A            
5r(ii) Audit requirements of reports A            
5s How a loss resulting from the co-operative is to be 
provided for 
A  (M point 13)    P       
5t Procedure for calling general and special 
meetings; notices; quorum 
D + M  (M point 9)     Same as GM      
5u Procedure at meeting of the co-operative 
including:  
M  (M point 9)           
5u(i) Rights of members in voting at meetings M            
5u(ii) Way of voting M            
5u(iii) 1 member 1 vote at general meeting M           U 
 
26 NZ: Covered as part of the Companies Act 1993 - http://legislation.govt.nz/act/public/1993/0105/188.0/DLM319570.html / however, directors of a coop and company are of a different composition 
27 INDIA: See S48, if government has subscribed to the share capital 




Co-operative Items (Constitution/ Rules/ 
Articles/ Bylaw etc.) in the law or other 
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Key:  = (Comply);  = (Does not 
comply); P = (Partial Compliance); U = 
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Mandatory; 

































  U 
5u(vi) Voting majority – ordinary resolution at 
general meeting 
M   simple (51%) 
majority 

















5u(vii) Voting majority – special resolution at 
general meeting 




      66% 
majority 
 
5u(viii) Voting majority – special resolution using 
postal ballot 
M   66% majority         66% 
majority 
 
5u(ix) Voting majority – special resolution using 
special postal ballot 
M   75% majority         66% 
majority 
 






   number 
unspecified 
 
5u(xi) Proxy allowed? M  (O point 10)    No   29 No    
5v Method of conducting postal ballots (including 
special postal ballots), including the: 
M            
5v(i) Sending and filing of information and 
votes by fax or electronic means 
M            
5v(ii) The way of voting M            
5v(iii) Majority necessary for carrying 
resolutions, and any special majority in 
addition for special resolutions 
M            
5w The way of amending the constituent documents M    (90%+ vote)         
5x How the co-operative may be wound-up M  (M point 17)           
5aa 2-Tier board (supervisory + board of directors)  D  (O point 4) No No Yes30 No Yes31 Yes32 Yes33 No34 Yes35 No 
5bb Term of directors G  (M point 10) No No Max 4 yrs. Max 3 yrs. Max 6 years Max 6 years No 5 years can 
be re-
elected 
Yes, 4 years No 








and Majority for 
management  
No Members only No 
5dd Creation of a Technical or Education or Social Assistance 
Fund from surpluses 












5ee Treatment of reserves G  Yes Partial Yes38 Yes Yes39 Yes40 Yes Yes Yes No 
 
28 GER: See S43(3) statutes may provide the grant of multi-vote rights but no more than 3 
29 GER: Also representation by person representing multiple members 
30 Brazil: Supervisory Board tasked with monitoring Co-operative management, 3 members + 3 alternates 
31 EU: 2-Tier systems allowed whereby the management board is appointed by the supervisory board from members. 
32 FR: See article 26-19, “The European cooperative society may be managed by a management board, acting under the control of a supervisory board.”; Executive board max 5 members (increased to max 7 if shares are listed; Supervisory board max 18 
33 GER: See S26 – S61 describes Supervisory and Management boards board duties and limitations. 
34 INDIA: S42 states that there must be employee representation in management decision process 
35 RSA: If provided for in the constitution – see S29 
36 EU: See Article 42 (2) 
37 Brazil: Technical + Education + Social Assistance fund from surplus + optional employee assistance fund. 
38 Brazil: 10% to reserves; 5% to Tech; Educational and social assistance funds 
39 EU: min 15% until Capital of EUR30,000 is reached then not stated after this amount. 
40 FR: See article 16 
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5ff Allow electronic documents G  Yes          
5gg Allow electronic attendance - members G            
5hh Allow electronic attendance - directors G        41    
5ii Allow electronic voting - members G            
6 Number of sections/ articles within the co-operative Law/ 
Act 
Stat  304 51 117 386 80 30 Articles 170 sections 126 99 155 
7 Count of use of the words (statute/ constitution/ Rule/ 
Articles/ Bylaw) 
Stat  378 45 68 179 108 71 149 125 140 235 
7a Count of no of mandatory provisions in constitutional 
document 
Stat 19 26 Not 
Mandatory 
10 22 12 10 7 NM 33 14 
8 Supporting regulation/ laws for co-operatives Stat  Yes42 Companies 
Law, superior 
law 







No No No 
9 Registrar checks and approves changes  R  Yes44 No U U U Yes45 Yes (large 
coops) 
Yes46 Yes47 U 
10 Comments - Missing a few 
things, assumes 
that the Law is 
good as per the 
document 
Well structured; 






seems to treat 



















Similar in many 
ways to the EU 
federal law for 
co-operatives 
Similar in many 
ways to the EU 
























41 GER: See S43(3.7) 
42 AUS: https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/regulations/2014-44.pdf (NSW used as example) 
43 FR: Refer to Law No 2014-856 of 31 July 2014 on the social and solidarity economy and the French Commercial Code (in French) 
44 AUS: https://www.legislation.nsw.gov.au/#/view/act/2012/29 : See Section 60(4), note that 60(8) gives a time limit for registrar to approve the rules as follows: “The Registrar is taken to have approved the proposed amendment (as submitted to the Registrar) 
at the end of the period of 28 days after it was submitted, unless before the end of that period the Registrar gives written not ice to the person who submitted it that the Registrar” 
45 FR: Called the High Council of co-operation 
46 INDIA: See S11(4) 
47 RSA: See S82 of Chapter 11 
 
 
Chapter-3 Appendix 3.2: Constitutional provision classification table  
 
Principle Code Theme Code Item Code Value Common? 
Member 
ownership 





    Milk Shares (Polls/ Postal) Not used 
other than Poll? 
MOO2 Y/N (1 
OR 0) 
 
        
Member 
Benefit 







MBU Debt leverage oversight (by information 




    Dividends paid to cooperative members 
only 
MBU2 Y/N (1 
OR 0) 
 
  Dispute MBD Dispute/ Grievance provision MBD1 Y/N (1 
OR 0) 
 
        
Memberhip 
Rules 
MR Rules MRR Common to all cooperatives and, coops 






        
Member 
Information  
MI Information MII Statutory information - Companies Act 





    Additional Information no =0; interests 




  Engagement MIE Committees/ other (member attend) MIE1 Y/N (1 
OR 0) 
 





MCV Vote on Appointed Directors No=0; 
Ratified at next GM = 1; Yes = 2 
MCV1 Y/N (1 
OR 0) 
 
    Vote on Member Directors MCV2 Common 
to all 
C  
    Show of Hands MCV3 Y/N (1 
OR 0) 
 
    Polls/ Postal votes (number): EQ 1 = 4; 5 
or less = 3; Between 6 and 10 = 2; Gt 10 




    Vote Separate not attached to 
shareholding 
MCV5 Y/N (1 
OR 0) 
 
  Member 
Meetings  
MCM Meeting Notice GTE 2 weeks/ 10 
working days 
MCM1 Y/N (1 
OR 0) 
 
    Facilities for distant members  
(Electronic Attendance – AV) 
MCM2 Y/N (1 
OR 0) 
 
    Ordinary Resolution majority 51% MCM3 Common 
to all 
C 
    Special resolution Majority, Same as 
Ord=0; GT Ordinary LTE 66% = 1; GT 




    Quorum LT 1% = 0; GTE 1% but LT 5% = 
1; GTE 6% and LTE 10% = 2; GTE 10% 




    Calling special meeting number/ votes 
(average is 5%) GT 0 and LTE 5 =3; GT 5 
and LTE 10 = 2; GT 10 and LTE 15 = 1; GT 




    Annual General Meeting conflict (peak 
three months)  
MCM7 Y/N (1 
OR 0)  
 
    Change to the constitutional document 
by special resolution 
MCM8 Y/N (1 
OR 0)  
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    Registrar oversight on changes to the 
constitutional document 
MCM9 Y/N (1 
OR 0)  
 
  Board of 
Directors 
MCB Majority of member directors? LT 50% = 
0; GT 50% = 1 and LT 66%; GTE 66% LT 




    Limited powers by the constitution? MCB2 Y/N (1 
OR 0) 
 
    Notice of meeting (LTE 2 days = 0; GT 2 
days = 1) 
MCB3 Scale 0,1  
    Number of meetings per year ( MCB4 Scale 0,1  
    Can any director call a meeting? Any 1= 
1; any 2 =0 
MCB5 Scale 0,1  
    Term: 3 years = 1; GT 3 years = 0 MCB6 Scale 0,1  
    Max term specified (or re-elected)?  MCB7 Y/N (1 
OR 0) 
 
    Quorum make-up of directors (Majority 
member?) Not specified = 0; GTE 50% = 




    Definition of a member director? (Active 
supplier = 2; indirect = 1; interest in an 
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Chapter-3 Appendix 3.3: Results of content analysis  
 
Code Item NZD NZF NZT NZW AUA AUD AUN Common? 
 Member Ownership         
MOO1 Cooperative shares 1 member 1 vote (1m1v) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Totals 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
 Member Benefit         
MBB1 Surplus to members based on patronage 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MBU1 Debt and security oversight  0 0 0 0 1 1 1  
MBU2 Dividends paid to cooperative members only 1 0 1      
MBD1 Dispute/ Grievance provision 0 1 0 0 0 1 1  
 Totals 1 2 1 1 2 3 3  
 Membership Rules         
MRR1 Common to all cooperatives and, coops in this 
study have no rules that impact governance.  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
 Totals 1 1 1 1 1 1 1  
 Member Information         
MII1 Statutory information - Companies Act 1993 
(Annual Report/ Member meet Minutes) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MII2 Additional Information no =0; interests = 1; 
Registers, Interests and more = 2 
0 0 0 0 0 2 2  
MIE1 Committees/ other (member attend) 0 1 0 0 1 1 0  
 Totals 1 2 1 1 2 4 3  
 Member Control          
 Member Vote         
MCV1 Vote on Appointed Directors No=0; Ratified at 
next GM = 1; Yes = 2 
2 2 0 0 1 2 2  
MCV2 Vote on Member Directors 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MCV3 Show of Hands 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MCV4 Polls/ Postal votes (number): EQ 1 = 4; 5 or less = 
3; Between 6 and 10 = 2; Gt 10 LT 20 = 1; Milk 
Share number = 0. 
3 0 0 1 4 4 4  
MCV5 Vote Separate not attached to Shareholding 1 0 1 1 1 1 1  
 Totals 8 4 3 4 8 9 9  
 Member Meetings         
MCM1 Meeting Notice GTE 2 weeks/ 10 working days 0 0 0 0 1 0 1  
MCM2 Facilities for distant members (Electronic 
Attendance – AV) 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0  
MCM3 Ordinary Resolution majority 51% 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
MCM4 Special resolution Majority, Same as Ord=0; GT 
Ordinary LTE 66% = 1; GT 66% = 2 
2 2 2 2 0 1 1  
MCM5 Quorum LT 1% = 0; GTE 1% but LT 5% = 1; GTE 6% 
and LTE 10% = 2; GTE 10% and LT 15% = 3; GT 
15% =4 
3 0 3 1 4 2 3  
MCM6 Calling special meeting number/ votes (average is 
5%) GT 0 and LTE 5 =4; GT 5 and LTE 10 = 3; GT 10 
and LTE 15 = 2; GT 15 = 1 
1 4 4 4 4 3 1  
MCM7 Annual General Meeting conflict (peak 3 months)  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
MCM8 Change to constitutional document by special 
resolution 
1 0 1 1 1 1 1  
MCM9 Registrar oversight on changes to constitutional 
document 
0 0 0 0 1 1 1  
 Totals 8 8 11 10 12 10 9  
 Directors and Board         
MCB1 Majority of member directors? LT 50% = 0; GT 
50% = 1 and LT 66%; GTE 66% LT 75% = 2 
0 1 0 2 3 2 3  
MCB2 Limited powers by the constitution? 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
MCB3 Notice of meeting (LTE 2 days = 0; GT 2 days = 1) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0  
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MCB4 Any director can call a meeting? Any 1= 1; any 2 
=0 
0 1 1 1 1 1 0  
MCB5 Term: 3 years = 1; GT 3 years = 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1  
MCB6 Max term specified (or re-elected)?  0 0 0 0 1 0 0  
MCB7 Quorum make-up of directors (Majority 
member?) Not specified = 0; GTE 50% = 1 and LT 
66%; GTE 66% LT 75% = 2 
2 0 0 0 1 0 1  
MCB8 Definition of a member director? (Active supplier 
= 2; indirect = 1; interest in an entity who has an 
interest = 0?) 
2 1 1 2 1 2 2  
MCB9 Allow Electronic (AV) meetings? 0 1 1 1 1 1 1  
 Totals 5 5 5 6 9 6 8  
 TOTALS 27 29 28 31 39 40 39  
Key New Zealand:  NZD = Dairy Goat; NZF = Fonterra; NZT = Tatua; NZW = Westland 
Key Australia: AUA = ADFC; AUD = DFMC; AUN = NORCO 
Scale: Simple scale N=-0; Y=1; others as indicated 
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Theory of the Firm 











































































































The Reference Point Theory was added by in Walker (2014) which 
uses the research by Maskin & Tirole; Maskin; Hart & Moore; Hart 
did in extending the Foss Lando and Thomsen categorisation. 
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Chapter-5 Appendix 5.1: Letter to Cooperative Chairman (Generic) 
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Chapter-5 Appendix 5.2: Generic Initial Participant Contact Email 
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Chapter-5 Appendix 5.3: Participant Information Sheet (PIS) 
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Chapter-5 Appendix 5.4: Participant Consent Form 
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Chapter-5 Appendix 5.5: List of Semi-Structured Questions used 
Full Project Title: Member Voice and Influence: A study of New Zealand and Australian Dairy Cooperative 
Member Governance 
Background questions 
1. Can you tell me what your herd-size is currently, and/or how much Milk you supplied to your co-operative 
and/or how many kilograms of Milk Solids you produced? 
2. How long have you been part of your co-operative? Were you part of a different organisation also in the 
dairy industry before you joined your co-operative? What organisation and why did you leave and why did 
you join your co-operative? 
3. How loyal are you to your co-operative on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 being not loyal and likely to move in the next 
few months, 10 being extremely loyal and not likely to move at all at this stage. And why did you answer 
the way you did? 
4. Are you involved with any other co-operative or organisation? If so, can you elaborate on your relationship 
with the other entity/entities? 
5. What is your current overall satisfaction with your co-operative on a scale of 1 to 10? (1 being not at all 
satisfied, 10 being extremely satisfied). 
6. What technology is used on-farm for communication between you and your co-operative? (PC/ Laptop, 
Tablet, smartphone, etc.). What applications are used by you that relate to your coop? 
 
Engagement questions 
Lead-in: Engagement can be described as how “connected” you are to your co-operative. This section looks at 
your perception of how connected you are to your co-operative and the underlying reasons. 
7. Did you attend the last general meeting? Was this in person, via a proxy or via audio/ teleconference 
facilities? 
8. Over the past 12 months, please describe what contact or engagement you have had with the co-operative 
organisation (includes a council, a committee, Directors, others) either on-farm or elsewhere. 
9. I would like to know about the effectiveness of the current meetings and mechanisms or engagement 
between any part of the cooperative and yourself.  
10. Have you had any contact with any other members of the co-operative over the past year besides the AGM? 
Was this formal or an informal meeting? Where any topics discussed that related to the co-operative? 
11. When last did you have a query for the co-operative on any matter and how did you go about resolving the 
query? Were you satisfied with the way the co-operative answered your query? 
12. Is there anything that would help you be more involved with your co-operative? If so, what would this be? 
If not, please elaborate. 
13. Exploring the cooperative relationship, what are your views on working closer with your cooperative on 
governance and what mechanisms can be used to facilitate these discussions? 
 
Governance questions 
Lead-in: Co-operatives operate under the law of the country; the laws are usually based on an understanding of 
the principles of co-operation. Furthermore, the law usually mandates what the contents of the constitutional 
document contain. Governance of the co-operative can be seen as a combination of policy, the governance 
artefacts, the forums and obviously the board of directors. 
14. How familiar are you with the co-operative law and/or the co-operative constitutional document? Do you 
think it is important to have an understanding of your co-operative constitutional provisions, why or why 
not? If you are not familiar with your constitutional document, what would help you gain this 
understanding? 
15. In general terms, please describe any information, data or knowledge that you have received from your 
cooperative in the past 12 months, which relate to any decisions made or to be made? In your experience, 
what forums and mechanisms are available for farmers to ask questions? 
16. How often are people and organisations other than farmers involved in the forums? Can you tell me about 
the role they play? Could you suggest any ways the cooperative could improve information or data sharing 
that relates to member governance and mechanisms might be improved? 
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17. What major decisions in your mind has the co-operative made in the past 3 years that you are aware of. For 
example, these might include an acquisition, divestiture, creation of a subsidiary, a restructure in a joint 
venture, others. Looking at the past 3 years’ major cooperative initiatives and decisions, could you explain 
your general involvement in each of these? If you were theoretically in disagreement about a particular 
direction that the cooperative is taking, what options and mechanisms are available to you to find out the 
necessary information you require in order to make an informed decision? 
18. Could you explain what involvement you think is appropriate in the general running of the cooperative when 
decisions are made that affect the farm gate price, the leverage of assets in the cooperative, and the 
establishment of an offshore marketing presence (or manufacturing site)? 
19. Regarding technology for use in governance, do you know what your co-operative allows in terms of 
electronic attendance, voting on resolutions, information requests, other uses? Can you describe your view 
regarding the use of technology to improve or support, engagement and/or governance? 
20. How familiar are you with the Dairy Industry Restructure Act 2001 (DIRA 2001) that the government is 
reviewing? 
o farmers must be able to enter and exit Fonterra without restriction or penalties (with minimal 
exceptions) 
o independent processors must be able to obtain limited amounts of raw milk from Fonterra 
o shareholding farmers can supply up to 20% of their weekly production to independent processors 
o the Commerce Commission must report annually on the way Fonterra sets the base milk price. 
 
4-Hats questions (data collected but not part of this thesis) 
Lead-in: Previous research has shown that each co-operative member wears four hats, including investor 
(shareholder), Patron (supplier), Owner, and member of a community of purpose. {Interviewer will explain each 
of the “hats” to the member} 
21. Out of these “hats” which one would you most closely identify with and why? 
22. Which “hat” would you least identify with and why? 
23. What could improve your alignment with each of the hats: 
o Investor (Shareholder/ Financial) 
o Patron (Supplier) 
o Owner (Control) 
o Community Member (Your coop community and your community) 
 
 
Policy Support question  
24. Examining your understanding of policy what policy/ regulation, in your opinion, needs to be improved to 
support overall cooperative member voice  
 
 
